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xPreface
The Government of Zambia is embarking on an ambitious program of legal and administrative
reforms in land policy. Although the need to liberalize the land market is universally shared, the ideas
on how to accomplish this transformation are not. Two decades of underinvestment in field research have
resulted in the present situation of micro-level data on land tenure and farm-level production,
consumption, and resource management inadequate to guide policy decisions. This report was prepared
to help assess the state of knowledge and identify important land policy issues as a foundation for
recommending future research directions and to facilitate informed policymaking. Some will feel that the
current state of research is adequate and that the report does not go far enough with policy advice. Others
will disagree with the level and nature of policy recommendations that are given. Should this report have
erred in either direction, it is due to the very difficult task of finding the appropriate balance, rather than
to any willful decision by the research team.
The research was carried out between September 1993 and March 1994 with funding from the
US Agency for International Development (USAID) in Lusaka. Further comments and suggestions were
incorporated between March and September 1994. An action plan for land tenure and administrative
reforms based on these research findings was developed in close collaboration with the Ministry of Lands
(MOL) and is contained in a follow-up document entitled "Land Reform and Institutional Transformation
in Zambia: Recommendations for Policy Change" (July 1994). That action plan has now been
incorporated into a master planning document for the MOL, and its recommendations are under review
by USAID/Zambia for possible financial support.
As will be seen, many Zambian authors have made important technical contributions through their
respective chapters and more generally to the report. The Land Tenure Center (LTC) is grateful for their
support and that of the staff of the MOL who so generously gave their time in responding to the many
questions and calls for data. Important comments on the report were also received from the land
committee (S.P. Mulenga, T. Bull, L. Handahu, S.M.J. Zaloumis, and T.H. Phiri), David Straley of
USAID, the Overseas Development Agency, G.H. Sichalwe of the Department of Resettlement, and
various senior officers in the Central Statistics Office. The authors would also like to gratefully
acknowledge those people who willingly gave interviews or assisted with the analysis. Special thanks are
due David Musona, who managed in-country travel, banking, and other logistics, and Jane Dennis and
Steven Smith, who spent considerable time on editing and assembly. There are no doubt many
knowledgeable individuals in Zambia who should have been contacted for contributions but were not. If






Legal Framework and Administration of Land Policy in Zambia
by
Michael Roth, A.M. Khan, and M.C. Zulu'
I. Introduction
A. Issues
The current system of land legislation, based on antiquated English law, is badly in need of
modernization. Private landownership is effectively repressed if not prohibited by Zambia's current
legal framework, and land cannot legally have value.' Lack of private ownership and a land market
ostensibly constrains the development of formal credit and real estate markets, while delays and costs
in processing leasehold issuances and property transfers purportedly constrain land markets and inhibit
economic growth. The system responsible for officially delivering titles and managing state lands is
severely constrained by limited surveying capacity and the weight of thousands of applications, many
of which have been pending for years. Market reforms are increasing the profitability of agriculture
and the demand for agricultural holdings at the same time that improvements in wealth and population
pressures are increasing the demand for residential property. The historical, political, and economic
factors that have led to a highly urbanized Zambian population and emphasis on mining are beginning
to wane in favor of peri-urban and rural settlement. Zambia has a highly urbanized population; yet,
it has, arguably, an abundant supply of arable land that, for complex historical reasons, remains
uncultivated. However, institutional constraints to agricultural expansion are manifest. Urban dwellers,
whose links to ancestral lands have eroded with time, reportedly experience difficulties acquiring
sufficient land through customary authorities and/or do not want to depend on their control. Many turn
to the Ministry of Lands (MOL) for an allocation and for land sizes in excess of those provided by
traditional authorities; yet, considerable delays are caused by current registration bottlenecks and
problems with land identification.
Associated with the above agrarian expansion and land tenure constraints are issues that have
implications for economic growth and equity. Are land rights adequate to encourage investment in
buildings and other fixed land improvements? Are land markets overly constraining land access,
particularly for lower-income families in the residential real estate market and smallholders in the
agricultural land market? Is the growth in demand for land speculative or productive? Are the
landholders residing on the land or are they absentee? Are legal provisions or transfer fees overly
constraining the transfer of land among existing landholders or to potential market entrants? What
mechanisms are appropriate for facilitating the emergence of land markets after nearly two decades
of socialism? What policies are needed to create a land market that is conducive to economic growth?
' Michael Roth is associate research scientist with the Land Tenure Center and Department of Agricultural Economics,
University of Wisconsin-Madison. A.M. Khan is chief registrar of Lands-Deeds, and M.C. Zulu is commissioner of lands,
Ministry of Lands, Lusaka.
2 See the section "Tenure on State Lands" (p. 14, below) for counterarguments asserting that land could legally have value
under the Land (Conversion of Titles) Act, 1975, but that the law was incorrectly applied or interpreted in practice.2
Why are there delays in the registration system, and how ought they be corrected? Is expanded
registration a panacea, or have abuses at central and local levels resulted in land grabbing, land
concentration, and inefficient land utilization by elites in pattern with the experiences of other African
countries at similar stages of development? Is the veritable land rush underway creating resource
degradation problems on arable farm land? What natural resource concerns are emerging in newly
opening frontier areas?
The Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) government is calling for the
institutionalization of a modern, coherent, simplified, and relevant land code and land administration
system that: ensures the fundamental right to private ownership of land; creates a more efficient land
delivery system; restores the confidence of investors; merges the now disparate pieces of legislation
for reserve and trust lands; facilitates the varied development needs of the country; attaches economic
value to undeveloped land; encourages private real estate agency business; promotes the regular
issuance of title deeds to productive landowners in both rural and urban areas; and, clears the current
backlog of cadastral surveys and mapping.' This paper was contracted by the US Agency for
International Development and the MOL to identify current land market constraints as a basis for
designing an action plan to assist the government with land policy reforms.
B. Outline of report
This chapter provides a general overview of the history of land policy in Zambia and critiques
selected pieces of land legislation that define the legal framework governing land rights and land
markets in the country. Legal and institutional impediments to the development of a market-oriented
land policy are identified along with concrete recommendations for short- and long-term legal and
institutional reforms. An institutional profile of ministries and agencies responsible for designing,
promulgating, and implementing the various dimensions of land policy is briefly reviewed. Principal
land policy issues confronting policymakers in Zambia are identified, setting the stage for more
detailed analyses of land administration processes, leasehold demand, land markets, and land valuation
in subsequent chapters.
Chapter 2 presents a thorough review of land registration procedures starting with the roles
and activities of the chiefs and rural councils` and ending with the issuance of the title certificate by
the Commissioner of Lands. Emphasis is given to evaluating the issuance of leaseholds in previously
undemarcated State, Reserve, and Trust Lands. The chapter further examines the causes of delays in
the leasehold process, explores ways for streamlining registration processes, proposes legislative and
administrative changes, and identifies future research needs.
Chapter 3 focuses on the assimilation and analysis of data on official title issuances and
transfers in State, Reserve and Trust Lands. Data are assembled on the number and size of property
transfers and land prices as a basis for gauging land value and economic ground rents. Changes in
agrarian structure based on available regional and national data from annual surveys are also evaluated
to assess the net growth in the number of farming units by land tenure category, trends in farm size,
and growth of demand for leasehold property.
3 Since the MMD government came to power, value to land has been recognized and amendment to the law is being effected.
° Herein, the term council or rural council is used in place of district council. The latter, while frequently cited in
regulations, is discontinued as two or more councils sometimes exist in the same district.3
Chapter 4 deals with issues related to the emergence of a land market in urban and agricultural
properties in Zambia. Technical and financial problems confronting private investors and the real
estate industry are reviewed for private transfers. The chapter also reviews alternative methods for
administering government land policy in undeveloped areas, including options for land development,
land distribution via allocation or auction, land price determination, valuation of leasehold rents, and
property taxation. It further reviews the existing and potential institutional arrangements for setting,
collecting, and disbursing proceeds from land sales and rental fees. Finally, it evaluates the financial,
legal, and management issues associated with the establishment and operation of a land development
fund (LDF) proposed by the MOL to assist with financing land development.
Chapter 5 is a synthesis of a land tenure study recently completed by the International Centre
for Research in Agroforestry (ICRAF) in collaboration with the Land Tenure Center (LTC) and the
University of Zambia. That study, involving a survey of 200 agricultural producing households in
Eastern and Southern provinces, is one of the few studies in recent years that details customary land
tenure arrangements. Although the study focused on linkages between tenure and on-farm tree
planting, the formal questionnaire included general indicators of agricultural productivity and
development as well. The chapter briefly discusses the research methodology used, followed by
empirical findings on land acquisition, land rights, and land conflicts. Empirical results are also
presented of an econometric analysis of linkages between land tenure institutions and selected
productivity indicators including oxen mechanization, use of chemical fertilizers and credit, and
presence of various long-term improvements on land, including trees.
Chapter 6 reviews the nature and scale of past settlement schemes and assesses their
performance based on archival research, and analysis of primary and secondary data. The market for
private transfers and administrative allocations on newly opened lands will provide the principal
mechanisms through which people can acquire lands in agricultural areas. However, due to past
historical factors and economic hardship, some segment of the population seeking land for farming
will be unable to effectively use these mechanisms because of lack of purchasing power or the means
to resettle. The Government of Zambia (GOZ) has a long history of settlement programs that could
accommodate these disadvantaged populations. The desirability of continuing or expanding this
mechanism depends on the scale and performance of past schemes.
Chapter 7 uses available time series data to analyze national and regional changes in land use,
productivity, and profitability of agriculture, both spatially and temporally, for the commercial and
noncommercial farm sectors. This chapter was intended as a more forward-looking analysis of
economic forces influencing the profitability of farming in Zambia, the rate of expansion in the
agricultural frontier, and the resource issues that are likely to emerge in the context of agricultural
extensification. The chapter instead highlights the difficulties of using aggregate time series data for
such analyses due to structural biases and inconsistencies in the data. Relatively straightforward
questions—such as "How fast in area terms is the agrarian sector expanding?"—are rendered nearly
unanswerable by erratic swings in the data stemming partially from unreliable statistical methods and
reporting.
Interpretation of data in the above chapters depends crucially on data quality and length and
breadth of data time series. Chapter 8 provides an overview of official time series published by
various agencies in Zambia, including the state of their availability for analysis and the methodology
used to collect the data. Data presented in this and previous chapters underscore the difficulty of
making policy decisions given the very weak and tenuous base of empirical research on property4
rights, agrarian structure, resource management, land use, and market access in both the state and
customary sectors.
The Overseas Development Agency (UK) has made considerable investments in Zambia's land
delivery system and government valuation department. Likewise, the Swedish International
Development Agency (SIDA) has made considerable investments in Zambia's land surveying system
and the analysis of economic ground rents. In recognition of their quality efforts and studies, this
report deals only superficially with land surveying and mapping. Readers are encouraged to contact
those agencies for their respective reports. Any future work by USAID in land tenure reform and
policy in Zambia should be tightly coordinated with their endeavors.
II. Colonial policy and settlement
Zambia's present system of State, Reserve, and Trust Lands is a legacy of the early colonial
period. Emissaries of Cecil Rhodes and the British South Africa Company arrived in Barotseland in
1884 to make a treaty with the then-paramount chief Lewanika. Treaties concluded with most of the
chiefs in Zambia during the 1890s guaranteed "African" rights to large areas of tribal land in exchange
for mineral concessions. The 1911 Northern Rhodesia Order in Council instructed the company to
assign to the African population (of Northern Rhodesia) sufficient land for their use and occupation.
Missionaries, miners, and traders began to settle, reaching a population of roughly 1,500 Europeans
by 1911. The company divested its control of the territory in 1924, and a governor was appointed by
the British sovereign. Under its agreement with the crown, the company retained its mineral rights
in exchange for territory. The 1928 Northern Rhodesia Order in Council formally established areas
of crown land to be reserved for white settlement under English Land Law and reserve areas for
African occupation under customary tenure arrangements. (Section 5, "Land Tenure" [p. 14ff, below]
covers in greater depth changes in statutory law from colonial times to the present.)
White settlement initially took place in a rather haphazard manner, first by the company and
later under crown governance. A series of Native Reserves Commissions between 1926 and 1928
established a more regularized system of settlement by whites, and the systematic evacuation of crown
land by African residents, who were forcibly crowded into reserves. Much land was left unclassified
(table 1.1), and came to be known as the "silent lands," set aside for the anticipated influx of white
settlers that never materialized (Bruce and Dorner 1982).
A postwar influx of ex-soldiers in 1919 brought the number of white farms along the rail line
to about 250. This figure remained static into the 1940s, resulting in substantial areas of crown land
left idle. Overcrowding in the reserves continued to worsen, leading in 1938 to the Pimm Commission
openly stating that the reserves policy had been a disaster. The 1947 Northern Rhodesia (Native Trust
Land) Order in Council provided for a fundamental reversal in policy. Whereas previously crown land
was reserved for white settlers, under the 1947 order it was defined as that amount required for a
more realistic and limited number of white settlers, with the remainder reserved for native "African"
occupation. Around 100 million acres of formerly unassigned land, forest and game land, and
unutilized crown land were transferred to native "Africans" in the name of a new land category, Trust
Lands. By 1950, the crown land reserved for Europeans had shrunk to 4.6 million acres, while the
land reserved for "Africans" (Reserve and Trust Lands) had increased to around 171 million acres.5
Table 1.1: Land tenure classification, Zambia, 1937 and 1950 (million acres)





Crown (European) land 9.0 4.6




Unalienated crown land 4.7
Total i79.0 181.3
a. Robin Palmer, "Land in Zambia," in "Zambian Land and Labour Studies," vol. i, Occasional Paper no. 2
(Lusaka, National Archives, n. d. ), p. 64.
b. Robin Palmer, op. cit. supra, 64. The discrepancy between the i937 and i950 is carried over from official
sources.
A number of important developments followed in the post-World War II period. First, a wave
of settlers did eventually acquire farms; over a thousand white farms were established by the 1960s,
with a substantial reduction in the area of unalienated crown land. Second, prior to the 1930s,
allocations of crown land involved mainly freehold property. Beginning in the 1930s, more and more
settlers were granted long-term leaseholds rather than freeholds, giving way entirely to leaseholds by
1944. With independence in 1964, crown land became State Land, while Reserves and Trust Land
retained their pre-independence classifications (table 1.2). As late as 1987, the former European sector
comprised only 6 percent of the nation's total land area.
III. Agrarian structure
State Land, or the former commercial sector, has been the geographical focus of commercial
farming in Zambia. The country historically has relied heavily on the commercial farm sector for the
food surplus to feed its highly urbanized population and work force. Large numbers of expatriate
farmers emigrated in the 1960s for several reasons: Zambian independence, marketing policies that
seriously eroded profits, major land incentives offered by Zimbabwe and South Africa, and stringent
regulations governing expatriation of profits. Sales of freehold farms and assignments of leaseholds
increased in the years immediately preceding independence and continued into the 1970s.
Approximately 1,185 European farms with a total area of 3.79 million acres existed in 1961.
Approximately 460 European farmers left the country within two years after independence (Arntzen
et al. 1982). By 1970-71, the commercial farming sector had declined to 1,076 farming units, of
which 643 were classified as "African" and 433 as "non-African" (agricultural census). By 1981, the
number of "non-African" commercial farming units by most counts had fallen to around 300 (Bruce
and Dorner 1982).6
Table 1.2: Land tenure classification, Zambia, 1973 and 1987 (million hectares)
1973° 1987"
State (formerly crown) Land: 4,080,647 4,518,953
Freehold 1,015,791
Leasehold 1,284,788
Land under tribal occupation 509,396
Unalienated land 125,102
Inundated by water 216,250
Forest reserves 546,570
Protected forest reserves 382,750
Reserves° 27,314,000 27,297,500
Trust Land` 38,977,530 43,447,900
National parks and wildlife areas 5,826,300
Total 76,198,477 75,264,353
a. International Rural Development Division, Swedish University of Agriculture, Forestry and Veterinary
Medicare (Uppsala, April 1976), Zambia Sector Study, Preliminary Report, par. 3.1.1 (mimeo).
b. Includes 689,691 hectares of Protected Forest Areas.
c. Includes 4,250,889 hectares of Protected Forest Areas and 29,153 hectares of Forest Reserves.
d. Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources, "Ministerial Statement in Parliament on 4th August, 1987 on Land
Alienation in Reserves and Trust Lands" (1987).
The mass emigration of Europeans, as in Mozambique, depleted the agricultural sector of
much of its skilled labor and capital. The Zambian government, in order to maintain the productivity
of the sector and to feed its heavily urbanized population and work force, undertook a variety of
agricultural programs. In some cases, parastatals took over land under leases for direct farming
operations. In other cases, settlement schemes were established which subdivided large commercial
operations (in some cases failed parastatal operations) into smaller units of widely varying size.
Bruce and Dorner (1982) provide data on the number, area, and size of leaseholds existing
at the end of the 1970s (precise years are unavailable due to inconsistent updating of data from four
separate cadastre strips from the mid-1970s through 1981) (table 1.3). Private leaseholds constituted
the largest share, representing 60.4 percent of the total. Government leases held by ministries and
parastatals represented the next largest category (26.5 percent). The remainder of the leasehold land
was held by settlement schemes (3.1 percent), cooperatives (0.3 percent), and religious/educational
institutions (2.2 percent), or were vacant (2.2 percent) or in nonagricultural uses (5.3 percent).
Following independence, the agricultural sector witnessed a rapid expansion in the number of
smaller "medium-scale" and "emergent" commercial farms (table 1.4).
5 As of 1989, the farming
sector comprised 740 large-scale farms (> 60 hectares), 25,230 medium-scale farms (20-60 hectares),
119,200 emergent commercial farms (10-19 hectares), and 387,000 smallholder and mainly
"subsistence" farms (1-9 hectares). The number of "emergent" farmers increased from 25,000 in 1965
5 Data reported on number of farms in chapter 3 (table 3.4) indicates farm numbers greatly in excess of these figures. No
information is available on the methodology for calculating these data.7
to about 120,000 in 1990 (World Bank 1993a, p. 40). However, while the group of "emergent"
commercial farmers, who rely on oxen plows, improved seeds, and fertilizers to produce a large
marketed surplus, is substantial (21 percent of total farming units) and growing, smallholder
agricultural production, which is dependent on simple hand tools and subsistence farming, still
accounts for 73 percent of all farming units. Most large-scale farms (97 percent), and to a lesser extent
medium-scale farms (75 percent) and "emergent" farms (66 percent), tend to be concentrated along
the rail line and major road arteries in the Southern, Central, Lusaka, and Copperbelt provinces. Only
14 percent of smallholder households are located in these provinces; the majority reside in Northern
(29 percent), Western (22 percent), Luapula (19 percent), and North-Western (14 percent) provinces
that are less well connected to urban and market centers and where the marketing and physical
infrastructure remain less developed.
Converting "smallholder" households into "emergent" commercial farmers is of strategic
importance. While in the past, commercial farms produced sufficient marketed surplus for the urban
population, shortfalls in maize and food riots in the 1980s have underscored the need for more
broad-based agricultural development. However, such conversion of smallholders into an "emergent"
class of commercial farmers will require substantial public investments in rural infrastructure to enable
their integration into the marketplace.
IV. Arable land and crop expansion
Of Zambia's roughly 75 million hectares (table 1.2), approximately 16 million hectares are
considered suitable for rough livestock grazing, and 9 million hectares are considered to be arable land
with good potential for crop cultivation (Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries 1993). Only 1.3
million hectares are currently under crop cultivation, or roughly 14 percent of the nation's arable land.
Almost all of Zambia's highest-quality arable land (about 1.4 million hectares) is currently
concentrated in already densely-populated areas and generally in the state sector (World Bank 1993a).









A B C B/A
Private 1,674 1,232,987 60.4 737
Governmental 502 541,902 26.5 1,079
Settlement schemes 61 62,241 3.1 1,020
Cooperatives 10 6,580 .3 658
Religious/educational 69 45,677 2.2 662
Vacant 74 44,387 2.2 600
Nonagricultural 228 107,500 5.3 471
Total 2,618 2,041,274 100.0 780
Source: Bruce and Dorner, Agricultural Land Tenure in Zambia: Perspectives, Problems and Opportunities,
LTC Research Paper no. 76 (Madison: Land Tenure Center, University of Wisconsin, 1982), p. 11.8















Southern 330 9,000 51,000 6,000
Central 300 7,500 21,000 18,000
Lusaka 90 2,000 4,500 14,000
Copperbelt 500 2,000 18,000
Eastern 20 6,000 23,000 8,000
Western 10 5,400 85,000
North-Western 70 2,900 53,000
Luapula 60 2,000 73,000
Northern - 90 7,400 112,000
Zambia 740 25,230 119,200 459,000
a. Estimates provided by the Ministry of Agriculture and reported in World Bank, "Draft Economic Report for
Zambia CG Meeting" (1993), p. 40.
b. The discrepancy between the column sum (387,000) and the total indicates a discrepancy of 72,000
households.
However, a recent study commissioned by the Ministry of Agriculture, Foods and Fisheries
(MAFF) and the World Bank (DHV Consultants BY, Netherlands, and Wood Consultants and
Investments Ltd., Zambia, 1993), hereafter referred to as the MAFF/WB report, indicates that as
much as 43 percent of the potentially arable land in the commercial farming sector is being
underutilized for crop production (table 1.5).
6 According to the study, many farms owned by the
Government Republic of Zambia (GRZ) and many of the Zambia National Service Farms are poorly
managed and undercapitalized; the prison farms are only marginally better. Parastatals, including
farms held by Zambia Agricultural Development Ltd., Cold Storage Board, and Indeco, were also
found to be experiencing high rates of underutilization. Other areas found to be class I underutilized
farms are settlement schemes (Munyama, Mpimo in Kabwe, Chinjarain, Chipata) and most previously-
owned TBZ (Tobacco Board of Zambia) farms (Mukonchi, Chibwe, etc.). However, high degrees of
underutilization were also found in the private sector. Among private farms currently underutilized
were those owned by civil servants, parastatal employees, and armed forces personnel who manage
their farms as absentee landlords or leave their operation to relatives who lack basic farm-management
skills. According to the study, the combination of inexperience and undercapitalization coupled with
varying degrees of indebtedness have resulted in vast tracts of prime land lying idle.
6 The land has been cleared but not cropped and is being used for rough grazing, including grassland on prime arable land.
Determining whether livestock production is an "inefficient" land use relative to crop use would be difficult to assess without
a domestic resource cost analysis, but the data suggest that substantial expansion of crop agriculture on lands in the commercial
sector is possible without further expansion onto virgin soils.9
Table 1.5: Rate of land utilization, commercial farm sector



















Lusaka 227,691 46.6 10.2 33.6 9.5
Central:
Kabwe 140,486 21.3 11.3 60.6 6.9
Chisamba 121,800 45.1 4.3 47.3 3.3
Mukushi 151,050 63.4 7.2 29.4
Big Concession 91,569 - 100.0
Southern:
Livingstone 43,777 31.9 21.7 46.4 -
Kalomo 216,890 62.8 22.0 15.1 -
Choma 175,276 64.4 3.1 16.8 15.2 .5
Monze 76,378 48.3 15.3 35.8 .7
Mazabuka 164,515 59.4 .7 7.5 30.8 1.7
Northern:
Mbala 53,446 31.3 24.1 26.9 - 17.6
Eastern:
Chipata 49,240 28.7 19.8 18.1 33.4 -
Katete 92,744 56.4 2.5 26.6 14.5 -
Copperbelt 183,159 15.8 3.6 70.2 10.4 -
Source: DHV Consultants By, Netherlands, and Wood Consultants and Investments Ltd., Zambia, 1993.
With the exception of several parastatal farms and settlement schemes, the commercial farming
blocks in Southern province were the best utilized (table 1.5). Eastern-province blocks were found to
be generally well utilized due to their relatively high population densities. The commercial blocks
around Lusaka contained a mixture of some of the "best" and "worst" utilized farms in the country.
The entire Big Concession Block in Mumbwa was found to be grossly underutilized due largely to lack
of basic infrastructure. The Kabwe farm block was also found to be grossly underutilized due to "the
saga of the TBZ assisted tenant scheme." Many commercial farms in Copperbelt have recently been
opened, hence the reason for large areas of underutilized land there. The Mbala farm block in
particular was found to be underutilized due to poor soils and numerous absentee landlords.
Of the total of over 400 farms visited in the course of the study, 222 had underutilized land
totalling 364,583 hectares. The largest proportion was located in the Copperbelt, but large areas of
underutilization were also found around Lusaka, the Big Concession, Kabwe, and Chisamba. Of the
total number of assessed farms (visited and unvisited), 687,886 hectares were determined to be
underutilized. Assuming that 60 percent of this area is good arable land, an heroic assumption given
the dearth of data on land use quality, the study concludes that a total of roughly 400,000 hectares
could be brought into cultivation without opening new lands.10
The study recommends that: (a) all parastatal farms be privatized immediately; (b) government
should adopt stringent but realistic criteria for selecting farmers based on sound management, proven
track record in farming, solid financial base, and sound farm development plans; (c) land tenure
reforms should be implemented to permit private ownership, confer tenure security, and facilitate
transfers; (d) government should consider an economic ground rent (rates varying by agroecological
zone) to induce greater land utilization; and (e) government should establish a land agency to smoothly
handle land transfers.
The GRZ has also been identifying new farm land for agricultural expansion (table 1.6). In
Lusaka province, an area of about 30,000 hectares was identified along the Kafue Flats, but the land
base is fragile, requiring special management. The area in Central province east of Mukonchi,
according to the study, offers good scope for development. Two further areas south of Mkushi offer
good potential for development. Overall, the study concludes that about 1,470,000 hectares of new
land can be opened for agricultural production, and that some of these lands (79,384 hectares) are
currently being opened up for settlement with mixed success. Success, according to the study, usually
depends on the provision of basic infrastructure—roads, water, and utilities. Given the high level of
land underutilization already existing on state lands, the study concludes there is no immediate need
to identify new farm blocks, while the existing blocks—namely Mansha, Mkushi South, Mupamadzi
along the Tazara, the Mtirizi/Chipangali West in Eastern province, and Mukonchi East in Central
province—have high potential for development.
Table 1.6: New farm blocks and areas under development
Area (ha)
New farm block Gross Under development
Lusaka west, Lusaka province 30,000 0
Mukonchi East Bank, Central 28,000 0
province 10,000 1,000
Mtirizi, Eastern province 28,000 1,000
Chipangali West, Eastern province
Tazara blocks: 78,000 0
Cl: New Mkushi 215,000 11,216
TZC2: Munte 90,500 870
TZC3: Katikulula 125,000 0
TZC4: Mupamadzi 120,000 20,000
TZC5: Kanchibya 100,000 28,798
TZC6: Mansha 300,000 0
TZC7: Kasama 65,000 0
TZC8: Mbala 95,000 0
TZC9: Isoka
Copperbelt province: 22,000 4,000
Mpongwe 30,000 10,000
Munkumpu 30,000 0
Munkumpu South State Farm 66,000 2,500
Mwinuna 28,000 0




Source: DHV Consultants BY, Netherlands, and Wood Consultants and Investments Ltd., Zambia, 1993.11
Why such a large supply of arable land has not been brought under cultivation, despite Zambia
having one of the highest rates of urbanization in Africa, is fundamental to assessing the potential
expansion of crop and livestock agriculture. A number of factors have had an important influence.
First, the British colonial policy of forced resettlement of the "African" population into the reserves,
and later forced labor for the mines, combined to uproot the vast majority of the rural "African"
population. Second, once uprooted, the vitality of the copper industry until the late 1970s helped to
pull labor into urban employment and keep people in the cities. Third, the urban bias in agricultural
policies, which subsidized consumers and implicitly taxed producers until the late 1980s, provided
further disincentives to farming or returning to rural life. Finally, for much of the urban population,
one or two generations removed from their rural roots, the lack of physical infrastructure (roads,
hospitals, schools, comparable housing) and utilities in rural areas would now mean a high social cost
in moving.
The culmination of these historical processes is a highly urbanized population—one of the
highest in Africa. The urban population was estimated at 3.284 million in 1990, or 42 percent of the
total population of 7.818 million. With population growing at an annual rate of 3.8 percent in urban
areas and 2.9 percent in rural areas, the total population is projected to reach 10,816,440 by the year
2000, with the urban population increasing to 44 percent of the total (Ministry of Agriculture 1993,
p. 9).
Zambia's economy has undergone a transition since independence. The mining sector as a
percentage of GDP has declined from 41 percent in 1965 to 8 percent in 1991. Over the same period,
the share of the agricultural sector remained fairly constant at around 15 percent but has increased
slightly to about 18 percent in recent years (Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries 1993). With
a decline in the copper industry, an abundance of arable land, and recently implemented marketing
and price reforms that have begun to reverse the former urban bias in agricultural pricing policy in
favor of rural producers, agriculture is positioned to become the engine of growth for future output
expansion.
Despite what would appear to be a rather immobile urban population, Zambia's area of crop
land, according to one source, has witnessed an extremely high rate of expansion since the 1970s.
Data compiled by the World Bank from 1974 to 1990 (table 1.7) show an extremely high rate of
growth in agricultural production, but mostly from opening new lands. The World Bank report does
not provide statistics for total cropped area. However, the rates of growth for maize (10.0 percent),
sorghum (19.4 percent), millet (14.9 percent), and groundnuts (23.7 percent) (these being the most
important crops cultivated, table 1.8) provide a good indication of the rate by which new arable land
is being brought into cultivation. After weighting these percentages by crop areas in table 1.8
(1986-87 figures), the calculation shows that crop area is expanding at an average rate of 12.5 percent
per annum, resulting in a doubling of crop area every 6 years.
Independent estimates of growth rates calculated in chapter 7 show far more modest rates of
growth. The growth rate analysis suggests that total crop area in the commercial sector declined at an
average annual rate of 0.6 percent for the period 1975 to 1989, while maize area declined 4.1 percent
annually on average. Maize production declined between 3 and 7 percent per annum depending on the
farm size category studied. (Dramatically higher rates are observed among small farms in the
northwest region, but the base of cultivated area is relatively small). Published estimates of area and12
production figures for the noncommercial sector are extremely limited. Production data were located
for the period 1972 to 1986 after which date publication ceased; area estimates were published
Table 1.7: Rates of growth in crop production, 1974-1990
Principal crops
Yield growth rate Production growth
rate (%) Area growth rate (%) (%)
Maize 10.0 (1.9) 8.3
Millet 14.9 (1.8) 12.7
Sorghum 19.4 4.3 24.0
Paddy rice 22.0 2.6 24.0
Wheat° 78.2 18.0 64.0
Mixed beans 23.0 0.4 22.6
Groundnuts 23.7 (1.0) 17.8
Cotton 42.1 1.6 42.1
Tobacco (V) 1.1 (3.3) (2.4)
Tobacco (B) 30.6 (4.1) 24.5
Soybeans 29.1 (1.9) 25.1
Sunflower 15.9 2.7 19.8
a. The growth rate for wheat would appear to be incorrect as the estimated growth rate in yield plus the
estimated growth rate in area should more or less equal the estimated growth rate in production.
Source: World Bank, "Draft Economic Report for Zambia CG Meeting" (1993), p. 39.
only for the period 1983 to 1986. Based on these data, maize production in the noncommercial sector
grew at an average annual rate of 1 to 7 percent annually over the period 1972 to 1986, depending
on the region examined. Both sets of data for the commercial and noncommercial sectors are
consistent with statistics reported by the US Department of Agriculture which suggest a growth rate
in cereals production in Zambia of roughly 1.1 percent annually over the period 1961 to 1989. These
results suggest profound disparities between the World Bank analysis and the empirical analysis in
chapter 7. Differences stem partially from the World Bank analysis beginning with the year 1974, a
momentary trough in output, and their use of forecast (not actual harvested) data. Overall, the analysis
in this paper suggests a far more modest rate of agrarian expansion, though the highly volatile nature
of both forecast and Central Statistics Office (CSO) survey data cannot be overemphasized.
Rates of growth in area, production, and yields have important implications for the
sustainability of resource management in arable areas and the conservation of natural resources in
protected areas:
► A high rate of growth in area combined with stagnant yields would suggest that the greatest
output gains in the short to intermediate term (10-15 years) would be expected from crop area
expansion, particularly if an enabling land tenure environment is present. Data in table 1.7
would suggest this conclusion, while independent estimates in chapter 7 would suggest far
more cautious estimates of expansion growth. Further the data in table 1.7 would suggest a
conducive environment for land tenure and an ease in opening or expanding the agricultural13
frontier. The data in chapter 7, showing stagnant area growth, do not refute this hypothesis,
but likewise do not support it.
► A rapid rate of growth in area would raise important questions about: the sustained
preservation of land reserves for forests, parks, and wildlife; and environmental concerns of
deforestation and declines in soil and water quality, particularly in situations of land scarcity.
The data in chapter 7 do not indicate an immediate cause for concern, although the issue may
be important.
► Declining productivity measured by falling yields per hectare over time provides a weak
indication that soil mining is occurring, and/or that addition of soil supplements and
technology growth are not sufficient to offset the natural decline in soil fertility arising from
cultivation. The data in table 1.7 and chapter 7 would weakly support both hypotheses, though
again statistical inferences are difficult due to wide fluctuations in the data.










Maize (including seed) 699 78 535 44
Millet 70 0 88 0
Sorghum 63 0 44 0
Rice 22 0 11 0
Wheat 10 8 na na
Groundnut 107 na 125 3
Sunflower 48 5 32 5
Soybeans 27 14 15 38
Mixed beans 35 na 53 1
Cotton 33 1 na na
Tobacco 8 7 na na
Coffee 1 3 na na
Sugarcane 3 11 na na
Fruits 3 5 na na
Other crops 88 2 na na
Mixed crops 137 0 na 0
Total 1,354 134 na 91
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Food andFisheries, "Assessment of Potential Land For Expanding Agricultural
Production in Zambia" (1993), p. 3.
At a more fundamental level, there is an urgent need for ground truthing of aggregate data
time series through field-level research and data collection. There is a dearth of information on many
basic questions. Is the customary land tenure system facilitating or constraining agricultural
development? How are customary systems and statutory tenure curtailing or facilitating the agrarian14
transformation? Is the current leasehold system properly performing its role of clearly adjudicating,
recording, and guaranteeing rights, or instead is it causing unacceptable levels of disputes and
displacement of landholders under the customary system? Is tenure insecurity under either system
adversely limiting investment incentives and credit access?
Some weak evidence is provided on the performance of the various land tenure systems in the
remainder of this paper, but a gross underinvestment in research on land rights, their intra-household
distribution, agrarian structure, land markets, and land tenure security inhibits concrete conclusions.
It would seem a reasonable conclusion that the leasehold process discussed further in chapter 3 and
resettlement programs in chapter 5 have been important factors in bringing new entrants into
agriculture and new land into farming. Yet, data on leasehold numbers and CSO data on number of
farms are published only at a provincial level, which is far too aggregated to assess these issues in a
rigorous way. The process of land settlement or crop area expansion also has fundamental implications
for the sustainability of resource management, farm size, market access, and the environment; here,
too, the information is rather superficial and largely anecdotal.
V. Land tenure'
Zambia's legal system is based on common law imported from Britain (Chinene et al. 1993).
The Royal Charter executed on 29 October 1889 paved the way for the introduction of English law
in the country. Through the North-Western Rhodesian Order in Council of 1889 (for Barotseland) and
the North-Eastern Rhodesian Order in Council (outside Barotse territory), English law was made to
apply. A host of other legal regimes in Zambia make reference to English law, including the
Subordinate Courts Act Cap 45 of the Laws of Zambia (SECTION 14), and the High Court Act, chapter
50 of the Laws of Zambia (SECTION 13.9). However, the Application Act (chapter 4 of the Laws of
Zambia) is the most prominent integration of English law. According to this act, common law, the
doctrines of equity (c) statutes which were in force in England on the 17th day of August 1911, and
any later English statutes applied to Zambia, are made in force in Zambia. Chinene et al. (1993) note
there are doubts over which 1911 English statues apply, but these provisions and the decisions reached
in English courts elsewhere in the Commonwealth have considerably shaped Zambian law.
Despite the application of common law in Zambia, most Zambians still conduct their activities
in accordance with customary law. No single body of customs prevails across the country; in fact,
local variations are common. The term customary law encompasses a host of different prevailing tribal
customs. Although customary law has been superseded by legislation in many areas, it continues to
play a considerable role in the development of land tenure concepts and structure in tribal areas.
However, land legislation enacted in Zambia by the colonial government and the post-independence
parliament has had the single most important influence on land law and land rights in the country.
Common law, equity, and statute law mainly apply in State Lands, whereas customary law
applies to Reserve and Trust Lands except where land in these categories has been converted to State
Land. In 1928, the Northern Rhodesia (crown lands and Native Reserves) Order in Council was
promulgated, creating two categories of land: Crown Land and Native Reserves. Generally, Crown
7 Parts of this section draw heavily on chapter 2, "Review of Land Tenure under Legal and Customary Systems," in Chinene
et al. (1993).15
Land consisted of land earmarked for European settlements and mining along a narrow strip of about
20 to 30 miles on either side of the railway line from Livingstone to the Copperbelt, including thin
pockets of land near Chipata, Mbala, Mukushi, Mumbwa, and Mwinilunga.
A. Tenure on State Lands
Land alienation for white settlers along the rail line was initially framed in terms of freehold
tenure for a preliminary period of 5 years during which personal occupation and development of the
alienated land was mandatory. In other areas, farms were alienated to settlers for periods not
exceeding 99 years, while leases for ranches over 6,000 hectares were issued for terms not exceeding
30 years (Chinene et al. 1993). Considerable disaffection with freehold tenure arrangements eventually
led to a review of land policy by the Eccles Land Tenure Committee in 1943. The committee
recommended that the freehold system be displaced by a 99-year lease on grounds that it ensured
greater control over land by the state. The Legislative Council approved this in 1946. Extensive
changes in the ownership of state agricultural land accompanied the Land Ordinance in 1956 that
introduced the "concept of progression" whereby a farmer who performed satisfactorily could upgrade
tenure from leasehold to freehold. This ordinance was later repealed and succeeded by the present
Agricultural Lands Act.
The present framework for the administration of State Lands (former European sector) for
commercial farming is the Agricultural Lands Act of 1960 (CAP 292). This act provides for the
establishment of an Agricultural Lands Board appointed by the minister of Lands and Natural
Resources and prescribes its composition, membership, powers, and functions.' It also provides for
the alienation of agricultural land, preparation of schemes, application process for allotted land,
criteria for reviewing applications, duration of lease, rents, and conditions of use. It further provides
for the development of tenant farming schemes, including scheme creation, conditions for terminating
residency, and regulations. The act is framed to carry forward, and deal with, fee simple titles and
leaseholds in State Land from previous registrations (SECTION I.3).
9 New allotments to applicants are
decided upon by the Land Board (SECTIONS II.4 to II.9), and, if approved, alienated by the president
to the lessee for a duration of 30 years (SECTION III.19). Every lessee is required to take up personal
residence on the holding within 6 months of the commencement of the lease, or as otherwise agreed
by the board (SECTION III.21). Use conditions are specified, including (as approved by the board)
annual cultivation of some portion of the plot, maintenance of stock, or development of
dipping/spraying facilities, paddock fencing and water supplies as considered adequate by the board
(SECTION 111.21). The lessee, while allowed to use timber from the holding for own farming or
domestic purposes, is prohibited from selling or removing any timber without the president's consent
(SECTION II1.23). A lessee is not entitled to assign, sublet, mortgage, charge, encumber, enter into
a partnership, or part in any way with the holding without the prior consent of the president (SECTION
III.24).
New leases of scheduled State Lands must be approved by the board, which is to consider
general policy directions from the minister, age of applicant, the applicant's character, the applicant's
The agricultural lands board is defunct and hasn't been convened in years. Furthermore, land allocations are proceeding
without it (see chapter 2 for elaboration).
9 Although the provision was drawn to carry forward and deal with fee simples, this is now subject to SECTION 5 of the Land
(Conversion of Titles) Act, 1975, which terminated freehold property.16
willingness to personally occupy and develop the holding, and his or her capital resources and
qualifications to develop an agricultural holding (SECTION III.17). Preference is to be given to
applicants who do not already hold State Land (SECTION III.18). Once an allotment is made and a rent
level set by the board, the lease is executed by the president in whom the title is vested. This authority
has been delegated to the Commissioner of Lands. In case of failure to comply with the provisions
of the act or conditions of the lease, the board, after giving written notice of the failure and providing
an opportunity for remedial action, may terminate the lease. Upon termination, for expiry or other
reasons, the minister on the recommendation of the board authorizes compensation for unexhausted
improvements (SECTION III.22). However, the act envisages the renewal of most expiring leases
(SECTION 111.30).
The Land (Conversion of Titles) Act of 1975 (CAP 289, hereafter referred to as the
Conversion Act) vested all land in Zambia absolutely in the president (SECTION 4) and converted all
freeholds into leaseholds (SECTION 5). The act converted any fee simple titles or leaseholds still in
effect at the time of the act to leaseholds not exceeding 100 years (SECTIONS 5 and 6). Upon expiry,
a lease may be extended for a further 100 years or less as the president may see fit (SECTION 12.i).
Lessees are not entitled to assign, sublet, mortgage, charge, encumber, or part in any way with the
holding without the prior written consent of the president in writing (SECTION 13.1). The president
is also granted powers of fixing the maximum amount to be received, recovered, or secured for land
(SECTION 13.3). However, in fixing prices, the president must disregard any value of land apart from
the unexhausted improvements thereon (SECTION 13.3).
10 Thus, idle land without improvements
cannot have value, and the benefits of investments in land accrue to the leaseholder, but not the value
of the land created by location or presence of public investment. Mortgages on land are possible but
only on the value of unexhausted improvements on the land (SECTION 10). Also, the minister may,
by regulations, prescribe the maximum area of agricultural land, and different maxima may be so
prescribed for different areas, districts, or provinces (SECTION 17). Further under the First Schedule
to the act, the lessor or the state maintains the right of possession of all mineral oils and precious
stones and right of entry on all lands to prospect for and mine such minerals (SECTION III.3). Also,
the lessee is not allowed to let the land remain idle for a period of more than three years except with
written consent of the lessor (SECTION III.6).
These two acts in effect create two systems of review and control of leases and leasehold
transactions: State Land "scheduled" under the Agricultural Lands Act; and other State Land. In the
first case, any leasing of land must first be approved by the Agricultural Lands Board, then referred
to the Commissioner of Lands. As regards State Lands not scheduled under the Agricultural Act, the
board has no role. Here it is the Commissioner of Lands, acting under delegated authority of the
president who approves or refuses applications. As Bruce and Dorner (1982) suggest, there is no
logical basis for this distinction between "scheduled" and "unscheduled" State Land, and consolidation
is advised. Also, improvements on the leasehold must be valued to comply with the legal requirement
Michelo Hansungule (personal communication) of the School of Law, University of Zambia, asserts that the use of the
term may rather than must or shall implies that the president need not set prices in every case. If a maximum price is not set,
then the provision does not come into play. SECTION (13(3) theoretically would allow a transaction where a willing buyer and
a willing seller freely negotiate a price without recourse to the president, but the law has been neglected in practice. In
Hansungule's view, SECTION 13(3) was intended to allow the Commissioner of Lands to decide whether a presidential invitation
to fix prices was warranted, and, if so, a price would be set without regard to land value. However, successive commissioners
apparently read the provision as applying to all land probably because of the prevailing mood against land markets and concerns
of land speculation at the time.17
that compensation be paid only on the basis of unexhausted improvements in the land, not the land
itself. As the MOL lacks a valuation department, this task must be performed by the Valuation
Department of the Ministry of Local Government and Housing—a cumbersome and time-consuming
process.
The Lands and Deeds Registry Act of 1914 (CAP 287) provides for the registration of
documents, the issue of Provisional Certificates of Title and Certificates of Title, and the transfer and
transmission of registered land. Every lease for a period of more than one year must be registered,
as must any assignment of, mortgage, or charge upon such a lease (SECTION II.4). Any document not
registered in the designated time period is null and void (SECTION 1I.6). Any proprietor of a lease of
14 years or more must first apply for a Provisional Certificate of Title. After 6 years, the proprietor
of the lease may apply to the registrar for a final Certificate of Title (SECTION 111.43).
Before any title certificate (provisional or final) may be issued, the applicant must submit a
survey diagram which complies with the requirements of the Land Survey Act of 1960. The act makes
comprehensive provisions for the registration and licensing of land surveyors, provides for the manner
in which land surveys are carried out and the diagrams and plans connected therewith, provides for
the protection of survey beacons and other survey markers, provides for the establishment and powers
of a Survey Control Board responsible for the registration and licensing of land surveyors, and for the
exercise of disciplinary control over such surveyors.
The act imposes high and rigorous standards of ground survey. The Land Survey Division of
the MOL, with severely limited staff for meeting these standards, is badly behind in survey work.
Currently, the MOL estimates a backlog of roughly 30,000 applications in various stages. To avoid
long delays in the issuance of title certificates, the Survey Division and the registry have for many
years adopted a policy of accepting, for registration, leases of up to 14 years if accompanied by an
adequate sketch plan (thereby sidestepping the rigorous standards of fixed-boundary survey). Once a
Land Survey Act survey is conducted, the 14-year lease is surrendered, a 99-year lease is granted,
covered by a final Certificate of Title. This practice is common, and is the mechanism for grants of
land in settlement schemes. Its legality, however, is an open question because of the lower survey
standard. In addition, the majority of the above backlog cases are reportedly 14-year titles for which
surveys were never undertaken. The pending expiry of these leaseholds is raising anew the issue of
surveying bottlenecks and added registry work associated with either renewing them as 14-year leases
or converting them to a 99-year basis.
These procedures, involving six different sections in three different ministries (the Agricultural
Lands Board, the Commissioner of Lands, the Land Registry Section and the Land Survey Section,
all in the MOL, the Land Use Planning Branch in the Ministry of Agriculture, and the Valuation
Branch in the Ministry of Local Government and Housing) are far more complex than can be justified.
This complexity, coupled with severe understaffing, results in extended delays in leasehold transactions
(see chapter 2 for further analysis of the registration process).
The Town and Country Planning Act (CAP 475) is the legal framework for the control and
regulation of all development of statutory leaseholds. Submission and approval of these plans can be
an onerous exercise, as indicated by a recent ODA (1989) study:
The system often fails to plan and program the release of land to meet demand or
development policy and to program and coordinate the release of funds for plan18
implementation including the opening up and servicing of land....The development
plan system...is over-demanding in its requirements of plan content and procedure of
preparation for the modest planning guidelines needed for the development of
relatively small rural provincial and district centers. Staff resources in the Department
of Town and Country Planning have found it difficult within their day-to-day
workload, to keep up with the monitoring, updating and new plan preparation needed
for these centers....A more simplified system is required but one which nevertheless
is capable of measuring land requirements and providing a framework for and
encouragement of public and private investment.
The Town and Country Planning Act omits from planning control and plan preparation
important peri-urban areas on the city fringes. Curiously, the requirement of a development plan
approved by planning authorities in Reserve and Trust Lands has also been excluded. The requirement
for planning permission is mandatory and extensive. The term "development" is defined by statute
(SECTION 24, CAP 475) and by common law, but in effect is determined on a case by case basis.
Land use conditions are also specified in towns. Although the act provides for the preparation of
regional plans, none to date have been prepared (ODA 1989).
The Lands Acquisition Act of 1970 makes provisions for the compulsory acquisition of land
and property. No compensation is payable in respect of undeveloped or underutilized land (SECTION
IV.15). In assessing compensation, the value of property is the amount by which the unexhausted
improvements would be realized if sold on the open market (SECTION III.12). A right of appeal to the
National Assembly exists against the amount of compensation determined by the minister. There is
no appeal on matters involving decisions to compulsorily acquire property, since this is at the
discretion of the president. This act has been severely abused in the past as government has
expropriated land with inadequate levels of compensation, in some cases for public works, but in other
cases for reallocation to private individuals. Charges of fraud, corruption, and bribery have been
widespread in association with the implementation of this act.
B. Reserve and Trust Land administration
The administration of Reserve Land is governed by the Zambia (State Land and Reserves)
Orders, 1928 to 1964 (hereinafter referred to as the State Land and Reserves Orders). Under these
orders, the land in the reserves is set apart for the sole and exclusive use of the indigenous people of
Zambia. This provision according to the Ministerial Statement in Parliament (4th August 1987) on
Land Alienation in Reserves and Trust Lands is intended to protect the villagers and their customary
rights to land. The president can make grants or dispositions of land to Zambians and rural councils
for periods of up to 99 years. In the case of nonnatives, terms are limited to 99 years for public
purposes, 33 years for missionary societies and charitable bodies, and 5 years in any other case
(SECTION 6A.1). The president must in all cases consult the rural council (SECTION 6A.4). The lessee
cannot, without written consent of the president, assign or sublet the leased land or appoint any person
other than a native approved by the assistant district secretary to be in charge of the land (SECTION
10, The Reserves Regulations). Also, according to the Reserve Grant Regulations, a lease cannot be
disposed of by will except if a law permits, that its disposal by intestacy shall be governed by a law
passed by parliament, and that the land granted cannot be subdivided without the consent of the
president unless a law permits (no such laws exist in any of the three cases). The nature of rights and
interests that can be acquired in reserves is nowhere explicitly stated, although from the powers of the
governor it is implied that what was intended is customary tenure (Chinene et al. 1993).19
As a result of overcrowding and resource degradation in the reserves, and demands by
Europeans for more land for settlements, Governor Young in 1938 introduced a new concept of Native
Trust Lands. Unlike its predecessor in Nyasaland, which declared the whole of unalienated land as
Trust Land, it was decided in Zambia that areas of alienated land which showed promise for European
farming and mineral deposit would be retained as crown land. Once ecological and geological surveys
determining these criteria were completed, the remainder of the land would be declared Native Trust
Land. By the 1947 Trust Land Order in Council, 57 percent of the country was declared Trust Lands,
and the net area under crown lands was subsequently reduced.
The above restrictions pointed out for the reserves do not apply to Trust Land areas. The
administration of Trust Land is governed by the Zambia (Trust Land) Orders, 1947 to 1964
(hereinafter referred to as the Trust Land Orders). The president can grant a Right of Occupancy of
up to 99 years to a non-Zambian and demand rent for the use of the land. While Zambians and district
councils can own title, non-Zambians are also allowed provided that they qualify as investors or are
approved by the president as provided under Act No. 15 of 1985. While fee simple and rights of
occupancy with rent are mentioned, the president now makes such grants in leaseholds. No transfer
of Trust Land to anyone for more than 5 years is valid without consent of the president. Further
restrictions are placed on transfer, disposal by will, and subdivision. The governor (forerunner to the
president) more or less enjoyed the same powers of administering land as in the reserves. The two
provisions—99-year leases and grants of land to nonnatives—imply a felt need to distinguish between
the Reserve and Trust Lands. As with the reserves, interests and land rights in the Trust Lands fell
to customary law and administration thereof to traditional authorities (chiefs).
While the Conversion Act would seem to invoke fundamental legal changes in the Reserve and
Trust areas, it was enacted without repealing the Orders in Council. The practical effect has been that
land matters in Reserve and Trust areas continue to be interpreted in light of the orders. Under the
Local Administration Act, 1980 to 1992, chiefs were statutory members of rural councils, a policy
followed by the 1985 administrative circular in which the Department of Lands stipulated the
requirement of consent of the chief before an application of leasehold on customary land. This
arrangement has essentially afforded customary leaders a legalized means of effectively resisting land
alienation, which according to Zambia's National Farmers Union is an important factor underlying
the low rate of land alienation in Reserve and Trust areas.
The policy of land reservation through the Native Reserves and Trust Lands did not until
recently apply to land in Barotseland proper. According to the Barotseland North-Western Rhodesia
Order in Council of 1899, land in the central regions of Barotse were set apart for the litunga and
their people. Under the terms of the Barotseland Agreement of 1964, the litunga 's powers over land
in Barotseland as governed by customary law were recognized and guaranteed, as they were in
ARTICLE 8(2) of the Independence Constitution of 1964. Land in Barotseland continued under the
domain of the litunga and Lozi customary law until the Western Province (Land and Miscellaneous
Provisions) Act of 1970 which vested all land in Western province in the president as a reserve under
the State Lands Orders. Regardless of these legal changes, the traditional authorities in Western
province have been the most reluctant to encourage or permit their subjects to hold state title deeds
(personal communications, Commissioner of Lands). The litunga is in fact issuing title deeds that,
while offering proof of customary rights, have no legal grounding in the eyes of government. There
is substantial evidence (see Times of Zambia, 25 May 1993) of tensions emerging between local and
central authorities over control of land rights.20
[According to the acting] MMD chairman of Sesheke...three investors wanted...to set
up cigarette and tomato sauce...factories [but] because of [a] mix-up between the
council and the royal establishment...these people have not come back....But Chief
Inyambo denied...he was blocking efforts by councillors to give land to
investors.... [According to the chief's advisor, the chief] was not at loggerheads with
the councillors because they were not...supposed to be involved in...issuing...land in
his area....The investors were being misled [by the Sesheke council] into selecting
areas of their choice which were already occupied by villagers and then...being taken
to the senior chief for consent. The process of allocating traditional land is that
headmen should [first] be approached. These report to the Silalo indunas who take the
applications to the Kuta, [who] finally informs the chief to sign. [The MMD chairman
indicated] that because of the previous mix-up..., investors [are now being] referred
to the Litunga of Western Province.
Such problems act to stifle the initiative of "outsider investors," meaning all non-Lozi investors
including foreign nationals and Zambians from other parts of Zambia. However, even Lozis cannot
get statutory title deeds to their customary land.
The government is currently encouraging an "open-door" policy to spur capital creation,
whereby foreign investors are encouraged to develop farms and businesses in Zambia. The current
situation of high debt loads, declining donor aid, and slow economic growth are expected to dampen
capital expansion from internal public and private sources for the foreseeable future. Foreign investors
seek guidance on suitable land for settlement from the MOL, which then directs them to the councils.
Investors leave disgruntled when the MOL is unable to designate clearly defined, demarcated, and
registered areas of land for settlement, or when negotiations are held with the chiefs which must
subsequently be turned down by the MOL.
The Ministerial Statement in Parliament on 4 August 1987 on Land Alienation in Reserves and
Trust Lands provides clarification on the role of chiefs and the importance of leasehold property. It
states that "there is no need to consult Chiefs before granting land on title deeds in the customary
(Reserves and Trust) area." Rather the statement points out that ART. 6A(4) of the State Lands and
Reserves Orders and ARTICLE 5(2) of the Trust Land Orders stipulate "that only the District Councils
must be consulted" (p. 2). However, "since it is recognized that the Chief can make a grant of land
under customary law and since the Chief is the custodian of traditions and customs of his community,
it is important that he is consulted so that any alienation of land in the Reserves and Trust land areas
does not infringe on the customary rights and interests of the community....[B]eing custodians of
customary law and rights, [they] know better which members of their communities hold land under
customary tenure or which land has been set aside for settlement, communal grazing, traditional
farming or indeed for any other use" (p. 3).
It goes on to point out that some chiefs "regard the title deed as something that would make
them lose control over land and their subjects. Hence they are very reluctant to recommend
applications for land. [However,] there is a growing number of other progressive Chiefs who
understand the law and procedures for applying for title deeds. These Chiefs have taken the lead in
acquiring title deeds to their personal holdings" (p. 3).21
An alternative view on the role of the chiefs is provided by the Zambia National Farmers
Union (n.d.):
One of the main problems of improving access to individual titles in the traditional
areas is the attitude of the chiefs....Some chiefs refuse [to give their consent] fearing
loss of status and respect....There may be a case for removing the chiefs' power of
veto, but this should only be...a last resort. They still have a significant role in rural
societies, and removal of their power could both weaken this role and create
opposition to...farming progress....On balance, it is probably desirable that
they...retain [control over] land, but...there may be need for education and perhaps
some sort of appeal procedure—possibly to provincial committees of chiefs.
Circular No. 1 of 1985, "Procedure on Land Alienation," hereafter referred to as simply the
circular, lays out the procedures for preparation of layout plans, allocation of stands, matters related
to unscheduled agricultural lands, matters related to Reserve and Trust Lands, and applications for
land by non-Zambians. The councils are responsible, on behalf of the Commissioner of Lands, for
processing applications, selecting suitable candidates, and making recommendations (SECTION 3). In
the Reserve and Trust Lands, the powers of the president in making grants or dispositions of land are
limited by the requirement to consult the local authorities affected by such grants or dispositions
(SECTION D.(i)). Local authority, in the circular, had been administratively understood to mean the
chief and the rural council (SECTION D(ii)). To ensure this practice, the Commissioner of Lands will
insist upon the written consent of the chief concerned. The circular stipulates, for the time being, that
leases cannot exceed 250 hectares of land for farming purposes in the Reserve and Trust Lands, and
rural councils are advised not to recommend alienation of land in excess of this amount (SECTION
D(v)).
Under Amendment 2 to the Conversion Act (see p. 16) no land can be alienated to a
non-Zambian (foreigner) without written approval by the president. To obtain approval, a
non-Zambian must first submit his/her application to the council. The council is given wide powers
to request information about the intended development as is deemed necessary (s. E(ii)). When
recommending the application to the Commissioner of Lands, the council is required to give full
information on the intended development plan, extracts of the minutes of the committee of the council
responsible for land matters, extracts of the minutes of the full council, and four copies of the
approved layout plan duly endorsed and stamped by the Chief (SECTION D(iii)).
With the rigorous survey standards required for 99-year leaseholds, the many steps and
procedures required by the leasehold process, the different levels of national and local bureaucracy
involved, and one central registry to process applications, it is clearly understandable why there are
long delays in processing leasehold applications. Advancements in survey technologies and
decentralization of registry services can reduce registration costs and expedite surveying time.
However, the issue remains whether, and to what extent, the involvement of chiefs in the registration
process creates bottlenecks and will continue to do so even after actions are taken to improve the
technical aspects of registration delivery." The strengths of the current system lie in the checks and
balances imposed on the actions of both the chiefs and government, but inherent in the process are
" To some extent, the chiefs consent is a false issue. A newcomer would find it very difficult to operate in most Reserve
and Trust areas without the chiefs consent and forbearance.22
many tedious steps that lead applicants through a maze of administrative channels (see chapter 3 for
more details).
C. Urban, housing, and improvement areas
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The Legislative Council in 1957 set up a committee to examine tenure conditions in respect
to urban and peri-urban areas. That committee according to Chinene et al. (1993) recommended that
government adopt a policy of freehold tenure in urban areas except African townships and African
housing areas located in European municipalities and townships. It was further recommended that
unalienated land should be granted as freeholds to municipal councils. These recommendations led to
the Crown Grants Act, which was later repealed by the Housing (Statutory and Improvement Areas)
Act of 1974 and the Conversion Act of 1975.
President Kaunda in 1975 announced fundamental changes in land policy to the sixth National
Council of UNIP on grounds that freehold tenure impeded the country's development and led to
excessive speculation by landlords (see, for example, Chinene et al. 1993). All freehold titles were
to be converted to statutory leaseholds of 100 years duration or less; all unutilized tracts of farmland
were to be taken over immediately by the state; a requirement of presidential consent was introduced
before any dealings in land; sale of land in urban areas was abolished save for dealings in
improvements on the land; all vacant and undeveloped land in and around major centers was to be
municipalized; and real estate agencies were ordered to close down. The supporting framework for
these changes—the Conversion Act of 1975—took effect the following year.
The Housing (Statutory and Improvement Areas) Act of 1974 still provides for the control and
improvement of housing in declared areas. The minister is granted powers to declare any area of land
within the jurisdiction of a council to be a Statutory Housing area as long as the land is held in fee
simple, and a housing plan prepared by the council is approved by the surveyor general (SECTION 4).
The council, with the minister's approval, can subdivide the land, effect improvements, and lease any
piece to any person for such a term and conditions as are approved by the minister (SECTION 5 (1)
(a)-(c)). The council is prohibited from selling or conveying any freehold estate, leasing more than
one piece of land to any one person, or leasing to any person who is engaged in the business of
buying, selling, letting, or developing immovable property (SECTION 5 (1) (i)-(iii)). Upon payment
of a prescribed fee, a council certificate of title for land is issued to an individual (SECTION 7 (1)) or
legal entity (SECTION 5 (2)). Where two or more persons are entitled as tenants in common to
undivided shares, only one certificate of title shall be issued (SECTION 7 (3)), although the council
registrar is given powers to issue a separate certificate for each person's share upon payment of a fee
(SECTION 7 (4)). The registrar is prohibited from registering any document purporting to transfer land
not having received the council's prior consent (SECTION 42). A person is liable to a fine (K500) or
imprisonment (not to exceed 2 years) (SECTION 45) if such person applies a rent, fee, purchase price,
or other charge in excess of charges prescribed in the act, erects a structure without prior approval
of the council, or illegally occupies or uses the land (SECTION 44 (a)-(d)). The act further describes
the regulations for registration of titles under part III, and for the declaration of improvement areas
under part VIII.
'
Z Parts of this section draw heavily on chapter 2, "Review of Land Tenure under Legal and Customary Systems," by
Michelo Hansungule, in Chinene et al. (1993).23
The rights of squatters and the landless were also implicitly addressed by this legislation. In
1968, the Ministry of Local Government instructed local authorities to lay out basic site and service
schemes for squatter settlements (ministerial circular No. 29 of 1968). Settlers were issued Land
Record Cards as verification of their rights to individual plots, but the cards lacked legal grounding,
leaving settlers fearful of eviction (Chinene et al. 1993). Under the Housing (Statutory and
Improvement Areas) Act, the minister was authorized to declare an "improvement area," and the
Commissioner of Lands was granted authority to issue titles to the local authority, which in turn could
issue occupancy licenses and titles to settlers. Once a general sketch plan by a settler is produced,
occupants are allocated serial numbers indicating their plots which suffice for registration and issuance
of title (i.e., 14-year leases). The Housing Act is the only legislative enactment on squatters in the
country, but applies only to urban areas while squatting is common in state lands. Officials contend
that occupancy licenses confer security of tenure, and the title is sufficient for collateral. Data on
number of mortgages by 14-year and 99-year lease (in chapter 3) provide weak evidence to the
contrary.
D. Agencies responsible for land policy
The MOL is responsible for formulating and ensuring proper administration of land. All land
regardless of location is vested in the president (and the minister of Lands) on all land matters
including granting of land, fixing ground rent, and determining the conditions under which land is
held. The Lands and Deeds Registry is responsible for registering all interests in land and for issuing
title deeds. The Town and Country Planning Department in the Ministry of Local Government is
responsible for zoning, certain large local authority plans, and determining "proper" land use. The
Ministry of Environment is responsible for the control of land use for forestry, factories, and other
uses, and for formulating conditions under which land can be used in certain areas. It is also
responsible for approving the consolidation and subdivision of land based on its environmental
interests.
The Land Use Planning Section of the Department of Agriculture, Ministry of Agriculture,
is involved through its central, provincial, and district offices with the preparation of farm plans and
farm layouts, settlement planning, land allocation and demarcations, site preparation, land use and land
suitability assessment. It receives directives from the planning section of the department to find sites
and prepare layouts for agricultural schemes and projects. It also gives advice to applicants for
individual farm holdings based on conservation principles, i.e., suitable land use, farm size, farm and
field boundaries, and location of services and facilities (ODA 1989).
The workload in providing such advice for new individual holdings as well as the increased
demand for lease titles will continue to expand. Without changes, farm planning advice and land
application processes are likely to be overstretched, leading to further delays in land allocation and
registration. The expansion in numbers of small-scale and medium-scale commercial farms is eroding
the structure of a few large commercial-sector farms that the agency was designed to service. One can
only expect the commercial farm sector to become more dispersed and extended through subdivisions
and opening of new lands. The department will no longer be able to afford the intensity of planning
work per farm that has characterized its operations since colonial times. If the department is to keep
pace with these trends, fundamental changes will be needed. Options include, but are not limited to:
(a) greatly simplifying land use planning and the work entailed in lease approvals; (b) reducing the
volume of work by perhaps eliminating reviews of subdivisions; (c) prioritizing work toward farm24
appraisals for divestiture and opening new lands for resettlement; and/or (d) expanding personnel,
equipment, transport, and land mapping capabilities through additional infusion of funds.
The Government Valuation Department is responsible for assisting councils in levying rates
for local revenue generation, for monitoring and advising on legislative and procedural reforms (e.g.,
the current government considerations on replacing the property transfer tax with the capital gains
tax), for capital valuations of private sector housing, and for general advisement on ground rents,
office allocation, land allocation, land identification, economic ground rent, land value, and sale of
government housing. The GRZ also has approximately 15,000 government houses. The Government
Valuation Department (GVD) sees a continued and growing role at the policy and implementation level
in assisting GRZ policy to introduce phased economic rentals, and to provide funds to manage the
portfolio more effectively (GVD 1993). It remains unclear to what extent the GVD will or should be
responsible for fixing prices for land allocations by the Lands Department or setting economic ground
rents for leasehold property. The Lands Department would argue that a separate capacity within the
MOL ought to be developed to assist the Commissioner of Lands in these areas, particularly for
agricultural properties. Alternatively, it could be argued that a merger, or greater integration, of
functions is needed.
The institutions responsible for implementing the various functions of land policy are currently
highly dispersed with inadequate coordination among ministries. As indicated in chapter 3, the
Commissioner of Lands must rely on a nearly autonomous Surveys Department for surveying and
mapping. Decisions on subdivision must come from the Ministry of Environment. Land use planning
appraisals are made by the land use planning section of the Ministry of Agriculture, while no
department has the capacity for conducting research on land policy. It is too much to expect the
various ministries to make expeditious decisions in a seamless fashion. An overhaul of departments
responsible for land policy is needed, with careful attention given to clarifying roles and
responsibilities. In some cases, the establishment of new line departments (land policy analysis) may
be needed. In other cases, mergers or consolidation may be justified.
E. Subdivisions
Various attempts were made in the course of this work to determine the rationale and criteria
for decisions related to land subdivisions. As indicated earlier, the Ministry of Environment is
responsible for the control of land use and for formulating conditions under which land can be used
in certain areas. The land use division of the Ministry of Agriculture is responsible for advising on
land use decisions for agricultural properties including making site evaluations and project plans for
newly opened lands. Policy related to subdivisions has important land market implications, particularly
if subdivisions are tightly controlled and constrain land access. Unfortunately, no data could be located
on applications for subdivisions involving either of these ministries or the MOL. Data on number of
approved lease subdivisions are reported in chapter 3, but these data would not necessarily reflect the
existence or scale of problems should subdivision policy be constraining transfers. Furthermore, no
official circular could be located that clearly articulates the criteria used to make actual decisions on
whether to permit subdivisions in individual cases. The "General Notes on Farm Subdivisions," dated
1978, in figure 1.1 was extracted from ministry files and, according to certain ministry personnel, is
still effectively used.
According to these notes, a number of considerations must be taken into account before any
farm subdivision can be implemented. Such considerations may be based on land capability, farm size,25
water potential, and the viability of the units to be subdivided. Except for land close to urban areas,
allotments cannot be less than 10 hectares; in outlying areas, subdivisions would not normally be less
than 80 hectares; and under certain circumstances, subdivisions may not be allowed in cases where
the resulting portions are less than 500 hectares.
Subdivision limitations in general are difficult to justify on economic grounds. Farm sizes
aimed at providing a minimum economic return are nearly impossible to set as yields or productivity
change with technological advances, and prices of inputs and outputs fluctuate with supply and
demand. Small farms, through part-time farming, may be quite effective in maintaining income parity
with larger farms and non-farm employment may actually increase the private flow of capital into
agriculture. Furthermore, designing farm size limits that carefully account for changes in incomes
among region (based on differences in soils, climate, and prices) are nearly impossible to make, and
in practice tend to be either badly done, or not done at all, resulting in regional imbalances. Concerns
about uneconomical farm sizes developing from subdivisions are also not justified. In the presence of
an unconstrained land market, profitable farmers should be able to expand their parcel (farm)
holdings, while likewise farming units with underutilized land should have the flexibility to downsize.
Granted, land markets in the past did not permit this flexibility. But, in the future economy where
prices are permitted to adjust in response to market forces, the old system of applying subdivision
policy to a limited number of commercial farm holdings will no longer suffice and runs the risk of
curtailing growth.26
Figure 1.1: General notes on farm subdivisions
1. 10 ha (25 acre) subdivisions should be confined to an area within 5 km of the latest Lusaka boundary. The
subdivisions should all be on arable land with either high borehole potential or having a perennial stream
within reach. Beyond 5 km from the Lusaka boundary, subdivisions should not go below a minimum
economic agricultural holding. Thus each unit to be subdivided should remain large enough to remain
economically viable as well as self-sustaining.
2. As a general rule, the size of the units to be subdivided should be calculated on the soils (as well as land
use capability) and borehole or water potential. For example, deep Makeni red soils over dolomite with high
water potential could be subdivided to 40 ha (100 acres). Similar subdivisions can be carried out on deep
colluvium or alluvium soils with perennial streams through the land.
3. Sandy soils derived from schist and with low water potential fall into two categories: (a) farms over muva
or cheta schists on the periphery of dolomite areas can be subdivided into 10 ha (25 acre) plots within 5 km
of Lusaka. Beyond this distance, these soils should not be subdivided to less than 80 ha (200 acres) per unit
of arable land; (b) basement complex schists usually with low borehole potential, high erosion hazard, and
long soil rotation required should not be subdivided to less than 160 ha (400 acres) of arable land.
4. Farms with large areas that are non-arable (classes V, VI, and VII) will need special planning to maintain
their agricultural viability. Cattle ranching is best suited for these classes. But as for farms close to Lusaka
where stock theft is rife, forestry should be considered. A green forestry belt for rock areas west and south
of Lusaka should be seriously considered. The carrying capacity of the above-named classes is one livestock
unit for 4 ha and the minimum economic herd size is 125 livestock units. Therefore the minimum size
subdivision of the above classes (V, VI, and VII) should be 500 ha (1,250 acres). This should be taken as a
guide as each farm will need to be considered individually. For instance, if a proper subdivision only covers
class V (dambo), then even 551 ha will not be viable as cattle will have nowhere to graze during the rainy
season when the dambo is too wet for cattle grazing.
5. The units to be subdivided should remain large enough so that proper rotation and soil conservation
practices may be carried out. Moreover, very small units far away from Lusaka are considered to be
uneconomic. In addition, one should take into account the physical shape of the farm in relation to the arable
units before considering subdividing the farm. The implication here is that the physical shape of a farm will
ultimately influence the manner in which subdivisions should be carried out as well as taking into account the
positions of the arable units.
VI. Demand for leasehold properties
A. Current registrations and lease transfers
Despite intentions to increase the number of leaseholds nationwide, the number of titles has
plateaued in recent years. The number of new title issuances ranged from 1,491 to 1,757 annually
between 1990 and 1992 (table 1.9). (More recent and complete data at the provincial and national
levels are represented in chapter 3.) The MOL reports that these figures are down somewhat from
earlier years, but nonetheless it is not expected that the supply of new titles would increase
substantially from these levels due to capacity constraints. Surrenders of title or repossessions by the
state for reasons of death or failure to meet land use plans or pay rents has been steadily increasing,
from 219 in 1990 to 281 in 1992. Assignments or transfers of existing leases have also been steadily
increasing, from 845 in 1990 to 1,242 in 1992. These data shed some doubt on the hypothesis that
transfer fees and subdivision policy are absolutely constraining transfers. As the pool of existing leases27
expands with registration, the demand for reissuing leases via surrenders or assignments will place
ever greater demands on the registry.
Table 1.9: Issuances, transfers, and mortgages of leases, 1990 to 1992
1989 1990 1991 1992
Issuance of state leases (including reserve leases) 1,491 1,757 1,701
Surrenders and certificates of reentry 219 203 281
Assignments (transfers of leases) 845 924 1,242
Mortgagee' 879 707 677 692
Agricultural charges 10,947 1,530 517 2,137
a. Total value of mortgages was K809.7 million in 1989, K695.1 million in 1990, and K653.2 million in 1991.
Source: MOL.
Unfortunately, lack of time series data on official transfer fees preclude any analysis of the
elasticity or inelasticity of land transfers (how transfers change with adjustments in the level of transfer
fees). A high elasticity would imply a strong positive response to a reduction in transfer fees
(elaborated on in chapter 4), a negative response would imply only a limited potential land market
response, perhaps due to subdivision policy. Without such an analysis, only weak conclusions can be
drawn from the data in table 1.9: land transfers (assignments) are low. While subdivision policy may
be constraining land markets, it is not an absolute constraint as transfers appear to be easing with time.
(Ministry officials note that many if not most subdivisions have been approved in recent years;
landholders taking excessive time to work through the various administrative procedures, however,
may be dissuading potential market participants from selling land.)
At present, there are between 70,000 to 100,000 titles issued nationwide (MOL estimates).
Most are residential properties, but a large number are agricultural properties, mainly registrations
by "emerging" and "medium-scale" farmers (see chapter 3). New applications for title brought forward
to the Land Allocation Committee" provide a fairly good indication of the overall split between
agricultural and non-farm demands for title. During the first 5 months of 1993, a total of 2,486
applications for title were made to the councils: 58.5 percent were for residential property, 33.7
percent for agricultural property, 7.3 percent for commercial and industrial property, and 0.5 percent
other. (See chapter 3 for a more complete and detailed regional breakdown.) Of the agricultural
leasehold applications, over 71 percent originated in the councils located in the urban and peri-urban
settings of Lusaka and Copperbelt provinces. Whether this demand stems from higher population
densities, nearer access to the registry, greater demand for tenure security, or enhanced credit access
is not possible to sort out from existing data.
B. Potential leasehold demand
The above estimates of current lease issuances and transfers reflect only the "flow" of work
by the MOL and exclude lease applications in process and known future demands. Besides the 1,750
13 This agency appears to be fulfilling the functions of the board in the Agricultural Lands Act.28
or so leases issued annually by the government, the MOL estimates that it has a current backlog of
30,000 applications in various stages. Based on the number of lease applications brought forward to
the councils (table 1.10), applications are currently coming in at a rate of 6,000 per annum. In
addition, the MOL foresees a large increase in the demand for title: 17,658 new registrations of
small-scale and medium-scale farms on planned farmlands (on an area of roughly 730,350 hectares)
mainly along the Tazara corridor; 6,210 cases of pending titles in settlement schemes on 338,700
hectares; and 1,020 titles on an area of 59,390 hectares associated with land demarcation surveys done
in 1992 (internal MOL data). Another 18,000 titles are envisioned associated with the survey and
settlement of smallholders on parastatal farms currently being considered for privatization in Lusaka,
Central, and Northern provinces.
Table 1.10: Lease applications brought forward to district councils,
1 January to 31 May 1993
Residential Commercial Industrial Agricultural Others
Northern 63 7 - 25 1
Luapula 19 7 25 1
Central 218 13 1 85
Southern 144 37 1 58 2
Lusaka - 477 -
Eastern 70 10 2 30 2
North-Western 30 5 9
Western 120 8 1 8
Copperbelt 190 33 12 122 3
Lusaka 600 30 15 - 2
Total 1,454 150 32 839 11
Source: MOL.
As with the administration of the Land Acquisitions Act, there are widespread rumors of graft
and corruption in the leasehold process extending from the chiefs up to the MOL. Regardless of
whether these claims are true, the situation where demand for title is greatly outpacing the system's
capacity to process leaseholds creates a fertile environment for those with influence or wealth to abuse
the system, as has been the case under the sporadic registrations systems in southern Uganda before
1975 and in Somalia throughout the 1980s. While the average time to process an application according
to the MOL is 2-3 years at present, these estimates are biased in that they count only those leases that
ultimately get issued and not the ones that have remained in the system for much longer without being
processed. Under current conditions, many applications may never result in title.
C. Factors influencing demand for title
Why such a large demand for title? Two reasons, sometimes inseparable, are repeatedly
mentioned by official sources: the demand of the leaseholder for enhanced tenure security for
investment; and the greater security afforded to lenders of capital from title as collateral.29
1. Tenure insecurity and investment demand in Zambia
Until independence, chiefs held responsibility for all land in the Reserve and Trust areas. With
the nationalization of land after independence, the chiefs lost most of their legal responsibilities for
land allocation, although they retained some status as titular heads. The government in 1985, partly
to gain favor with the chiefs and partly in recognition of their custodianship of customary law and
rights, decided in practice that the chiefs ought to be formally consulted on decisions of leasehold
matters (SECTION V.B). Formerly, an individual wishing land, would go to his or her native village
or parents' village and ask the chief for an allocation. This process appears to be no longer possible
in many areas for two reasons.
► Ties between the urban population and the chiefs have weakened considerably with time.
Children, whose parents and grandparents are one or more generations removed from rural
life, in some cases find that chiefs no longer recognize their traditional rights to land and in
other cases simply do not want to subject themselves to the chiefs authority. Applicants are
requesting land allocations from the MOL partially for convenience, cost, freedom of control,
and the assistance they get in finding new land.
► Colonization and state nationalization of land have undermined the chiefs  role in the
customary tenure system, particularly in the peri-urban area, and further created ambiguity
regarding who holds ultimate responsibility for land allocation. Individuals seeking land to
establish a commercial farm or a game ranch are directed by the MOL to the chiefs and rural
councils. Chiefs in certain areas are willing to designate lands, but other chiefs who have seen
their control over land erode with time lack the willingness to do so. Once allocations are
made by the chiefs, the MOL still maintains the right to disapprove any contract negotiated.
Very little rigorous empirical work has been done on the issue of tenure security in Zambia.
Examples are reported, however, of people being unwilling to invest in the land because of concerns
that the chief will reallocate or sell the land of a current holder to another. Inheritance law under the
indigenous system also appears to confer tenure insecurity, in that the landholder does not have
assurance that land or property can be passed onto kin. In one case reported by his son, the father who
lived on the land for more than 20 years one day discovered that the chief had sold the entire farm
to an outsider. The son tried to register the land as a leaseholder to keep the sale from going through
but without success. Two other cases have been reported where chiefs sold large blocks (one of 56,000
hectares, the second of 14,000 hectares) of land to outside investors. In both cases the sale failed to
materialize because of the land ceiling imposed by the district authorities when the buyers tried to
register the land. Nevertheless, such occurrences can have a ripple effect on communities throughout
the region.
Some individuals, having established residences, become concerned about the possible loss of
their home and improvements in the land. The steep investments required to open new lands—land
clearing, boreholes, fencing, and buildings for livestock and place of residence—increase the felt need
for title to increase security of rights. In addition to investors' inability to acquire land, those who
manage to borrow land from fellow villagers fear that the land can be grabbed back by the owners
without notice of justification (see, for example, the following article published in the Zambia Daily
Mail, 1994).30
For a long time, would-be investors in Western province have been complaining about
the tenure system which they accuse of failing them to acquire land for
development....For those who manage to borrow land from fellow villagers, [the]
possibility of the owners...grabbing [it] back is more than 80 per cent. [A]
teacher...complained that the land...he had borrowed was later grabbed from him by
the owner.... [A]fter a successful season which saw his family harvest quite a number
of bags of rice, the owner suddenly withdrew the land on the pretext that his family
was under land pressure....[D]espite these rigidities,...certain influential individuals
have broken the barrier and [claimed]...massive pieces of land.
It is certainly a matter of concern that borrowers are feeling insecure in their rights, but
lenders as owners are within their rights to repossess the land. The more important issue is the lack
of long-term transfer rights and contracts that provide security for both lender and borrower. It also
is difficult to assess from the anecdotal evidence whether the landholders being evicted are local
inhabitants or recent arrivals. All that is evident is that certain landholders are experiencing tenure
insecurity under customary tenure arrangements. In other instances, land grabbing by outsiders,
sometimes armed with official titles, is precipitating tenure insecurity in rural areas as illustrated in
the following article (Daily Mail, 14 January 1994):
In Zambia...land is being dished out to foreigners and investors without considering
the long-term consequences such action will have on the people ....Zambia has entered
a phase where land grabbing is escalating at an alarming rate....In Chief Kabamba's
area, for instance, Serenje district council has already given out 4,800 hectares of land
to a South African investor on grounds...this will bring development to the district....
North-Western province which is probably the richest in terms of forest resources is
said to be attracting many foreign investors....Traditionally,...people managed
agriculture based on land rotation.... However, things have been changing over the last
few years. People from outside the province are coming to stake claims to land in the
name of development and local people cannot fight Lusaka businessmen or South
African investors.
There is no doubt that tenure insecurity is occurring in some cases where title is absent in
Zambia. But that question in itself is not sufficient to encourage widespread titling. The spotty and
anecdotal information available simply isn't detailed enough to determine whether the insecurity is
arising in the more densely populated areas, in instances of high or rapid commercial development,
on the expanding frontier of the agricultural zone, or whether title itself may in some cases be
generating the tenure insecurity through improper adjudication of rights.
Three sources of tenure insecurity thus seem to be present or at risk of occurring. First, the
leasehold system itself is the cause of large land allocations to outsiders that, when driven by pressures
to "privatize," can result in tenure insecurity for those lacking title or the means to acquire it. Second,
there is the misadministration of the customary sector by some chiefs on Reserve and Trust Lands,
characterized by chiefs allocating or selling large tracts of land to outsiders, chiefs reallocating or
selling land of existing claimants to a higher bidder or someone with influence, or chiefs preventing
one from bequeathing land to heirs or otherwise preventing the transfer of land to another. Third,
there is the potential risk of conflict between registered and customary systems. Sporadic titling
systems relying on voluntary registration are susceptible to generating landlessness or displacement
of rights by existing holders, particularly in situations of rising land value, acute land scarcity, and31
situations where the state is either unable (due to fiscal constraints or excessive work) or unwilling
to completely adjudicate all rights of landholders.
2. Credit access
It is difficult to conclude from the data on existing mortgages and agricultural charges placed
on titles that registration has had a significant effect on credit access. Agricultural charges include
credit issued under the Agricultural Act for crops and farm implements. Mortgages include credit
disbursed for land purchase and long-term capital improvements. As indicated in table 1.9, mortgages
where title was secured for collateral generally remained stagnant or declined from 1989 to 1992,
ranging from a high of 879 to a low of 677. Agricultural charges have varied widely. From a high
of 10,947 charges in 1989, the total dropped to 517 in the drought year of 1991, before rebounding
to 2,137 in 1992. Compared with the total number of commercial farms nationwide (145,170 in 1989,
table 1.4), the number of agricultural charges does not seem particularly impressive. However,
compared with the 740 large-scale farms which likely possess title, the data would suggest a strong
linkage between title and credit access. Which farms are acquiring the credit is a crucial question.
There is no doubt that perceptions of title being needed to gain access to credit has been an
important factor driving leasehold demand. Discussions with two agricultural lending banks give some
insight into the perceived importance of title in enhancing credit access.
Lima Bank is a state bank with no private capital or private investors. Its principle operating
objective is disbursing agricultural credit to increase production and incomes in rural areas. Credit is
predominantly given to small farmers; 96 percent of the total clients are small farming units, 3 percent
are medium-scale farming units, and 1 percent are large-scale commercial farming units. In the current
year, the bank disbursed K8 billion of credit, 85 percent being short-term seasonal loans, 10 percent
medium-term loans and 5 percent long-term loans. Sixty percent of this credit went to roughly 18,000
smallholders nationwide. The remaining 40 percent was disbursed to roughly 3,000 medium- and
large-scale farmers. Demand for credit increased sharply around 1980 with the increase in the large
number of "emergent" farmers entering commercial agriculture. While the bank used to extend credit
without title as collateral, and still does to a limited extent, it is now reaching the point where title is
a prerequisite. In normal years, the bank experiences 30 percent loan losses on its seasonal loans, one
half of which is usually recovered through legal action, late repayments, or foreclosures on property.
Rarely has the bank had to engage in foreclosures, however. For those loans secured by title,
titleholders are reportedly extremely reluctant to part with the title once they have it and resort to
other sources to pay back loans. In the 1970s, the bank had to advertise foreclosed farms for sale or
auction. However, because of a very robust land market, the bank no longer has to advertise. A list
of potential buyers is maintained by the bank that is purportedly much longer than the supply of
foreclosed properties, and properties are liquidated quickly.
14
The Zambia National Commercial Bank has the backing of 98 percent public capital and 2
percent private capital from shareholders. The bank's agricultural portfolio is smaller than that of
" Whether this process of foreclosing on farms is good or bad is not easy to assess. There is always the possibility that farms
are resold to insiders and those with political influence. One wonders whether properties should not be foreclosed via an auction,
even if fair market value is not paid, to minimize the potential for corruption and any appearance of impropriety. Separate
sources in the ministry indicated that foreclosures were in fact nearly impossible to achieve.32
Lima Bank and has been erratic in recent years due to the drought. About K2.8 billion were disbursed
in the last agricultural season. Of this total, roughly 60 percent went to 120 large commercial and
corporate farmers, and roughly 40 percent to 1,025 smallholders and 52 "emerging" commercial
smallholders (table 1.12). All credit has a 5-year term or less to minimize exposure to inflation.
Defaults vary in the vicinity of 15 percent in normal to good years, but can be 40 percent or worse
in drought years (as occurred in 1989-91) (table 1.11). Most of the credit being extended to
smallholders is not secured by title. Rather, the individual's credit history is the principle guarantee.
For newcomers, credit will initially be disbursed for seasonal inputs sufficient for 2 hectares of land
(approximately K250,000 for a package of inputs). If repayment is made, the borrower is eligible to
increase the size of borrowing the next season to an amount sufficient to buy inputs for 4 hectares,
and so on up to around 40 hectares. Beyond that size limit, more intensive capital inputs (i.e.,
tractors) are generally needed and the bank is reluctant to extend such credit without title as collateral.
While smallholders do get access to credit without title, it takes a considerable number of years to
build the credit history and to reach medium commercial size.
Table 1.11: Direct agricultural financing, Zambia National Commercial Bank
Amount of credit Recovery rate
Number of clients (K1,000) (%)
1987/88 1,374 47,475 83
1988/89 2,340 110,000 87
1989/90 2,737 304,768 60
1990/91 1,238 391,493 65
1991/92 1,140 743,552 45
1992/93 1,197 2,825,402
Source: Zambia National Commercial Bank.
In the past, banks were able to effect charge and stop orders that enabled the bank to claim
the crop in the field to ensure repayment, or to place a lien on crop sales at the local cooperative.
With market liberalization, however, farmers have the freedom to sell where they wish, greatly
reducing the effectiveness of such orders as collateral. Title's role in guaranteeing credit has increased
as a result. Title helps to secure the loan in case of default. Even without foreclosure, the landholder
is unable to go to another bank to get credit as long as the title is held by the former bank. Sooner
or later, the borrower will have to repay the loan to regain borrowing status.
Both banks expressed the need to help the rural population for sake of development and, no
doubt, partially due to development mandates imposed by government. Both banks are expected to be
privatized soon. It would be difficult to predict how the agricultural component in either bank's
portfolio will fare after privatization. Both banks have reported sizable defaults in recent years, yet
both report profitable operations from their agricultural lending activities. It is difficult to see how the
Lima Bank, which charges 47 percent interest on its loans, can earn income in an inflation
environment well in excess of 100 percent, along with the 15 percent losses reported earlier. Either
lending operations are being subsidized through indirect transfers from the state or its capital base is
eroding. On the positive side, both banks feel that land title is a strong form of guarantee and that a
strong land market enables easy liquidation of foreclosed property, thereby reducing lending costs.33
Table 1.12: Credit by number of farms, Zambia National Commercial Bank
Total farming
units (#) SSF (#) ECF (N) LCF (N) C (#)
1987/88 1,374 1,266 - 100 5 3
1988/89 2,340 2,142 180 10 8
1989/90 2,737 2,500 200 20 17
1990/91 1,239 1,100 84 38 16
1991/92 1,140 1,015 60 45 20
1992/93 1,197 1,025 52 79 41
SSF =small scale farmers. ECF =emergent commercial farmers. LCF=large commercial farms. C=corporate
companies.
Source: Zambia National Commercial Bank.
These structural developments in the financial market have important implications for future
title demand. Should agricultural lending by banks stagnate in the new private market era, then a
strong case can be made for the emergence of credit rationing to titleholders. In Kenya, for example,
it is nearly impossible to get an agricultural loan without title, but roughly 2 percent of titleholders
get credit. Once one moves out of the registered former white highlands in Kenya, and the areas of
large-scale commercial farming, the use of commercial credit declines sharply for a number of
reasons: economies of size in mechanization and demand for intensive capital investment by large
farms; the diseconomies associated with smallholders gaining access to credit; and the difficulty banks
have had in foreclosing on leasehold properties in rural areas. There are preliminary indications that
credit demand is beginning to outpace credit supply in Zambia. While Lima Bank, for example,
extended K8 billion in credit in the last season, it received applications for more than K20 billion.
Should the pace of title issuances outpace the growth in credit supply, future credit access will
depend heavily on three factors: title ownership, farm size, and non-farm incomes or other forms of
collateral that banks might use as a guarantee. Larger farms with title and other sources of capital will
continue to get credit. But small "emerging" farmers will be squeezed on the one hand by tenure
insecurity from lack of title (due to administrative bottlenecks), and on the other by lack of capital that
is necessary to undertake the land improvements to make farming profitable.
VII. Proposed land policy reforms
A. MMD Manifesto
The MMD government in its manifesto called for the following reforms in its land policy:
The MMD shall institutionalize a modern, coherent, simplified and relevant land law
code intended to ensure the fundamental right to private ownership of land as well as
to be an integral part of a more efficient land delivery system. To this end an MMD
government will address itself to the following fundamental land issues. A review of
the Land (Conversion of Titles) Acts of 1975 and 1985, the Trust Lands and Reserves
Orders-in-Council of 1928-1947, the Land Survey Act, and the Town and Country34
Planning Act, in order to bring about a more efficient and equitable system of tenure
conversion and land allocation in customary lands; land adjudication legislation will
be enacted and be co-ordinated in such a way that confidence shall be restored in land
investors; the land planning system and related legislation shall evolve such land
strategy as not only to merge Reserve and Trust Lands, but also to meet varied
development needs in the country. The MMD government will attach economic value
to undeveloped land, encourage private real estate agency business, promote the
regular issuance of title deeds to productive landowners in both rural and urban areas,
and clear the backlog of cadastral surveys and mapping.
B. Ministry of Lands proposal
In response to the policy directives issued by the MMD government, the MOL in the
document "National Conference on Land Policy and Assistance From The Donor Community in the
Implementation of Proposed Projects" proposes to strengthen the operations of the Lands and Survey
departments through reorganization, increasing capacity, staff training, and identifying more land for
development. The government is giving very high priority to the issuance of title deeds to facilitate
its program of privatization and liberalization. The cabinet has already approved a proposal for
amendments of land laws and a change in land policy to make land easily available to both local and
foreign investors. Real estate agencies should be allowed to operate freely in bringing buyers and
sellers together. It is the government's policy also to increase revenue; in accordance with this aim,
monetary value for land will be introduced by charging an economic ground rent on leasehold
property. It is envisioned that an efficient land registration system and proper records would simplify
conveyancing procedures and issuance of title deeds and facilitate revenues. Only 4 percent of the
nation's land area is on the register. The MOL is actively seeking or identifying land within urban,
peri-urban, and rural areas to meet the surging demand for land nationwide. In essence, the
government's policy is to amend the land laws and decentralize the functions of both the Lands and
Survey departments to facilitate issuance of title deeds.
1. Land tenure reforms
The MOL, in a 10th September 1993 memorandum, "Amendment to Land Laws," has drafted
amendments to the Land Titles Act and the Lands and Deeds Registry Act. There is need to update
and modernize legislation, instill greater harmony in the laws, remove inconsistencies, and create a
more unified body of legislation. What remains to be done, according to the MOL, is the drafting of
new land laws after existing laws have been reviewed and, most importantly, to see through their
implementation in the next three to four years.
2. Decentralization
The Lands Department now consists of two separate units: the Commissioner of Lands' Office
and the Lands and Deeds Registry. The forger's function is to allocate land while the latter's main
function is to register documents and issue certificates of title. The bottlenecks in issuance and transfer
of land title stem from three sources: (1) delays in application from the councils to the central registry;
(2) delays and costs associated with channeling leases through one central registry in the country; and
(3) onerous leasehold procedures. The MOL proposed that both functions of land allocation and
registration be decentralized to two additional sites in the next five years. A regional office has
recently been set up in Ndola in the Copperbelt to cater to the four provinces in the northern half of35
the country. By 1994, it is proposed that another regional office be established in Lusaka for the five
provinces in the southern half of the country. By 1995, a third fully decentralized office is planned
for either Kasama or Chipata. A direct link will need to be established between the decentralized
offices and the central registry. Assistance is requested by the ministry in the form of equipment,
computer software, staff training, and personnel. As it would be impossible to transfer all documents
from the current central registry to the regional offices, it is proposed that a system be developed
whereby relevant documents and title deeds can be scanned and information stored in optical memory
connected to a desktop computer.
15 The MOL is requesting workstations, laser printers, scanner,
modems, desktop computers, photocopy machines, facsimile machines, typewriters, safes, cabinets,
and other office equipment.
3. Land identification body
An urgent need is felt by the MOL to create a formal body with committees in all the
provinces to carry out the function of land identification for future agricultural expansion. This body,
at both headquarters and provinces, would comprise senior members from the relevant ministries and
departments. The body would also be expected to advise on general land policy matters. A section
within the Lands Department would be needed for the demarcation of identified land and the
preparation of layout plans. The MOL further hopes that through an act of parliament, legal powers
will be granted to strengthen the body's role in coordinating and implementing such a land
identification program.
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4. Personnel, training, coordination, and implementation
Trained labor will be needed to operate and manage the system of decentralized offices and
the computer-aided registry system. At present, only three public and seven private licensed surveyors
(plus or minus one or two) can be found nationwide. A program is envisioned that trains both existing
staff and new recruits. The government has already committed to doubling the size of the MOL's staff.
Additional financial assistance is requested of donors to support a project coordinator and
implementor, an experienced land lawyer, two officer's experienced in land management and land law
to assist on short term consultancy, one officer experienced in estates management to establish an
estate management section with a view to generating revenue from fixing rents on land, and one
officer qualified in surveying methods and making plans for identification of land for issuance of title
deeds. The principal aim is to find a suitable, cheaper, but reliable method of leasehold registration.
Scholarships and training are needed in land administration, land valuation, planning and surveying,
and land laws and registration. Vehicles are needed. Finally, additional assistance is required for
short-term consultancies, seminars, and conferences.
C. 1993 Land Policy Conference
The National Conference on Land Policy and Legal Reform (20-22 July 1993) specified a
number of reforms, some of which required immediate action while others were to take place over
many years. The MMD called for immediate repeal of Act No. 15 of 1985 which prohibited land from
15 The rationale for this is unclear. Records in the registry systems of most developed and developing countries are
decentralized.
16 Chapter 2 discusses in some detail the concerns associated with this proposal.36
being granted, transferred, alienated, or leased to non-Zambians, and repeal of Section 10 of the 1975
Land Act which stated that bare land per se has no commercial value (Place and Twinomukunzi
1993)27)17 Furthermore, reentry of private real estate firms would be encouraged to improve land
market efficiency. Other reforms were proposed that would be initiated within a period of one year:
(a) Combine Reserve and Trust Land categories into a single customary land category; (b) allow for
uniform 99-year leaseholds on all land;
18 (c) identify unutilized land to be made available to all
investors;
19 (d) permit mortgaging and leasehold transfers of one year to take place without
presidential consent; (e) formally recognize customary rights;
ZO (f) increase the rent or tax charged
on leaseholds; (g) extend an automatic renewal of 99-year leaseholds provided that lease conditions
are met; (h) facilitate requests for leaseholds in customary land; (i) allow for leaseholds of separate
units in buildings; and (j) repeal all undesirable land legislation and replace with two primary acts:
Land Act (covering State Land and Customary Land) and Registration Act. With respect to land
delivery, the MMD called for decentralization, creation of a land development fund (LDF) for local
public investment from ground rents, and acceptance of cheaper survey techniques.
A number of papers referred to "major land reforms" being undertaken in the longer run
without specifying their nature. The conference concluded with 10 resolutions or principles on land
tenure presented in figure 1.2 (the entire text of the resolutions is reproduced in annex 1.1 below).
 7 A lively debate followed on the issue of opening land to foreigners. Chiefs and church groups expressed serious concerns
about "truckloads" of foreigners seeking land and the risk of wealthy foreigners and rising land prices resulting in a high degree
of foreign land control.
18 Lengthy debates followed on the issue of leaseholds versus freehold. Many professionals and the Farmers' Union asserted
the need for freehold property to minimize insecurity as the expiration of the leasehold draws near, and out of distrust that
government would not keep its pledge for automatic renewal. Counter arguments were raised by nearly all political parties that
the freehold system would create dispossession for the poor, lead to excessive concentration of land holdings, and result in
underutilization of land. Fear of foreign control was a principal factor in support of leaseholds over freeholds.
19 Some participants argued that rights exist over almost all land in customary areas, and some chiefs questioned whether
land in customary areas can be found without disturbing villagers. The MMD assured the chiefs that villages would not be
disrupted, while at the same time chiefs were charged by government officials and the church as being greedy or uncooperative
in helping to locate land for resettlement or allocation.
20 One proposal from the Faculty of Law called for a Record of Rights in rural areas that would simply record existing rights
to land.37
Figure 1.2: Land tenure resolutions, 1993 Conference on Land Policy and Legal Reform
1.METHODOLOGY. Both short-term and long-term approaches are needed in tenure reform, for
example, seminars in the short term and establishment of a Commission of Enquiry in the longer
term. It is recommended that a working group be established immediately to devote more time to
the issues raised and that a permanent body be established over time.
2. CLASSIFICATION OF LAND. The classification of land should reflect both national and
customary interests and should consist of two classes: State Land and Customary Land. The tenure
should be a 99-year leasehold in State Land and the duration should vary according to intended use
in Customary Land.
3.REGISTRATION SYSTEMS. There should be a decentralization of both land administration and
surveys. There should also be continued computerization of title registration and the development
of a land information system.
4. ALLOCATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF LAND. The administration of land should be
improved through decentralization of activities. All relevant parties must be consulted prior to
undertaking decisions. Allocation boards should be established at the local level.
5. ROLE OF CHIEFS. The role of chiefs should be formally recognized and the government
should make efforts to enable them to better conduct their tasks.
6. LAW REFORM AND CONSOLIDATION OF LEGISLATION. The Orders in Council 1928-64
should be repealed. The Commissioner of Lands along with other selected participants should
identify all statutes related to land and review them for the purpose of revision. The outcome
should be a single bill dealing with land and another for registration.
7. STATUS OF WOMEN. The universal principle of equality for women and other disadvantaged
groups should be formally recognized.
8. SECURITY AND CREDIT. The government should explore the development of alternative
facilities to improve access to credit.
9. LAND UTILIZATION AND REGULATION. Professional assessments of land use should be
made on commercial and farming land. Land use rules should be enforced. Urban settlements
should be improved or relocated to alternative sites. Efforts should be made to improve conditions
in rural areas to mitigate migration. The Land Development Committee should be strengthened.
Taxation and rent charges should be used to discourage underutilization of land.
10. LAND VALUATION. The market should determine the price of land in State Land. In
Customary Land, valuation procedures should evolve according to local conditions.
D. Assessment
The government's proposal to liberalize the land market and expand the supply of leaseholds
is a sound policy. Leasehold tenure of 99 years, while less satisfactory than freehold tenure, can
provide adequate security for long-term investment and credit. However, leasehold will not confer the38
same sense of ownership as freehold property, and the concerns expressed by the Farmers' Union
about government expropriation without due process are reasonable. If the government is to adopt
leaseholds as its main land tenure instrument, then land use regulations and the Land Acquisition Act
need to be carefully rewritten to ensure that landholders do not perceive genuine risk of loss of
property. The resolutions in figure 1.2 are not comforting in this regard. Such resolutions as providing
leaseholds of variable duration in customary areas, making professional land assessments, and
enforcing land use rules act to create insecurity, increase the costs of farming, and create yet more
government bureaucracy in the land market. Eliminating land use conditions, levying an economic
ground rent pegged to market value, and reducing costs in the land market would act to reduce
speculation, increase land utilization, and reduce demands for government oversight of land
use—demands that it likely will never keep due to scarce resources.
It is extremely difficult to estimate the true demand for title as title acquisition in the past was
highly subsidized and linked with free land access—a policy environment conducive for anyone of
sound mind to request land title and a plot of land. Once ground rents are increased nearer to their
economic value and their collections are enforced with penalty of repossession upon default (after 3
years on non-payment), it would be expected that the current demand will be curtailed, and reentries
and surrenders will increase, a process that is already occurring. Nevertheless, demand-size policies
alone will not suffice; it is important to increase the efficiency of survey and registration services
through decentralization and administrative reforms.
The long overdue program of decentralization to the Ndola office and eventually to district
levels would help increase the supply of titles to smallholders and "emerging" small-scale farmers and
help reduce the costs and delays associated with registration at present. The institutional capacity for
land administration (land survey and registry systems) is weak. The current capacity is more or less
the same as that of the pre-independence era when the various ministries had only to deal with the
management of leaseholds on State Lands (6 percent of total land area). The MOL is now being asked
to extend its services to the Reserve and Trust Lands in all nine provinces. Staffing, facilities and
equipment simply are not sufficient for the MOL to expand its scope of operations to the entire
country (yet it is crucial that it does) or to keep pace with the flood of demand for new leaseholds
since independence. Actions will need to be taken to expand the staffing of public sector surveyors,
but there is also a critical need to expand private sector involvement in land surveying. The conference
resolutions again raise a number of concerns about the government's ability to reduce registration
delays. Such resolutions as "consulting all relevant parties prior to undertaking decisions" and
integrating chiefs into land matters, while politically necessary, run counter to the need to reduce steps
and streamline the process. Controls are necessary to ensure customary rights on land held under
customary law, but once land has been identified, the procedure for allocation and registration needs
to be considerably simplified.
In areas with higher population densities and a better-developed transportation network, the
customary tenure system does not appear to be providing the tenure security necessary for long-term
investment. Customary systems seemed to have weakened for three reasons: (1) rising land values,
increased competition for land, and increased rent-seeking by chiefs and others controlling land
allocation; (2) little incentive to make long-term improvements without clearly defined long-term land
use and testacy rights; and (3) increased central government control and reduced powers of local
leaders. While the extension of leasehold tenure is appropriate for these situations, the government
will need to deal with customary land rights outside leasehold areas, and carefully consider how to
minimize overlapping rights and conflicts between the customary and leasehold systems. Conflicts39
under a sporadic system of registration will inevitably arise and will worsen with increases in growth
of leasehold issuances. Customary systems in most rural areas are generally superior in ensuring a
subsistence livelihood and tenure security. But in practical terms, even with massive investments in
leasehold registration, government's long-term targets call for the registration of only 20 percent of
the nation's land area. The government has no other recourse but to design a strategy for strengthening
the ability of the customary system to govern the remaining lands. The recommendation of the MMD
government to move more slowly with land tenure reform in customary areas and to engage in a
long-term program of research to better understand customary land rights, transfers, and dispute
processes is a sound approach.
Although the State Lands will continue to draw attention to the necessity of intensifying the
productivity of existing cultivated area, the long-term future of Zambian agriculture lies in the far
more extensive Reserve and Trust Lands. Here resolution of the most fundamental tenure problems
will need to go hand in hand with major investments in public infrastructure and marketing. The real
challenge lies in planning the effective development of these lands. Land use surveys, community and
regional development plans, along with field research on land use patterns, management practices,
market access, and land tenure are needed. In addition, government will need a stronger revenue base
to provide the infrastructure necessary to open up rural areas and to plan the development of new
agricultural lands. Roads, schools, clinics, and utilities will be needed to either encourage urban
dwellers to move to more remote areas or to keep settlers on the land. To provide these funds, the
government proposes the establishment of the Land Development Fund (LDF) to support such
infrastructure and regional development.
21 Such development expenses would normally be provided
out of the central budget, but the limited size of the overall budget combined with overly restrictive
past allocations to the MOL has forced the ministry to rethink ways to raise revenues and earmark
funds for development. The funds would be derived from economic ground rents charged on leasehold
property. Much more thought needs to be given to such issues as the structure of land taxes/rents
nationwide, valuation of property in the absence of well-functioning markets, and fiscal management
to ensure accountability and transparency.
The government sees itself as a facilitator of development. It envisions an increase in the
number of titles nationwide from roughly 70,000 to 100,000 at present to somewhere in the range of
500,000 to 1,000,000. No long-term date has been set for achieving this target. Eighty percent of
these titles would fall in the peri-urban zone and 20 percent in rural commercial areas. Opening the
rural areas would require money for land clearing, construction of roads, extending utilities, and the
provision of boreholes, clinics, and schools. The experience of past settlement schemes has apparently
been one of some settlers returning to the city because of lack of adequate physical and social
infrastructure. The urban population, now accustomed to the amenities of urban living, cannot be
expected to move easily to rural areas. The government thus sees its role as creating an enabling
environment in rural areas and providing incentives to help families move.
The proposal to increase the economic ground rent to support the state in opening new lands
and in paying for physical infrastructure is an area of concern. Any form of annual rent increases the
21 Rents on current leaseholds are reportedly approaching K1 billion per annum. By increasing the number of leaseholds from
70,000 to 500,000 or 1,000,000, the MOL envisions the potential for generating huge financial resources that can then be
directed to develop rural infrastructure and open new lands. The costs of leasehold issuances and rent collection would have to
be kept modest relative to revenue generation for such a surplus to occur. A financial analysis is advised to assess the viability
of such a system.40
disincentives for registering land or re-registering transfers of leasehold property. The use of leasehold
rents to pay for general rural development expenditures imposes on leaseholders a disproportionate
share of the cost burden. There is further risk of double taxation resulting from ground rents and
property taxes being levied on the same piece of property (chapter 4). The MOL may be correct in
arguing that it now has a record-keeping system that makes a land-based tax feasible, and at a lower
administrative cost than alternative forms of taxation. However, these claims should be discounted and
a push made for a more careful and general review of the tax system (of which the land tax would be
a part), for an evaluation of alternative approaches for financing rural development, and for a general
institutional review of agencies (including the rural councils) and their appropriate roles in tax
collection and expenditures. In the end, the MOL may play a greater role in tax collection, but every
attempt should be made to divorce the land rent for purposes of enhancing property rights from
general taxation of land value.
The MOL's plan to pay up front the costs of developing new lands then recouping the costs
through annual leases is problematic on another front. The leaseholder would bear none of the
development costs, or at least would be required to put little personal capital into the holding. Once
the title is in hand, the leaseholder is eligible for short- to medium-term credit. Should the banks
foreclose, the government or the bank is left bearing all the costs of land development, while the
leaseholder gains tremendous financial leverage from investing little or no personal capital in the land.
Rather than amortizing the development costs into the lease rent, a strong argument can be made for
auctioning properties to recoup part of the development expense from the land purchaser up front.
Such a policy would limit land demand, but would help minimize risks of land speculation solely for
the purpose of increasing credit access.
VIII. Proposed actions
A. Land tenure reforms
There is wide consensus within government of the need for land tenure reform to increase
private sector development, private and foreign investment, and capitalization of the farm and
non-farm sectors. The existing land legislation needs to be comprehensively reviewed with the overall
aim of simplifying the legislation, achieving a more unified body of legislation, and identifying
fundamental changes necessary to facilitate the development of the land market. Indicative changes,
that are by no means exhaustive, are outlined below:
Zambia (State Land and Reserves) Orders, 1928 to 1964. This act as currently written
suffers from at least three major deficiencies. First, while it addresses the role of district councils and
the conversion of land into leasehold property, it administratively ignores the land rights of natives
and nonnatives to customary lands outside of leased land. Second, the term "native" is ambiguous and
difficult to argue in a court of law. Third, restrictions limiting leasehold property of charitable
organizations to 33 years and nonnatives to 5 years of occupancy does not provide sufficient duration
for long-term investments or planning. In addition, the Commercial Farmers Bureau raises concerns
about the commissioner's powers to set legal area maximums on leasehold property. The ceiling of
250 hectares, according to the Bureau, is too small for large-scale commercial farming, particularly
for beef cattle or game ranching. The central issue that government must address is whether it wishes
to control the size of farms, particularly if the demand for land by foreigners increases in response
to current Zambian policies aimed at attracting foreign investment.41
Land (Conversion of Titles) Act of 1975. Currently, the State Land and Reserve Orders
govern the tenure on Reserve and Trust Land while the Conversion of Titles Act governs the tenure
on State Land. There is need to both modernize this legislation and to create one comprehensive act
dealing with land in State, Reserve, and Trust areas. Several specific changes are also in order: (1)
customary rights on non-leasehold land in the Reserves and Trust lands need to be articulated,
including the role of chiefs; (2) greater attention needs to be given to issues of dispute resolution;
currently, disputes can only be taken to the high court creating administrative bottlenecks; (3)
provisions preventing the valuing of land (i.e., permitting value to be charged on only the unexhausted
value of improvements) need to be revised to permit the market to establish land prices for
determining "fair" and "just" compensation and for setting lease rents; (4) any restrictions on land
transfers need to be thoroughly reviewed with the aim of liberalizing land markets including
abolishment of presidential consent; (5) as a term lease of 99 years is usually quite sufficient for
long-term tenure security as long as use conditions are not attached to the lease, it is recommended
that land use conditions be eliminated; and (6) careful consideration should be given to a
progressive system of rents/taxes on leases to prevent excessive land accumulation and land
underutilization.
zi
Land Registry Act and Survey Act. The current legislation lays out rigorous survey
standards for preparing maps for leases. Attention is currently given to consideration of new
technologies (general boundaries surveys approach, modern computer and GPS mapping) to reduce
surveying costs and to speed surveying time. First, legislation will need to be updated to accommodate
these new technologies. Second, a legal base is needed that will accommodate registration of
documents by computer and introducing and enabling the registration of separate units of blocks of
flats or offices (sectional registrations). Third, the problem of the 14-year leasehold will need to
addressed. Either the relaxed survey requirements need to be provided for in the legislation (i.e.,
permitting simpler sketch maps), or eliminated to unify leaseholds around a standard 99-year lease.
Fourth, the duration of the 14-year lease should be increased, preferably to 99 years.
Land Acquisition Act. The sweeping powers granted to the president should be reduced, and
the rights of landholders clarified and strengthened to reduce abuses associated with land expropriation
(and on the basis of "unreasonably" low compensation) that occurred in the past. Compulsory
acquisitions for the public good should be based on willing buyer/willing seller provisions, and should
provide for right of appeal.`
Subdivision policy. Because policies aimed at curbing subdivisions tend to restrict the land
market, this study would tend to repeal any subdivision legislation that may exist. However, should
there be valid reasons for government monitoring and control of subdivisions, the onus should be on
' The National Lands Committee, in its 27 April 1994 comment to this report, maintains that such land use covenants are
essential and should even be fortified. Furthermore, lease renewal should not be automatic but instead based on fulfillment of
the covenants contained in the lease.
23 The MOL sees also the need for a provision enabling the land development fund. A strong case has not yet been made
why such a fund is needed versus funneling ground rents through the central government to be allocated along with other public
funds. See chapter 4 for further elaboration on the strengths and weaknesses of this proposal.
24 The Land Committee, in its comments to this report of 27 April 1994, proposes that the act be modified so that: the only
land to be repossessed is that required for public use or a national scheme; the lessee is served with adequate notice, at least
6 months; the compensation should be based on the current market value of the land; and the appeal should be with the Supreme
Court where it has not been resolved in the lower courts.42
government to provide the resources to make the appraisals on a timely basis, and a limited time frame
should be specified in the regulations for completing its decision, barring which the landholder has
the right to move forward with the transaction. Clear and verifiable data should be kept on number
of applications, and the number and location of approvals and rejections. Should the data indicate a
constrained land market, a very strong case would have to be made for retaining such a policy.
It is remarkable that Zambia is still working with land, property, and inheritance laws that are
based on 1911 English law that even the British saw fit to reform in 1925. In addition to the above
legislation, an entire replacement is needed of the Conveyancing Acts, Statute of Frauds, Probate and
other inheritance laws, laws of Property Act, Chancery Amendment Act, Common Law Procedure
Act, and Laws of Equity, Married Women's Property Act, and Land Registration Act, among others.
Land tenure reforms resulting in amendments to a few provisions is not the answer. Rather, a
wholesale revamping and modernizing of the entire set of antiquated property, inheritance, and
registration laws is needed. In addition, careful reviews need to be made of the Town and Country
Planning Act, Local Government Act, Forestry Act, Landlord Tenants Acts, Law of Succession, and
Power of Attorneys Act.
There is a temptation in light of the current atmosphere of policy reforms and desire for
private investment to rush forward with legal reforms. Such motivations, while understandable, are
fraught with risk. Land tenure, particularly in the customary areas, is a sensitive issue, and sound
policy advice is hampered by a dearth of field-level research. A number of key amendments to existing
legislation in the short-run are advised (e.g., amendments permitting land to have value, converting
leases to 99-years in duration, and easing subdivision requirements). However, focusing too much on
short-term changes runs the risk of undermining the process of wholesale reforms that are needed, and
misdirecting energies away from producing a comprehensive and quality body of legislation. Already,
draft legislation has been prepared by several groups in Zambia in absence of careful review,
advisement, and consensus building. The current rush to adopt a few key amendments has opened the
door for various ministries to push amendments and legal changes based on self-interest (e.g., relaxing
restrictions on foreign ownership to increase private capital investment). Meanwhile the MOL feels
compelled to undertake reforms that dispel notions that it is sitting idle on land matters. This situation
has all the makings for bad policy: dispersion of land functions among multiple agencies, multiple
ministries suggesting legal reforms, widespread demands for immediate policy changes and quick
fixes, a sense of urgency, a ministry that feels compelled to act, and basic disagreements between
central and local authorities regarding responsibilities in land policy.
The approach recommended by the World Bank is probably the best strategy under the
circumstances: adopt a few key amendments to free up the land market in the State Lands (permitting
land to have value, facilitating subdivision and real estate transactions, reducing land and property
taxes). These legal actions would be followed by a more gradual period of research in state lands and
customary areas, institutionalization of a land policy and research unit, increasing the capacity for land
delivery, and carefully designing and promulgating a comprehensive set of legislation over a four to
five year period.
A gradual approach is not likely to appeal to the business community. The MOL must
currently bear the brunt of accusations that it is dragging its feet on land policy matters—an
environment that is far from conducive for setting thoughtful policy. It is recommended that
government assert the need for a longer-term approach, clearly specify a strategy for reforms, then
designate an interministerial committee to coordinate land policy and collectively bear the heat for not43
moving quickly on land reforms. This strategy is not intended to put foreign investment or private
commercial interests on hold. Land titles may still be issued to viable commercial interests and even
be given special treatment but in moderate measure, with transparency, and with careful monitoring.
A special body with wide powers for designing new legislation under wide advisement should
be appointed (e.g., the standing law reform commission, a land tenure reform commission, or the law
school) with the sole responsibility for drafting the new legislation. The current process whereby a
person or department designs and submits for review legislative acts is not the process of legal reforms
that this study recommends. Hearings and local workshops with interested parties should be held to
hear the views of citizens on land policy needs, legislation outside Zambia should be thoroughly
reviewed, legislation should be drafted, hearings and local workshops should again be held to review
the legislation, changes will again need to be made, and finally the legislation will have to be enacted.
This process, while requiring considerable effort, will stand a much better chance of developing a
policy that is acceptable to government, the people, and the business community alike, than the
top-down legislation that is easily enacted by government but is rendered ineffective by noncompliance
and illicit activity.
B. Land administration
Specific proposals on decentralization and land administration are presented in chapter 3, and
on land valuation, in chapter 4.
C. Research
The process of land tenure reform will need to be complemented by a program of
policy-relevant research. The below-mentioned research activities are indicative, and neither exhaustive
nor mutually exclusive. Chapter 3 covers further research issues related to land registration, chapter
4 on land markets, and chapter 7 on data.
1. Land tenure in customary lands. There is an inadequate understanding of land
rights, inheritance, dispute processes, land markets, and resource management in the customary areas
that will need to be alleviated before any legal changes affecting rural areas are considered. Detailed
field-level research is needed in different areas of the country and under various socioeconomic
contexts (peri-urban versus rural). Answers need to be sought to such indicative questions: Is tenure
security robust or weakening, and by whom, for whom, and where? Is tenure insecurity constraining
commercial and agricultural investment? To what extent are chiefs encumbering land transfers,
undermining security of transfers, or resisting title? To what extent is the expansion of the leasehold
system undermining the security of producers under customary arrangements? Do women and
minorities have equal and free access to land or are they constrained by customary norms and
traditions?
2. Land tenure at the periphery of titled areas. The conversion of customary land
into State Land represents a second priority area of research. Land is converted through the process
of sporadic land allocations and acquisitions, demarcations, and allocations of newly opened lands and
through resettlement schemes. It is at the periphery of these transfers that potential conflicts between
state and customary tenures will be evident and where equity issues will be most manifest. Priority
questions include: What are the characteristics of groups and individuals acquiring land in resettlement
schemes and newly opened farming areas? To what extent have women and minorities been able to44
participate in the land-acquisition process? What is the relationship between titling, agricultural
expansion, land utilization, productivity, and credit use?
3. Informal settlement. In addition to formal structured programs aimed at moving
people from urban to rural areas, spontaneous settlement is occurring through informal markets as
indicated by the rapid increase in small- to medium-scale emergent farmers. Land use planners in the
MOL contend that the result is irregular and dispersed settlements that increase private and social costs
in the longer run through inefficient land use, poor resource management, and higher land disputes
from encroachment. The highly aggregated CSO data would not provide sufficient detail on land
market processes or resulting land degradation problems should they exist. A rigorous program of
field study is required to evaluate rates of agrarian expansion, how land is being acquired, what
property rights are being transferred, whether tenures are secure, and how productivity and market
access compare with those people involved under more formal modes of settlement.
4. Productivity and resource management on newly opened lands. The ability to
function in the land market will depend on size and access to capital, thereby influencing the viability
of smaller farms. To the extent that title is increasing access to financial services and farm size is
enhancing access to markets and technology, targeted smallholder assistance would be required to
ensure land access and maintain competitiveness in the marketplace. High rates of land underutilization
and absenteeism on settlement schemes would suggest the need for measures to improve on settler
selection and to increase land utilization through land market reforms and enhanced market access.
Nowhere in the data available is there detailed information on types of agricultural activities, output,
input use or incomes of the settlers, or indicators of land resource conservation. Among priority
questions are the following: How do land use and market access vary among regions and farm-size
categories, and what factors explain the differences? To what extent is land underutilization and
productivity (customary and state areas) caused by land market constraints and inadequate property
rights to land and water versus other factors? What scale-economies exist in Zambian agriculture? Is
the expansion that is occurring from opening new lands resulting in unacceptable levels or risk of
environmental degradation? How are differences in resource access, technology, extension services,
input distribution, commodity marketing, and tenures affecting resource management?
5. Gender. The Zambian constitution or land legislation do not make explicit gender
biases. Nevertheless, there is anecdotal evidence suggesting voluntary or involuntary biases in land
administration under both formal and informal tenures that are affecting women's access to land, title,
land markets, and participation in settlement schemes. In-depth empirical research at all levels of land
administration is needed to assess the scope and depth of the gender problem. Biases may require
either explicit legal provisions ensuring and protecting women's rights, administrative changes in the
current process of formal land allocation and title, or special programs to assist women and minorities
in gaining access to land.45
Annex 1.1: Resolutions of the conference
I. Methodology
1. On the subject of Land Policy and Legal Reform, it is important to adopt short-term and
long-term approaches.
2. In the short term, use should be made of seminars, workshops, and random research
studies as a method of consultation.
3. In the long term, appointment of a commission of enquiry is a more appropriate and long
established method of exhaustively probing, by way of wider consultation, all pertinent
issues and problems relating to the subject of land.
4. In the current and urgent context of the exercise there is need to constitute a representative
group of about fifteen (15) from participants in this conference to devote a little more
attention to the issues raised in the papers presented and resolutions agreed to before
submitting fmal conclusions.
5. There is need of establishing a permanent body which would supervise, monitor, and study
recurrent issues relating to land on a more systematic and routine basis.
II. Classification of land type or interest and duration in customary land and state land
1. That it be recognized that historical and colonial considerations in the molding of the
current categories of land are out-dated, that therefore consideration be given to the
reclassification of land to serve contemporary needs and requirements of the country.
2. That the nature of the interest in the reclassified land tenure system reflect customary as
well as national interest thereof bearing in mind that interest in perpetuity may pose
problems of regulation and the reversion of the residue to the National State of Zambia.
3. That there be two classes of land, namely state land and customary land, and the respective
interests be a ninety-nine (99) year lease with provision for automatic renewal and
customary interests that can be subject to specific grants of specific durations to be
determined according to the purpose for which the grant is made.
III. Land registration system
1. There is need to strengthen the land registration system by decentralizing both the functions
of the Lands Department and Survey Department to the provincial level.
2. Multi-holding of land should be introduced to facilitate acquisition of sectional titles.
3. There is a need to develop a land information system.
4. There is need for legal provision to support computerized registration of titles.
IV. Allocation of land and land administration
1. The land allocation system be strengthened and improved upon through decentralization
of functions and powers of the Commissioner of Lands by provision of adequate personnel,
facilities, and resources.
2. In the allocation of land all relevant institutions and authorities be consulted to take part
in influencing decisions on the subject.
3. That in the customary land sector in particular, consultation should be extended to the
traditional authorities.
4. Land allocation boards be set up at provincial and district levels to advise on allocation of
land.
V. Role of chiefs
That the role of Chiefs in policy formulation and their participation in allocation of land in the
customary sector or domain be explicitly recognized and further provision, administrative or
otherwise, be made to enhance their participation in planning and development of land at both district
and provincial levels.46
(Annex 1.1: Resolutions of the conference, cont.)
VI. Law reform and consolidation of statutes relating to land
A. Minor amendments
1. State, Reserves, and Trust Land Orders of 1928-1964 be immediately repealed and a new
land bill initiated to take account of the new classification ofland and the interest therein.
2. That the Commissioner of Lands in consultation with all interested groups, in particular
the Ministry of Legal Affairs, Law Development Commission, and Law Association of
Zambia, identify all statutes relating to land which require immediate revision and effect
the necessary amendments.
B. Major law reform and policy
That a completed consolidation of Land Laws and Statutes be undertaken culminating in
a comprehensive land bill and land registration bill discarding all outstanding anomalies.
VII. Status of women and vulnerable groups
That the universal principle of equality be applied to the ownership of land by women and vulnerable
groups which entail a prohibition of discrimination of women and vulnerable groups in the ownership
of land.
Further, administrative and legislative measures, if necessary, be put in place to remove any
discriminating practices and other laws.
VIII. Security and credit facilities
Government should urgently explore access to financial facilities which have been beyond the reach
of either land holders or developers outside the formal commercial sector.
IX. Land utilization and regulations
1. Agricultural, commercial, and emergent farmers:
a. Professional assessment of land use in all categories of land should apply before
allocation.
b. National land use plans should be adopted to reinforce utilization of all
categories.
c. Existing regulations of land use in all categories of land should be enforced.
2. Urban and rural human settlements:
a. Existing settlements should be upgraded whereas new ones should be regulated
and planned for to curb rural-urban migration.
b. Government should also allocate those settlements where upgrading is impossible
to more orderly planned ones.
c. Conducive conditions should be created in rural areas to retain people.
3. Land development fund: We strongly recommend that this fund be created to improve
infrastructure in rural areas to facilitate settlement.
4. Taxation, consideration of ground rent: Taxation and ground rent should encourage
development and discourage underutilization of land.
X. Land value
1. In State Land, market forces should determine the price. In certain circumstances
Government should provide concessionary price for land to those vulnerable groups of the
population.
2. In customary land, a system of pricing, if need be, should be left to evolve according to
rural conditions.Chapter 2:
Land Administration: Processes and Constraints
by
John Bruce, Fortune Kachamba, and Michelo Hansungule'
I. Current framework for land administration
All land in Zambia is vested in the president, in trust for the people of Zambia, under the
Land (Conversion of Titles) Act, 1975 (see p. 16), SECTION 4. The president has delegated land
administration to the Commissioner of Lands under Statutory Instrument No. 7 of 1964 and Gazette
Notice No. 1345 of 1975, as amended. Land in Zambia is divided into State (formerly crown),
Reserve, and Trust Lands, as well as park reserves.
The Commissioner of Lands administers the State Land, appropriated by the colonial power
for settlement of whites. The commissioner allocates this land as farms and agricultural smallholdings,
and as stands for buildings and other uses, all under leasehold. There is also a state-farm and
parastatal sector. The entire State Land amounts to less than 6 percent of the total land area of
Zambia, but it is relatively good-quality land, advantageously located near the rail lines. All land in
municipalities is also State Land. The larger municipalities now administer land independently under
the Housing (Statutory and Improvement Areas) Act, 1976, i.e., statutory land and housing land.
In the Trust and Reserve Lands access to land is governed by customary law and institutions.
The Reserve Lands were set aside for the original inhabitants of Zambia by the colonial authorities.
The Trust Lands were at one time destined for white settlement but white settlement did not
materialize to the extent anticipated. In both the Reserve and Trust Lands, land has been in the hands
of traditional land users. The government, following the example during the colonial period, has for
the most part continued to rely on traditional authorities for the allocation of that land to farming
households. However, the Commissioner of Lands also allocates land in these areas directly to other
users, such as outside investors.
The work of the MOL consists of the allocation, survey, and registration of leasehold titles
in the State, Trust, and Reserve Lands, and in both urban and rural land. Under the legal breakdown
of responsibilities, allocation is handled by the Lands Department (headed by the Commissioner of
Lands), survey by the Survey Department (headed by the surveyor general), and registration by the
Lands and Deeds Registry (headed by the Chief Registrar) under the Commissioner of Lands. See
figure 2.1 for an organization chart. Recently, the former minister created a committee chaired by the
deputy permanent secretary to review allocations, and asserted authority in the P.S. to make
allocations, but this has no basis in law.
' John Bruce is former director of the Land Tenure Center and adjunct professor in the College of Agricultural and Life
Sciences at the University of Wisconsin-Madison; Michelo Hansungule is lecturer in land law, School of Law, with the

































The ministry has historically carried out its functions in a highly centralized fashion, and
despite a several-year-old policy of decentralization, it continues to do so. Lack of funds and lack of
qualified staff are cited as causes of the slow progress. As will be seen later, some ministry staff are
now posted to each province, but decision-making and record-keeping have not yet been decentralized.
Leasehold was the dominant tenure for titling from the colonial period. The very small amount
of freehold land, amounting to less than 1 percent of the land, was converted to 100-year leasehold
by the Conversion Act. Leasehold tenure is today available from the state as follows. The
commissioner grants leases of up to 99 years on State Land. In Reserve Lands, Zambian nationals can
also receive leases up to 99 years in duration. In the Trust Lands, they can be granted a right of
occupancy up to 99 years.
There are significant restrictions upon the right of noncitizens to hold land. Under Amendment
No. 15 of 1985 to the Conversion Act, no noncitizen may receive a lease, unless the noncitizen is an
investor within the terms of the 1993 Investment Act, and the application has been approved in writing
by the president. In Reserve Lands, "nonnatives" cannot receive lands for more than 5 years, except
in the case of a religious or charitable organization, in which case the lease can be for up to 33 years.
There are no special restrictions as regards the Trusts Lands, but the president's consent is necessary
in all cases.
The leases are heavily concentrated in the State Land, where a 99-year lease is typical. To be
registered, a 99-year lease requires a survey which complies with the relatively rigorous accuracy
requirements provided for under the Survey Act. The MOL does not have the necessary technically
competent staff to meet the demand for survey at this standard. When a Survey Act survey is not
feasible, a 14-year leasehold is granted and registered on the basis of a sketch map (see section VII
below). The 14-year leases have been widely used in a number of contexts: in settlement schemes on
State, Trust, and Reserve Lands, on land in municipalities, and for leaseholds granted in the Trust and
Reserve Lands.
Leases are granted with only a charge for services. Ground rents, despite several increases,
have been so nominal that they have not been worth collecting. The rents remain nominal because
raises do not keep pace with inflation. Ground rents are paid sporadically, tending to be paid only
when the land is to be mortgaged or transferred, by which time the value of the rent has been
decreased by inflation. There are no penalties for late payment. Current ground rents are presented
elsewhere in this report.
Land is administratively allocated. When State Land becomes available, it is advertised and
applications for leasehold requested. Availability generally comes about through abandonment or
resumption by government for failure to comply with leasehold conditions, but there is also a small
amount of unallocated State Land. The land can be allocated to anyone who is Zambian; beyond that,
there are no clear legal criteria. A Land Allocation Committee within the ministry advises on
allocation decisions (see section III below).
On Trust and Reserve Lands, a similar procedure is followed in settlement-scheme situations.
But in most instances outside the settlement scheme context, a sole applicant for the lease identifies
the land requested. A new ministry regulation seeks to require at least three applicants for each
leasehold, but this may not be practical in Trust and Reserve Land situations, and it is clearly
inappropriate where the applicant is already the customary owner. The ministry requires that the chief50
of the area where the land is located consent in writing to the lease and that the local council must also
concur in the lease.
The appropriate size for allocation is decided according to administrative guidelines developed
within the ministry. They call for an estimation of the applicant's present and anticipated income, and
relate it to investment costs, an evaluation of the applicant's management capability, and land
availability in the area concerned. The guidelines are undated, but they envisage appropriate sizes for
ranching (2,000 hectares), mixed farming (1,000 hectares), dairy (100 hectares), horticulture (200
hectares), and small stock (100 hectares). The guidelines predate the 250 hectare limitation in the land
circular of 1985, but that limit can be and is surpassed with the consent of the minister.' The
guidelines are reproduced in annex 2.1.
Lessees can assign their leases to others or mortgage them only with the consent of the
Commissioner of Lands (SECTION 13 of the Conversion Act). In the case of scheduled farms under
the Agricultural Lands Act, the Agricultural Land Board is required to approve such transactions, but
it is now defunct and the consent is provided by the commissioner. There is no requirement of
consultation with the chief or council.
Leasehold documents require certain development of the land by the lessee. Failure to meet
these conditions constitutes breach of the lease, allowing termination after six months' notice to the
lessee of the government's intention to terminate. The ministry appears to read these conditions as not
only requiring the initial investment specified, but the maintenance of that investment over the life of
the lease. At the same time, because of a lack of staff and transport, there is no systematic inspection
for compliance with these conditions, and breaches are commonly identified by persons seeking to
have the land taken from the lessee and made available to them.
II. Lessons from the African experience
At independence, a great many countries in Africa opted for state ownership of land and
leasehold tenure rather than freehold tenure. The latter was associated with white ownership of land
in many countries. State leasehold, if sufficiently long-term, was considered to provide adequate tenure
security and economic incentives to households for land development, while at the same time allowing
the state to maintain control of the landholding structure. To some, there were parallels to customary
land tenure, with the state assuming the role of the chief, holding land in trust for its people and
allocating it according to need (Bruce 1989).
The experience with state leaseholds has been troubled, however. The problems do not stem
from the necessary characteristics of a leasehold (since it is possible to draft a lease which is virtually
a freehold except in the most formal sense), but rather lie in the policies which are implemented
through leasehold tenure.
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The National Lands Committee in its 27 April 1994 comments to this report suggested a maximum of 100 hectares
per applicant because land is limited and there is danger that chiefs become carried away with promises of development and
begin allocating large tracts to local and foreign investors.51
In most leasehold systems (including that of Zambia), land is provided at little or no charge,
and subsequently the value of the land is not allowed to be reflected in transactions. Land may be said,
as was the case in Zambia, to have no value, indicating that government as a matter of policy refuses
to recognize its value. This raises several problems. There are distortions in land use created when
market forces are not allowed to determine the allocation of land. Land near Lusaka is often underused
precisely because it has been treated as a free good. There are problems with urban elites, both
governmental and commercial, grabbing land from rural people. Because the land is virtually a free
good, cost puts no brake on their ambitions. In some counties, such as Guinea-Bissau, this
landgrabbing has been extensive (Bruce and Tanner 1992), and in a number of countries it has caused
serious, often interethnic, conflict (Bruce 1989; Platteau 1992; Binswanger et al. 1993).
Such systems, almost inevitably, have serious corruption problems and encourage rent-seeking
behavior. The tendency towards corruption is strong because a limited amount of a valuable good is
being administratively rationed and allocated virtually for free. The gap between the real value—what
someone would pay to get the land—and the value recognized by government is the amount which
those seeking land will be willing to pay in bribes.
In addition, because state leasehold systems do not rely on market forces to exert economic
pressure for land development, they must instead rely upon contractual development conditions.
Development conditions have in practice proven very problematic. If they require a specific type of
development, for instance a coffee farm or a petrol station, they are too rigid and impose economically
irrational limits on behavior as rapidly changing economic circumstances alter the most profitable use
of land. On the other hand, if the development conditions are vague, they are difficult to enforce.
There is a tendency for holders to be harassed by reports of noncompliance from those seeking to
replace them on the land, and again there is great potential for corruption in the evaluation of
compliance. In many countries, political dissent has caused a review of the dissenter's compliance with
development conditions. In fact, there has been almost complete failure in most countries to
systematically and fairly evaluate the fulfillment of development conditions. The requisite staff and
resources, especially transport, are usually not available. Alternatives to development conditions
include less-direct land use controls, such as zoning enforced through fines, plus mechanisms such as
economic ground rents which exert pressure on landholders to either place their land in economically
profitable uses or, if they cannot afford to do so, to transfer the land to someone who can develop it.
Finally, the experience with leasehold systems shows that it is simply difficult to find the
resources for a national system of land administration. It is one thing to implement a leasehold system
in a settlement scheme, quite another to imagine the costs and staff requirements of bringing all the
land in a country under such a system. Even a freehold system requires an administrative
infrastructure—the cadastral and registry system—and cannot be expanded without concern for costs.
In light of these problems, there is a growing realization that it is not feasible to broadly
replace indigenous tenure systems with leasehold (and to a lesser extent freehold) in the short or even
intermediate term. The need is to identify what the priority areas should be for the limited tenure
"replacement" which can be afforded. Replacement is likely to be most effective in rather limited
geographic areas where market forces, including produce markets for relatively high-value commercial
crops and rural financial markets, are well developed. For other areas, the need is for tenure-change
strategies which stress more evolutionary processes and may involve continued reliance for some time
on the relatively cost-effective customary institutions of land administration.
Zambian experience and needs will be examined with these issues in mind.52
III. State leasehold process
The process of getting an initial lease of land from the ministry is set out in the ministry's
circular No. 1 (see p. 21). The circular is a set of instructions addressed to all provincial permanent
secretaries and district executive secretaries. It includes the forms to be used in applying for land and
imposes certain important limitations. There is a basic pattern which is common regardless of the
location of the land, but details differ.
For Trust and Reserve Lands, the applicant for a lease begins with the local headman and
chief in whose territory the land is located. The State Land and Reserves Orders, SECTION 6A(1), and
the Trust Land Orders, SECTION 5(2), require that the president consult local authorities before
granting a lease or a license in their area. The circular requires that the chief consent to a lease and
that the lease be considered by the appropriate subcommittee of the rural council and then approved
by a meeting of the full council. In the case of a resident villager, there is no need for the headman
to identify his land, only to review the lease application.
For a stranger or nonvillager seeking land, the process begins with the headman of a particular
village (there may be a dozen or many more in a chiefs area) who receives the application for land
under a lease.' Applicants seeking land may go to a particular headman because they have friends
there or someone (e.g., a district agricultural officer) indicates the village has good land available.
After discussion in the village, if inclined to recommend the land and lease, the headman takes the
applicant to meet the chief. There may be 2-5 chiefs in a district. After discussion with council, the
chief may give consent to the application. This usually takes the form of a simple letter to the local
council.
Before the application can be presented to the council, however, there must be a sketch plan
of the land for which application is made. This will generally be done by an agricultural assistant from
the Ministry of Agriculture's Land Use Planning Office, who usually comes from the provincial office
for this purpose. The assistant has access to a 1:50,000 topographic map, on which the applicant
locates the land. The assistant then visits the parcel, verifies the location, and clears a 2-4 meter swath
around the boundary. Sometimes this is done in the presence of the headman, at other times in his or
her absence. This is a critical step in making sure everyone understands which land and how much
is involved. A sketch map is prepared at the office based on the field visit and the topographic map
base. The applicant will have the sketch plan signed by the chief. Until recently, the Ministry of
Agriculture provided this service for free but now has begun to charge for its services.
In the case of settlement schemes on Trust and Reserve Lands, the land for the entire
settlement is obtained from the chief at the outset. The chief is not involved in the process further,
nor in subsequent leases to the settlers. The parcels are demarcated and assigned to the settlers. At
the end of a two- or three-year probationary period they can apply for leases to the Commissioner of
Lands through the council.
In the case of any State Land, there is no need for a chiefs consent. It is the municipal survey
officer who will do the sketch map, or failing such an officer, a staffer from Town and Country
As indicated in chapter 5, either the headman or the chief may be responsible for allocating land, depending on the
region. Hence in certain instances the application process may start with the chief.53
Planning, often from a Regional Planning Authority. While the wording of the circular suggests that
there are likely to be predemarcated stands to be allocated, this is often not the case.
In all the above situations, a sketch map is the basis for a 14-year lease. If a 99-year lease is
desired, the applicant must apply for a survey by the Survey Department of the MOL, either from
Lusaka or a provincial office, or from a private surveyor (see section VII below). The former is more
expensive, the latter involves long delays. The ministry's charge is K40,000/day, including both
fieldwork and office work, plus expenses such as transportation, accommodation, and food as may
be necessary. It is not possible to give a specific figure for these costs, which tend to be negotiated
on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, some elements are provided directly by the applicant, for instance,
use of a vehicle. (See figure 2.2 for a list of ministry fees.)
The process up to this point will have taken several months, sometimes years, since the
process involves convincing local people of one's serious intentions to develop the land.
At the council, a K2,000 fee for paper is charged. The application is first considered by the
Plans, Works and Development Committee, a subcommittee of the council. The committee will
interview the applicant and may visit the parcel, especially if none of the councilors is familiar with
the location. This committee will make its recommendation to the full council, which must give final
approval. The full council may meet only every three or four months, partly because this time frame
is so stipulated in Council Standing Orders, and partly because of the costs of bringing councilors
from different parts of the district. The result is considerable delays in application approvals. A
council may, if it chooses to do so, meet on special issues or hold extraordinary sessions.
The council then forwards the application to the ministry's provincial office or the ministry's
headquarters in Lusaka. The provincial office lands officer is not actually in the line of authority for
land allocation, and if it receives an application from council, it can only inspect the paperwork to
make sure that it is in order then pass it on to the Lands Department in Lusaka. For settlements, the
paperwork goes through the provincial agricultural officer.
The applications normally travel by mail, which is regarded as reliable and reasonably prompt.
When the office concerned has no stamps, the application may wait to be hand-carried by an official
travelling to Lusaka. On arrival in the Lands Department, it goes to the Registry, which gives the
application a temporary number and sends it to the relevant regional office in the Lands Department.
Within the Lands Department in Lusaka, the work is divided into a Northern region (Eastern,
Western, Copperbelt, and North-Western provinces, and part of Lusaka province) and a Southern
region (Southern, Central, Luapula, and Northern provinces, and part of Lusaka province).
The regional officer reviews the file to determine if everything is in order. Roughly one in
ten is returned to the district because of problems with paperwork. If there is no such problem, the
regional office sends the file through the Registry to the Land Department's Folio Section (the Map
Room). All files moving between offices in the ministry move through the Registry, primarily to
ensure that the location of a file can be determined at any time, but also, since records are
computerized, to allow the relevant acts to be recorded in the computer file at the Registry. In the
Folio Section, the map accompanying the application is plotted onto a master map on which all other
leased parcels are shown to make sure the parcel is available and that there are no overlaps with
existing parcels. This process in the Lands Department takes about one week.54
Figure 2.2: Survey Department fees and charges, 1 August 1993
Cadastral fees
1) Daily rate. Excluding subsistence and transport costs, for each survey team including related office and
drawing work shall be 40,000.00 (prorated when more than one parcel).
2) Subsistence. A land surveyor engaged on a survey away from headquarters shall, when free board and
lodging are not provided, charge reasonable hotel or subsistence expenses.
3) Transport. Actual costs to include fuel and oil or public transport used in the course of the survey.
Surveyor general's charges
1) Land surveyor's license. In accordance with subsection 9 of the act shall be 3,000.00. Surveyor general
may remit this fee for a license issued to a land surveyor in government service but the fee shall become due
should the surveyor leave government service and continue to practice in Zambia.
2) Taxing account. For taxing a land surveyor's account, the fee shall be , 2.5 percent.
3) Examination fee. Examination of survey records, general, and working plans the fee shall be 1,600.00 each
stand; 1,600.00 each lot or farm in urban areas, and 3,200.00 each lot or farm outside urban areas.
4) Cadastral drawing charge. For work involved in the preparation of certified true copies of plans or
diagrams, the compilation of plan and diagrams where fieldwork is not required, the drawing of plans and
diagrams for private surveyors, and any other miscellaneous drawing work, the charge shall be 1,600 per hour
for each draughtsman excluding materials (at cost).
5) Photogrammetric survey charge. Aerial triangulation, plotting, and other office-based photogrammetric
work shall be 48,000.00/day per photogrammetrist excluding materials and new aerial photography (at cost).
Noncadastralfees
Printed Maps: price payable by all map users within Zambia including departments (postage at cost).
Topographic Maps 1,000.00
Street Plans and Tourist Maps 1,500.00
ICAO Charts 1,500.00
Miscellaneous and Atlas Charts
International and Regional 1,500.00
National 1,000.00
Prices payable by all map users outside Zambia US$10.00
Dyeline prints (charges per square decimeter for paper/film)
Materials supplied by Survey Department 30.00/90.00
Materials supplied by customer 10.00/40.00
Photographic products (Materials supplied by customer/client, half the total cost shall be charged)
Contact prints 1,700.00
Paper P/DM
2 120.00 (single weight)/140.00 (double weight)




Dyeline paper copy P/DM2 100.00
Ozalar film P/DM 2 250.00
Computer printouts of survey data 800.00 per page
Photocopies 80.00 per A4 page and 160.00 per A3 page
Nonstandard services (survey and mapping projects, other than cadastral, including field survey, cartography,
and map-related photo-reproduction or photogrammetry)
Field survey, each field team per day 40,000.00
Cartographer, per day excluding materials 20,000.00
Photo reproduction staff, per day, excluding materials 20,000.00
Photogrammetrist, per day, to include stereo plotting but excluding materials US$110.00
Photogrammetrist, per day (planning, sorting, and preparations) 12,000.00
All figures in Zambian currency unless otherwise noted. Source: Survey Department, PO Box 50337, Lusaka.55
If the parcel is available, the file is sent via the Registry to the Surveys Department, where
it is checked against a master map in the Property Registration Section (Plan Room), then given a
number and returned via the Registry to Folios for the number to be noted. This may take one month.
Folios then sends the file back to the regional office for presentation of the case to the Land Allocation
Committee (LAC), which meets weekly. The LAC will advise the commissioner who makes the final
decision. The new committee chaired by the deputy permanent secretary has taken over this function,
and makes its recommendations to the permanent secretary. (For "scheduled farms" listed in a
schedule or annex to the Agricultural Lands Act, the appropriate agency for the allocation would be
the Agricultural Lands Board, but this board no longer functions.) If the allocation is approved, the
regional office or headquarters then sends a letter of offer to the applicant by post, stipulating the
amount of the lease charges the applicant is expected to pay. This takes a minimum of two weeks, and
often much longer.
If State Land is involved, especially in a town, planning permission may be needed before an
offer can be made. If the council where the land is located is itself a Planning Authority, this will have
been handled earlier, but it may be necessary for the applicant to pay certain service charges to the
authority before he or she can get a certificate of title. If the council is not a Planning Authority, the
offer is an offer in principle and requires the applicant to obtain planning permission. Only when that
permission is obtained and communicated to the Commissioner of Lands will an offer be given. The
time to obtain planning permission will vary considerably depending on the particular planning
authority. The Lusaka provincial planning authority is quite prompt, but one also hears of other cases
in which the time needed could be as much as five months. It can be much longer if the land must be
repossessed before it can be reallocated.
If there is not a need to obtain planning permission, the applicant accepts the offer by paying
the lease charges. Unless there are special reasons for delays (such as the applicant having difficulty
finding the funds for the payment or confusion as to the roles played by different agencies, as when
the council is also the planner), this is usually accomplished about two months after the letter of offer
is mailed. Once the offer is accepted, the regional office requests the Surveys Department to prepare
a sketch plan for the lease agreement itself. Where the land has been surveyed, the regional office will
request a survey diagram rather than a sketch plan. On receipt of the plan, the regional office prepares
a lease agreement for the successful applicant and mails it to him or her to sign. Another two months
may elapse.
The applicant signs the lease and returns it to the regional office and sends it through the
Registry for the commissioner's signature. After signing, it is sent through the Registry to the Chief
Lands Officer, who witnesses the signature and returns it through the Registry to Folios. Folios
records the lease and then sends it on to the Lands and Deeds Registry for registration. There, the
lease is received by the Lodgement Desk and then forwarded to the registrar. The registrar reviews
the lease for completeness and, if it is complete, signs a processing schedule. The lease is entered in
the register. A title deed is prepared by the registrar and sent to the Commissioner of Lands, who
sends it to the regional office who mails it to the applicant. This process, after the applicant returns
the signed lease to the ministry, may take ten days.
The process is largely the same for the different categories of land, except that chief's
permission must be obtained for Trust and Reserve Lands and planning permission becomes an issue
in many State-Land contexts.56
The processes for consents to transactions concerning leases are more expeditious. All
transactions concerning leases must have the state's consent under SECTION 13 of the Conversion Act.
The consents are available only in the head office of the ministry. No consents from chiefs or district
authorities are necessary. The structure of consent fees at various periods from 1985 to newly
proposed rates for 1994 are summarized in table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Structure of revenue of the Lands Department: Consent application fees
$
Year Assign/sell transfer Sublease
Mortgage/
_ charge Subdivide
101 /01 /85 K100 K100 K50 K50
01/01/88 i) K100 for CMV below
K100,000.
ii) K300 for CMV between
K100,000 and K300,000.
iii) K500 for CMV above
K300,000.
i) K100 for annual rent
K10,000 and below.
ii) K300 for annual rent
between K10,000 and
K30,000.
iii) K500 for annual rent
above K30,000.
K100 K100
01/01/91 i) K300 for CMV
K100,000 and below.
ii) K600 for CMV between
K100,000 and K300,000.
iii) K1,000 for CMV above
K300,000.
i) K600 for annual rent
K10,000 and below.
ii) K600 for annual rent
between K10,000 and
K30,000.
iii) K1,000 for annual
rent K30,000 and above.
K250 K1,000
01/07/91 i) K600 for CMV K10,000
and below.
ii) K1,200 for CMV
between K10,000 and
K30,000.
iii) K2,000 for CMV above
K30,000.
K2,000 K500 K5,000
01/01/94 K25,000 K25,000 K5,000 K50,000
a. The consent application fees came into effect on 26th January 1985. Prior to that date all consent applications
for dealings in land were free of charge. Figures in the table are the respective fees as they were being
reviewed upward from time to time.
For an assignment or transfer of the lease, the applicant must pay a K2,000 consent fee (1993
rate). He or she must produce photocopies of the national registration card of the buyer, if an
individual, or, if a company, form 23 from the company's registry, and copies of the national
registration cards of all the shareholders. Alternatively, an investment certificate from the Investment
Centre can be produced to establish that the applicant is a Zambian or qualified to hold land in
Zambia. The applicant must also show that the ground rent is paid up to date and that he or she is not57
in breach of any of the covenants in the lease. The file is sent to the Valuation Department in the
Housing Conglomerate for assessment of the "unexhausted value of improvements." A property
transfer tax of 5 percent of the value must be paid. The commissioner will grant consent if the
applicant has fulfilled these conditions. The process may take five weeks to one year. The onus of
registering the transaction is on the parties to the transaction.
Consents are similarly required for subleasing, mortgaging, and subdividing leaseholds. The
consent fee for subleasing is K2,000, for mortgaging K500, and for subdividing K5,000 (1993 rates).
The process is the same, except that in the case of a subdivision the applicant must provide an
approved sketch plan showing the proposed subdivisions. In the case of a subdivision, the onus is on
the individuals to get the proposed subdivisions numbered and surveyed by the surveyor general.
In general, the processes for consents are fairly straightforward. Rather, the issue is why they
are needed at all, except perhaps as a means of collecting ground rents and the property transfer tax.
If land values were recognized and self-declaration of the consideration used as the basis for a property
transfer tax, the declared price could by law be made the base for compensation in case of a taking
by the government, and underreporting would cease to be a major problem.
The basic problems lie in the process for initial grants of lease. No one step seems to take an
unreasonable amount of time, yet in the field, one regularly hears stories of files that have been sent
to Lusaka and then nothing heard for years. The various parts of the MOL tend to blame one another
for delays, and the ministry as a whole emphasizes the delays that occur before the application even
reaches the ministry and the delays caused by reliance on staff from other ministries or the
municipalities. The process usually goes well enough so long as all is in order, but once a mistake is
noted and the case moves back down through the system, it often goes into administrative limbo. It
was estimated a few years ago that there are between 25,000 and 50,000 applications pending, some
from many years ago (ODA 1989).
IV. Overcentralization and overarticulation
The leasehold system is too centralized, and the procedures for leasing reviewed above involve
far too many separate stages and decision-makers. Each step in and of itself is not very time
consuming, but at each stage there are possibilities for delay caused by backlog of work, absence of
officials, clerical error, or any number of other reasons. The process emphasizes precise compliance
with all requirements, and so it is not uncommon for files to be sent back down the chain to remedy
errors and omissions. Once confusion develops in this many-staged process, it is very difficult to
resolve. Troubled cases cycle up and down in the system, fraught with misunderstanding of what is
required, and very substantial amounts of time must be devoted to them over several years before they
are finally resolved.
Part of the answer lies in decentralization. When applicants can come to the office in the
Lands Department where their papers are being processed, confusion can more readily be resolved
than through an exchange of documents through the mail. Though it is not in theory necessary, those
seeking action by the ministry very often have to follow up in person. Proximity to the client is an
important factor and reduces follow-up costs to the client. These considerations also apply to some
extent, though less forcefully, to the work of the Land and Deeds Registry. For the Department of58
Surveys, the existence of a survey capability closer to the land to be surveyed obviously can reduce
costs, which have been the major obstacle to applicants' obtaining 99-year leases.
The ministry has for the last several years been opening offices in provincial capitals. Both
the Lands Department and the Department of Surveys now have some staff in each provincial capital,
though these are skeleton staffs. At present, the Department of Surveys has offices in Kabwe, Ndola,
Livingstone, and Kasama. The Department of Lands now has some staff in every provincial capital.
There are plans to move the Northern Regional Office from headquarters to Ndola, and to establish
a Lands and Deeds Registry there for the northern provinces. The pace of the process has been
constrained by a lack of funding and qualified staff.4.` Support for establishment costs for provincial
offices is a clear priority for donor assistance, provided the ministry demonstrates that it can generate
the revenues necessary to maintain the system.
But there are also some questions that need to be raised about the decentralization process to
date. First, the purpose and implementation of the opening of the new offices has not always been well
thought out. There is, for instance, no centralized supervision of Lands Department and Survey
Department offices at the provincial level. They operate as if they were from different ministries, each
reporting to its home department in Lusaka. The Lands Department's provincial-level staff lacks
vehicles and, more important, clear terms of reference. While staff have been decentralized, decision-
making has not. The provincial office simply examines the papers and if they are in order, passes
them on to Lusaka. The result is simply to interpose a new layer in the process with no clear rationale
for its existence.
The program must also be examined carefully with a view not just to moving ministry
personnel physically closer to the land concerned but to reducing the number of steps involved where
possible, or at least never increasing the number of steps. To date, there is not a true decentralization
program.
While a presence at provincial level is obviously potentially useful, the shortage of trained
staff has inclined the ministry to think in terms of a regional solution. There is the beginning of a
regional office for the north in Ndola and one for the south in Kabwe. Before proceeding much further
there is a need to rethink the relationship among these offices and the head office and where final
decision-making will be located.
The issues involved are not simple. It would be convenient to selectively delegate final
decisions which are more complex or technically demanding than others to lower-level officials. But
there are also compelling reasons why the authoritative records of those final decisions need to be
maintained at one level, to permit easy cross-referencing and communication among the decision-
makers. Some possible approaches are suggested in section XI below.
° The Ministry of Lands in late 1993 authorized the Lands Department to double the size of its staff in order to carry
out the decentralization.59
V. Institutional coordination
Another reason for the poor performance of the system is that the MOL must rely on
numerous other government agencies. Difficulties in coordination with those agencies account for
considerable delay and confusion. The point is not to place blame, as too much time is already spent
pointing fingers. Rather, it is important to understand what flaws in the system lead to such great
delays.
Having to rely on planning approval and services from local authorities is a first problem area
identified by ministry staff. For the planning of stands for various purposes, the Lands Department
relies on Municipal Planning offices, where they exist, or alternatively on the Department of Town
and Country Planning in smaller towns and in rural projects such as settlement schemes. When the
Lands Department makes an offer in principle relating to an area for which a plan exists, the applicant
must obtain planning permission before a final offer can be made. This is often a source of
considerable delay over which the ministry has no control. In addition, these local authorities are
responsible for servicing plots. Unserviced plots are commonly allocated in towns, and rates are
charged even before services are provided. This has caused problems in the implementation of
development conditions, allowing leaseholders to plead the town's failure to provide services as an
excuse for nonfulfillment of the conditions.
A second problem area involves the MOL's dependence on the Ministry of Agriculture staff
for preparation of sketch plans for 14-year leases. The Survey Department cannot meet the demand
for Survey Act surveys, and in fact few holders are anxious to incur the cost for such surveys. Since
that department has failed to move quickly to develop a program utilizing less precise but more cost-
effective survey methods, the Lands Department has relied upon the staff of other ministries to
produce sketch maps. In small towns, this is the town and country planning staff, but in rural areas
they are prepared by the provincial staff of the Ministry of Agriculture, usually based in the
Department of Lands and Irrigation in the ministry's provincial office. In some areas, the preparation
of such sketch plans has become their major role. This reliance on the staff of another ministry means
that the MOL lacks control over the rate of land delivery in rural areas. On the other hand, the sketch
maps prepared appear adequate for the 14-year leases, and in fact for longer tenure. The issue appears
to be why this function, in the case of rural lands, should not be performed by the Survey Department,
rather than a section of the Ministry of Agriculture.'
Problems of coordination exist within the MOL as well, constituting a third problem area. The
Lands Department and Survey Department within the ministry have not always worked well together
to provide cost-effective access to land. In particular, the Survey Department has enjoyed a remarkable
degree of autonomy, with the surveyor general at an equivalent level with the Commissioner of Lands.
The department delayed for decades the introduction of more cost-effective methods of parcel
demarcation and identification used successfully in other countries for rural titling, such as the general
boundaries system linked to aerial photography. The Survey Department must be seen as an integral
part of the land-delivery system, as a service section for the Lands Department which actually
allocates land. In the process of decentralization, it is important that the provincial or regional offices
5 One answer is that the Ministry of Agriculture has staff posted in all districts, while the Survey Department has a
critical shortage of staff. Under current restructuring plans, consideration is being given to transferring some staff from the
land use planning section of the Ministry of Agriculture to the Survey Department.60
have integrated management at that level rather than separate lines of authority running back to the
respective departments in Lusaka.
A further area of concern is the requirement of consent by chiefs and councils for certain
leases. Because the MOL does not generally have a presence at the district level, it relies heavily on
local political institutions for decisions about the availability of land, the viability of proposed land
development, and the reliability of proposed lessees. This is not just an administrative convenience.
It is entirely appropriate that local authorities, in closer contact with local opinion, should make
decisions about land allocation in their areas. These decisions should not be centralized in the MOL.
On the other hand, some important questions can be asked about the present arrangements. There is
significant demand for leaseholds in some Reserve/Trust Land areas, especially near towns and along
major roads. The popular attitude toward leasehold tenure from the state is effectively blocking the
development of leasehold tenure in these areas. This may be expressed as opposition from chiefs, but
it has a broader base and extends to some councils. The councils may delay or ignore lease
applications, and in one case a council suspended consideration of applications for leases two years
ago. When the councils are willing, they lack the staff and administrative systems necessary to play
their role properly.
A number of other problems hamper the land administrative system as well. In the areas
visited, the poor state of rural infrastructure and the rather desperate financial situation of rural
councils was striking. Both the chiefs and councils have a virtual veto over any application for a lease
in a Reserve/Trust area. Further, they do not have a good working relationship, and there is often a
difference of perspective about the utility and future of leasehold tenure. At present, there is no forum
for discussion and compromise, which would lead to the development of a common vision of the
future of land tenure in these areas. This problem is discussed further in section IX below, but in time,
there will need to be significant institutional changes at the local level to permit effective land
administration.
VI. Ignorance of correct procedures
Another source of problems is the widespread public ignorance of correct procedures. As far
as the local participants are concerned, all the procedures of which they need be aware are outlined
in one document: the MOL's circular (see p. 21). But some officials at both district and provincial
level are not familiar with the circular and could not locate a copy in their offices. In addition, the fact
that many important steps in the process involve staff of government agencies other than the MOL
makes these procedures more difficult to communicate. This appears to be a particular problem in
settlement schemes, in which Ministry of Agriculture or Directorate of Settlement personnel are the
primary source of information on how settlers can apply for leasehold titles after the successful
completion of their probationary periods.
It also seems that no attempt has been made to provide chiefs with copies of the circular. All
consulted at village and district level expressed enthusiasm for the possibility of seminars and popular
education on leaseholds and titling. One chief remembered a 1988 Pickwe seminar at which these
issues had been discussed. While the wider distribution of the circular is one element in such a
program, it would be important to produce and distribute more informal instructions. These should
discuss not only procedures, but the rationale for the system. Translation of such materials into local
languages should be considered.61
The lack of understanding of the system is strikingly pervasive. In a full meeting of the
Chibombo Rural Council at Kabwe, councilors were unable to repeat the procedures governing
applications for titles. Often, they confused their powers over land with those of the Commissioner
of Lands. None of them knew that Trust and Reserve Lands, just like State Land, was vested in the
president. Nor were they aware of the existence of the circular.
Similarly, officers of Chongwe Rural Council east of Lusaka did not have a clear
understanding of the titling process in settlement schemes. They considered that they did not have the
authority to process applications for titles in resettlement schemes, although no applications for such
titles can be considered by the commissioner unless recommended by the council.
In a random interview of ten civil servants and ordinary citizens, nine thought a house could
be bought in the same way as a car, i.e., without the requirement for a deed. Of those nine, five
absolutely rejected the suggestion that the MOL played a role in property transfer at all. One of them
confessed to having already paid the full purchase price to a vendor for a house and land in Ngwerere
farming area even before the transaction was completed.
The Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) has discussed an awareness campaign
as an important component in its future assistance with the ministry. It is an important initiative, but
it is important that the work be approached not just as a one-way transfer of information. The ministry
and its staff need to engage in serious conversations with rural people about the advantages and
disadvantages of leasehold tenure and titling and be willing to modify its actions accordingly. But the
ministry has no capacity to do this alone. Villagers need to be presented with the advantages and
disadvantages of various customary tenures as well as statutory tenure and be granted choice to make
their best educated decisions. The University of Zambia's law school and other extension services
could play an important role in performing these functions.
VII. Survey standards and the 14-year lease
A further source of problems in the system of land administration concerns appropriate survey
standards and the 14-year lease. The Lands and Deeds Registration Act (CAP 287) in SECTION 12
requires a diagram under the Survey Act (CAP 293) to be presented with any document relating to
land presented for registration. The Survey Regulations, 1971, define normal acceptable standards of
error in terms of maximum acceptable misclosure of a traverse, requiring different standards for
different types of land: a maximum of 1:12,000 for surveys to determine the position of township
control or reference points, 1:8,000 for surveys in townships, and 1:4,000 for all other cases,
including agricultural lands. These are relatively rigorous standards of accuracy and can be achieved
only by well-trained survey staff.
Due to a shortage of such staff, the ministry's inability to provide surveys to that standard
became the major bottleneck in the system of land delivery and titling. In 1973, the backlog of survey
work was estimated as twenty to thirty years surveying at present staff levels (Swedish University of
Agriculture 1976). To deal with this problem, the MOL has increasingly resorted to a 14-year lease,
for which it requires only a sketch plan instead of a Survey Act survey. The legal basis for this is not
clear, but the reasoning seems to be that a more limited tenure could make do with a lesser degree
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settlement schemes, isolated parcels placed under leasehold in Reserve/Trust areas, and any
circumstance in which a Survey Act survey would take too long or cost too much.
The 14-year leases are of very questionable value. It is clear that they have done nothing to
provide better access to credit (see chapter 3), it is doubtful that there is much of a market in them,
and they provide only limited security of tenure. The option of a 14-year lease may have hampered
the ultimate obtaining of 99-year leases by creating a longer and more complex road to that end. It
is further difficult to justify them as a reasonable response to a lack of well-trained survey staff, as
they have been presented.' One must justify titling in terms of its economic and financial impacts,
and a 14-year lease seems to have little of either. Their widening use appears prompted by an
overemphasis on accuracy and classic ground-survey methods.
As has been noted in consultancy reports going back more than ten years, the surveyor
general's office has insisted on an unnecessarily high and uneconomic standard of accuracy and has
been slow to adopt new methods such as the marking of boundaries on aerial photos for situations with
lower accuracy requirements (e.g., Swedish University of Agriculture 1976; Bruce and Dorner 1982).
While it is sometimes suggested that greater flexibility requires legal changes, the standards of survey
are in regulations which could be changed by the minister. The Survey Act (SECTION 38) does allow
use of aerial photography as a basis for boundaries, provided the surveyor general gives prior written
permission. And SECTION 12 of the Lands and Deeds Registry Act gives the surveyor general the
ability to allow lesser standards of accuracy where a normal survey is impractical, by approving a
sufficiently detailed plan as a basis for registration.
The reason given for the backlog in survey work—a lack of qualified personnel—would lessen
in importance if more appropriate standards and methods of survey are accepted.
A 1993 draft amendment of the Lands and Deeds Registry Act prepared by the MMD
committee on land issues provides for description of land in a document presented for registration to
be by a plan or "verbal description" which satisfies the surveyor general. The verbal description is
too extreme a reaction to the past; what is needed is simply a clear statement of the surveyor general's
legal discretion to utilize whatever survey means appropriate and economic in a particular situation.
This will include use of aerial photography in some situations, but for some work there should soon
be a shift to survey by GPS (global positioning system), which relies on hand-held units to establish
precise position by fixes from multiple satellites. That technology could be particularly important for
isolated parcels in Reserve/Trust lands, where the geodetic network for conventional survey is poorly
developed.
The sketch plans prepared for the 14-year leases and located on the 1:50,000 contour maps
provide a perfectly acceptable standard of accuracy for large parcels of low-value rural land. Based
on broadly accepted international standards, they are an acceptable basis for the registration of 99-year
leases. For urban areas, where access to survey should be relatively easy, the survey should be done
either to Survey Act standards or by aerial photography, which results in some size distortion but is
entirely reliable for boundary verification. There, on more high-value land, 99-year leases should have
been issued, with conditions concerning later upgrading of survey standards. The recommendations
e To some extent, more work is placed on the limited numbers of learned staff, as the volume of turnover is high.63
below suggest the conversion of all 14-year leases to 99-year leases. A proposal for 30-year leases
does not go far enough.
VIII. Land management principles: plan and market
Zambia's land management style has been that of a planned economy with direct administrative
control, rather than through managed markets and control of land use through regulation as in market
economies. It has involved state ownership of land; administrative rather than market determination
of land allocation; reliance upon development conditions; restrictions on transactions; and undervaluing
of land in the context of both transactions and taxation. These policy decisions have impoverished
Zambia's public sector and undermined development in its private sector. The government has denied
itself income from the country's most valuable resource—land. The MOL, anxious for donor
assistance, has failed to generate the revenues that could easily have come from land. Ground rents
are uneconomic and not regularly collected. Land is allocated for nominal amounts.
There is substantial evidence that the current system is not allocating land to those who will
use it efficiently. The MAFF/World Bank 1993 evaluation of use levels on State Land found 652,000
hectares underutilized, of which 60 percent (400,000 hectares) is good arable land (see chapter 1). It
found that 150,000 hectares are available from the state farm and parastatal sector, between 100,000
and 200,000 from privately owned farms, and substantial unutilized land from the settlement sector.
An examination of the state of use of Reserve/Trust Lands recently allocated under leasehold might
reveal even higher levels of underutilization.
Many allocations have been requested purely for status and speculation, and development
conditions have failed to prevent holders from keeping the land idle. In light of the experience of other
countries with such conditions, this is hardly surprising. It is important that attempts to encourage land
development shift from reliance on a development-condition approach to reliance on economic
incentives, creating economic costs for land that make it disadvantageous to hold land without
developing it.
It is equally important to reestablish public confidence in the probity of the MOL. As in any
system which allocates a scarce and valuable good for free or nearly free, opportunities for corruption
abound. Not surprisingly, it is popularly believed that favoritism, abuse of insider information, and
the acceptance of bribes are rife in the MOL. Officials of other government agencies which act on
behalf of the ministry at local levels are subject to similar temptations.
Clearly one of the most fundamental requirements of reform is the recognition of the value
of land. This must be done through the expansion of the role of market forces rather than through
administratively set prices. Government must make land available for economic cost and allow the
market a major, if not necessarily exclusive, role in determining its distribution. Constraints on the
market, such as restrictions on subdivision, must be removed.
IX. Problems of confidence and vision: Trust and Reserve Lands
If the problems of the State Land are considerable, it is relatively easy to see the directions
that must be taken. It is land policy with respect to Reserve and Trust Lands that is most genuinely64
problematic. To date, land policy seems to anticipate the gradual conversion of the land under
customary tenure to leasehold tenure. But such policies have worked out badly in many countries.
Administrative allocation of land has often been used to deprive indigenous people of their land. Those
who lose the land are not compensated. Often the land is allocated to those who use it poorly,
resulting in resentment.
Zambia has been no exception to this pattern. Zambia's Land (Acquisition) Act, 1975, is a
textbook example of a callous disregard for rights in land. Allocations made by the ministry to date
have induced cynicism about government's intentions on the part of local people. In rural areas in
Eastern and Northern provinces, complaints were heard of land-grabbing and a failure to bring the
land under production. In one location, an 8,000-hectare allocation to a former commissioner was said
to be undeveloped, but now is being subdivided and sold. In other places, huge areas of land taken
by the government for unsound development projects, for instance the ill-conceived council farms, are
sitting idle. There are bitter complaints about the abuse of the ministry's power to allocate land. Land-
grabbing has emerged as an issue in the local press (Daily Mail, 14 January 1994) as the result of a
critical report from the Southern African Non-Governmental Organizations Network (see p. 29 in
chapter 1 for an extract from the Daily Mail).
The current titling system, which is in theory open to traditional farmers in the rural areas,
is by reasons of expense and complexity really open only to the relatively wealthy, well-informed, and
influential. It is exceptional for traditional farmers to apply for or receive titles. The system as it is
now working is not solely or even primarily a system for providing title as evidence of rights to land,
but a mechanism for taking land away from communities which customarily have had access to it and
allocating it to new governmental and commercial elites, both Zambians and foreigners.
If the land is actually allocated to those who will develop it, if reasonable compensation is
provided to the community that loses access to it, and if the community consents, some such transfers
may be appropriate. There are areas of unutilized land in Reserve and Trust regions which local
communities will not need for the foreseeable future. If the land is developed, local communities can
potentially profit through new jobs, new technologies, and new sources of revenue. However, as rural
people look at the current system, they see no end to this process of deduction from their land. It
occurs not only through leasehold titling but through the declaration of protected areas and reserves
for environmental purposes. In some areas, at least, they feel threatened. The vast majority of
traditional farmers do not understand the pros and cons of leasehold tenure and are not in a position
to evaluate its relevance to the development of their land. While most traditional farmers seem to have
no felt need for titles, there are exceptions, especially in areas near towns and along main roads.
Chiefs see the gradual erosion of their authority over land as seriously undermining their
power and a harbinger of landlessness and social disintegration. They react in very different ways,
and it is worth reviewing their comments on these issues.
Headman Mang'ang'auka, Chief Sianjalika, Mazabuka, said that he could not allow title deeds
in his village, arguing that the traditional systems of tenure would not allow it. Land, despite
allocation, remains community land. He said he held the land for the community which, by
implication, would cease to be a community if individuals acquired title deeds for their land:65
I am holding this land for you in town.... [W]hen you die, I must find land to bury
you here as I should when you return home to settle. Where will you stay when you
come back if I allowed people to get title deeds to our land?
Headman Mwambula of Chieftainess Nkomesha also rejected the notion of land titles and said
he never consents to them for his subjects. His chieftainess, Chieftainess Nkomesha, has recommended
people for title deeds but has watched her authority over that land erode and considers that a strong
case must be made by a potential investor to justify her granting a title deed.
Senior Chief W. Tafuna, in Mbala, was willing to consider requests to title deeds and has
consented to several, including some to foreign nationals. They are given land away from the
villagers' cultivation. But, he stressed, "we do not really understand title deeds, and are not clear on
the relationship between farms and title deeds."
Paramount Chief Chitimukulu, near Kasama, argued the importance of title deeds, and said
that he encouraged his subjects to obtain them. He was not enthusiastic about titling for investors
coming from outside, however, and while land is plentiful in the area he worried about possible
lessees who would bring new systems of land use, such as livestock herding, and take up large
amounts of land quickly. He reacted favorably, at least tentatively, toward the suggestion of a program
of systematic survey and titling of existing farm holdings.
Indeed, the full range of opinion was present, from chiefs who said they would never consent
to a lease in their territory under any circumstances, to chiefs who had selectively approved leaseholds
for outside investors but made the allocations well away from traditional areas of cultivation to prevent
conflicts with traditional tenure rights, to chiefs who wanted titles for all their subjects in order to
protect their land rights and foreclose the possibility of the ministry allocating the land to outsiders.
Government has taken two steps in this area. The first is the limitation of grants of leaseholds
to 250 hectares in the Reserve/Trust Lands (D(v) of the circular).7).' This is a critical step in limiting
abuses, but it is undermined by the understanding that exceptions can be made with the consent of the
minister, with no clear criteria for those exceptions. It also may effectively preclude cattle ranching
or extensive mixed farming systems in certain regions where there are sizable economies of scale. The
second positive step is the requirement of prior consent to any allocation by both the local chief and
the local council. This is an important step towards more local control over the use of land and other
natural resources.
What is needed is a clear vision of the future that reassures traditional farmers. One option
would be systematic, compulsory registration of customary titles as leaseholds. But experience from
other countries suggests that this would be expensive and difficult to justify in cost/benefit terms.
Considerable flexibility is needed. There is a need to provide for systematic registration for limited
areas where commercial development is relatively advanced, for instance in areas closely associated
with State Land farms along the rail lines. There may be a need to provide for some means by which
local residents can overcome the reluctance of their chiefs to approve leaseholds, especially in the
7 The policy debate does not yet seem to have contemplated restriction on the number of leaseholds. As indicated in
chapter 3 (table 3.6), multiple parcels are held, making it possible, even likely, that the 250 hectare limit could be
contravened by acquiring two or more leaseholds.66
vicinity of towns and along major roads. Incentives for local communities must be created which allow
them to continue to view land under leasehold as part of their community resource base. For instance,
ground rents might be collected by municipalities and chiefs with a portion retained for local
development projects.
Arrangements will to some extent need to be worked out locally and the various interests
effectively represented. It is not clear that any forum for this exists at this time. The MMD has talked
about an increase in the powers and responsibilities of chiefs, and there is a need to take better
advantage of the respect and authority that these traditional authorities still enjoy in many areas.
Moreover, the need is not simply to strengthen one side or the other in a struggle for control of land
but to create institutional arrangements within which the various interests are represented and have
incentives to work together and strike the needed compromises.
X. Policy debate: July 1993 Land Policy Conference
The electoral victory of the MMD in the 1993 elections provided the first opportunity in
twenty years to question in a fundamental way the land policies of post-independence Zambia under
UNIP. The MMD had campaigned on a platform which suggested it would promote basic changes,
such as the reintroduction of freehold tenure.
The July 1993 conference (see chapter 1), supported in part by USAID, provided the
opportunity for a first frank exchange of opinion on the issues. Conference participants discussed the
presidential power to acquire land and agreed that it should be clarified if not curtailed. They
discussed a need for two land statutes, one dealing with State Land and one for land under customary
tenure, without any distinction between Trusts and Reserves. They noted that discrimination against
women was common both in the allocation of State Land and in the Trust and Reserve areas. There
was broad agreement that the issues of land under customary tenure deserve more careful study, with
increased input from traditional leaders. It was questioned how much customary land was available
for allocation to investors, and whether customary land tenure itself needed reform.
Participants also debated the relative merits of leasehold and freehold titles. Those who
supported the freehold system argued that leaseholds became insecure as they neared the end of their
term. Freeholds, they argued, could be regulated to achieve many of the same ends desired in the case
of leaseholds. Those who supported the leasehold system argued that freehold would, through land
transactions, lead to the dispossession of the poor and excessive land concentration, especially in the
hands of foreign interests. They argued that it would lead to uncontrolled land speculation and
underutilization. In the end, a large majority of the participants favored a leasehold system.
Discussion of land concentration led to discussion of the effectiveness of ceilings on
landholdings and of the impact of auctions of land. It was agreed that the economic value of land
needed to be recognized in the form of increased ground rents, but there was no consensus as to
whether land should in the future be allocated by government or sold.
For land in urban areas, the discussions focused on the issue of squatters, the housing
shortage, and protection to landlords and tenants in their dealings with one another. In the domain of
land administration, the participants urged decentralization of Lands and Surveys and a greater67
emphasis on dissemination of information about the titling process, especially to traditional rulers.
Cheaper, less-precise means of survey were urged for rural areas.
The final resolutions of the conference are listed in figure 1.2. While they are not binding on
government, they will be influential in framing policy.
XI. Recommendations
1. The Lands and Deeds Registry Act should be amended to confer broad discretion on the registrar
to accept and certify any economic and appropriate parcel description as adequate for the purposes of
registration.
The system to date has been too conservative about what it will accept as the parcel
description for a registration. The need is not to specify new standards—technologies
in this area are developing with incredible rapidity—but rather to make clear the
discretion of the Registrar and to provide the resources that ensure that Surveys will
have access to these new technologies.
2. All 14-year leases should be automatically converted to 99-year leases, by law and without ground
inspection or further survey.
These leases are too short for any useful purpose, and their renewal is already
becoming a burden on the system. Proposals for a 30-year lease do not go far enough.
The sketch plans on which the 14-year leases were based are in fact accurate enough
for a 99-year leasehold. At a later date the leaseholder could pay for a more precise
survey, if there were a need. Beyond this, the current report will make no
recommendations on survey. The ministry is being ably advised by a very competent
Swedish team.
3. All future leases of State Land outside agricultural settlement schemes and urban squatter upgrading
schemes should be offered at public auction. Within those exceptions, clear criteria for selection must
be developed.
The MOL manages a vastly valuable resource and cannot expect foreign donor
assistance while it continues to give the resource away. Moreover, allowing the true
value of the resource—and differences in prices depending on potential and
location—to be recognized is a critical first step toward allowing the market to
determine the most economically effective use of the land. An auction strategy is far
simpler with freehold. If the government decides to continue a leasehold system, it is
still important that an auction system be used. But to do so, it will be necessary to
drop development conditions. With those present, it is unlikely anyone will feel it is
worthwhile to bid any substantial amount. The bidding would be on a premium which
represents the scarcity value of the lease over and above that recognized in the ground
rent. It would test the relationship between the ground rent and actual market value.68
4. In order to facilitate the operation of a market in leasehold rights, the requirements for government
consent to transactions, including subdivisions, should be eliminated, with the possible exception of
lease assignments to non-Zambians.
Already, these approvals are a formality, an occasion for collecting a consent fee
which hardly covers the cost of processing, and for collecting ground rents unpaid
over many years and the property transfer tax. Provision could be made instead that
proof of payment of ground taxes and a property transfer tax must be proved to the
Registrar before the transaction is registered. The issue of non-Zambian ownership of
resources arouses strong passions. It may be best to preserve the principle of control
through a consent requirement, even though that consent will be readily given to
attract investment. However, the 5-year limitation on leases to foreign companies on
Trust Land should be eliminated.
5. Development conditions should be eliminated from leases and reliance placed instead upon
economic disincentives for holding land idle, such as ground rents.
Zambia's experience with development conditions is little different from that of other
countries in Africa. They are not enforced systematically and are most often raised
as an issue by someone who hopes to displace the exiting holder. They create
insecurity, without achieving their objectives. Rather than worry about development
conditions, ground rents should be increased to economic levels to bring pressure to
bear for the development of the land in a profitable fashion.
6. If in some cases development conditions are still considered necessary, they should only require
a specific investment or construction in the short term, for instance five years. The development
condition should be considered met if notice of default is not given by the ministry or other relevant
authority such as a municipality within that period. Default should be punished by fines rather than
by retaking the land. Beyond that time, only a prohibition of abandonment should apply, and in that
case a retaking should be subject to compensation for the land and improvements.
A set of development conditions along these lines would be less harmful than the
present conditions.
7. Further increases in ground rents should be considered as the economic value of land becomes
clearer through the auction process. Penalties should be imposed for late payment of ground rents.
These rents can provide government with much-needed revenue and can in large
measure substitute for far less satisfactory means of ensuring that land will not be held
idle, including development conditions. It is not a good idea, as recommended in the
ODA report (1989), to increase the property transfer tax: this acts as a drag on the
land market.
8. The MOL, given its limited staff and facilities, should carefully consider the economic and financial
impacts of the allocation of its staff to particular tasks and to particular regions and tenure sectors.
The ministry, like many other Ministries of Lands in Africa, must cease to think in
terms of providing a uniform set of services nationally. It must begin to heed the69
economics of land administration, focusing efforts on activities that can be
characterized as high-return in terms of development or revenue.
9. Using these criteria, the highest priority should be getting land and titles into the hands of
cultivators within the State Land sector.
This should be the priority because (a) there are large amounts of good arable land
there, (b) its proximity to the rail lines and other facilities will increase the
probabilities of profitable operations there, (c) its higher value can produce more
revenue, and (d) it is relatively accessible for survey by the ministry.
10.Within the State Land, first priority should be given to reallocation of the land of State Farms and
parastatal holdings, second to resettlement schemes, and third to private holdings. If a land
identification committee or similar body is created to identify land for investors, it should for the first
several years focus its attention on the State Lands and these particular areas.
The State Farms and parastatal holdings will decline, and prompt action will be
needed to ensure a sound scheme for distribution, before the land can be occupied by
squatters. A land identification committee could also work out a repossession strategy
and targets based on the World Bank-funded study of land utilization in the State
Lands, initiate the reviews suggested in recommendation 32 below, recommend
retakings for failure to pay ground rents, and recommend penalties for late payment.
11. Interms of resolving titling difficulties for land already allocated, the resettlement sector deserves
special attention. A crash program for dealing with this sector should be considered and put forward
for donor funding.
There appears to have been especially serious confusion in the titling process in this
sector, in part as a result of inadequate information. Few settlers have received leases.
Because these holdings are clustered geographically, the titling situation could be
sorted out relatively expeditiously through a field operation, with scheme officials
present to provide planning consent and Lands and Survey officials on the ground
empowered to certify plans and sign leases. A field adjudication procedure to
determine entitlements would be necessary because of the confusion which has
developed in some settlement schemes through departure and replacement of settlers.
12. For selected areas of considerable commercial development in Reserve and Trust Lands, the
ministry should seek to develop a procedure for systematic titling of all holdings, along the lines of
that incorporated in the repealed Lands (Adjudication of Titles) Act, 1962.
The priority need for titling in the Reserve/Trust Lands is not so much to make land
available to outsiders, since more accessible land is available in the State Lands, but
to develop an approach in areas where commercialization justifies title registration.
Yet, smallholders are being disadvantaged in obtaining title. These areas are likely to
be near existing State Lands. Work under such a system should initially be on a pilot
basis.70
13. There is a need to create a Policy Analysis and Studies Unit directly under the Permanent
Secretary's Office of the MOL.
When the MOL was split from the Ministry of Agriculture, the research capability
remained with the latter ministry, and there is no capacity for sustained, informed
thinking about policy within a ministry preoccupied with delivering land and titles.
14. There is a need to rethink the present structure of the ministry's senior management to reflect a
broader concept of the ministry.
As it stands, the ministry is a structure to deliver lands and titles and little more.
Organizational structures in other Ministries of Lands and agencies with similar
responsibilities in the region should be examined. Possibilities include a bifurcation
into divisions under an Undersecretary (Urban) and an Undersecretary (Rural) and the
creation of a post of Director-General for Provincial Land Administration. Among
other needs, it is important to ensure that the Survey Department serves the needs of
the Department of Lands, rather than pursuing a separate agenda.
15. There is a need to redesign the land allocation committee and the office of the commissioner.
The commissioner should be appointed by the president subject to approval by
parliament, and serve a 10-year term. The land allocation committee should be
composed of prominent citizens selected in the same fashion, not bureaucrats. The
committee should decide allocations, with the commissioner as chair with a tie-
breaking vote.
16. The most critical aspect of decentralization is the transfer of responsibility for urban lands to
municipalities.
The bulk of the ministry's work concerns urban land and reducing its workload can
most effectively be accomplished by establishing the necessary skills and record
keeping at municipal level.
17. Regional and provincial offices of the ministry should be fully integrated, with a single officer in
charge, rather than divided into departments with separate lines of authority running to Lusaka.
Decentralization cannot be expected to work unless this is achieved. At present, the
provincial office of the Lands Department and the Survey Department make their own
arrangements for office space, have their own vehicles, etc.
18.The regional office of the ministry in Ndola should be primarily a Land and Deeds Registry, while
decentralization of other Lands Department and Survey Department activities should be to provincial
level.
Regional offices are still considerably removed from the location of most lands and
clients. The provincial level is a more appropriate level to which to decentralize most
ministry functions. After offer of a lease, land development tends to begin without71
waiting for completion of the registration process and will not be delayed by lodging
the registration at the regional level.
19. The final decision on all leases for under 250 hectares should be delegated to provincial level.
Auctions should be held at provincial level, though advertised nationally. The ministry's provincial
office should issue both in-principle and final offers, be responsible for sketch maps, and collaborate
with the relevant planning authority. A master parcel map would need to be maintained at provincial
level to permit checking of possible overlaps and numbering of the parcel. The numbering system
would need to reflect location by province and district.
If decentralization is to be tackled seriously, it must be done at least at the provincial
level. This implies new resources for the ministry, but provincial offices already exist
in many provinces and the new resources needed are within the realm of possibility.
20. Delegation of authority to make final offers for leases to the district level is technically feasible.
This would require the posting at that level of a district lands officer. When resources allow, the
ministry should begin to build such a cadre on a pilot basis.
If sketch maps as presently done are accepted as an adequate basis for all leases, not
just 14-year leases, there is no serious obstacle to delegation of final offers to the
district level. This would require the creation of a cadre of district lands officers for
the ministry, which would in turn mean new recruitment, but this is in any case
necessary for this understaffed ministry. Master map numbering of parcels could be
reported up the line for parallel maps at provincial and regional level. The district
lands officer would do sketch maps and act as the planning officer for rural grants.
Once the council approved the application, the ministry's district officer could make
the offer in principal and, once fees were paid (at district level) and any other
necessary planning permission received, could make the final offer. Access to vehicles
might be the major constraint to the development of operations at district level.
Council vehicles could be utilized in some districts, with costs shared.
21. For the time being, the roles played by councils and chiefs should remain as they are but should
be studied to determine whether alternative institutional arrangements exist, which require a more
collaborative mode between the council and chiefs.
The involvement of chiefs and councils in the approval of leaseholds is a very positive
element in the present system. However, chiefs may not adequately represent the
interest of all their people and give too heavy an emphasis to preservation of their
traditional prerogatives. It is possible to imagine elimination of the consent
requirement by either the chief or the council in certain circumstances, where the
applicant holds the land as ancestral land. It is also possible that the process could be
improved upon significantly by providing an institutional forum in which traditional
authorities and elected councilors could interact and discuss policy. But such changes
should be based on careful study. Research is urgently needed to explore the
possibilities and must begin by obtaining a better understanding of traditional land
administration.72
22. The process for initial leasing of land could be shortened at the district level by altering the
provision of circular No. 1 to allow a subcommittee of the council to act finally in approving a lease
without requiring the matter to go before the full council. A special lands subcommittee should be
created for this purpose. The powers of the subcommittee and the criteria that they are to use in
approving an application should be set out in law, possibly as part of a revision of the Conversion Act.
This is very necessary in light of very infrequent meeting of the full council, only 3-4
time a year in many rural districts.
23. The master map now maintained in Folios in the Lands Department should be turned over to the
Survey Department so that checking the parcel for conflicting allocations and numbering the parcel
could be done as one process.
At present, the file goes to Folios to be checked for conflicts, then to Surveys for a
number, then back to Folios for that number to be recorded. It seems that this could
be done in a single step in Surveys.
24. Offers in principle should be eliminated. A final offer should be made initially, to be accepted by
payment of fees.
At present, the Lands Department sends out an offer in principle wherever planning
permission is required and does not send a final offer until permission has been
obtained. It is not clear why this is necessary. This process may have been based in
the notion that the development conditions could not be agreed upon until planning
consent was required, but if development conditions are dropped or made more
general in nature, as is recommended here, this is not a factor.
25. The process could be further expedited by making the final offer the lease itself. On its return,
signed by the applicant, with the necessary fees, it could be signed by the commissioner, registered,
and sent back to the applicant with the title deed in one mailing.
Currently, once the offer is sent and accepted, a lease is sent to the applicant to sign
and return, and then once it is registered, a title deed is prepared and sent to the
applicant. The process seems unusually cumbersome. If it is legally required by any
act or received law, then this should be amended.
26. Personnel, vehicles, and budget now devoted by the Ministry of Agriculture to the preparation of
sketch maps to support applications for leasehold should be transferred to the provincial offices of the
MOL. Serious consideration should be given to transferring to the MOL the entire Land Use Planning
operation from the Ministry of Agriculture and the Evaluation Section of the Housing Conglomerate.
There is little sense in this work remaining within another ministry. But if the
personnel and responsibility for the work is to be transferred, it is essential that the
vehicles and budget for salaries and fuel be transferred at the same time.
27. Rural councils and municipal councils should be made responsible for the collection of all grounds
rents in towns and on State Lands and should be able to retain a portion of those rents, perhaps half,
for local development projects in return for providing this service. It would also be useful to explore73
how chiefs might collect ground rents in their areas of Trust and Reserve Lands and similarly retain
a portion of those rents for local development projects.
The ministry should not attempt to develop an independent capability for ground rent
collection. It must take advantage of the capabilities of these other institutions but will
be able to do so effectively only if they themselves have some direct interest in the
revenues to be collected.
28. There is a need for the ministry to develop an effective program of training and public information
concerning land policy generally and titling specifically. This implies the creation of a training and
information unit within the ministry.
There is a need to give the circular much broader distribution but also a need to
provide more "how-to" information, which might be disseminated not just through the
ministry but through an NGO such as the National Farmers Association of Zambia.
In the Trust and Reserve Lands in particular, the need is not just for information but
for genuine exchanges on the role of titling. The ministry will need to carry out more
formal training in procedures and record-keeping for its own provincial staff and for
employees of other agencies on which they must rely, especially council staff.
29. In framing land policy for Trust and Reserve areas, there is a need for a frank admission that
abuse of the titling process for land-grabbing is not just a potential problem. It has been taking place,
permitted by inadequate safeguards within the ministry's land allocation system. The 250 hectare limit
from the circular should be enacted in law for farms; clear criteria should be created for exceptions
to this limit; and the approval of such exceptions be entrusted to a national board consisting of
respected figures.
The ministry should set up a task force to think through how landgrabbing can be
avoided in the future. An effective and economic ground rent will be the first need,
but even then difficult cases will arise. There will be requests which tax the ability of
officials to estimate real land needs, like one currently pending at district level in
Northern province for a 15,000 hectare game ranch. Should the commercial farm
community find that this ceiling is prohibitively low, a study should be commissioned
to arrive at a more efficient and acceptable standard or set of standards.
30. For Trust and Reserve areas, the supply of titles and land delivery for outside investors, though
an important element, should be secondary to the development of a viable strategy for protecting and
enhancing the land rights of local farmers and communities.
To date, policy has focused almost entirely on the supply of titles, which is in no
sense a comprehensive land policy for these areas. Such a policy needs to be
developed. There is time to step back and think through the needs of these areas more
systematically than in the past, time provided in part by the availability of
considerable good, arable land in the State Lands.
31. The recognition of value in land should be an element in this policy as it is in State Lands.
Government (and donors) must recognize customary property rights and should pay compensation for
land taken for development by others.74
When government passes land on to outside investors, they should bear the cost of
making the land available. Similar costs should not be placed on local land users and
their communities when they seek title to land they already use, in recognition of their
land rights under customary law.
32. There should be a systematic review of leaseholds or parcels in the Trust and Reserve Lands 50
hectares or larger held by government, and over 100 hectares held by private individuals or
companies. Where this land is unused, government should consider retaking it and returning it to local
communities unless the communities can agree with the ministry on some other use for the land.
Too often, local communities have been asked (and pressured) to provide land for ill-
conceived development efforts (e.g., the Council Farms), then watch the land sit idle
for years. Where such land exists and cannot be put to the use for which it was
provided, it should be returned. This would do a good deal for the ministry's poor
credibility in the rural areas. In each case, the displacement of traditional users should
be noted, and they should be given priority to return to the land.
33. Broad local consultations should be undertaken by the ministry to help it think through the future
of tenure in the Trust and Reserve areas.
Those consultations should be linked to educational activities; framed to allow a
genuine exchange on the pros and cons of leaseholds and their grant to either local
people, outside investors, or both; and framed to include farmers and other productive
land users as well as officials and traditional authorities. Participatory rural appraisal
methods and focus group approaches would be useful. The recent national
consultations on land policy in Tanzania by the Presidential Commission on Land
Matters which reported in 1992 should be examined as a model.
34. The ministry should consider further work on systematic titling activities in some quite limited
Trust and Reserve areas with good market access where a lack of title may be a binding constraint on
investment.
See recommendation 13 above.
35. A program of studies should be undertaken in several carefully selected areas to explore new
approaches to customary tenure and local organization for the administration of land.
Our information base on customary land administration is very poor. Each area should
include the lands of a group of three or four villages in a district, and the studies
should examine not only rights and dealings in farmland but rights in common-
property resources shared by community members and by more than one community.
The studies should utilize a variety of methodologies: participatory rural appraisal,
dispute studies, and household surveys. The studies should develop plans for follow-
up pilot work on land rights and administration in these areas.
36. A comprehensive study of the terms of access by women to productive resources should be carried
out.75
The resolutions of the July 1993 conference (figure 1.2) stress the need for equality
of treatment of women. In spite of important legal changes such as the 1989
amendments to the Wills and Administration of Testate Estates Act, there is a vast gap
between the aspirations of the resolution and the facts on the ground, where women
are seriously disadvantaged both under national statute and customary laws and where
implementation of reforms is highly problematic. The purpose of the study would be
to devise a realistic and effective strategy for increasing women's rights and
opportunities.
37. A study should be carried out to determine the relationship between the rapid expansion of
cultivated land in the last decades and the expansion of the leasehold system.
It should not be assume that the two are directly related as there is some evidence to
the contrary. There is a need to understand how access to land for expansion is
obtained.76
Annex 2.1: Guidelines for determining the size of landholding for farming purposes
Chapter 1. The Formula and Explanation set out below are designed to help District Councils and their
Staffs, District Agricultural Officers, and District Executive Secretaries determine the size of
undemarcated land granted to a prospective farmer. Before this formula can be implemented
the following data must be available:
2. 1. Land capability, at semi-detailed level
2. Location of farm (peri-urban or rural)
3. Relative pressure on the land
4. Pattern of settlement in the adjacent area to the proposed farm (commercial,
traditional, emergent agriculture, peri-urban, urban)
5. Pattern ofpast urban drift and consequential past population density
6. Traditional land use patterns — provincial strategy
7. Recommended future land use pattern — provincial strategy
8. Proximity to economic centers and markets
9. Proximity to power
10. State of roads plus their development.
3. 1. The present income of the prospective farmer
2. The size and education of his family and whether they will be part of the farming unit
or independent
3. Capital available for immediate investment
4. Plant and equipment available to support the proposed program
5. Proposed source and extent of funding
6. General ability of the prospective farmer to succeed. By combining the above data we
are able to determine the size of farm within any given planning area suitable for a
prospective farmer.
This pre-supposes that the province has already had a development strategy plan drawn up.
(This has yet to be done for Southern province.) It is the basic ingredient of any coherent
development plan. Thus the following principles are applied for guiding prospective farmers
to the right location and right size farm for themselves:
4. 1. Is the farmer self-sufficient? Can he survive in the bush by himself? If not, he must
be in an area where he can receive support services.





e. Small stock only.
These items are graded in the degree of return per hectare of land, i.e., land use intensity.
Therefore, a small stock specialist can expect more than K1,000.00 per hectare of land if
properly used. A ranching operation can only expect a return of K200 per hectare on
intensively grazed improved pastures properly managed.
(This scheme takes no amount of traditional methods as these are not economic.)
5. Therefore, the process works as follows:
The income that a prospective farmer can reasonably expect is calculated from his past
performance in whatever sector he comes from and his income for the past five years before
he applied for a farm. His future expectations of income are based upon what his previous77
expectations were, i.e., a civil servant who has successfully reached the top of his career can
reasonably be expected to achieve the same level of success in farming but is unlikely to
expect more than a safe income as he is probably not an experienced entrepreneur. Therefore,
if his present income is approximately K8,500.00 with subsidized housing and transport, we
would expect him to be able to command a gross income of K100,000.00 which would allow
him a disposable income of K10,000.00 per annum.
Therefore, if we apply our income criteria to the five types of farming we would recommend
landholding as follows:
a. Ranching 500 hectares
b. Mixed farming 300 hectares Average net income
c. Dairy 300 hectares K10,000.00
d. Horticulture 100 hectares
e. Small stock 20 hectares
N.B. Holdings smaller than 20 hectares would not normally be planned for Commercial Sector
Farmers.
6. In respect of traditional farmers there is not much of a problem as they only apply for title
deeds when they need to become commercial. Therefore, the size of holding surveyed for title
deeds will be restricted by the present income of the farmer projected back over the last five
years and a professional estimate of the level that he will achieve over the next 10 years based
upon the size of loan he is likely to get.
7. By far the greatest call on the land is from workers wishing to ensure their future. In the case
of large companies applying for land they are usually encouraged to move to the areas where
they will contribute to the reversal of the rural urban migration. Apart from this provincial
policy, the same formula applies, i.e., the amount of money available for investment is
compiled, along with the borrowing from various sources so that a total investment figure is
available and a program may be involved for a five- or ten-year period of investment plus
development leading to an established expectation of income at the end of this period.
It must be mandatory that all such programs be certified as within the financial resources of
the company concerned, by an independent firm of chartered accountants who will be held
professionally responsible if they mislead the settlement committee. All such costs are naturally
borne by the prospective farmer.
8. In any case, all holdings of more than 2500 hectares of arable land, i.e., 4—5000 hectares
gross, will be presented to Provincial Council for public scrutiny and approved before being
finally recommended for title deeds. Therefore, a company wishing to invest K1,000,000.00
in mixed farming will be calculated as follows:
K1,000,000.00 investment = income 250,000.00
Ranching = 2000 hectares, which includes 500 hectare development allowances
Mixed farming = 1000 hectares
Dairy = 100 hectares
Horticulture = 200 hectares
Small stock = 100 hectares
9. In conclusion we should say that land should be granted in:
a. proportion to the investment expected and income anticipated;
b. the level of competence of the lender;
c. the strategic needs of the province;
d. the demographic expectancy of the area in which the land is granted.Chapter 3:
Agrarian Structure, Land Markets, and Property Transfers
by
Michael Roth, Paula Despins, and Peter Kangwa'
I. Introduction
This chapter assembles and analyzes official time series information on agrarian structure,
official property transfers, and issuances of leaseholds in State, Reserve, and Trust Lands. Unofficial
data on property transfers and an analysis of land valuation issues are treated in chapter 4. Data are
presented on the number and size of reported property transfers and land prices paid. Changes in
agrarian structure are evaluated to assess net growth in the number and area of farming units by land
tenure category, trends in farm size, and growth in demand for leasehold property. The analysis shows
that the number and area of farming units varies widely over time, in part due to changing trends in
population settlement and agricultural expansion but also due to unexplainable swings in the data. A
high demand for leaseholds is apparent, but most of the demand is originating from properties in the
urban and peri-urban areas under residential and commercial uses. Land as collateral is increasing
credit use by the largest farms, but most credit is being funneled to urban and peri-urban properties
for mainly nonagricultural uses. The analysis further suggests that capacity limits may be constraining
the expansion in leasehold issuances. The fact that leasehold activity has plateaued at 2,000 issuances
annually over a reasonably long period of time indicates a sustainable level of demand for registry
services but also possible constraints that warrant investment in surveying and registration capacity.
II. Agrarian structure
A. Land base
Zambia possesses an abundance of natural resources. Of its 75,261,200 hectares nationwide,
18.4 percent of the land area is located in game management areas (GMAs), 8.8 percent in state forest
reserves, 8.7 percent in national parks, and 1.2 percent in lakes (table 3.1). GMAs along with the
other natural resource categories (excluding lakes) are broadly distributed nationwide, but 23.3 percent
can be found in Eastern province, another 21.4 percent in North-Western province, and 15.6 percent
in Central province. The predominant share of state forest lands are located in North-Western (36.4
percent), Northern (14.4 percent), and Eastern (13.2 percent) provinces, while national park land is
concentrated in Northern province (27.0 percent), followed by Central (16.5 percent), Southern (14.7
percent), and Western (13.7 percent) provinces.
Data series on landownership by farms are presented in the second half of table 3.1 for two
categories of farms: (1) MAFF forecast survey data of arable land which, at least in principle, are
' Michael Roth and Paula Despins are, respectively, associate research scientist and graduate research assistant with the
Land Tenure Center and Department of Agricultural Economics, University of Wisconsin-Madison. Peter Kangwa is senior
analyst, Lands Department, with the Ministry of Lands, Lusaka.80
supposed to include commercial farms; and (2) the total area under large-scale commercial farms
reported in the Commercial Production Series. A comparison of columns G and I indicates that
column I cannot be inclusive within G as the area under commercial farms exceeds the MAFF data
in certain years. One logical explanation is that the MAFF land reported is only arable land, not the
total land area of the holding. Column H shows the percentage of arable land area on MAFF farms
relative to available land outside natural resource reserves, while Column I compares the total land
area under commercial farms in each province with the same.
Outside of the natural resource reserves, an abundant supply of land would seem to be
available for future expansion of crop and livestock production. Of the 47,244,800 hectares not
included in state forests, national parks, GMAs, or lakes, only 2.7 percent is occupied by farming
units based on the MAFF data and 3.2 percent based on the commercial farm series. Assuming, as
in chapter 1, that about 13 percent of the nation's land area is potentially arable, then around
6,141,800 hectares of land would be available for crop cultivation. Assuming further that the MAFF
data represent arable farmland, then the data suggest that only about 21.0 percent of the arable land
base is currently under crop cultivation, leaving ample scope for agricultural expansion. Furthermore,
as reported in chapters 1 and 2, a high percentage of land under commercial farms is underutilized,
suggesting that even these figures are overestimates of area under cultivation. Certain provinces (e.g.,
the more-remote Northern, Western, and North-Western) experience lower rates of occupation than
others. Unfortunately, data are not available on areas of urban land, making it difficult to interpret
the data for Lusaka and Copperbelt.
B. Crop land utilization
As described in greater detail in chapter 8, the most recent data on area cultivated for the
commercial farm sector are disaggregated into four provinces—Central, Lusaka, Southern, and
Copperbelt, the latter of which includes data for the remaining provinces. The data series for the
noncommercial sector, which in principle include all farms in the agricultural sector other than
commercial farms, were last published in 1985. The MAFF agricultural data series based on area
forecasts theoretically include all farms and, while comprising a relatively complete time series back
to 1976, include data mainly on crop area, production, and yields.
Provincial level data on total farming area and cultivated land are provided in table 3.2 for
commercial farms based on the commercial sector data series and all farms (noncommercial and
commercial) based on the MAFF series. Area cultivated in the commercial farm sector represents on
average only 10.6 percent of total farming area, a figure consistent with the high rates of
underutilization reported in a recent World Bank study (MAFF/WB 1993) (see chapter 1). Utilization
ranges from a low of 3.8 percent in Southern province to a high of 19.2 percent in Copperbelt
province—estimates that on the surface would appear exactly opposite the regional findings reached
by the MAFF/WB report and summarized in table 1.5.Table 3.1: Arable land area (000 hectares)
State forest National Game mgmt MAFF Total Land Total
Province Total land reserves`'` parks` Lake areas' areas' Net total land reported land area area of land
area" (1974) (1974) (1974) (1973) area owned (%) comm. area
land' farms' (%)
A B C D E F =
A-B-C-D-E
G H=G/F I J=I/F
Central 9439.4 577.0 1,081.8 - 2170.7 5609.9 150.2 2.7 471.8 8.4
Copperbe1t' 3,132.8 585.0 - - - 2547.8 59.4 2.3 125.0 4.9
Eastern 6,910.6 887.0 410.2 - 3236.0 2377.4 314.1 13.2 44.3 1.9
Luapula 5,056.7 137.0 138.9 409.0 490.2 3881.6 90.7 2.3 6.3 0.2
Lusaka 2,189.6 * 600.0** - 1250.0 339.6 36.3 10.7 177.9 52.4
Northern 14,782.6 965.0 1,765.5 265.0 1076.7 10710.4 279.2 2.6 0.0 .0
North-Western 12,582.6 2,432.0 693.3 - 2964.0 6493.3 55.3 0.9 35.5 0.5
Southern 8,528.3 655.0 958.6 248.0 1906.9 4759.8 185.7 3.9 665.4 14.0
Western 12,638.6 442.0 893.6 - 778.0 10525.0 117.0 1.1 5.2 .0
Zambia 75,261.2 6,680.0 6,541.9 922.0 13,872.5 47,244.8 1,288.0 2.7 1,531.4 3.2
a. Source: Ministry of Lands, Survey Department, 1993.
b. Source: J. Schultz, Explanatory Study to the Land Use Map of Zambia, Ministry of Rural Development, Lusaka, 1974 (adjusted to reflect 1993 MOL figures).
c. Source: Schultz, op cit.
d. Central province includes some national park area located in Lusaka province.
e. Source: USAID, Zambia - Natural Resource Management Projects - Project Amendment, Game Management Area Descriptions, 1993.
f. Source: Ministry of Lands, Annual report of the Forest Department, 1987.
g. Landholdings on commercial farms as of 30 September 1990, Commercial Farms series.
h. MAFF planning division, survey data, 1990.
* Essentially nil.
** Estimated. Reported under Central province.82
Table 3.2: Percentage of total farm unit cultivated, 1987-88



















1987-88 (ha) 1987-88 (ha)
(ha) (ha)
Central 453,279 59,924 13.2 150,194.2 114,387.0 76.2
Copperbelt' 311,506 59,763 19.2 59,395.6 41,590.5 70.0
Eastern 314,138.1 273,692.2 87.1
Luapula 90,701.3 56,369.5 62.1
Lusaka 265,739 30,079 11.3 36,340.1 29,838.8 82.1
Northern 279,200.3 177,302.6 63.5
North-Western 55,347.5 26,585.1 48.0
Southern 601,228 23,136 3.8 185,663.0 160,893.9 86.7
Western 117,017.5 93,779.1 80.1
Zambia total 1,631,752 172,902 10.6 1,287,997.6 974,438.5 75.7
a. For the commercial farms, Copperbelt province figures include all other provinces except for those separately
listed. This is the case for every year except 1990.
Source: Commercial Farm Series Data, 1987-88.
Rates of utilization in the MAFF survey are much higher at 75.7 percent nationwide, but range
from a low of 48.0 percent in North-Western province to a high of 87.1 percent in Eastern province.
Allowing for grazing uses and land left idle for waste, site of homestead, natural forest, and public
infrastructure, these figures suggest a fairly high rate of utilization by small farms which dominate the
MAFF sampling frame. But conclusions hinge on the definition of "reported arable land," for which
data provided by respondents are guesses, not estimates taken from area surveys. Furthermore, farms
that are completely underutilized, as indicated in chapter 1, may very well be due to absentee
landlords who are impossible to locate at the time of the survey.
The extent of farm utilization is also linked with farm size, as indicated in table 3.3. Land
utilization in the smallest farm size category (0-79 hectares) is 35.1 percent of the total farming area.
Rates of land utilization decline with further increases in farm size: 20.5 percent for the 80-199
hectare category, 8.1 percent in the 200-399 hectare category, 14.4 percent in the 400-799 hectare
category, 12.3 percent in the 800-1,999 hectare category, and 8.8 percent on farms 2,000 hectares
and above.83








0-79 ha 36,978 12,978 35.1
80-199 ha 38,655 7,913 20.5
200-399 ha 37,468 3,019 8.1
400-799 ha 74,192 10,667 14.4
800-1,999 ha 304,556 37,554 12.3
2,000+ ha 1,139,903 100,771 8.8
Source: Commercial Farm Series data, 1987-88.
C. Livestock grazing utilization
Land not in crop production, parks, or forests is not necessarily idle, due to the possibility
of livestock grazing. Table 3.4 recapitulates data on net total land area from table 3.1 and cultivated
area from table 3.2. In addition, it provides data on the number of cattle held reported in the
1984-1985 commercial farm and noncommercial farm series. Jeanes (1986) gives grazing
requirements (per head of cattle) under a wide range of agroclimatic and farm management conditions
based on a synthesis of research. One head requires 5-8 hectares on munga woodland in upland areas
receiving less than 1,000 mm rainfall, and 6-10 in wetter areas. On dambo land (ranging from
palatable grasses and legumes to sedges), grazing requirements range from 4-8 ha/head depending on
soil acidity. Grazing rates under improved management on upland pasture range from 1-7 ha/head
depending on topography and intensity of forage management. Rough grazing rates in valley areas
range from 4-12 ha/head, 8-16 ha/head in Kalahari sand areas, and 4-8 ha/head in floodplain areas.
Based on these estimates, rates of grazing intensity (i.e., percentage of net land not in forests,
parks, lakes, game management areas, or crops that is used for livestock grazing) are calculated for
three hypothetical stocking rates—12 ha/head for low stocking, 8 ha/head for medium stocking, and
4 ha/head for high stocking. Lusaka, the second most densely settled province, and Southern province,
the heart of the commercial farming sector with the highest land use efficiency (table 1.5), have high
levels of grazing utilization, as expected, even without excluding the normal 5-15 percent of land area
that is usually taken up by roads, buildings, and wasteland. However, Copperbelt province, with the
highest population density nationwide and with substantial land in commercial production, has a very
low grazing intensity even at a very conservative grazing requirement of 12 ha/head. Other provinces
have very low rates of grazing intensity (less than 14 percent at 12 ha/head), in particular, Luapula,
Northern, and North-Western provinces. Thus, there appears to be a great deal of variation in the
degree to which potential grazing areas are in fact grazed. It would be speculative to state a priori that
issuing leaseholds to newcomers or opening new stands runs the risk of displacing livestock herders
due to the very aggregate nature of the data examined. Yet it would be equally negligent to assume
that open areas are "idle" and can be brought into crop, residential, game ranching, or livestock use
without the risk of displacing current stockholders, particularly in Eastern, Lusaka, and Southern
provinces.
Table 7-88Table 3.4: Cattle holdings and estimated rates of grazing intensity
Commercial sector Noncommercial
Province





land areaa land, 1977-88
b




(000 head) Low Medium High Beef Dairy
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F=12 ha/hd) (F=8 ha/hd) (F=4 ha/hd)
Central 5,609.9 114.4 46.2 2.2 112.1 35.0 23.4 11.7
Copperbelt 2,547.8 41.6 22.5f ` 16.6f` 9.3 23.2 15.4 7.7
Eastern 2,377.4 273.7 224.6 128.1 85.4 42.7
Luapula 3,881.6 56.4 3.3 1.0 0.7 0.3
Lusaka 339.6 29.8 51.8 5.1 37.6 366.0 244.0 122.0
Northern 10,710.4 177.3 102.4 11.7 7.8 3.9
North-Western 6,493.3 26.6 74.1 13.8 9.2 4.6
Southern 4,759.8 160.9 148.6 8.7 898.3 275.4 183.6 91.8
Western 10,525.0 93.8 311.1 35.8 23.9 11.9
Zambia 47,244.8 974.4 269.2 32.7 1,772.8 53.8 35.9 17.9
a. Total land less State forest reserves, national parks, lakes, and game management areas in table 3.1
b. MAFF series from table 3.2.
c. Commercial farms data series.
d. Noncommercial farms data series.
e. GI = (F(C+D+E)±A-B) + 100.
f. Copperbelt and others.85
For many areas of the country, there thus appears to be potential arable land that is not
cropped (although perhaps in cattle) and large potential grazing areas that are not grazed. These low
rates of utilization—despite high rates of urbanization—raise fundamental questions about causes,
whether due to poor management, more lucrative nonfarm opportunities, or lack of marketing
infrastructure, market access, credit, price incentives, or need. Inthe present system where lease rents
are low (state sector) or nonexistent (customary sector), there is no disincentive to underutilization.
This situation is further exacerbated by resettlement schemes and land allocations on newly opened
lands by government where the landholder bears little or no share of the land cost. The land market
should theoretically act to reallocate underutilized land, but subdivisions and land market controls have
acted to dampen transfers, while there is weak evidence that capacity constraints may be reached in
terms of processing transfer applications within the ministry. In general, it is disturbing that so much
emphasis is being placed on opening new lands and expanding leasehold issuances when high rates
of land underutilization prevail in the state sector.
D. Type of farming unit
Information on crop area, livestock numbers, and rates of change in land use are evaluated
in detail in chapter 7. Data on number of farms by principal type of farming operation in table 3.5
provide a preliminary sense of the importance of various subsections or farm types in the Zambian
agricultural economy. Of the 815,326 total farms reporting nationwide, very few (195,841 or 24.0
percent) rely solely on cropping operations. The majority have mixed cropping and livestock activities
or are engaged in commercial activities: 0.1 percent are strictly livestock operations, 2.1 percent are
poultry farms, 4.6 percent are mixed crop and livestock operations, 40.6 percent are mixed crop and
poultry operations, 22.8 percent are mixed poultry and livestock operations, and 5.8 percent are
nonfarming operations. Theoretically, one would expect poultry operations to be located nearer to
urban centers, and livestock in more extensive rural areas. The evidence in table 3.5 reflects this to
some degree, but generally the various farming enterprises tend to be dispersed among all provinces.
E. Parcel holdings
The previous data on number of farming units disguise the fact that multiple farms or parcels
may be farmed by one operator. A frequency distribution of number of parcels held by farming units
(commercial and noncommercial) in different provinces of the country is reported in table 3.6 for the
period 1987-88 (two-year average). Of the 737,603 crop growing households reporting, 49.5 percent
held one parcel, 24.9 percent two parcels, 13.2 percent three parcels, 6.3 percent four parcels, 2.8
percent five parcels, and 3.2 percent six parcels or more.
The number of parcel holdings appears to be positively associated with population density and
degree of commercialization. In the registered and more peri-urban environments of Copperbelt and
Lusaka provinces, 91.6 percent and 96.2 percent of farming units, respectively, comprised 2 parcels
or less, reflecting the combined effect of higher land prices and mixed agricultural and residential land
uses. Conversely, in the more rural areas of the country, farming units tend to consist of more
holdings: 69.2 percent have two parcels or less in Western province, 61.2 percent Central, 61.0
percent Luapula, and 49.3 percent Northern. A high degree of fragmentation is apparent in the Central
(11.9 percent of farming units with 6+ holdings) and Northern (6.2 percent) provinces. However, the
urban and rural split based on population density is not completely deterministic as three
















Central 10,808 97 2,773 1,121 30,427 16,850 6,680 68,756
Copperbelt 19,632 23 1,779 950 28,400 5,022 4,208 60,014
Eastern 29,350 71 436 17,701 47,743 64,103 1,595 160,999
Luapula 20,899 80 4,462 1,255 37,182 6,306 6,291 76,475
Lusaka 6,693 37 933 657 10,020 4,297 8,307 30,944
Northern 28,782 4 802 1,855 89,234 23,670 1,602 145,949
North-western 17,991 142 982 2,058 25,060 7,771 2,731 56,735
Southern 18,598 95 3,336 5,840 28,377 42,561 7,549 106,356
Western 43,088 228 1,541 6,229 34,252 15,642 8,118 109,098
Zambia Total 195,841 777 17,044 37,666 330,695 186,222 47,081 815,326
Source: CSO, unpublished data




1 parcel 2 parcels 3 parcels 4 parcels 5 parcels 6+ parcels
Central 71,021 43,457 15,343 2,807 664 263 8,487
Copperbelt 53,466 28,875 20,106 3,746 577 154 8
Eastern 124,694 103,075 3,701 12,033 4,405 1,313 167
Luapula 69,761 24,907 17,644 12,532 7,960 3,794 2,924
Lusaka 23,595 16,063 6,646 778 108
Northern 147,374 30,114 42,544 33,344 20,106 12,061 9,205
North-western 52,071 22,544 20,432 6,712 1,883 153 347
Southern 96,182 58,349 26,655 7,622 2,470 681 405
Western 99,439 37,866 30,960 17,873 8,649 2,035 2,056
Zambia Total 737,603b 365,250 184,031 97,447 46,822 20,454 23,599
a. Calculated data representing the sum of the columns differ from printed data in official reports.
b. Data are only for those farms reporting, not the number of farming units nationwide.
Source: CSO, post-harvest survey, 1987-88.87
(85.6 percent), and North-Western province with numerous and scattered small farms (82.5
percent)—with high land/resident ratios still have a high degree of fragmentation.
These data showing a prevalence of multiparcel farming units justify concerns over any policy
that attempts to restrict the number of leaseholds per farming unit or ration leases to individuals who
currently lack title. Any tenure insecurity, should it be present, would likely apply to all parcels
containing arable land rather than a single farm within a farming unit. Furthermore, they place in
perspective the potential population of lease titles required should the government seek to pursue its
goal of registering 500,000 to 1,000,000 titles nationwide (chapter 1). Based on the total number of
farming units (815,326 rural households) in table 3.5 and 1.5 parcels per household (weighted average
calculated from table 3.6), the total potential demand for rural leaseholds is 1,222,989.
It seems inconceivable that all these farms or even the majority would require or even want
title. This number of potential registrations would sharply increase if strictly urban and commercial
uses were included as well (as indicated shortly, the majority of lease issuances are in fact principally
for residential and commercial uses), but it remains questionable whether these titles should be handled
by the MOL. City and municipal councils already operate registries for statutory and improvement
areas within their jurisdictions under the Housing (Statutory and Improvement Areas) Act, 1986. As
municipal governments are developed and/or strengthened, strong arguments can be made for the
municipal registries to handle the residential and commercial registrations within their jurisdictions,
while the MOL retains responsibility for leases in the more rural or extensive areas. This of course
hinges on the state of the registry system and human skills in various municipalities and highlights the
need for a review of alternatives to gradually shift these titles out of the MOL to the municipal level
(see chapter 2 recommendations). Further, should the MOL's portfolio be restructured to emphasize
rural properties, the above data would suggest that a far more modest scale of registration activity
within the MOL is justified and even advised given the current bottlenecks being experienced in
registration activities.
III. Current structure, commercial farm sector
The Zambian agricultural economy comprises two principal sectors: commercial and
noncommercial. Farmers were considered commercial in 1987-88 if they had done any of the
following in the previous year:
(1) sold to the National Agricultural Marketing Board (NAMBOARD), or any other
cooperative union, any crops whose value was equivalent to 150x90 kg bags or more
of maize at the ruling producer price;
(2) grew tobacco in their own name and were registered with the National Tobacco
Company of Zambia Ltd;
(3) sold to the Dairy Produce Board;
(4) bred, reared, and/or fattened cattle or poultry and sold them to the Cold Storage
Corporation of Zambia, Poultry Processing Company Ltd, or to any licensed butcher;
(5) reared and/or fattened pigs and sold them to the Zambia Pork Products Company, the
Cold Storage Corporation of Zambia, or any licensed butcher or supermarket;
(6) bred hybrid poultry; and/or,
(7) were state farmers for the Agricultural Division of Zimco and other agencies on a
commercial basis.88
A noncommercial farm, according to the above criteria, are those farms not selling the
minimum quantities to any of the parastatal agencies mentioned. Numbers and areas of commercial
farms (and noncommercial farms as the remainder) would tend to fluctuate from year to year as farms
swing from one sector to the other, depending on whether the threshold quantities are produced or
whether the produce is sold through state or informal channels.
According to data published in the Commercial Farms Series, the distribution of land among
farms in the commercial sector is highly skewed (table 3.7). Although small farms with 0-199 hectares
account for 42.9 percent of total commercial farms in 1989-90, the most recent year for which
complete data were available, they control only 2.1 percent of cultivated area in the sector. In
contrast, farms of over 2,000 hectares occupy 65.8 percent of the land even though only 11.4 percent
of all farms are of this size. The remaining 31.2 percent and 14.6 percent of farms in the 200-799
and 800-1,999 hectare range cultivate 13.5 percent and 18.6 percent of the land in the sector.











Zambia 0-199 806 42.9 32,363 2.1
total
200-799 586 31.2 206,978 13.5
800-1,999 274 14.6 285,102 18.6
2,000+ 214 11.4 1,007,118 65.8
Total 1,880 100.0 1,531,561 100.0
Source: Commercial Farm Series data.
Since 1975, 1990 is the first year in the time series that data are reported for all provinces.
Prior to this date, provincial data except those for Central, Southern, and Lusaka regions were
collapsed into the category Copperbelt/Others as illustrated in annex 3.1. Unfortunately, in 1989, data
for farm sizes were reduced from six to four categories: the 0-79 and 80-199 categories became one
category; and the 200-399 and 400-799 categories were merged into a second new category.
Presumably this change was meant to economize on data collection and reporting. Unfortunately,
collapsing the two smallest farm categories into one (i.e., 0-199 hectares) will make it difficult to
monitor and assess rates of expansion by the emerging small- and medium-scale commercial farms
which, as indicated in chapter 1, are reportedly expanding at a rapid pace. Many of these farms are
10-20 hectares. By including them with farms up to 199 hectares, it is difficult to assess the extent
to which small- and medium-scale farms are affecting the composition of farms in the commercial
sector, and the extent to which they are fully being captured in the CSO sampling frame.
Table 3.8 illustrates some important regional differences in the distribution of commercial
farms. In terms of numbers, most are located in the more-densely settled Central (577 farms, 30.7
percent of the total), followed by North-Western (500 farms, 26.6 percent), and Southern provincesTable 3.8: Provincial breakdown of number and size of farms, commercial farm sector, 1990
Size Number of Percent of Percent of
Province category farms (it) total (%) Area (ha) total (%)
Central 0-199 189 10.1 14,745 1.0
200-799 231 12.3 98,544 6.4
800-1,999 88 4.7 107,025 7.0
2,000+ 69 3.7 251,448 16.4
Total 577 30.7 471,762 30.8
Copperbelt 0-199 93 4.9 5,054 0.3
200-799 76 4.0 28,276 1.8
800-1,999 28 0.0 91,765 0.0
2,000+ 197 1.5 125,095 6.0
Total 10.5 8.2
Eastern 0-199 16 0.9 1,123 0.1
200-799 18 1.0 6,990 0.5
800-1,999 4 0.2 3,312 0.2
2,000+ 3 0.2 32,880 2.1
Total 41 2.2 44,305 2.9
Luapula 0-199 12 0.6 1,612 0.1
200-799 11 0.6 4,730 0.3
800-1,999 0 0.0 0 0.0
2,000+ 0 0.0 0 0.0
Total 23 1.2 6,342 0.4
Lusaka 0-199 97 5.2 6,071 0.4
200-799 76 4.0 34,916 2.3
800-1,999 35 1.9 42,744 2.8
2,000+ 27 1.4 94,215 6.2
Total 235 12.5 177,946 11.6
North-Western 0-199 345 18.4 - -
200-799 100 5.3 - .0
800-1,999 50 2.7 - -
2,000+ 5 0.3 35,500 2.3
Total 500 26.6 35,500 2.3
Southern 0-199 29 1.5 1,758 0.1
200-799 63 3.4 30,288 2.0
800-1,999 97 5.2 132,021 8.6
2,000+ 82 4.4 501,310 32.7
Total 271 14.4 665,377 43.4
Western 0-199 25 1.3 2,000 0.1
200-799 11 0.6 3,234 0.2
800-1,999 0 0.0 0 0.0
2,000+ 0 0.0 0 0.0
Total 36 1.9 5,234 0.3
National total 1,880 100.0 1,531,561 100.090
(271 farms, 14.4 percent). However, in terms of area, commercial farms are most extensive in the
southern regions (665,377 hectares, 43.4 percent), followed by Central (471,762 hectares, 30.8
percent) and Lusaka (177,946 hectares, 11.6 percent) provinces.
Southern province has the majority of the large farms with 38.3 percent of those with 2,000
hectares or more and 35.4 percent of those in the 800-1,999 hectare range. Only 3.5 percent of the
small farms and 10.7 percent of the mid-size farms in 200-799 category are located there however.'
Central province has another 32.2 percent of the two largest farm size categories, 39.4 percent of the
mid-size farms (200-799 hectares), but only 23.4 percent of the small farms. Lusaka and the
Copperbelt, which together comprise 23.0 percent of all farms, each have another 10-15 percent of
the largest farms with Eastern and North-Western provinces each having a few. Lusaka and the
Copperbelt are also the most urbanized and densely populated areas of the country with 39.9 and 31.7
people per km
2 versus less than 10 people per km
2 for the rest of the country (CSO 1991).
3 The small
farms are relatively evenly distributed across regions although North-Western province, which has
only a few large farms, has 42.8 percent of the farms in the 0-199 category and 26.6 percent of all
farms.
The skewed distribution of farm numbers versus farming area described above is also apparent
when one examines the regional figures. While most regions have roughly the same percent of total
farm numbers as total area, North-Western and Southern provinces are exceptions. North-Western
province, for example, has 26.6 percent of all farms but only 2.3 percent of the total land base. In
contrast, Southern province which is dominated by large commercial farms has only 14.4 percent of
the total number of farms but 43.4 percent of the total land area. It, like the Central region, is located
primarily in agroecological zone IIA which is characterized by a mean rainfall of 800-1,000 mm
annually, 100-140 day growing season, and 5-6 hours of sunshine per day. Despite some soil
limitations, it is the primary agricultural area (according to an unpublished report on agroecological
zones).
IV. Changes over time in farm structure
The change in the number of farms over time has been rather stochastic according to the
figures reported in annex 3.1 on the number of commercial farms by province for the period 1976 to
1990. The time series data begin in 1976 with 1,527 farms nationally. One year later, the number
jumps to 2,242, drops again to 1,566 in 1979, before surging again to 1,894 in 1980. A steady decline
in the number of farms nationally occurred from 1980 to 1985, when a low of 1,102 was reached. In
1986, the reported number of farms rebounded to 1,972 and held steady around the 2,000 mark
thereafter through 1990. These trends are illustrated in figure 3.1 for national totals and figure 3.3
for farms in the 0-79 hectare category. The Copperbelt/Others region seems to have enjoyed a long-
term gradual increase in the number of farms. The Central and Southern regions exhibited more
instability, with a fall in the mid-1970s from which they rebounded again in the mid-1980s. The
Central region seems to have included Lusaka prior to 1981 which may account for part of the dip
2 See footnote on number of farms over time and Southern province below.
] Population densities were calculated based on the 1990 census data and were reported in the CSO 1991 booklet,
"Women and Men in Zambia." The provincial population densities per square kilometer are as follows: Copperbelt, 39.9;
Lusaka, 31.7; Eastern, 9.4; Luapula, 8.3; Southern, 7.9; Central, 5.4; Northern, 4.6; North-Western, 3.9; and Western,
2.4.91
in the early 1980s. Annex 3.2 containing data on the area of commercial farms bears this relationship
out as well, particularly for the smallest farm size category (0-79 hectares, figure 3.4). The peaks and
valleys are much more pronounced in the Central and Southern regions despite the fact that, as noted
above, the Southern region only possesses 3.5 percent of the farms in this category and 14.4 percent
of all farms.4.`
Data on number of farms by size category are illustrated in figure 3.5 for the period 1976 to
1988. Associated data on farm area over the same period are contained in figure 3.6. The two smallest
farm sizes—0-79 hectares and 80-199 hectares—are experiencing the most volatile changes. The farms
in the 0-79 hectare range are particularly variable in number and clearly seem to account for most of
the corresponding national jumps and declines. There is a fairly steady decline in their number from
1977 to 1985 and then a phenomenal increase in 1986. One possible explanation is a demand response
by small fanners to price and marketing reforms instituted in the 1980s. A more telling but
analytically elusive possibility is the influence of statistical methodology including possible changes
in the definitions of commercial farms. Small farms are particularly likely to be overlooked in survey
administration. They also may fall in and out of the commercial category to the extent that market and
climate characteristics drive their production below the threshold for commercial farms. Overall there
has been an increase: the average number of farms in the two smallest farm sizes increased from 1,023
in 1976-78 to 1,214 in 1988-90, a 19 percent increase.
Although the other farm sizes tend to follow the national pattern, their lines are extremely
smoothed vis-a-vis the overall trend line and that for the smaller farms. The largest fluctuation occurs
in 1985. Farms in the 200-799 hectare range are relatively stable with 372 in 1976-78 and 397 in
1988-90, a change of 7 percent. Farms of 800-1,999 hectares are also somewhat constant in number
and seem to escape the sharp decline felt in the other farm sizes in 1985. They have, however,
steadily decreased in number over time with 307 on average for 1976-78 and only 256 in 1988-90,
a drop of 17 percent. The largest farms, those with at least 2,000 hectares, also decline in number
over time. The low point is in 1985 with 160 farms and the change in the averages from 1976-78 to
1988-90 is 14 percent, with 225 and 193 farms, respectively.
Data reflecting changes in the area of farms over time tell a similar story. The area of
commercial farms in 1976, according to the Commercial Farm Series Data, was 1,877,490 hectares,
which is roughly 2.5 percent of the 75,261,167 total hectares in Zambia. As with the number of
farms, the area under farming increased dramatically in 1977 to 2,494,960 hectares then fell again in
1978 to 1,434,876 hectares. There was another peak in 1980 of 1,861,280 hectares but only 1,298,030
hectares in 1981—a major drop from which the sector has yet to recover. By 1984, the area had risen
to 1,689,083 hectares where it hovered for the next six years. Surprisingly in 1985, when the number
of farms plummeted dramatically, area did not change significantly with 1,661,825 hectares operated.
By 1990, 1,531,561 hectares were farmed, 345,929 hectares less than in 1976. In fact, the average
from 1976-78 dropped from 1,935,775 to 1,514,233 hectares in 1988-90, a 22 percent decline.
Because data from the early to mid-1970s could not be located, it is not clear if this represents a
significant trend towards shrinkage of farm sizes in the sector overall or if the figures for the late
1970s were simply anomalous.
° Note that the 3.5% figure is taken for 1990 when only 29 farms were reporting. However, in 1989, 415 farms were
reporting, a drop of 386. In fact, the decline in total number of farms from 2,185 to 1,880, a difference of 305, seems to
be largely attributable to the change in this region.92
Figure 3.1: Number of total farms by province, 1976-1990
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Figure 3.2: Area of total farms by province, 1976-1990
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Figure 33: Number of total farms by farm size category, 1976-1988
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The average area of the small farm sector (0-199 hectares) was 43,890 hectares for 1976-78
but rose to 65,326 hectares in 1988-90—an increase of 49 percent. Much of this increase was from
smaller farms (0-79 hectares) which had risen from an average of 20,231 hectares in 1976-78 to
33,942 in 1985-87, a dramatic increase of 67 percent. The increase over the corresponding period for
farms in the 80-199 range is 55 percent. The only major fluctuation was 1985 when both farm sizes
shrunk to nearly half the area they had in 1983. In contrast, the area controlled by farms with 2,000
hectares or more was very stochastic as shown in figure 3.4. Overall, the largest farms shrunk in area
from 1,381,623 hectares in 1976-78 to 1,016,766 hectares in 1988-90, a decline of 26 percent.
V. Private transfers
The land market is the mechanism by which farming units change in number and size. Data
on official transfers, i.e., transactions in leasehold properties and other legal transfers under the
oversight of the MOL, are quite limited in scope and duration. The information that is available is
reviewed below in section VI. The data on private transfers analyzed in this section have been taken
from the commercial farm series collection for the period 1976-1990, formally known as the Annual
Census of Agricultural and Pastoral Production.
5 There is no indication how many of the transfers
reported in the commercial farm surveys have also been registered with the MOL. Accordingly, no
attempt will be made to formally reconcile the two sets of data.
The 1988-90 three-year averages indicate a relatively low level of land market transfers for
the region (table 3.9). With regard to annual figures for Zambia as a whole, roughly 9,198.6 hectares
(0.7 percent of the total land area) were purchased and 29,264.0 hectares (2.1 percent) were rented-in
or leased-in,
6 compared with purchases of around 4.0 percent per annum in the Republic of South
Africa (Roth et al. 1993). There is, however, a discrepancy between the amount purchased and the
amount sold and similarly between the amount leased-in and the amount leased-out. Normally one
would expect the land-in and land-out figures to be roughly equal. As leases not fully utilized can be
reassigned or claimed by outsiders, there is some incentive to underreport rental data. Also absentee
landlords would not usually lease-out land, particularly to outsiders. Further, they would be the most
difficult group to locate should underreporting be a serious problem in survey design. Unfortunately,
it is impossible to ascertain the determining factors from the data provided.
Most of the land market activity is occurring in Southern province with 60.9 percent of the
purchases nationwide and 40.9 percent of the leases. Copperbelt comprises 22.3 percent of the
purchases but only 4.4 percent of the leases which may be accounted for by the presence of many
small farms in this region, although Lusaka province (also with many small farms) has figures of 8.8
percent and 26.7 percent, respectively. Central province has 8.1 percent of the purchases and 28.0
percent of the leases.
6 Only area figures are reported. There is no information on the number of transfers.
6 Hereafter "lease" shall stand for lease or rental transactions. The data for most years does not distinguish between the
two, so this report shall avoid doing so as well.96
Table 3.9: Private transfers, commercial sector, 1988-90 average (hectares)
Land owned














0-199 18,863.7 73.3 0.4 1,077.3 5.7 65.7 0.0
200-799 64,081.0 667.7 1.0 2,151.3 3.4 62.3 0.0
800-1,999 13,840.7 0.0 0.0 3,905.7 3.4 15.7 2,643.7
2,000 or more 206,957.7 0.0 0.0 1,045.3 0.5 0.0 0.0
Copperbelt   others
248.7 1.1 267.7 1.2 138.7 0.0 0-199 22,956.3
200-799 29,039.0 0.0 0.0 1,017.0 3.5 95.3 0.0
800-1,999 21,422.0 1,800.0 8.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
2,000 or more 170,442.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 493.7 480.0
Lusaka
0-199 5,920.7 60.0 1.0 926.7 15.7 99.3 8.3
200-799 25,247.0 750.3 3.0 1,564.3 6.2 0.0 500.7
800-1,999 65,189.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
2,000 or more 125,811.7 0.0 0.0 5,333.3 4.2 0.0 0.0
Southern
17,585.7 173.3 1.0 322.0 1.8 0.0 122.0 0-199
200-799 24,214.7 2,168.0 9.0 93.3 0.4 22.0 91.3
800-1,999 89,106.7 0.0 0.0 7,103.0 8.0 46.3 0.0
2,000 or more 513,554.3 3,257.3 0.6 4,456.7 0.9 1,172.3 928.7
Zambia total
65,326.0 555.0 0.8 2,594.0 4.0 304.0 130.0 0-199
200-799 142,582.0 3,586.0 2.5 4,826.0 3.0 180.0 592.0
800-1,999 189,559.0 1,800.0 0.9 11,009.0 6.0 62.0 2,644.0
2,000 or more 1,016,766.0 3,257.0 0.3 10,835.0 1.0 1,666.0 1,409.0
Total 1,414,233.0 9,198.0 0.7 29,264.0 2.0 2,212.0 4,775.0
Land purchases, relative to total area, were concentrated in the 200-799 hectare and 2,000
plus hectare ranges with 40.0 percent and 35.4 percent of the area transferred respectively nationwide.
Of the total land area in the 200-799 hectare size category (142,582 hectares), 2.5 percent was
purchased and 3.4 percent was leased-in. Land markets appear to be particularly dynamic in the
Southern region, where a full 9.0 percent of the land base in this farm size category was purchased.
In the Copperbelt/Others region, 8.4 percent of the land base of 800-1,999 hectare farms was
purchased, despite the fact that the earlier analysis indicated that small farms were changing the most
in number. Moreover, as seen above, the area occupied by large farms over 2,000 hectares
experienced the greatest change, yet only 0.3 (0.1) percent of the land base of the largest farms was
reported purchased (sold), and another 1.0 (0.1) percent was reported as leased-in (leased-out). A very
high proportion (15.7 percent) of Lusaka's total land base was leased-in by farms in the 0-199 hectare
category. The 0-199 hectare farms in every province appear to be most active, usually with 3-6
percent of their area being transferred each year.97
The area purchased dropped dramatically during most of the early to mid-1980s with several
years of 0 hectares purchased in each of the provinces (annex 3.3). It is not clear whether this is due
to reporting error or structural changes in the land market. In Central province, 11,593.6 hectares
over 1976-78 were purchased on average, which was 1.36 percent of the land base, while only
2,223.0 hectares were purchased on average in the 1988-90 period, a decline of 80.8 percent despite
far less change in total farm area. Similarly, purchases in the Copperbelt/Other region averaged
12,327 hectares for 1976-78 but dropped to 2,048.6 hectares per annum by the 1988-90 period—an
83 percent decline. The change in purchases for Lusaka could not be measured over the same period
due to missing data, but there was a drop from the 1981-83 average of 4,221.6 hectares to an average
of 810.3 hectares in 1988-90. Southern province, in contrast, had only 174.3 hectares purchased on
average in 1976-78 but had 5,598.6 hectares purchased per annum in 1988-90. No purchases were
reported for several years. Small farms in all provinces, described in table 3.10, exhibit the same
tendencies with 0 hectares purchased in 1983 and 1987 and under 20 in 1985 and 1986.
Table 3.10: Small farms (0-79 ha), private transfers, 1981-1990
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Number of farms 798 722 560 503 366 1,024 1,035 1,070
Land owned at start of year (ha) 20,215 20,597 18,460 13,281 10,368 33,909 36,216 31,703
Purchases (ha) 246 223 0 241 17 19 0 444
Rented/leased-in (ha) 1,479 1,586 1957 4,080 1,885 185 995 1,530
Sold (ha) 785 0 0 0 0 0 233 366
Rented/leased-out (ha) 95 31 193 142 12 422 0 0
Land operated 21,060 22,375 20,224 17,460 12,258 33,691 36,978 33,311
Difference between operated & owned 845 1,778 1,764 4,179 1,890 -218 762 1,608
The amount of hectares leased also suffered a decline during the 1980s and an overall decline
for the data period. Comparing the periods 1976-78 with 1988-90, the leased-in area of 62,313.3
hectares in 1976-78 declined to 8,179.6 hectares in Central province; from 74,347.6 hectares to
1,284.6 hectares in the Copperbelt/others; from 75,537 hectares to 11,975 hectares in Southern
province; and a less dramatic 8,776.3 hectares (1981-83) to 7,824.3 in Lusaka, despite the fact that
land area in the sector remains relatively constant.
Overall, land purchases tend to be undertaken by farms in the larger farm size categories
(800-1,999 and 200-799 hectares) and principally in Southern and the Copperbelt/Other provinces.
Leasing-in tends to be more common on farms less than 2,000 hectares, and particularly on the
smallest farms in Lusaka province (0-199 hectares, 15.7 percent) and Southern province. In contrast,
sales and leasing-out tend to be widely dispersed among all provinces and, on the basis of area, tend
to be concentrated in the larger farm size categories. These data further suggest a land market that,
while quite important in the commercial sector, is still constrained compared with other countries in
the region. Most farms appear to renting-in land from other individuals or groups that fall outside the98
commercial farm definition, either absentee landlords or chiefs, although the cause remains an
empirical question. Large farms over 2,000 hectares do not lease-in appreciable quantities of land.
While this is not surprising, it is somewhat unexpected that they do not lease-out significant quantities
either.
Most intriguing is the drastic decline in land purchases and leases over time compared with
area, especially given the fact that land market controls appear to have eased considerably since the
1975 Conversion Act (see p. 16) was adopted. It is not a matter of simply underreporting, as total land
area is rising slightly. It is possible that high land transfer fees and MOL bottlenecks in the late 1980s
have begun to exact a toll on volume of transfers. The late 1970s and early 1980s was also a period
associated with "white flight" following independence, and the volume of transfers may have
experienced an upward surge as a result. Tenure insecurity may also be affecting transfers in certain
regions. Finally, the shrinkage in the large farm sectors over time and the expansion of smaller farms
may have simply moved purchases and rentals out of the sampling frame. None of these explanations,
either individually or collectively, is satisfactory. Field-level research will be required if these
questions are to be sorted out.
Given the apparent increase in small- and medium-scale commercial farms, one would have
expected: (1) a much more rapid growth in the number of small farms (0-79 hectares) than is
observed in annex 3.1; and (2) a greater number of land purchases and/or leasing by this group. While
land markets appear to very dynamic in certain peri-urban settings (e.g., Lusaka), this does not seem
to be the case in other areas. In fact, the wild swings from zero to thousands of hectares suggest
fundamental problems. First, the current data-collection methodology is underreporting land transfers
by existing farms. Second, the rapid expansion of new commercial farming units is not being captured
in survey designs; in fact, there is little indication of it in the data. Unfortunately, lack of data on land
transfers in the noncommercial sector limits insight into the sources of land for the lease and purchase
markets being reported, the expansion of farms that is ostensibly occurring, or the mechanisms used
to acquire land.
VI. Official land transfers
The MOL routinely maintains records for at least twelve categories of official land transfers
in Zambia:
  Assignment: the sale of registered and unregistered property usually involving a price. From
1975 to 1992, the government set values through the Government Valuation Department or
via other appraisals. Prices have been market determined since 1992.
  Assignment of subdivision (or simply subdivision): the transfer of a portion of a plot of land,
usually involving a price.
  Transfer: official change in ownership that occurs through inheritance or gift, usually without
a value ascribed.
  Deed of gift: transfer declared as a bequest or gift, usually with no value attached.
  Reserve lease: lease issued on Reserve Land.99
  State lease: lease issued on State Land.
  Right of occupancy: lease issued on Trust Land.
  Sublease: sublease on either State, Trust, or Reserve Land.
  Deed of guarantee: lien placed on property by building societies or other official agencies,
guaranteed by the Ministry of Finance.
  Mortgage: lien placed on property by banks or other formal lending institutions for long-term
credit involving land or fixed land improvements.
  Surrender: voluntary surrender of a lease. This may mean either giving up a lease or
converting from an unsurveyed 14-year lease to a surveyed 99-year lease.
  Reentry: repossession of a leasehold because the lease conditions are not met (e.g., the rent
is not paid or the plot is not developed).
Data for all transfers are recorded and filed on a computerized database maintained in the
MOL. Efforts to construct the computerized database began in 1990. Data on leases were automated
back to roughly 1987, but the reliability of the data is questionable as there is no guarantee of
completeness in data entry. To conserve time, the decision was made to omit entering data on
mortgages and offers prior to 1990. In the ministry's current usage, assignments, transfers, subleases,
mortgages, and deeds of guarantee all refer to leasehold property. Under the Lands Department's
current practices, there is no dealing in land held under customary law (e.g., areas of Reserve Land).
All categories are theoretically unique in that no transfer is allowed to be included in more than one
category. The extent to which mutual exclusivity is maintained is difficult to assess, but, on the
surface, records since 1990 appear well maintained thanks in large part to assistance provided by
SIDA in computerizing records.
A. Regional distribution of transfers
Detailed data for the period 1990 to 1993 (July) are reported for total number of transfers,
total area of transfers, average area transferred, and the average price (only for assignments,
subdivisions, deed of gift and transfers) in annex 3.4 for property transfers, annex 3.5 for lease
issuances, annex 3.6 for reentries and surrenders, and annex 3.7 for liens and mortgages. Percentages
of each type of transfer by region, and total number and area of leases nationwide are reported in table
3.11.
The level of activity is very similar to that found above for private transfers which suggests
that private and official markets are picking up the same dynamics, or the two markets are in fact
partially inclusive. Between the period 1 January 1990 and 31 July 1993, the government issued 6,013
state leases, 98 reserve leases, 237 rights of occupancy, conducted 2,972 assignments, and 215










occupancy State lease Subleases Transfer Mortgage Re-entry Surrender
Central 0.0629 0.0372 0.3776 0.2363 0.0891 0.0290 0.0576 0.1378 0.1225 0.1038
Copperbelt 0.3183 0.0651 0.3163 0.0886 0.2074 0.1739 0.0976 0.2616 0.1624 0.1491
Eastern 0.0242 0.0093 0.0306 0.0464 0.0717 0.0145 0.0277 0.0301 0.0085 0.1113
Luapula 0.0111 0.0000 0.0000 0.1730 0.0338 0.0000 0.0154 0.0078 0.0057 0.0132
Lusaka 0.5182 0.8558 0.0612 0.0338 0.3627 0.7101 0.7040 0.4069 0.5869 0.4528
Northern 0.0074 0.0000 0.0204 0.2700 0.0397 0.0000 0.0062 0.0236 0.0142 0.0453
North-Western 0.0027 0.0000 0.0000 0.0844 0.0230 0.0000 0.0051 0.0039 0.0000 0.0094
Southern 0.0505 0.0326 0.1429 0.0633 0.1074 0.0725 0.0771 0.1206 0.0684 0.0868
Western 0.0047 0.0000 0.0510 0.0042 0.0652 0.0000 0.0092 0.0078 0.0313 0.0283












Subleases Transfer Mortgage Re-entry Surrender
Central 0.4696 0.5354 0.3039 0.2728 0.2880 0.0001 0.2564 0.3330 0.5012 0.1622
Copperbelt 0.0766 0.0015 0.2551 0.1086 0.1613 0.0008 0.2430 0.2742 0.0965 0.2275
Eastern 0.0110 0.0040 0.0074 0.0286 0.0445 0.0061 0.0520 0.0203 0.0483 0.0165
Luapula 0.0021 0.0000 0.0000 0.1284 0.0094 0.0000 0.0055 0.0094 0.0000 0.0197
Lusaka 0.1637 0.2141 0.0620 0.0858 0.1573 0.0045 0.1676 0.0673 0.2870 0.3658
Northern 0.0096 0.0000 0.0133 0.2295 0.0394 0.0000 0.0092 0.0132 0.0269 0.0411
North-Western 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1006 0.0026 0.0000 0.0001 0.0003 0.0000 0.0001
Southern 0.2581 0.2451 0.3410 0.0447 0.2835 0.9886 0.2604 0.2816 0.0400 0.1671
Western 0.0092 0.0000 0.0173 0.0010 0.0139 0.0000 0.0058 0.0006 0.0001 0.0001
Total No: has 118329 6368.11 37770.95 58108.45 154164.7 2966.8 46286.52 752729.3 25303.32 55772.86
a. Data was only available through July of 1993.101
repossessed 351 leases. Without knowing the total number of leases issued nationwide, it is difficult
to evaluate the magnitude of these transfers, but, given the evidence presented in the earlier section,
the volume of assignments and subdivisions would seem very low.'
Much of the activity in assignments, transfers, and subdivisions was in peri-urban areas. While
Copperbelt (32 percent) and Lusaka (52 percent) had the majority of assignments, the main farming
regions of Central (47 percent) and Southern (26 percent) had the majority of the area transferred.
With regard to subdivisions, Lusaka had 86.0 percent of the number but only 21 percent of the area.
It also had 70 percent of the transfers but only 17 percent of their area.
State leases and subleases also seemed to be issued to small farms and properties in peri-urban
areas with the majority occurring in the Lusaka, Copperbelt, and Northern regions while Central and
Southern regions again dominate in area. Lusaka has 71 percent and Copperbelt 17 percent of the
subleases implying mainly the residential and commercial character of leases in these regions
(reviewed shortly). Reserve leases and rights of occupancy seem, however, to have been issued for
agricultural properties in Central, Copperbelt, and Lusaka. The greatest number of reentries and
surrenders appears to be occurring in the more urban and residential areas of Lusaka (58.7 percent
of reentries, 45.3 percent of surrenders), Copperbelt (16.2 percent, 14.9 percent), and Central (12.2
percent, 10.4 percent) provinces, roughly in accord with the regional distribution of state leases, but
the high percentage for Lusaka suggests the possibility of greater enforcement of land use conditions
due no doubt to the close proximity of the region to government and the central registry.
Lusaka had 40 percent of the number of mortgages placed on leases but only 7 percent of the
area under mortgages, which clearly indicates the majority of these loans are going for small, peri-
urban properties. The Central (14 percent), Southern (12 percent), and Copperbelt (26 percent) regions
seemed to have received some loans for larger agricultural properties with 33 percent, 28 percent, and
27 percent of the area respectively. Average sizes reported in table 3.12 are particularly large in the
Central region with 1,396.1 hectares for deeds of guarantee and 588.4 hectares for mortgages, the
largest of any region. Southern province also reported a 568.3 hectare average size for mortgages
although no deeds of guarantee were issued there during the reporting period. The low numbers of
such issuances vis-a-vis mortgages bears this out. Nonetheless, the larger farms in these two provinces
seem to be able to access formal channels of credit more easily than smaller farms.
These conclusions about the type and distribution of transfers are borne out by table 3.12,
which reports the regional disaggregation of land values and sizes transferred in the commercial
sector. The average size of all transactions in Lusaka was uniformly small with the exception of
reserve leases (390.2 hectares) and rights of occupancy (622.9 hectares). In contrast, the areas
transferred for the Central and Southern regions were substantial ranging from 165 to 1,396 hectares
and 42 to 587 hectares respectively. These numbers are particularly interesting for the deed of gift and
transfer categories with very large parcels (roughly 200 to 1,000 hectares) being offered for no price.
Nonetheless, as reported in annex 3.4 on the figures for transfers from 1990-93, the average size of
all four categories of transfers ranged from only 16-93 hectares.
7 The issue of rent payment aside, the volume of reentries appears quite high. However, considering the low payment
rates on lease, the MOL through enforcement of lease rents could justify a much higher rate.Table 3.12: Regional disaggregation of land values and sizes transferred in the commercial sector, 1990-93
a
Average size
of transfer Assign- Sub- Deed of Reserve Right of State Sublease Transfer Deed of Mortgage Re-entry Sur-
(ha) ments division gift lease occupancy lease guarantee render
Central 297.15 426.18 217.83 310.18 283.11 82.84 0.15 211.91 1396.09 588.35 294.93 164.50
Copperbelt 9.58 0.67 2.54 310.84 300.52 19.94 0.19 118.40 5.98 255.13 42.86 160.59
Eastern 18.09 12.64 0.76 93.67 151.04 15.93 18.00 89.16 0.00 164.63 407.35 15.56
Luapula 7.70 0.00 0.08 0.00 181.98 7.14 0.00 16.82 250.00 296.37 0.21 156.60
Lusaka 12.58 7.41 7.43 390.23 622.94 11.12 0.27 11.32 7.08 40.27 35.25 85.01
Northern 51.66 0.00 0.00 251.19 208.38 25.45 0.00 71.28 0.00 136.32 136.03 95.50
North-Western 0.58 0.00 0.02 0.00 292.42 2.93 0.00 0.79 0.00 16.46 0.00 0.97
Southern 203.57 222.96 344.84 919.89 173.03 67.64 586.59 160.70 0.00 568.31 42.15 202.64
Western 78.18 0.00 0.00 131.00 57.18 5.47 0.00 30.04 0.00 20.13 0.22 0.23
Average land Average
value/price Assign- Sub- land Assign- Sub-
(K,000/ha) ments division Transfer value/price ments division Transfer
(K000/ha)
Central 6.57 0.13 0.04 Northern 19.94 0.00 0.11
Copperbelt 193.78 912.91 0.21 North- 1997.83 0.00 0.00
Eastern 59.62 31.46 0.01
Western
Southern 5.48 4.18 0.03
Luapula 38.71 0.00 0.20 Western 3.28 0.00 0.00
Lusaka 251.28 62.66 5.04
a. Data was only available through July of 1993. Average size of transfer was calculated by summing the number of transfers in each category across 1990-93 and summing the number
of hectares across the same period and dividing. Average value was calculated in the same manner.103
B. Average values
Lack of data obscures the numbers for average value of land reported in table 3.12. There is
much disparity in average land prices across regions. It is clear from a comparison of average size
vis-a-vis average value that the far higher prices for Copperbelt, Lusaka, and North-Western generally
represent transactions in urban land with its higher value. The few transactions over the reporting
period in North-Western province, in all likelihood involving urban land, resulted in an average value
of K1,997,830 for assignments versus K251,280 for Lusaka and K6,570 for Central province. No
clear pattern is evident except that subdivisions and assignments have a higher average price than
transfers and deeds of gifts (see also annex 3.4). Even adjusting for inflation via the consumer price
index (CPI), the real price of assignment and subdivision appear to have increased in real terms from
1990 to 1993 and increased more dramatically than the other categories. Prices for transfers are
negligible for the most part with the exception of Lusaka where the average price was K5,040.
C. Lease issuances
The number, aggregate, and average areas of leases reported in annex 3.5 are much larger
than those for transfers but appear to also be relatively static, suggesting the presence of supply
constraints. Most lease activity seems to involve peri-urban properties, although there is some
heterogeneity across lease types. State leases tend to be issued to smaller, peri-urban properties.
Reserve and rights of occupancy, however, are most often going for agricultural land. According to
the data reported in annex 3.5 on lease issuances from 1990-93, state leases dominate with 1,397
(52,761 hectares) issued in 1993 (partial year) versus 65 (15,424 hectares) rights of occupancy and
only 17 (5,163 hectares) reserve leases. The average areas for state leases are much smaller than for
the other categories, with approximately 22 hectares in 1990 and 38 hectares in 1993, which again
suggests peri-urban activity. Significantly, 36 percent of state leases were issued in Lusaka and 21
percent in the Copperbelt. The largest amounts in terms of area were in the Central and Southern
regions, although these were still only 82.8 and 67.6 hectares in size respectively. Subleases are also
very small with the exception of those in the Southern region which are unusually large at 586.6
hectares. This region in fact has 99 percent of the area of subleases though only 7 percent of the total
number. As noted above, this region has a disproportionate number of the largest farms.
Reserve leases in contrast had average areas of roughly 300 hectares for three of the four years
in question. Rights of occupancy are also very large in general with an average area of 150 hectares
or more, mostly between 200-300 hectares. According to table 3.11, the main farming regions of
Central, Southern, and Copperbelt provinces lead, in area terms, in the issuance of reserve and right
of occupancy leases. While Luapula and North-Western provinces listed no reserve leases over the
period, Southern province had a reported average size of 919.9 hectares. Central, Copperbelt,
Northern, and Lusaka provinces had sizes between 250 and 400 hectares. The 390.2 hectares reported
for Lusaka is particularly surprising given the urbanized nature of the province and the small (6-8
percent) number of the leases occurring there. Without the data on distribution of Reserve, State, and
Trust Lands across provinces, it is difficult to say more about the reasons for dominance of one
province or another in lease types.
The reentries and surrenders reported in annex 3.6 are significantly larger than the state lease
sizes, indicating that most of these are occurring on Reserve and Trust Lands or are reentries of larger
state leaseholds issued in prior years. The ratio of reentries and surrenders to lease issuances is high.
In 1992, the ratio of lease issuances to reentries was 21:1 and the ratio of lease issuances to surrenders104
was roughly 9:1. In 1991, the equivalent ratios in terms of area were 13:1 and 5:1. As stated earlier
with respect to rates of utilization, it seems remarkable that the government and donors are pushing
to expand the number of leaseholds at the same time that reentries are climbing.
D. Mortgages and the credit market
According to annex 3.7, mortgages showed more change than the other official transfers: 905
were issued in 1990, 825 in 1991, and 784 in 1992. The major change in area occurred between 1990
and 1991 when the area shrunk to half its previous size, from 364,041 to 145,827 hectares. Data not
reported here from the MOL indicate that 71 percent of the mortgages (numbers) involved parcels of
less than 6 hectares. Unfortunately records are not computerized on the value of mortgages, but
conceivably these figure would be misleading as large farms, while having few mortgages, could
capture a large share of the total volume of credit as indicated in chapter 1. Given the greater tenure
security associated with 99-year leases compared with 14-year leases, one would expect a strong
association between mortgages and lease duration. Of a total of 1,285 mortgages over the period 1
January 1990 to 31 July 1993 on 14-year and 99-year leases, the vast majority of the leases were
recorded on State Land (95.1 percent), followed by rights of occupancy on Trust Land (3.3 percent),
and reserve leases (1.6 percent). With regard to duration of leases, the majority are issued for 99-years
(84.0 percent) followed by 14-year leases (16.0 percent). Care should be taken in interpreting these
numbers as 99-year leases tend to be highly correlated with state leases which tend to be located on
better lands with superior access to input and credit markets. Leaseholders also tend to be better
established with perhaps superior ability to overcome information and transaction costs associated with
taking out a mortgage. These factors would tend to skew mortgages toward state leases, most of which
are 99 years.
VII. Land use
The land use data contained in table 3.13 bear out earlier conclusions about the types of uses
dominating various transfers. For all types of transactions, residential uses overshadow other uses
everywhere but the major farming regions of Central and Southern provinces. The majority of official
transfers (assignments, subdivisions, and transfers) in 1990-93 were for residential uses with exception
of Central province. In Copperbelt province, they accounted for 62 percent, Luapula 67 percent,
North-Western 85 percent, Western 52 percent, Lusaka 50 percent, Eastern 42 percent, Northern 39
percent, and Southern 33 percent. Commercial uses accounted for another 20-30 percent in
Copperbelt, Eastern, Luapula, Southern, and Western provinces. Agriculture was the major use only
in Central province at 60 percent, but did account for roughly 30 percent in Eastern, Northern,
Southern, and Lusaka provinces. Industry was less important, with only 1-5 percent of transfers
occurring in that land use (with the exception of Northern province, where 18 percent of the transfers
involved industrial properties).
Residential uses figured importantly in lease issuances during this period in all the provinces
but particularly North-Western, Luapula, Western, and Eastern areas, with approximately 60-75
percent of their lease issuances. Agricultural uses accounted for 30-35 percent of lease issuances in
Copperbelt, Lusaka, Northern, and Southern provinces and 46 percent in Central province. In
Southern province, 20 percent of the leases were issued for properties classified as "other." There is
no indication as to what might be included in this category. Commercial uses accounted for 7-10
percent of all leases except for Luapula, where 17 percent of leases were for commercial properties,Table 3.13: Percentage of transfers, by land use and province
Residential Commercial Industrial Agriculture Other Total number
Transfers (includes assignments, subdivisions, and transfers)
Central 0.2470 0.1315 0.0120 0.6016 0.0080 251
Copperbelt 0.6181 0.2000 0.0353 0.1113 0.0353 1,105
Eastern 0.4158 0.2772 0.0198 0.2871 0.0000 101
Luapula 0.6667 0.2292 0.0208 0.0417 0.0417 28
Lusaka 0.4972 0.0992 0.0533 0.2845 0.0658 2,309
Northern 0.3929 0.1429 0.1786 0.2857 0.0000 28
North-Western 0.8462 0.1538 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 13
Southern 0.3319 0.2155 0.0129 0.3276 0.1121 232
Western 0.5217 0.2609 0.0000 0.2174 0.0000 23
Total Number 2,078 584 176 1,051 221 4,110
Leases (includes reserve leases, rights of occupancy, and state leases)
0.0111 0.4658 0.0223 629 Central 0.4308 0.0700
Copperbelt 0.4904 0.0978 0.0446 0.3364 0.0308 1,299
Eastern 0.7079 0.1348 0.0270 0.1056 0.0247 445
Luapula 0.5943 0.1721 0.0082 0.1885 0.0369 244
Lusaka 0.4333 0.0970 0.0907 0.3581 0.0210 2,195
Northern 0.4984 0.1191 0.0125 0.3041 0.0658 319
North-Western 0.6772 0.0886 0.0063 0.1772 0.0506 158
Southern 0.3640 0.1081 0.0161 0.3168 0.1950 805
Western 0.7995 0.1320 0.0127 0.0305 0.0254 394
Total Number 3,193 677 301 2,001 316 6,488
Mortgages
Central 0.1620 0.0798 0.0188 0.7347 0.0047 426
Copperbelt 0.5241 0.2386 0.1001 0.1100 0.0272 809
Eastern 0.3871 0.0538 0.0108 0.5484 0.0000 93
Luapula 0.5417 0.1667 0.0417 0.2500 0.0000 24
Lusaka 0.5119 0.0922 0.0851 0.2695 0.0413 1,258
Northern 0.3973 0.2603 0.0411 0.2466 0.0548 73
North-Western 0.5000 0.2500 0.1667 0.0833 0.0000 12
Southern 0.1546 0.1031 0.0474 0.3938 0.3010 485
Western 0.6000 0.2800 0.0400 0.0800 0.0000 25
Total Number 1,311 431 227 1,010 226 3,205
Source: CSO data averaged over 1990-93.106
and Eastern and Western provinces, where 13 percent were for commercial properties. Industrial uses
were not terribly important, accounting for only 1-5 percent of leases everywhere except for Lusaka,
which had 9 percent of its leases issued for industrial properties.
The distribution of mortgages across land uses was more varied. Residential uses accounted
for roughly 40-55 percent of mortgages in Copperbelt, Eastern, Luapula, Lusaka, Northern, and
North-Western provinces. While 60 percent of the mortgages were placed on residential properties in
Western province, they constituted only 15-16 percent of those in Southern and Central provinces.
Agricultural properties accounted for 70 percent in Central province and 39 percent in Southern
province. In the latter, 30 percent of the mortgages were also placed on properties categorized as
"other." Luapula, Lusaka, and Northern provinces also had roughly one quarter of their mortgages
placed on agricultural lands. All provinces except for the Eastern region (5 percent) had one quarter
of the mortgages placed on commercial properties. Industrial uses received another 10-16 percent of
the mortgages.
Overall, the data indicate that land transfers, whether assignments, subdivisions, or lease
issuances, are generally for residential and commercial properties. Agriculture makes up over 45
percent only in Central province. Mortgages for agricultural uses are important (8.0 percent to 39.4
percent, excluding Eastern and Central provinces), but residential and commercial properties still
predominate. Arguments raised in chapter 1 that title is needed to obtain credit are not inconsistent
with these data, but the use data suggest that residential and commercial, rather than agricultural uses,
are driving demand.
VIII. Size distribution of leases
Table 3.14 lists the number of leases issued by size category totaled over the period 1990-93.
The vast majority (81.9 percent) of state leases are issued to farms less than 6 hectares in size. This
accords with the findings above but shrinks the size from the range 0-79 to the more precise 0-6
hectares. This suggests the significance of peri-urban activity and the possible filling-in of pockets of
unregistered land in areas largely registered. Due to the dominance of state leases over reserve leases
and rights of occupancy, 78 percent of all leases are issued for properties less than 6 hectares in size.
The 100-250 hectare size is more important for reserve leases and rights of occupancy, with
29.6 percent of the former and 48.1 percent of the latter. Most of the leases in this category were
issued for properties between 50-500 hectares in size, with a surprisingly large number (25.5 percent
of reserve leases and 16.5 percent of rights of occupancy) issued in excess of the 250 hectares ceiling
set by the MOL to avoid land concentration.8.'
Data on the percentage of leases for each farm size by province are reported in table 3.15.
Only four provinces garnered more than 10 percent of the leases for any given farm size. The medium
and large farm leases seem to have been issued largely in the main commercial farming regions.
The minister has discretionary powers to issue leases for areas in excess of this amount, particularly for certain uses
(e.g., ranching) where a larger size makes economic sense.Table 3.14: Numbers of leases by size category, 1990-93 totals

















0-2 4,215 70.1 5 5.1 9 3.8 4,229 66.6
2-6 707 11.8 9 9.2 8 3.4 724 11.4
6-11 233 3.9 4 4.1 2 0.8 239 3.8
11-21 151 2.5 4 4.1 12 5.1 167 2.6
21-50 213 3.5 12 12.2 21 8.9 246 3.9
50-100 171 2.8 10 10.2 32 13.5 213 3.4
100-250 207 3.4 29 29.6 114 48.1 350 5.5
250-500 52 0.9 17 17.3 25 10.5 94 1.5
500-1,000 43 0.7 2 2.0 5 2.1 50 0.8
1,000-2,500 18 0.3 2 2.0 7 3.0 27 0.4
2,500-5,000 1 0.0 2 2.0 2 0.8 5 0.1
5,000 or more 2 0.0 2 2.0 0 0.0 4 0.1
Total 6,013 100.0 98 100.0 237 100.0 6,348 100.0
Table 3.15: Regional disaggregation of leases by farm size, 1990-93 percentages
Hectares
0-2 2-6 6-11 11-21 21-50 50-100 100-250 250-500 500-1,000 1000-2500 2500-5000 5000+
Central 7.6 2.9 3.8 12.6 18.7 28.2 22.9 44.7 42.0 18.5 40.0 25.0
Copperbelt 19.8 7.6 35.6 51.5 48.0 16.9 17.4 11.7 2.0 25.9 0.0 25.0
Eastern 9.0 2.3 1.7 2.4 2.4 4.2 4.3 3.2 12.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Luapula 4.6 0.3 0.4 1.8 2.4 1.9 8.0 2.1 4.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Lusaka 33.1 80.0 49.0 18.6 12.2 6.1 3.4 3.2 12.0 3.7 0.0 25.0
Northern 5.0 0.8 1.3 4.8 4.1 7.5 10.6 7.4 2.0 14.8 40.0 0.0
North-Western 2.8 2.2 0.4 0.6 1.2 1.9 2.3 3.2 0.0 7.4 0.0 0.0
Southern 9.0 3.5 7.9 6.6 9.3 31.9 30.3 24.5 20.0 29.6 20.0 25.0
Western 9.0 0.4 0.0 1.2 1.6 1.4 0.9 0.0 6.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total number 4,229 724 239 167 246 213 350 94 50 27 5 4108
Central province, which led in the percentage of area of leases, tends to have a significant percentage
of the leases in the medium- to large-size farms: 28 percent of those in the 50-100 hectare category,
23 percent of those 100-250 hectares, 45 percent of those 250-500 hectares, 42 percent of those
500-1,000 hectares, 19 percent of those 1,000-2,500 hectares, 40 percent of the few 2,500-5,000
hectare leases, and 1 of the 4 farms over 5,000 hectares. Southern province, which also led in
percentage of the area of leases, had a significant percentage of leases for these farm sizes as well,
with 32 percent, 30 percent, 24 percent, 20 percent, 30 percent, 20 percent, and 1 of 4 respectively.
In keeping with our earlier findings, Copperbelt and Lusaka provinces were the most important for
leases on land 50 hectares and under. The Copperbelt had 20 percent of the 0-2 hectare leases, 7
percent of the 2-6 hectare, 36 percent of the 6-11 hectare, 51 percent of the 11-21 hectare, and 48
percent of the 21-50 hectare leases. Lusaka had 33 percent, 80 percent, 49 percent, 19 percent, and
12 percent of the leases for the same farm sizes. The dramatic dominance of Lusaka in the 2-6 hectare
size seems to confirm the hypothesis about the significance of peri-urban activity and in-filling of
registered land. The Copperbelt, which also has some sizable areas under agricultural production, had
15-25 percent of the leases in most of the larger farm sizes as well.
IX. Foreign offers
Foreign offers have been an issue of contention in Zambia. There is concern among some
government officials that the leasehold process could promote excessive concentration and a growth
in foreign ownership if the land market is fully opened to outsiders. Conversely, following 15 or more
years of nominally socialist policies, a number of Zambians are expressing the need for private capital
growth to develop the economy, and foreign investment is considered the most promising source of
this private capital. There is palpable concern from all sides, nonetheless, about possible equity
consequences of opening the land market.
Data from official transfer records indicate there may be no foundation for these fears at
present, although missing data preclude any strong conclusions. When offers are registered, the offerer
is asked to produce a national registration card (NRC), 9 the last digit of which indicates citizenship
status (see chapter 2).
10 The data on foreign ownership in table 3.16 were compiled from a computer
listing of the offers. Unfortunately, roughly 15-25 percent of the offerers in every province were
missing an NRC with the exception of Lusaka province, where 39.4 percent of offers did not have
the proper NRC codes attached. It is possible for foreigners to register land in names of Zambian
spouses or other kin which may begin to explain the large number of missing registration cards.
Assuming that only Zambians were missing their cards, no more than 2 percent of the offers
were made by non-Zambians (averaged over 1990-93) with the minor exception of Central province
(2.9 percent). Assuming the missing cards were evenly distributed between Zambians and non-
Zambians, then foreign offers would account for 12-13 percent in most provinces. With the large
number of missing cards in Lusaka, the number would rise to 18.8 percent there. In other provinces
where one percent or less foreign offers were registered (e.g., Eastern, Luapula, Northern, North-
Western, Southern, and Western), this assumption seems a bit strong, particularly when this weighting
9 In the ministry usage, "offer" refers to an application that has been approved for registration.
10 Zambians have a 1 appended and foreigners have a 2 or another digit. The data were sorted according to this criteria.
All residents of Zambia are required by law to carry these cards.109
of the missing cards makes the percentage jump from 0 to 12.7, as in the case of Northern province.
Overall, there seems to be little cause for concern about the number of offers registered by foreigners.
On the other hand, there are insufficient data to determine whether large areas of land may be
transferring to outsiders.















Central 105.3 77.5 4.00 2.9 26.67 19.6
Copperbelt 449.3 77.1 10.00 1.7 123.67 21.2
Eastern 109.7 80.0 0.67 0.5 26.67 19.5
Luapula 75.7 81.9 0.33 0.4 16.33 17.7
Lusaka 444.0 64.5 8.67 1.3 235.67 34.2
Northern 66.0 74.4 0.00 0.0 22.67 25.6
North-Western 51.0 83.6 0.67 1.1 9.33 15.3
Southern 205.0 81.9 1.00 0.4 44.33 17.7
Western 115.0 74.2 0.33 0.2 39.67 25.6
Total 1,621.0 74.0 25.67 1.2 545.00 24.9Annex 3.1: Number of commercial farms, by province, 1976-1990
Sae Number
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Central 0-79 119 490 338 280 372 183 188 160 152 112 301 303 305
80-199 50 89 146 111 124 95 74 85 51 36 96 98 100 415 189
200-399 38 65 81 74 89 65 81 42 36 30 43 44 45 110 231
400-799 102 149 138 99 142 61 35 30 29 30 60 60 63 103 88
800-1,999 192 228 157 144 239 94 95 80 77 59 100 101 102 71 69
2,000+ 92 116 92 111 124 54 50 42 58 12 70 70 70
Total 593 1137 952 819 1090 552 523 439 403 279 670 676 685 699 577
Copperbelt 0-79 34 126 73 101 162 124 122 120 99 63 342 344 345
& others 80-199 19 29 27 55 42 37 58 50 40 27 97 98 100 460 491
200-399 14 74 58 48 32 22 50 35 39 23 46 48 50 75 216
400-799 14 9 12 9 20 15 30 25 38 18 20 20 21 24 54
800-1,999 19 24 23 21 25 40 48 55 30 36 22 22 23 30 36
2,000+ 15 24 27 21 29 26 42 62 27 45 28 28 29
Total 115 286 220 255 310 264 350 347 273 212 555 560 568 589 797
Southern 0-79 320 374 388 192 223 215 210 160 207 96 316 318 320
80-199 146 154 146 94 93 85 83 80 69 48 81 83 85 415 29
200-399 52 56 54 46 35 31 29 40 35 31 38 39 40 64 63
400-799 64 66 69 48 39 31 35 40 23 22 17 19 21 55 97
800-I,999 104 70 104 56 50 66 64 60 52 48 53 53 54 62 82
2,000+ 133 99 77 56 54 62 62 58 70 79 60 60 61
Total 819 819 838 492 494 490 483 438 456 324 565 572 581 596 271
Lusaka 0-79 276 202 120 45 95 65 70 100
80-199 38 40 40 20 19 18 25 37 155 97
200-399 32 38 20 20 36 9 13 20 60 76
400-799 46 40 35 25 28 20 27 35 68 35
800-1,999 99 80 75 50 85 50 60 65 18 27
2,000+ 38 24 12 22 24 20 23 24
Total 529 424 302 182 287 182 218 281 301 235
Zambia total 0-79 473 990 799 573 757 798 722 560 503 366 1024 1035 1070
80-199 215 272 319 260 259 255 255 255 180 130 292 304 322 1445 806
200-399 104 195 193 168 156 150 198 137 130 120 136 144 155 309
400-799 180 224 219 156 201 153 140 130 115 98 117 126 140 250 586
800-1,999 315 322 284 221 314 299 287 270 209 228 225 236 244 181 274
2,000+ 240 239 196 188 207 180 178 174 177 160 178 181 184 214
TOTAL 1527 2242 2010 1566 1894 1835 1780 1526 1314 1102 1972 2026 2115 2185 1880
Blank spaces indicate no data reported. It appears that the numbers for Lusaka were included with those for the Central province prior to 1981.Annex 3.2: Area of commercial farms by province, 1976-1990
Size Number
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Central
0-79 3780 12770 8243 6660 9350 6048 6730 6250 4999 4344 12291 11912 12979
80-199 5550 10200 14424 12410 15460 12101 8622 8845 6746 4006 12152 12863 9529 19338 14745
200-399 9830 16500 18224 17140 22710 17945 18763 10580 9948 8263 11225 8980 11145
400-799 44760 90570 59418 45700 73920 31292 16393 19775 15644 18877 37520 36400 31206 51348 98544
800-199.9 196230 254150 198810 153060 276570 87725 101912 95951 92530 72322 126351 126892 122221 112276 107025
2000+ 445080 852780 314380 503950 943570 138761 108108 164574 212761 100951 319046 255237 175630 193795 251448
Total 705230 1236970 613499 738920 1341580 293872 260528 305975 342628 208763 518585 452284 362710 376757 471762
Copperbelt   others
1180 1572 3370 3780 2520 3492 3294 2852 2146 10112 10836 10444 0-79 620
80-199 2230 2370 2196 6580 5010 3693 6588 5040 4988 2835 9739 11687 11663 36973 9789
200-399 2500 5790 6077 3870 7960 5582 13190 11055 12295 6319 12647 12732 12800
400-799 7130 2960 3320 4780 10020 7635 15021 13573 20441 8591 9895 10185 10458 20629 43230
800-1999 17800 26140 29492 28500 18310 55859 49992 76369 43133 41578 25361 30433 30954 30000 3312
2000+ 150200 372790 274743 295030 91590 113208 181723 566780 174338 495747 292653 234122 117061 234122 160145
Total 180480 411230 317400 342130 136670 188497 270006 676111 258047 557216 360407 309995 193380 321724 216476
Southern
0-79 11120 10910 10497 5870 6750 7136 8292 5566 4259 2604 10287 12028 7055
80-199 12210 11220 10578 8740 11320 8871 7948 7302 2990 4372 10123 9039 10554 33390 1758
200-399 11920 14150 11654 14460 8820 6868 5952 8500 9900 8307 10020 11362 10740
400-799 40520 28220 31396 19090 21880 15978 20351 22640 13211 12228 9133 10467 9610 22006 30288
800-1999 162260 90100 150866 74320 71320 89328 88016 77439 69894 61906 73087 75980 69685 65614 132021
2000+ 753750 692160 288986 183570 262940 278572 356782 276123 630815 522783 401038 481246 564947 474406 501310
Total 991780 846760 503977 306050 383030 406753 487341 397570 731069 612200 513688 600122 672591 595416 665377
Lusaka
0-79 4511 2083 3350 1171 1274 1219 1440 1225
80-199 3872 5473 6083 2390 2966 2376 3960 6290 4176 6071
200-399 7693 11514 6390 4780 11311 2535 4394 5610
400-799 27800 24176 18913 17562 17297 11970 15600 16670 18545 34916
800-1999 - 114574 94906 88584 64880 95754 50692 71280 69795 83029 42744
2000+ 250458 174574 38488 266556 155044 122680 169298 161840 121380 94215
Total 408908 312726 161808 357339 283646 191472 265972 261430 227130 177946
Zambia total
0-79 15520 24860 20312 15900 19880 20215 20597 18460 13281 10368 33909 36216 31703
80-199 19990 23790 27198 27730 31790 28537 28631 27270 17114 14179 34390 37549 38036 93877 32363
200-399 24250 36440 35955 35470 39490 38088 49419 36525 36923 34200 36427 37468 40295
400-799 92410 121750 94134 69570 105820 82705 75941 74901 66858 56993 68518 72652 67944 112528 206978
800-1999 376290 370390 379168 . 255880 366200 347486 334826 338343 270437 271560 275491 304585 292655 290919 285102
2000+ 1349030 1917730 878109 982550 1298100 780999 821187 1045965 1284470 1274525 1135417 1139903 1019478 1023703 1007118
TOTAL 1877490 2494960 1434876 1387100 1861280 1298030 1330601 1541464 1689083 1661825 1584152 1628373 1490111 1521027 1531561
A blank space indicates no data were reported.Annex 3.3: Private transfers, commercial sector, 1976-1990 (000 hectares)
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 19901
Central Number 0.6 1.1 1.0 0.8 1.1 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6
Starting land 705.2 1,237.0 613.5 738.9 1,341.6 293.9 260.5 306.0 342.6 208.8 518.6 452.3 362.7 376.8 471.8
Purchases 16.0 7.8 10.9 0.8 4.5 21.8 29.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.2 1.9 0.2
Leased-in 49.8 79.6 57.6 81.3 112.0 223 30.5 21.3 0.6 4.4 1.2 1.0 5.8 16.5 2.2
Leased-out 4.5 22.6 1.1 36.0 12.7 0.2 0.5 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.1
Sales 49.2 3.2 3.8 6.3 0.9 0.0 5.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.9 0.0 0.0
Copperbelt Number 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.8
& others
Starting land 180.5 411.2 317.4 342.1 136.7 188.5 270.0 676.1 258.0 557.2 360.4 310.0 193.4 321.7 216.5
Purchases 28.0 1.8 7.2 0.1 0.8 5.7 0.0 0.0 10.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.7 5.4 0.0
Leased-in 14.7 179.6 28.8 31.3 32.8 15.6 0.0 0.0 3.1 18.2 4.2 2.7 1.5 2.2 0.2
Leased-out 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.4 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.6 1.6
Sales 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.0 0.0 1.4
Lusaka Number 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2
Starting land 408.9 312.7 161.8 357.3 283.6 191.5 266.0 261.4 227.1 177.9
Purchases 2.6 0.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 2.3
Leased-in 13.4 9.1 3.8 0.2 10.6 19.4 0.0 19.5 2.3 1.6
Leased-out 1.2 1.0 0.1 0.7 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3
Sales 0.8 0.0 1.2 1.7 8.2 1.0 0.2 1.4 0.0 0.2
Southern Number 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.3
Starting land 991.8 846.8 504.0 306.1 383.0 406.8 487.3 397.6 731.1 612.2 513.7 600.1 672.6 595.4 665.4
Purchases 0.2 0.0 0.4 0.3 2.4 0.9 7.8 0.0 0.5 3.6 0.0 0.0 4.2 12.1 0.5
Leased-in 134.1 34.7 57.8 31.8 11.9 15.9 11.4 20.8 19.0 16.0 15.9 1.1 20.0 14.4 1.5
Leased-out 15.6 2.2 0.0 4.4 6.6 3.7 0.0 0.0 0.1 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.5 0.2
Sales 6.7 0.0 0.2 0.0 4.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 2.8 0.3
Source: Data were taken from the Commercial Farm Series.113















Assignments 1990 659 30,212.87 45.85 10.94 10.94
1991 598 27,624.25 46.19 29.64 26.75
1992 999 33,815.50 33.85 74.27 19.67
1993 716 26,676.76 37.26 135.64 35.92
Subdivision 1990 59 2,432.29 41.23 9.96 9.96
1991 52 2,100.41 40.39 6.31 5.69
1992 62 1,009.50 16.28 23.27 6.16
1993 42 825.91 19.66 49.35 13.07
Deed of gift 1990 18 402.28 22.35 0.00 0.00
1991 25 1,187.23 47.49 0.00 0.00
1992 41 2,659.36 64.86 0.00 0.00
1993 24 371.94 15.50 0.00 0.00
Transfer 1990 186 7,365.21 39.60 0.05 4.74
1991 311 5,256.67 16.90 0.33 .30
1992 284 15,839.38 55.77 1.60 .42
1993 192 17,825.26 92.84 0.84 .22
a. Data was only available through July of 1993.










Reserve lease 1990 30 9,200.02 306.6673
1991 19 5,737.59 301.9784
1992 32 17,669.36 552.1675
1993 17 5,163.98 303.7635
Right of 1990 74 20,734.22 280.1922
occupancy 1991 54 9,881.83 182.9969
1992 44 12,067.74 274.2668
1993 65 15,424.66 237.3025
State lease 1990 1,347 30,945.74 22.97382
1991 1,664 35,380.28 21.26219
1992 1,605 35,077.13 21.85491
1993 1,397 52,761.52 37.76773
Sublease 1990 21 5.81 0.276667
1991 15 3.01 0.200667
1992 22 23.98 1.09
1993 11 2934 266.7273114









Reentry 1990 91 14,249.64 156.5895
1991 79 3,980.09 50.38089
1992 81 2,697.74 33.30543
1993 100 4,375.85 43.7585
Surrender 1990 119 29,943.82 251.6287
1991 111 9,525.80 85.81802
1992 191 10,396.62 54.43257
1993 109 5,906.62 54.18917









Deed of 1990 11 926.71 84.24636
guarantee 1991 3 39.27 13.09
1992 3 4,959.35 1,653.117
1993 2 0.40 0.2
Mortgage 1990 905 364,041.20 402.2555
1991 825 145,827.30 176.7604
1992 784 109,128.00 139.1938
1993 578 133,732.90 231.3717Chapter 4:
Land Valuation and Taxation
by
John Strasma, Sonny P. Mulenga, David Musona, and D.
Siansumo1. Introduction
There has been a land market in Zambia for centuries, just as there has been in every country
in the world. Land and the right to use it in specific ways and for specific times are exchanged in
many ways, each reflecting custom, local conditions, expected demand for what can be produced with
land, and power relationships. In most societies, people get access to land on which to build or to
farm in various ways. Some involve a high initial or threshold cost and little or no recurring cost. An
example would be to buy a house with freehold title in an area that does not have taxes or rates. Other
access to land may have a very low initial or threshold cost but relatively high periodic costs if
continued access is desired. In some countries, almost everyone knows from experience and
observation whether, where, and on what terms, to obtain land on which to live, work, or both. In
other countries, people may be familiar with only one or two ways in which they could obtain access
to land. Even in countries that declare the private sale or rental of land illegal, land or housing can
usually be obtained in exchange for something.
In customary land tenure areas, access may require the consent of a headman or chief, which
is often obtained more easily if one is a relative of families already there. In areas of former European
settlement, the market is often more visible, and access available to persons with enough money,
regardless of family or other personal characteristics. Even in areas in which the government forbids
the private sale or rental of land and housing, market processes work—though with limitations and in
ways that not everyone can utilize. Access to housing is sometimes part of an employment contract.
Access to land or housing may be bestowed as a favor in exchange for support of a politician or party,
or as a reward for superior performance in sports or other activities. Where functionaries decide who
gets access to land or housing, access to better land or housing may require payment of a bribe in
money, scarce goods, or services.
Much of the genius of modern developed economies is that their societies offer a high degree
of personal liberty. They make it possible for almost everyone to choose among several ways in which
they could get the use of various kinds of land, in different places, in varying amounts according to
their own means and productivity. These societies have prospered largely because their land markets
meet five standards of justice and efficiency:
(1) Everyone, not just a few powerful "insiders," can get access to land at a reasonable initial and
recurring cost.
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(2) Those who invest money and effort in improving land are allowed to collect and enjoy the
fruits of their effort.
(3) Society, usually through government, provides or finances the provision of roads, schools, and
other services and productive infrastructure that most people cannot efficiently produce by and
for themselves.
(4) Recurring costs, usually in the form of taxes and interest on borrowed money, are high
enough that few people can afford to speculate or control land without putting it to productive
use.
(5) Those who want to use land can identify and choose an available parcel and acquire secure
use rights to it quickly, at minimal cost other than what they agree to pay to the person who
gives up the right to use the land (i.e., search and transactions costs are small).
In an efficient market, people needing land for productive use can identify appropriate parcels,
negotiate a price, and complete the transfer with little cost in time, energy, or money other than the
amount paid to the person or entity from whom the land is obtained. In Zambia, identifying available
parcels is neither easy nor inexpensive, negotiations are difficult, and heavy transfer taxes and
administrative deficiencies make transfers slow and costly. Policy changes would greatly reduce the
cost of finding and obtaining land; the supply could also be increased by funding council and private
projects to service and sell sites.
This chapter reviews the land market in Zambia, to see how it measures up to the above
standards. It then considers proposed alternative policy actions to improve its performance,
considering both Zambian experience and that of other countries with such policies. In particular, the
theory and practice of land valuation, including transfer taxes, annual "rates" on improvements, and
ground rents, are addressed. Draft legislative changes are now under discussion, and this chapter
includes an analysis of these proposals and suggestions to make them less ambiguous and more
effective. Section II looks at transactions costs associated with real estate. Sections III and IV analyze
taxation through rates and valuations. Section V covers ground rents as currently applied in Zambia.
Section VI then summarizes and analyzes the relevant proposals in draft reform laws currently
circulating. Section VII will address the proposed land development fund, an idea introduced at the
July 1993 land conference (see chapter 1) and warmly endorsed by the participants. And section VIII
will close with conclusions and recommendations.
II. Transfer taxes, fees, and other transactions costs
A. Transfer tax
The Property Transfer Tax Act, No. 12 of 1984, created a transfer duty. At the July 1993 land
conference (see chapter 1), and in many interviews, there was a consensus that the present 7.5 percent
tax on land transfers, supposedly charged on the actual market price, was unreasonably high and117
curtailed transfers.' Assertions were also made that parties have been falsely underdeclaring the actual
price at which leaseholds or other interests are changing hands. Theoretically, this tax should be
eliminated or reduced to a nominal level, both to encourage more frequent transactions in land and
improvements and to remove the present powerful incentive to falsely declare a transfer price below
the real price charged and paid.
If accompanied by an adequate educational campaign, it is likely that revenues would actually
rise if this rate were to be cut in half. For that to happen, buyers, sellers, and functionaries would
have to be informed the government is serious about enforcement of tax collection and accurate
reporting of the actual sale price. There are a number of ways to encourage honesty. One is to provide
by law that in the event of any property acquisition by government, the purchase price (or
compensation if expropriated) may not exceed the amount declared as the purchase price, adjusted for
inflation. Another method, used in various Latin American countries, is to forbid banks to lend more
than a fraction (say 60 percent) of the declared purchase price when the property is mortgaged to the
bank in order to guarantee repayment (see figure 4.1). Fines or penalties represent a third option.
Figure 4.1: Central American experience with tax declarations, bank credit, and
compensation for land expropriated in land reforms
Legal requirements linking value declared for tax purposes to bank credit and to compensation in
the event of expropriations are common in Central America. For example, in the 1970s, Salvadoran banks
still made loans to commercial farmers at interest rates below the expected rate of inflation. In 1976 and
1977, landowners were required to declare the value of their lands for annual property tax purposes. The
farms were taxed at a rate of 1 percent a year, on the value declared, with the revenues going mostly to
finance road construction and maintenance. When farms larger than 500 hectares were expropriated in the
land reform of 1980, it turned out that about 90 percent of the owners had declared values for tax
purposes that were clearly less than the market value of the land. On the other hand, about 10 percent of
the large farms had been declared at more than their actual market value. In most cases, this appears to
have happened because the owners expected to obtain bank loans with the land as collateral. By paying 1
percent a year on inflated declared values, they could increase the amount of money they could borrow at
an expected negative real rate of interest on the order of 10 percent.
Since the beneficiaries were supposed to repay, over 30 years, whatever amount of compensation
had been paid to the former owners, false overdeclaration years before also meant that the land reform
beneficiaries might have to pay more than the land was worth. In practice, however, inflation has cut the
real value of prices set at the time of expropriation, and beneficiaries are not actually being asked to pay
more than the land is worth, even when a former owner had overdeclared its value in 1976/77.
Source: Strasma 1966 and 1990.
In any event, quite apart from the temptation to declare falsely the price at which leaseholds
or improvements change hands, the transfer tax is a poor way to recover government's expenditures
to provide access and services in land. The first transfer, from government or traditional authority,
is not subjected to the transfer tax, and if the property remains in the hands of the first transferee, no
transfer tax is ever collected. It would be far more equitable to lower the rate of the transfer tax, while
creating and enforcing a significant annual tax or ground rent.
2
It is in fact quite difficult to determine whether the transfer tax has curtailed transfers. A 7.5 percent transfer fee would
not be a serious constraint if landholders were allowed to greatly discount or underreport the purchase or sale price.118
B. Incidence and shifting of the transfer tax
Zambian law and practice state that the transfer tax is supposed to be paid by the seller.
However, the estate agents and functionaries interviewed observed that, in practice, the buyer pays
it along with other costs; Zambian real estate has been a seller's market of late, so it appears that
sellers can sufficiently raise their asking prices to cover the transfer tax.
Regardless of what the statutes say, a transfer tax actually affects both parties. To the buyer,
it is part of the amount he or she must pay in order to acquire the property. To the seller, it is an
amount that the buyer is willing to pay but which the seller does not receive. Both share in the tax
burden; how much each "pays" depends on their relative bargaining power, which depends largely
on how many other people are seeking such properties to buy and how many similar properties are
currently for sale. If demand exceeds supply, prices will tend to rise and vice versa.
To analyze the burden of the transfer tax, one must suppose a different world, in which there
is no transfer tax but government obtains the same revenue in a more neutral way, such as a value-
added tax. In that hypothetical world, the actual market price might be higher or lower than the
market prices in the real world (where a transfer tax is charged) depending on the other forces
operating on supply and demand at the moment. Economists simply do not have a reliable way to
determine the actual incidence of this tax, even in developed countries with excellent statistical data
(Musgrave 1960).
C. Revenue yield and tax evasion
According to informal sources, buyer and seller frequently agree to falsely declare the
purchase price to avoid paying an "excessively" high transfer tax (7.5 percent in 1993)2 The honest
buyer and seller are thus penalized, paying much more tax on the transfer than others who buy and
sell property of the same market value, but who understate the price.
The Minister of Finance announced, in the 1994 budget message (p. 14), that the government
intends to reduce the Property Transfer Tax rate to 2.5 percent, to amend the Property Transfer Tax
Act so that the commissioner may use property assessments by the Government Valuation Department,
and to amend the Land Conversion of Titles Act revoking the provision stipulating that land has no
value. This proposed 2.5 percent tax should be reduced further and perhaps even replaced by a capital
gains tax. This will encourage landholders to sell more quickly when their own needs for land
diminish and help the economy adjust faster to economic changes. Even so, Zambia's real estate
market and institutions will still suffer from sluggish titling and registry services. According to the
1994 budget message (p. 10), the government will take an initiative in 1994 to approve terms of
reference for ways of decentralizing to the district-council level and for improving the registration of
land transfers and the collection of fees. (See chapter 2 for an assessment of these proposals).
The transfer tax is not the only cost in real estate transactions in Zambia. There are also user
fees to be paid to the registry and the costs of survey. Attorney fees and a commission charged by an
3 In comparison, the transfer tax in the United States is only 2 per 1,000 (0.2 percent). The amount of the tax is recorded
on the actual record of the transfer, which is open to public inspection. Thus, appraisers, real estate tax assessors, and the
public in general can find out rather easily the price at which properties are actually bought and sold.119
estate agent may also be involved. All of these costs separate the amount paid by the buyer from the
amount received by the seller and make the land market less agile, slowing economic development.
D. Registration fees or stamp duty
The regulations contain a number of prescribed fees set in colonial times that, while generating
revenues, have become a nuisance as monetary values have eroded. For example, the stamp duty
applied to real estate transfers is a nominal rate held over from colonial times. The Zambian 1994
budget message announced its abolition as of midnight, 28 January 1994.
E. Planning department scrutiny fees
All construction in Zambia, other than on agricultural holdings, requires a permit issued by
the relevant city or council, and a scrutiny fee is normally charged for this review. The fees are based
on an estimated minimum development investment per square meter and vary among councils. The
current scrutiny fee for Lusaka is 0.25 percent. Thus a 100 square meter building costing K115,000
per square meter, or K11.5 million, would require a scrutiny fee of K28,750. A scrutiny fee of
K40,000 is charged in Lusaka for the review of subdivision and consolidation.
Various other problems are leftovers from the previous government of Zambia. For instance,
there is still a widely shared reluctance to recognize the fact that land values change rapidly and by
large amounts when product markets or other relevant data change. Some who write draft legislation
regularly propose legal language that is ambiguous. The proposed reforms in the Land Titles Act and
the Land Registration Act are good examples of positive draft laws that need sharper focus and
clarification.
The problems of the land market will not end with better laws. Those land laws are
administered by government entities, some of which have employees who are not dedicated to
minimizing cost and maximizing service to taxpayers.
From inertia, tradition, political concerns, or other causes, the Republic of Zambia issues 99-
year negotiable leaseholds instead of freehold titles. Freehold tenure would be no more secure, as the
Second Republic showed when the president simply decreed that all freehold titles must be converted
into 99-year leases. More worrisome is that neither leaseholders nor hypothetical freeholders have very
firm guarantees against expropriation or other actions by the state that may take their property without
fair prior compensation. The best estimates available so far indicate that recording a sale of a leasehold
interest may take several days; seeking, obtaining, and recording a new leasehold with the consent of
a tribal chief may take several months or even years (see chapter 2). The actual cost of buying or
subleasing land and improvements includes the explicit taxes and fees plus the value of the time of
the interested parties (or their attorneys or other agents). Based on the above-mentioned time
requirements, transfer costs would appear to be considerable.
F. Revenues of the Lands Department
The GOZ collects money from persons to whom state land has been allocated under three
headings: registry fees, state consent fees, and annual ground rents. (There was formerly a stamp tax
as well, but it was abolished in early 1994.) Table 4.1 shows that the revenues obtained from these
sources have varied sharply over time in current kwacha terms. Because the year-to-year changes were120
somewhat arbitrary and because the rate of inflation itself varied sharply from year to year, the
revenue in real terms has been highly variable. Making matters more confusing, revenues depended
on the level of transfer activity as much as on the tax rates themselves. Consent and registry fees
depended on the number of transfers and new allocations recorded each year. Ground rents, however,
were so low that many leaseholders failed to pay them. The main source of actual receipts was
generated by registry demands that ground rents be paid up to date before a transfer would be
recorded. Thus revenues in a given year depended on how many property transfers were recorded that
year rather than on the rate or amount of ground rent levied.
At well under US$1 million a year, total receipts from the three forms of revenue do not begin
to cover the costs of the MOL, much less make a contribution to government's investment in services
and infrastructure on State Land. Equally telling, well over half of the total comes from the Registry
fee levied on transfers recorded. The 1994 fee is 1 percent of declared value, and many transactions
are underdeclared, probably in order to evade the property transfer tax (see above).
The existing statutes state that persons holding state lands are supposed to pay a ground rent
of 4.5 percent on the value of the land, but the land board that is supposed to oversee the process of
setting and collecting ground rents through the Lands Department has not met for several years. Since
ground rent revenues have been running under 40 percent of the registry fee just on land transferred,
it is obvious that the ground rents in place are not remotely near the theoretical 4.5 percent of land
values that the statutes direct. All interviewees agreed that ground rents should be raised substantially.
As will be seen shortly, the Hammar report provided by Swedish technical assistance
recommends setting ground rent levels at around 5 percent of market values of land for residential
stands, and comparable levels for farm, commercial, and industrial parcels. That would be consistent
with the 4.5 percent of present law, and would certainly go a long way to help the GOZ cover its
budget for land development. The far more difficult problem involves the task of assessing market
value given the lack of current information on land prices, land market restrictions that distort prices,
high demand for newly opened stands for which land prices are difficult to estimate, and the limited
supply of qualified assessors in the private and public sectors.
Further study is needed to determine the impact of a significant ground rent on different types
of farms and farmers, to design an automatic updating of rents for inflation (including indexing back
rents due so that the amounts actually paid at least reflect the real value of the rents when originally
due), and to design a systematic program of adjusting ground rents to reflect fully the actual
investments made in roads and services that increase the market value of land. Some progress has been
made in computerizing the records of the Lands Department so that when leaseholders visit the office
to pay, employees can inform the client immediately how much is owed. However, study is urgently
needed to design and implement a system that will induce leaseholders to pay annually when due,
rather than only if and when they decide to transfer the land.Table 4.1: Analysis of Lands Department revenue, Zambia, 1985 to 1992
































1985 566,980 30 1,084,440 58 211,123 11 1,862,543 5.70 157.00 326,762
1986 807,281 26 2,028,388 65 306,445 10 3,142,114 69 55 14 12.71 123.00 247,216
1987 1,778,407 32 3,540,247 63 303,640 5 5,622,294 79 47 32 8.69 (46.30) 646,984
1988 1,531,586 20 5,281,878 69 833,396 11 7,646,860 36 54 (18) 8.26 (5.20) 925,770
1989 .1,764,175 12 11,383,409 79 1,251,000 9 14,398,584 88 128 (
40) 13.84 67.60 1,040,360
1990 1,587,616 7 18,581,474 86 1,481,855 7 21,650,945 50 110 (60) 31.40 126.90 689,521
1991 17,863,610 37 26,735,515 56 3,165,962 7 47,765,087 121 118 3 64.63 105.80 739,054
1992 39,882,240 27 96,315,124 65 12,144,958 8 148,342,322 211 200 11 172.21 166.50 861,404
Totals 65,781,895 26 164,950,475 66 19,698,379 8 250,430,749 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
a. Percent of total annual revenue.
b. Percent change in the CPI during previous year.122
III. Taxation of rural and urban improvements ("rates")
A. Form of taxation
Rates and ground rents are both forms of recurring annual costs imposed on the holders or
users of real estate. They are quite distinct from consent fees, transfer taxes, and scrutiny fees, which
are paid only when land is transferred or when a leaseholder seeks a building permit.
In Zambia, rates are applied to the estimated value of improvements only, while ground rents
are applied to the value of the land as such, not including the value of any improvements. Revenues
generated by rates accrue to local government (city, municipal, and district councils), while ground
rents are paid to the MOL of the central government. Neither applies to land still under customary
tenure. Rates apply to the rateable areas of each district or city—referring, essentially, to the urban
area, but some agricultural land near to or within the urban perimeter may be included.' The fact that
rates are applied only to improvements, rather than to market value of land plus improvements, is
problematic. A number of economists, from Henry George
5 to the present, consider this the wrong
approach to taxation. They reason it would be far better to exempt improvements (or at least newly
built ones) and apply a heavy annual tax on the site value of the land under them, thereby capturing
some of the market value that results from government expenditures on infrastructure. As a result of
inflation, poor administration, and lack of interest, neither the rate nor the ground rent generates
significant revenue—nor has any other economic impact at present.
The current legal and institutional framework for setting and collecting rates is inadequate, but
improving, particularly through the work of the Government Valuation Department. The legal and
institutional framework for setting and collecting ground rents on urban and rural lands is worse.
Government is aware of the problem, and officials have stated their intention to address it, but no
improvement is yet in sight. Far less clear is the present and potential revenue generation of rates and
ground rents, where little hard information is available. Research is needed to determine the revenues
available to traditional authorities, and their relationship, if any, to land allocations and land uses.
B. Speculation
Speculators are investors who buy undeveloped land and hold it without making
improvements, hoping to resell it at a higher price in the future. Their activity does not create
productive employment for anyone except the speculator; their returns depend on their assessment of
market information and the risks they bear in the event that higher land prices do not materialize.
Speculators favor any tax that does not apply to the market value of undeveloped land. Because that
market value depends almost entirely on location, or on site-specific soil and climate factors, it is often
Zambia has 3 large cities (Lusaka, Ndola, and Kitwe) and 9 smaller cities. The rest of the country is divided among
some 60 districts. Each of these entities has an elected city or district council, which sets policy, and council employees,
who implement it. Below the district council, in communal areas, some authority rests in tribal chiefs, who in turn oversee
village headmen.
Henry George, an American whose views appeared in Progress and Poverty about 1880, believed so much revenue
could be obtained by taxing site values that all other taxes, including the income tax, could be repealed. The movement he
founded was thus known as the Single Tax Movement. Some cities in the United States and other English-speaking countries
have adopted lower rates on improvements than on land values, and a few exempt new construction completely for a certain
time.123
called site value, meaning the land has value simply because of its location. A heavy tax on land
alone, economists argue, will induce owners to invest as needed to improve land quality to its "highest
and best use," given its location, attributes, and amenities. Skeptics respond that governments seldom
if ever have the technical ability or the political courage to impose taxes high enough to affect
landowners (or leaseholders) (Strasma et al. 1987).
This argument is less relevant to Zambia, where the government itself is the legal owner of
land and allows individuals and companies to use it on the basis of leaseholdings. Thus as landlord,
the government collects rent rather than land tax as such. It bases the rent on the value of the land,
since the improvements were generally put in by the lessees. Since the basic model lease is for 99
years, it is implicitly assumed that the lessee's investment will be recovered long before the lease
expires.
C. Setting rates
The level of rates in Zambia is determined exactly as in the United States or Canada, except
the value of the site or land beneath improvements is theoretically excluded from the taxable value.
Each house, shop, factory, or other permanent part of a building is assessed a taxable value. The city
or council decides its budget, then subtracts revenues it expects to collect through other taxes, licenses,
and fees. The remainder—the amount to be raised from the rates—is divided by the total rateable
values for the city or district, giving the actual tax rate to be applied to the assessed value of each
property. Lusaka is about three years behind in its accounts, and 1994 figures could not be located
for this report. The model that follows in table 4.2 is, therefore, hypothetical.
Table 4.2: Hypothetical example of rate determination in a city
(kwacha values in billions)
(A) Budgeted expenditure for 1994 K100.2
(B) Other revenues expected - 20.2
(C) Amount needed from rates (A-B) K80.0
(D) Total value of rateable improvements in the city K8,000
(E) Tax rate required to generate the revenues needed for the
budget (C _ D)
1 %, or 1 ngwee in
the kwacha
By law, every city or district is supposed to reevaluate all rateable property every five years.
In addition, new buildings constructed or parcels left off the rates list are supposed to be added in a
supplementary roll. The owners of these properties pay the same rate that would have been applied
had they been valued at the time of the last general roll rather than at the time the supplementary roll
properties are actually evaluated. Inflation in Zambia has left the values assigned rateable property far
below land market levels. When the next five-year revaluation is performed, it would not be unusual
for the total market value of privately held land and improvements to rise substantially. In Lusaka,
for example, a revaluation was just completed. The value in kwacha assigned to a typical house rose
by about 11 times over the five-year period (1100 percent).124
Urban services in Lusaka and other cities appear deficient in many respects, justifying the need
for additional revenue. Yet, when the values of improvements are raised to adjust for inflation,
Zambian taxpayers seem to expect the tax rate to drop, maintaining a constant tax bill in real terms.
When a city tries to update the values without a significant drop in the rate, and without negotiations
with ratepayers to win acceptance, the result is likely to produce a taxpayer revolt, as happened in
Lusaka in 1993. The municipal councils and the public do not appear to understand the rate-setting
process.
In practice, urban rates in Zambia fall far short of their revenue potential. First, notices are
not always delivered to taxpayers, and second, there are no real penalties for late payment. The one
effective collection method does not even involve the municipality; i.e., the registrar requires that
persons seeking to record a property transfer bring in clearances, or certificates of payment of both
rates and ground rents. As a rule, they do not, but the tax is so low that the entire arrears can be paid
from pocket change. Actual revenues in any given year thus depend much more on the level of real
estate transfer activity than on the total values of rateable improvements or the rate of the levy.
Revenues have reportedly risen somewhat in the last two years following computerization of rates due.
The MOL (ground rents) and some council offices (rates) are now able to determine instantly how
much is owed by someone seeking a tax clearance.
In contrast with Zambian laxness, the United States and a few other countries have an
enforcement mechanism for tax collection that is simple and extremely effective. Any property for
which the tax is not paid during two years is auctioned off to the highest bidder. The successful bidder
is delivered a new property title, and the occupant is evicted. In practice, almost all delinquent
taxpayers manage to pay up the back taxes plus interest owed within a day or two before the property
is to be auctioned.
As far as could be determined, there are no penalties for late payment in Zambia, no indexing
for inflation, or interest on arrears. With inflation in 1993 of approximately 100 percent, any rational
taxpayer would postpone payment. The law effecting penalties on tardy payments appears drastic
enough. The council may obtain a court order for distraint, which entitles it to seize a building and
remove enough furniture or other contents to cover back taxes. It may also auction the building, and
if the winning bid exceeds taxes due, the law requires that the difference be paid to the now-former
owner. In practice, all interviewees stated that they had never heard of such enforcement ever being
practiced on delinquent ratepayers in Zambia.
D. Rate valuations
Between valuations (legally every five years), there is no indexing or other adjustments for
inflation or general growth in market values. If inflation raises expenditures, the rateable values
remain the same, but the arithmetic causes the tax rate itself to rise. When the next valuation is
performed, the tax rate logically falls. The law contemplates supplementary valuation rolls whenever
new construction occurs, or for any properties inadvertently left out of the five-year valuation. The
opinions of interviewees differed as to whether this was done systematically throughout the country.
The Government Valuation Department (GVD) is now able to do it for the rural councils, and does
so when requested. The values of new or omitted buildings are set with tables representing kwacha
values per square meter of each type of construction used at the last general valuation. This seeks to
ensure horizontal equity, with like improvements being taxed alike. However, in practice,125
supplementary valuation is spotty; owners who escaped the five-year valuation could well be
overlooked for five years.
Most of the 55 cities and municipal and other councils with the legal authority to collect rates
have no personnel trained to do valuation, so the revaluations are usually performed by the GVD, a
largely autonomous professional entity attached loosely to the Ministry of Works and Supply. This
agency has become much more professional and organized in the last two years with the assistance
of the Overseas Development Administration (UK). For 1992, the GVD performed 11 complete
revaluations (20 percent of the 55 potential client local governments), and 4 supplementary
revaluations to add properties overlooked or built since the last revaluation. (See section IV for an
analysis of the valuation process.) For taxpayers to accept valuation as fair and objective, it is
important to have a means of resolving disputes. This is the task of the Rating Tribunal, which
receives administrative support from the GVD. While not perfect, it appears to be more effective in
issues of rateable values than are the mechanisms for resolving most other conflicts regarding land.
Lusaka and the other main cities have their own valuation departments, which are
understaffed, but may contract with private valuers or with the GVD to help with major valuations.
The GVD was not involved in the valuation exercise just completed in Lusaka in 1993, however; all
other cities are now asking the GVD to help them supervise or carry out revaluations.
As the capital city, Lusaka has special problems collecting rates. First, many buildings belong
to government, which does not pay taxes. The law envisions government payment of a "Contribution
in Lieu of Rates." Such payments have been made in the past but have sharply decreased under the
current fiscal stringency. When such payments were made, they fell short of the amount that would
have been due if the same buildings were privately owned.' Lusaka (city council) itself owns a lot
of housing and other property (some 15,000 buildings as reported in chapter 1), but it does not tax
itself. Church and nonprofit organizations do have to pay rates on the theory that they receive
services. Finally, Lusaka finds that a significant share of the most valuable buildings are occupied by
regional agencies and by foreign embassies and consulates. In a bizarre interpretation of international
law, if one room in a building is rented to and occupied by a diplomat, the entire building is exempt
from paying rates.'
E. Nominal and effective rates of taxation
When Lusaka property was revalued in 1993, no official estimate was made of the average
increase in assessments. It was also unclear how much of the increased valuation roll was new
construction and how much a result of revaluation of improvements that were on the previous roll.
Some interviewees claimed that the average increase was between 10 and 40 times. When the owners
were advised of the new values, few complained because they were still below actual market values.
Owners assumed that the tax rate would fall accordingly, keeping the actual tax constant in purchasing
power terms. The 1993 tax rate was 11 percent, leading some ratepayers to assume that the 1994 rate
would be 0.25 percent to 0.5 percent. Instead, the city council asked the Ministry of Local
6 In 1992, according to the GVD, the central government should have paid K13 million in lieu of rates on government-
owned properties in Lusaka. It actually paid K5 million. No payment was made in 1993. (Source: GVD Rating Position
Paper, 1993, p. 1.)
' This quirk was reported by several interviewees and affirmed by the Minister of Local Government and Housing in
a talk to the Economics Association of Zambia on 12 January 1994.126
Government and Housing to approve a rate of 4.0 percent. When owners of valuable properties
calculated the amounts owed, they became vociferous, and the city later bowed to their pressure. The
Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Lusaka proposed that the rate instead become 0.025 percent,
or 1/40 of 1 percent. On 15 January 1994, the Town Clerk of Lusaka published a notice proposing
a rate of 1 percent.'
Some local governments discriminate by use of the property. For example, in Chipata, the rate
due in 1994 is one half ngwee per kwacha for domestic (residential) improvements, and 3 ngwee per
kwacha (3.0 percent) for commercial and industrial improvements.'
IV. Valuation of land and improvements in Zambia
A. Valuation process
The balance sheets of business firms in Zambia show both land and improvements as assets.
When a business firm is sold as a going concern, the buyer normally seeks an up-to-date valuation.
Banks and other lenders may request a valuation to determine the property's collateral. For such
purposes, a valuation surveyor is usually hired, a person trained formally at the University of Zambia,
followed by on-the-job practical training in firms of valuation surveyors. In practice, most such
valuation surveyors also function as estate agents.
Government frequently needs the estimated value of a piece of land, or of an improvement,
or both. The transfer tax is charged on the reported value of the transfer; ground rents are, or ought
to be, based on the value of the property if it were rented in the market. When the government needs
to acquire land or a house for public purposes, a value is needed as the basis for negotiating
compensation. In these cases, the valuation is done by the GVD. Government and private sector
planners also need values for land and buildings when preparing feasibility studies and cost-benefit
analyses for proposed investment projects. Estimates are often prepared as to the value at present, and
also for the value the same land and/or improvements will have once the proposed road, dam, or other
project is built.
There is at least one significant investment fund in Zambia that enables individuals and
companies to invest in a share of a set of properties.
10 That fund in turn needs a value for each
property every quarter for reporting to investors. The fund also redeems investments for cash upon
8 The chamber also suggested that rates not be collected at all until the city provides better services, and that rates ought
to vary among parts of Lusaka, because some neighborhoods receive more and better city services than others. Complicating
matters further, the deputy mayor and the mayor led rival factions of the city council that refused to work together. The
Minister of Local Government in early 1994 informed the city council that his ministry would take over city administration
if various problems were not solved by 31 March 1994.
9 Local usage is ngwee in the kwacha; the ngwee is a penny, or 0.01 kwacha. With inflation, the ngwee is no more
current than the mill formerly used in the United States to refer to one one-thousandth part of a dollar.
10 The Meridien Property Fund, managed by Meridien Financial Services Ltd, has been operating since 1987 and,
according to its latest annual report (30 September 1993), currently owns 15 commercial, industrial, and residential
properties with a total value of K1,111 billion. Of these, 13 are in Lusaka, one in Kitwe, and one in Crescent. The return
to investors is a combination of rental income, profit on the sale of properties, and interest earned on cash balances awaiting
investment.127
request, during a specific period each year. The fund retains the services of a well-established private
valuation surveyor for this purpose.
B. Impact of the "Watershed Speech"
In 1975 former president Kenneth Kaunda announced a sweeping new land policy. Blaming
real estate brokers and land speculators for recent increases in the market value of land, he announced
that since land was a gift of God it should not have market value. An obliging parliament quickly
passed a law that canceled all existing freehold titles, replacing them with 99-year leaseholds. All land
was nationalized, with responsibility for its management vested in the president. Anyone needing State
Land for any acceptable purpose from that point forward had to request it of the Commissioner of
Lands who would study the request and sign a lease on behalf of the president. Real estate agencies
quickly took down their signs and vanished from the commercial telephone directories. From 1975
on, no land transactions were allowed without state consent. Maximum prices charged and paid were
fixed by the state. Sellers could not legally ask, nor the buyer agree to pay, prices higher than those
fixed. The law further stipulated that prices fixed by the state for private transactions could not be
questioned in "court of law or tribunal." In practice, for the first few years after 1975, the GVD,
which was responsible for fixing prices, was swamped with requests; it often took six to twelve
months before a transfer could be assigned a price and completed.
Enforceability of the Conversion Act of 1975 depended largely on whether the documents were
to be registered. The Lands and Deeds Registry Act, 1914, SECTION 4, required registration for all
transfers of land or interests in land, if for more than one year. This reportedly led many parties to
sign leases for one day less than a year, and thus there was no need to officially decree a price or rent.
Estate agents themselves practically disappeared in 1975. Some emerged as surveyors, as the
president had not blamed mapmakers for rising real estate prices. A new specialty arose: valuation
surveyor, who specialized in studying and determining what improvements were worth. In 1990, the
official 1991 budget speech lifted the ban on estate agency and announced that the Zambian economy
would be liberalized. The Surveyors Institute of Zambia promptly held two seminars in 1991, at which
speakers urged formulating professional guidelines for estate agency, speeding up the land delivery
system, returning to freehold land tenure, and removing SECTION 12 of the Conversion Act (the
requirement that no real estate be transferred without state consent). The transfer process has been
accelerated somewhat by an administrative decision: the present Commissioner of Lands has begun
granting consent automatically where a professional valuation report is attached or when satisfied that
the amount declared as the transfer price is reasonable. However, there is no assurance that this
simplified procedure will be permanent.
The presidential edict also forced landowners to become leaseholders instead. Freehold titles
were ipso facto converted into leaseholds by law. This would not have mattered greatly if possession
were secure for the stated term of 99 years. However, an important corollary of the "land has no
value" doctrine was the belief that the president, as landlord, could arbitrarily and unilaterally revoke
a lease if the lessee was not "using" the land productively. Anyone holding land for future
construction had reason to feel vulnerable. Instead of the boom in construction activity that might have
been expected, holders of vacant lots and farmland tried to keep a low profile.
Land still had value, especially for location, but persons wanting to buy and sell had to go
through new rituals. A would-be buyer had to find land whose holder wanted to sell. This was not as128
easy as before because the holders did not deem it prudent to advertise that they had unused land. Had
they done so, they correctly reasoned that the Commissioner of Lands might revoke their leasehold
and take the land away without compensation. Once a buyer found a holder willing to sell a leasehold
(i.e., sublet the property to someone else), they negotiated a price and then had to seek presidential
consent to the transfer. The president delegated that decision to the Commissioner of Lands, but there
were no clear rules as to when consent was to be granted. This situation of course favored corruption
and introduced more murkiness into the land market.
The presidential action drove the land market underground, at least temporarily. However,
it did not create more land, nor did it persuade those who owned land to simply give it away free or
build more housing for the poor. The first concrete result was that it cut tax revenues. Thereafter,
when land transfers were recorded, the Land Commissioner's office told the parties to declare only
the value of the improvements on the land. In spite of the obvious fact that some land had enormous
market value because of its location, that land could be bought and sold without transfer taxes being
paid. Thus, although the high rate of the transfer tax (see section II, above) had already induced
chronic underdeclaration of values, the presidential "devaluation" of land led to even greater
underdeclaration and hence to lower transfer tax revenues.
C. Reappearance of the market
With the election of the MMD government, whose manifesto included a promise to recognize
that land had value, estate agents began to reappear. In general, at least in Lusaka and the Copperbelt,
it seems relatively easy to identify a parcel of land and negotiate a market price with the holder. The
newspapers once again carry classified and display advertisements offering to sell houses, lots, and
farms. Nonetheless, there are still occasional anecdotes suggesting a degree of backsliding from the
clear promises of the manifesto. For instance, one estate agent tells of a client who wanted a site for
business use one year ago. The agent found someone with suitable vacant land, who was quite willing
to sell, and agreement was reached as to the price. However, when consent was sought at the Office
of the Commissioner of Lands, the commissioner simply revoked the existing lease—confiscating the
land on grounds that it was not being used. In effect, the buyer had to buy the leasehold twice, from
the previous lessee and then from the government. There are other cases in which the supposed seller
really did not have good title even as a leasehold, or in which the commissioner, thinking the land
unassigned, had apparently already promised it as a new land grant to someone else.
The present Commissioner of Lands has stated that although the law still requires the consent
of the president for every transfer from one party to another, the process is to be more or less
automatic. His office still has a steady flow of petitioners, and delays still appear to be commonplace
(see chapter 2). Problems persist of past irregularities such as surveys that do not coincide with
boundaries on the ground. In countries where property transfers do not require the paternalistic
consent of a functionary, it is common to require a technical scan for such irregularities in the process
of recording land transfers. The difference in these countries is that recording the transfer is never
forbidden arbitrarily. If a transfer is rejected, the functionary must state what must be done to correct
the problem. But all parties know that as soon as the problem is corrected then recording the transfer
cannot be denied.
A major problem plaguing the land market in Zambia is the lack of an accessible, low-cost,
and rapid method of resolving land conflicts. The only judicial appeal is to the High Courts; anecdotal
evidence suggests that this route requires a wait of several years and high costs to the parties seeking129
justice. There appear to be numerous cases in which the use of a particular parcel is less than what
would appear to be the "highest and best use" simply because there is an unresolved conflict over
rights. Further research should establish the feasibility of creating a lands tribunal, as has been done
elsewhere, to resolve such conflicts quickly and fairly. Apart from the advantage of not having a
docket cluttered with every other type of dispute, the tribunal would be staffed with judges
knowledgeable about land law and policy, increasing the speed of resolution as well as the consistency
of decisions.
V. Determination of ground rents
A. Existing policy
In theory and in present law, no real estate in Zambia may change hands without the consent
of the president. The incumbent has delegated this responsibility to the land commissioner, but a future
president could cancel that delegation, or the commissioner could deny consent unreasonably, and the
affected party would have little effective recourse. Because State Land is delivered as leasehold
interests, holders are supposed to pay ground rent rather than property taxes on land. (Improvements,
of course, are subject to the property tax called rates.) While the former government asserted that bare
land had no economic value, it nevertheless collected money in the form of ground rent.
Under current law, all private properties are merely improvements, built on land which is the
property of the government. However, an existing law attempts to protect tenants by controlling the
level of rents charged. (In effect, they live in flats under subleases of parts of buildings built on
government-owned lands.)
CAP 438 (the Rent Act), 1972, states that the correct value of rent for buildings rented to
tenants by the actual holder of the government lease was 15 percent per year on the sum of the cost
of construction and the value of the land. This law was not appealed nor amended when the
Conversion Act, which declared in ARTICLE 12 that bare land has no value," was enacted in 1975.
By not repealing CAP 438 (the Rent Act), 1972, the government implicitly accepted the fact that bare
land has value to those who control it.
The actual market value of land varies greatly from site to site, depending mainly on its size,
location, and services. In Zambia, however, the MOL simply assesses a ground rent that each holder
must pay annually to the government for the use of the land. These rents are established arbitrarily
and change every few years by administrative decision. In the current version, ground rents per
hectare differ between residential, farming, and commercial sites. Little or no effort has been made
in the past to adjust the rents for site variances. In a proper ground rent system, rents would be higher
on the more valuable locations (e.g., along a major highway or on the shore of a river or lake).
After the inflation of recent years, the rents under present law are so low as to be meaningless.
Rent collection, aside from that required at the time of transfer, is rarely enforced. The present ground
rents were set in 1991, on the basis of the locality and the land use, at rates per hectare or part of a
" Some functionaries did not see the two laws as contradictory; they put down "zero" as the value of the land, because
the president said that was its value. They then calculated the maximum legal rent accordingly.130
hectare. Residential land is charged at low rates; commercial or industrial interests must pay more
(table 4.3). Land held by churches and charitable organizations is not exempt, although it is leased
at lower annual ground rents. Agricultural land and land in mining areas are subject to ground rents
that vary by size of holding and by proximity to the main cities (tables 4.4 and 4.5).
Table 4.3: Ground rent charges for nonagricultural lands, Zambia,
as set in Amendment 15 (1991) of the Conversion Act
Ground rent per year, per hectare or part of a hectare
Commercial or Churches and
Location industrial Residential charities
Lusaka K5,000 1(2,000 1(500
Ndola and Kitwe 5,000 2,000 200
Municipal councils 5,000 1,500 200
Councils 2,500 500 150
Rural bomas 1,000 200 100
Table 4.4: Ground rent charges for agricultural lands, Zambia,
as set in Amendment 15 (1991) to the Conversion Act
Table 4.5: Ground rent charges for land in mining areas, Zambia,
as set in Amendment 15 (1991) to the Conversion Act
Ground rent per year
Smallholding (2,600 m
2 or less)
All others, per hectare or fraction'
a. Presumably, holdings between 2,600 square meters and 3 hectares also pay the minimum ground rent
of K300/year.
Ground rent per year, per hectare or part of a hectare
Within a 12 km radius of the city
Bracket by size centers of Lusaka, Kitwe or Ndola All other areas
First hectare
Next 99 ha, each
Next 150 ha, each











B. Proposed mechanisms for setting ground rents
Three years ago, the GOZ obtained technical assistance from the Government of Sweden as
part of an institutional cooperation contract between the Lands Department of the Ministry of Water,
Lands and Natural Resources, and Swedsurvey, the Overseas Agency of the National Land Survey
of Sweden, to study current levels of ground rents and recommend a definitive system (study hereafter
referred to as the Hammar report). The final report was prepared, but no further action was taken.
There is now renewed interest in the study and the Swedish Embassy has been asked to bring the team
leader back in the near future.
The following preliminary analysis and recommendations were presented and discussed at a
conference attended by the executive leaders of Zambian government departments dealing with land
management and planning: the Commissioner of Lands, Acting Assistant Surveyor General, Director
of Agriculture, Director of the Government Valuation Department, and the Deputy Commissioner of
Town and Country Planning.
1. Conceptual basis for charging ground rents
A lease includes specified forms and conditions, one of which is the payment of an annual
ground rent. The basic concept of ground rents is that leaseholders receive substantial benefits from
access to the expensive infrastructure built and maintained by the state and ought to make a reasonable
contribution toward those costs. The current system assesses the amount of ground rent solely on the
basis of the zoning of the area in which the plot of land lies. As the study notes,
The rates are arbitrary and uniform in application. They are not based on any
empirical data. The rents charged for all types of land are extremely low and are
negligible compared with the economic benefits enjoyed by the users (Hammar 1990,
p. 6).
As true as this was in 1990, by 1993, three years of inflation left the rents lower still in real
terms—so low that when a leaseholder does bother to pay arrears, it can generally be done out of
pocket change.
The study deals diplomatically with the myth that land has no market value, and that there is
no market in land:
Only the State can own land in Zambia and, therefore, undeveloped, vacant land is
not a saleable commodity....Despite this, it is clear that the leaseholder does attach
value to the land depending on, in addition to its size, the privilege of using it, its
location, the land capability, and the availability of physical and social infrastructure.
The leaseholder does, for rational reasons, attach value to his land despite the fact that
he cannot sell it. Thus land has a definite value to the lessee and it is this value that
has been adopted as the value concept for this study (Hammar 1990, p. 6).
While vacant, undeveloped land does not generate income and therefore might appear to have
no economic value, the exclusive right to use and improve a particularly well-located piece of land132
for a stated period of time has enormous value. There is a very active market for leases giving the
right to use specific plots of land for specific periods of time (99 years). If the land is said to have
no value, the lease that determines who gets to use and improve it certainly does have value. The
confusion is not whether God-given land has a price, but rather that the infrastructure built by
governments, and the decisions whereby people decide where to live, or to build stores and factories,
are what give value to location. And a desirable location will invariably have value, both from natural,
God-given attributes such as climate, and from factors that stem from human actions, such as building
cities, roads, and ports.
The study proposes that ground rent for agricultural land should be based on the potential
annual economic output per hectare of land which is managed in an optimum manner. The leaseholder
should pay a fair portion of the expected gross margins as a yearly ground rent to the state; it goes
on to suggest that 20 percent would be that fair portion (Hammar 1990, p. 7).
It would appear from the study that the state ought to act like a normal landlord, charging
something similar to (though a bit lower than) the going market rental prices for rural land. Around
the world, agricultural land in settled farming areas tends to rent for somewhere between a third and
a half of the gross value of output. However, out of that the landlord often pays part—sometimes as
much as half—of the cost of purchased inputs like fertilizer, seed, and machine services. This is
almost always the case when the rent is stated as half of the harvest, the landlord usually pays half
of the cost of purchased inputs other than labor. On the other hand, when the rent is paid in cash, at
planting time, it tends to be less—often around a third of the normal harvest in the area, and the
landlord seldom helps with buying inputs.
For urban rental properties, the rent charged to occupy a flat tends to be closer to 10 to 20
percent of the capital value of the land and buildings. The urban landlord also has expenses to cover,
but few of them are related to the land under the building; almost all refer to maintenance of the
building, and collection of the rent. Thus, if a separate figure is needed to represent a normal return
on investment in the land under a building, it is customary to estimate first the market value of the
land, and then regard the rent attributable to the land as basically a return on a financial investment
with relatively little risk or cost—perhaps comparable to the return to an insured certificate of deposit
at a major bank.
The financial markets in Zambia are far from perfect, particularly because of recent inflation.
Even government securities have paid returns as high as 100 percent a year in kwacha, but this cannot
be regarded as normal. Adjusted for expected inflation, the real rate of return on capital in safe
investments in other countries tends to be on the order of 4 to 6 percent a year, and this would be a
reasonable standard to apply in Zambia—but with an effective provision so that actual ground rents
would rise from year to year according to the actual rate of inflation.
2. Implementation: urban areas
The Hammar report further suggests that residential stands be charged an economic ground
rent based on the optimum permitted use of the property, which is defined by zoning. It estimates that
the "land value portion" of the total value of the property would be estimated between 10 percent of
the total value of the land plus improvements (for poor quality housing) to 40 percent (for the best
quality housing). After estimating the land value portion, the report suggests that the state, as landlord,
could reasonably charge 5 percent of that amount per year for a normal residential stand.133
At 1989 price levels, table 4.6 shows the recommendations of the Hammar report as to
appropriate annual ground rents for normal-sized house plots, varying according to location.
Table 4.6: Annual ground rents, residential plots, by location (in 1989 kwacha/plot)
Location Low cost Medium cost High cost All stands
Lusaka 625 8,000 54,000
Kitwe 250 2,000 10,000
Chingola 190 1,500 7,500





Source: Hammar 1990, p. 8.
Comparing these 1989 figures with those of table 4.3, it is obvious that after inflation, the
rates charged starting in 1991 do not come close to the recommended levels in kwacha. With the
further inflation since 1991, it is no wonder that the Lands Department does not collect enough annual
ground rent to do much (chapter 2). The Hammar report suggests that ground rents, once brought up
to date, be adjusted annually by computer, to reflect price levels. The CPI would be used for
residential stands, but for agricultural lands it suggests that the price of maize would also be suitable
(Hammar 1990, p. 9).
3. Implementation: rural areas
It is proposed in the study that the expected gross margins for farmland, in kwacha per
hectare, be estimated on the basis of attributes representing the capability of the land (estimated as the
percent of the holding that is arable), the influence of agroecological zone, location with respect to
markets, and available infrastructure (table 4.7). Each factor is assigned a set of brackets; for instance,
land class is estimated on the basis of the percent arable: 81 percent or more, 41-80 percent, 20-40
percent, or under 20 percent. Market distance is estimated as 1-10 km, 11-30 km, 31-40 km, or over
40 km. Infrastructure is estimated as "best," "fairly good," or "very bad." The study then classifies
agricultural land, at the level of regional plans, on the basis of these four factors. The result, based
on 1989 price levels, ranges from gross margins of 200 to 3,000 kwacha per hectare. At 20 percent
for the state acting as landlord, the annual rents would have ranged from about K40 to about K750
per hectare per year.134
Table 4.7: Ground rents in 1989 prices for typical types of leases on farmland
Agroecological Land class Distance to Infrastructure Annual ground rent
zone (% arable) market (lun) due (1989 kwacha/ha)
I 81-100% 1-10 "best" 310
I 41-60% 31-40 "fairly good" 140
I <20% >40 "very bad" 35
Iia 81-100% 1-10 "best" 610
Iia 41-60% 31-40 "fairly good" 300
Iia <20% >40 "very bad" 70
III 81-100% 1-10 "best" 350
III 41-60% 31-40 "fairly good" 160
III <20% >40 "very bad" 40
Source: Hammar 1990, p. 7.
In 1991, Amendment 15 to the Conversion Act raised ground rent charges somewhat (see table
4.4) but did not come anywhere near levels recommended in the Hammar report. The rent was set at
10 to 20 kwacha per hectare for everything above the first hectare. The first hectare was to pay K400,
except if the land is within 12 km of the city centers of Lusaka, Kitwe, or Ndola, in which case the
rate was raised to K1,000. At present prices, even the first hectare ground rent is scarcely worth the
trouble to collect. This is clearly not even close to an appropriate contribution of the leaseholder to
the cost of building and maintaining the infrastructure which the land enjoys.
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4. Prospective revenues
According to the Hammar report, if the proposed ground rent system is implemented with the
suggested levels, as a fair return to the state, the potential revenue in 1989 kwacha would be about
1.1 billion if government-owned housing were included, and 800 million if it were not included
(Hammar 1990, p. 9). The report does not state how much actual ground rent was collected in 1989,
but it does note that the government's total revenue from all sources that year was only K7,884
million.
C. Preliminary suggestions for ground rents in 1994 and thereafter
This study certainly agrees that ground rents should be raised considerably from present levels.
One starting point has been brought forth by Sonny Mulenga, who suggests that 10 percent of the
minimum development value could be presumed to be the minimum value of the land under the
12 Of course, like ratepayers in Lusaka, some leaseholders could object that the infrastructure is badly maintained and
so not worth much to them. However, potholes and other signs of poor maintenance can be improved fa
irly quickly. If
ground rents are raised to appropriate levels similar to those a private landlord would charge, it would be good politics to
spend some money immediately, so that the roads and other services are obviously being improved.135
development. That amount would then be assessed an annual ground rent of 4.5 percent, which is
approximately the estimated market return on a secure investment in improvable land. For example,
consider a 100 square meter house in Lusaka, assigned a minimum development value of K115,000
per m
2, in 1993 kwacha. The improvement would be estimated to be worth at least K11.5 million. The
land value would be estimated to be not less than 10 percent of that, or K1.15 million, 4.5 percent
of which would give an annual ground rent due of K51,750 in calendar 1993. For 1994, of course,
the ground rent should be adjusted upward by the change in the CPI during 1993. If one were to
assume that the land under the average house in Lusaka were worth 25 percent of the price of the
improvements, 13 rather than 10 percent, then the ground rent due during 1993 should have been on
average K129,375. However, further research aided by experts on valuation would be needed to
determine whether 25 percent is in fact an appropriate estimate. Perhaps it would be feasible to follow
the Hammar report model, and categorize each sector of the city into low-, medium-, and high-cost
construction areas.
A related question is whether public policy should continue to subsidize residential areas with
relatively large gardens behind walls, in which relatively small but high-cost houses sit. Further study
should consider a mechanism that will base ground rents on an average amount of land per dwelling
but charge more for estates so large that two or more houses could readily occupy the land without
losing all the amenities. Eventually, as land values rise in the market, the very large stands will be
divided or will be used to build condominium apartment buildings.
A private landlord will not refrain from collecting annual rent from a tenant just because the
tenant chooses not to live in, or to till, a dwelling or a piece of farmland. The landlord will collect
the rent in any case, since the tenant had by lease the right to dwell or the right to till, excluding
anyone else from doing so. Likewise, the state should collect ground rent on vacant lots and idle
farmland.
In discussions of the proposed land development fund (following section), it is usually assumed
that the fund will have ground rents as an important source of funds with which to operate. It should
be noted, therefore, that until and unless economic ground rents are in fact imposed and collected as
effectively as a private landlord would impose and collect them, the proposed fund will lack the
resources with which to work. At the same time, the state, acting as the landlord, needs to think like
a good estate agent. Ground rents collected will need to go into improved road maintenance and other
infrastructure investments that in turn justify the significant increase in ground rents.
VI. Proposed tax reforms
Proposed changes in land laws are now circulating in two closely related draft laws: the Land
Titles Act and the Land and Deeds Registry Amendment Act. The Land Titles Act draft includes a
provision that "any person who holds land under customary tenure may convert it into leasehold
tenure." This would add the land in question to the supply of land on which annual ground rents
13 The Hammar study suggests that over the world, land values tend to be from 10 to 40 percent of the value of
improvements on urban residential stands, with the least desirable locations being on the low end and the best locations being
on the high end. This is certainly consistent with experience in the United States and in various countries of Latin America
and the Caribbean.136
payable to the government would be due. Some concern has been expressed about the wisdom of
allowing scattered conversion of landholdings in customary areas. A significant increase in annual
ground rents would give holders a reason to hesitate before applying for conversion.
The Land Titles Act reform draft also repeals and replaces SECTIONS 10 and 12, dropping
assertions that bare land has no economic value. It further provides that the president, when granting
land, "may fix consideration and ground rent which may be reasonable depending on the location and
the size of the land." This appears to be a prudent provision, that should provide ample authority for
needed administrative reforms in valuation and in the setting of initial fees and recurring or annual
ground rents.
The draft adds a provision that on expiry of a lease, if all the conditions and covenants in it
have been complied with, "the lease shall be deemed to have been extended for a like term. The
registrar, on production of a certificate of such compliance from the President, shall issue a Certificate
of Title to that effect." To further reassure leaseholders who hesitate to invest as expiration
approaches, the law should also allow holders to obtain a compliance certificate and request a 99-year
renewal at any time, even if the current lease has not expired.
The draft reform provides that failure to pay ground rent on due dates will triple the amount
due, and failure to pay that amount upon demand will entitle the president to enter a certificate of
reentry in the register, without notice, in effect canceling the leasehold. This should increase
collections, provided the regular ground rent is itself appropriately determined, and that the
government acts in a responsible manner. The penalty of lease cancellation, if effectively enforced,
should cause mortgage lenders to see that their debtors pay ground rents, and on time, so as not to
impair the collateral on their loans.
VII. Land development fund
A. Proposals and assessment
The land conference of July 1993 (see chapter 1) strongly recommended the creation of a land
development fund (LDF). There was considerable agreement that it would have as its resources ground
rents paid by leaseholders, consent fees charged to the assignees of newly distributed lands, and other
receipts from government or private land transactions. An MOL official memorandum suggests that
the fund be used for "plot demarcations, roads and bridges construction, provision of water supplies
(dams, wells, and boreholes), dip tank construction, conservation works, and fencing. Beneficiaries
would repay the investment in annual installments over ten years, with interest. Payments would go
back into the fund, which would operate as a revolving fund.
n 14 It suggests that the fund begin by
making such investments in the vast undeveloped areas (former Reserve and Trust Lands), and later
include individual emergent farmers who are not in the farming blocks nor in the settlement schemes.
Once the fund is serving these first two phases well, it suggests converting it into an autonomous fund
that serves commercial farmers in addition to the schemes and emergent farmers. However, the
participants did not reach consensus about the fund's objectives and priorities. Various possibilities
14D. Siansumo1., Principal Lands Officer, "Development Fund" memorandum, 20 October 1993.137
have been mentioned; the leaders among these are detailed below. It will not be easy to resolve these
conflicting demands for the same funds.
1. Increasing the supply of serviced farmlands
When the fund first considers an area for development, it should "freeze" the area to prevent
the issuance or registry of any further state or customary consents awarding land to anyone.
Otherwise, insiders will grab all the land before the fund opens it up, creating at least the appearance
of corruption. This grabbing would also prevent the fund from helping either the best farm operators,
redundant state employees, or other disadvantaged persons needing assistance. Secondly, before
committing itself to develop a specific area, the fund should make a complete inventory of land rights
in the area and negotiate with existing holders of leaseholds, firewood or grazing rights, or any other
land rights. The fund then would buy out holders who are willing to sell, at the current market value
of their holdings (not at the value which those holdings will have after the fund develops the areaa ).''
The fund should also negotiate with holders who are not willing to sell, as to the amount of
money or land these holders will contribute as their fair share of the investment the fund will make
in developing the area. Whenever land is already privately owned or held on long-term leaseholds
before government provides improvements, it is entirely reasonable to expect those who profit thereby
to contribute most or all of the cost of the improvements. (Colombia, among other countries, makes
a formal determination of benefits and assigns a share to each beneficiary at the feasibility study stage
of a project [Rhodes 1990]). If the landowners argue that they cannot afford to contribute the amount
by which the project feasibility report says they will benefit, the government can then say that the
feasibility report is wrong and that the project is not justified, so it won't be built. If the landowners
respond that the project should be built anyway, without charging them for part of the increased value
it will give to their property, at least their greed is demonstrated.
Payment, of course, can wait until the project is actually built and benefits realized. The
amount due from each owner should be documented with promissory notes and a mortgage, properly
recorded, and subject to a price index clause to guard against inflation, as well as interest at a normal
rate for other investments. If there is no provision for inflation protection through indexing, the
interest rate should at least be that rate which the government itself pays when borrowing. In effect,
government is lending money to the property owners who benefit from a project, and they repay over
time.
In some countries, such as the Dominican Republic, existing holders are required by law to
turn over part of their land, without compensation, as their contribution to state-funded irrigation
projects. They still benefit, because the irrigation greatly increases the value of their remaining
holdings. But by turning over part of their land, they enable the government to share the benefits of
that investment with landless laborers or other disadvantaged persons.
15 Until a much more active market exists in land rights, these values will have to be estimated by capitalizing average
potential net incomes. Before construction of improvements actually begins, an independent authority—perhaps an elected
council, a traditional chief, or an independent auditing firm—would investigate and verify that fa
ir compensation was actually
paid to families that lose land or rights, just as is required by the World Bank when families are forced to move for Bank-
financed dams and similar projects.138
In other cases, when government extends services to privately owned peri-urban land which
then becomes valuable residential sites, the owners of the undeveloped tracts are required to donate
to the local council suitable sites for schools, clinics, markets, and other services. Their compensation
for these sites consists of the state-financed roads, water and electric lines that made their landholdings
more valuable. As in the irrigation case, they still gain substantially, but at least the council is not
forced to later buy sites at market prices for needed community facilities.
There are several alternative ways in which the LDF could be used to increase the supply of
serviced farmlands:
► improve the idle or underutilized land in the state tenure area, recaptured from those who hold
leases now but are not using the land productively (once improved, it would be leased anew,
preferably at open, public auction);
► rehabilitate run-down and unproductive state farms that are to be privatized (actually, we
would prefer a cheaper, faster process—auctioning these state farms "as is," letting the bidders
develop the land with their own funds);
► make loans to emergent farmers who do not have access to loans from commercial banks
because they are unable to provide sufficient guarantees of repayment (such a plan should
begin with serious analysis of alternative schemes that make it likely that the emergent-farmer
borrowers will in fact repay the loans,
16 and that enable those farmers to thereafter apply to
commercial banks precisely because they have demonstrated creditworthiness);
► improve newly created leaseholds that government wants to create in customary tenure lands,
thereby converting customary into State Lands; or
► finance improvements to land in traditional villages in customary areas.
2. Who pays for the land and improvements?
There are several approaches the fund could use to finance land and improvements:
► outright gifts or grants to disadvantaged persons;
► installment loans which the beneficiaries would have to repay over a period of months or years
(the period might vary according to the type of improvement, and incentives such as free life
insurance might be provided for those who repaid punctually and in full); or
► increase the annual ground rent payment required of the leaseholder by enough to recover the
amount invested by the fund, with interest (this is similar to the case of a private landholder
who finances construction of a house or flat and then rents it to a tenant).
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3. Who provides the improvements?
In each approach, the state could do the actual construction, contract with private firms to do
the work, or make loans to the lessees, with which they would hire the work done (and supervise it).
Some types of investment (such as access roads into a new land block) would best be contracted for
and supervised by the state. Most on-farm improvements (such as fences, tree crops, wells, and
See, for instance, Strasma 1992.
A form of this, using two accounts (one for normal ground rent, and the other for recovery, at interest, of the
premium caused by the LDF improvements), has been used in settlement schemes and in the opening of new labor blocs.139
dwellings) might best be financed as long-term credit to farmers, who themselves would hire labor
as needed, and supervise the job. They would supply part of the labor themselves, as well as provide
more effective supervision and quality control than normally occurs with government visits.
4. Other uses of the LDF
All of the previous ideas as to uses of the LDF suppose that its purpose is to develop land.
Plot demarcation, roads and bridges, dams, wells and boreholes, dip tank construction, land levelling,
conservation works, and fencing were all proposed. However, in interviews, some Zambians have
mentioned other possible uses of this money, as a revolving fund of loans oriented largely to
increasing production by specific households or groups:
► production loans to women, redundant state or parastatal employees, and other disadvantaged
persons, to enable them to become productive emerging farmers and gradually build up their
own working capital;
► land purchase loans to the disadvantaged, enabling them to purchase leasehold interests from
other persons who are unable to put their leased land to productive use; or
► loans to enable emerging cooperatives or farm supply companies to go into the business of
supplying farming inputs and perhaps marketing production as well.
The previous set of ideas on using the LDF for loans would all be dedicated to increasing
production. Still other possible uses mentioned would have social elements:
► finance the building and operating costs of community facilities, clinics, and schools to benefit
small farmers in densely populated but poorly serviced rural areas;
► compensate families who lose grazing, gathering, or similar rights over customary land when
it is converted into leaseholds in the state sector;
► grants or low-cost investment loans to landless rural families in overpopulated areas, to help
them move to areas with available land; or
► loans to councils to help them service town plots, reducing the relative attraction of moving
to shantytowns in Lusaka or the Copperbelt.
5. Donor assistance
With so many ideas floating around as to how to use the higher ground rents, consent fees,
and other resources obtained by charging rents or fees closer to market values, it is no wonder that
the land conference did not yield a consensus on which uses should have priority, nor even on how
this would be decided. One final hope expressed by participants was that donor organizations might
contribute to a well-managed LDF. These organizations generally favor charging market rents and
significant taxes (rates); they might well offer matching contributions to the fund once the government
actually implements such policies.
B. Legal reforms: The draft law
The draft Land Titles Act proposes in SEC. 20 to establish a land development fund. The draft
proposes sources for its funding, a structure for policymaking for the fund, and its objectives.
However, the draft is silent on many aspects that will be critical if the LDF is to be successful.140
1. Uses
SEC. 20(7) of the draft states that the moneys of the fund are for "grants to councils situated
in rural areas for development of land and making of roads,...opening up of new areas for
development,...the improvement and development of agriculture,...the supply of water for domestic
farming and irrigation purposes,...and generally, such other purposes for the direct benefit of the
people in ensuring that more land is made available for development and is developed." These
objectives are quite broad and duplicate the objectives of other agencies, provided for in the annual
government budget. Improvement and development of agriculture coincides with the objectives of the
entire budget of the Ministry of Agriculture. The water-supply objective does the same for government
agencies concerned with water projects. Also, the building of local roads is often an activity of local
government, funded in part with property taxes (rates). Ground rents could also be channeled through
local councils.
If ground rents and other fees collected by the state continue to be taken off to Lusaka and
then routed back to some but not all rural areas, through decisions made in Lusaka, the fund may
work against the government's announced goal of decentralization. If, on the other hand, the fund is
politically necessary as the only way to get ground rents and fees up to economic levels, and hence
pressure speculators to put land to productive use, then the fund may still be justified. It might be a
good idea to include in the law provision that all moneys raised from land-related fees be invested in
the same province where they are raised.
Curiously, however, the draft law does not explicitly allow investing in existing but
underutilized state sector leaseholds, nor improving run-down state farms that are sold to commercial
farmers, smallholders, or emerging farmers. Surely government could show visible, positive results
more swiftly in that area than in opening up new land in customary tenure areas. Still, the objectives
are probably broad enough to include this area too. According to the 1994 budget message (p. 10),
a pilot scheme to subdivide state-owned farms for commercial use is under way.
The opening of new areas has been a main objective set forth by proponents of the LDF from
the beginning, but the draft law is totally silent as to who exactly is to benefit from this. Before an
area is opened, the land rights situation should be inventoried. Planning for the project should be
specific as to who is expected to benefit and how much they are required to contribute to the cost of
the project. Will foreign investors, who likely will have leverage in competitive bidding, be given
open and full access or should controls be placed on their actions through quotas or special fees? Will
newly improved lands be allocated to political insiders at little or no charge, as in previous republics?
Or will ground rents close to market levels be charged, and then an open public auction used to decide
who gets the most desirable parcels at those rental levels? The latter would generate far more revenues
for the fund, enabling government to develop land much sooner than if land is allocated by
administrative discretion. If running projects through the fund instead of the regular budget increases
accountability and productivity and helps justify the change to market-level ground rents and fees, this
is positive. It remains to be seen whether the fund, as proposed in the draft law, would in fact be
accountable and efficiently managed.
One might suggest redrafting these objectives, perhaps based only on the "opening areas" and
"other purposes" clauses and setting forth very specific provisions to ensure that (1) more land is made
available for development, (2) it is in fact developed, and (3) those who get the land effectively pay
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the remaining installments. The only exceptions to payment of full value should be persons who are
clearly disadvantaged, a category that does not include the high officials and other insiders who have
often received lands assigned administratively in the past. Even the disadvantaged should make some
payment, and there should be a provision to recapture the subsidy element should they leave the land
and sublease or transfer it to someone else.
2. Discretionary investment
SECTION 20(8) says: "Any money which is not immediately required for any of the purposes
set out...above, may be invested at the discretion of the Ministers responsible for the administration
of the Fund." Given the breadth of the proposed objectives, it is unlikely that the fund would have
"moneys not immediately required for any of the purposes set out." However, given the total
discretion the draft law offers the ministers, it is not hard to imagine that future ministers, wanting
to do something entirely different from the purposes of the LDF, might be tempted to decide not to
pursue its purposes, in order to "invest" the money in something else. Worse, this provision appears
to allow the four ministers absolute and total discretion. They could decide to invest in banks paying
less interest than Treasury bills or less than the highest rates currently available at other banks. It
would appear that they could even invest in loans to private businesses. If questioned, the attorney
general might be forced to say that this was permitted by the law, if enacted with the present wording.
Since this is surely not the intent of the drafters of the law, the wording should be changed to avoid
any doubt.
Other countries generally have transparent, professionally managed provisions to invest
government agency funds not currently needed. There is no reason to require the managers or
directors of the LDF itself to make decisions on short-term investment of government funds. This is
part of the job of a treasurer, who manages balances for all government agencies. For example, some
countries specify that all funds of parastatals, which the fund somewhat resembles, not required for
disbursement within the week, must be held in an account in the central or state bank. This reduces
the amount of money in circulation and hence at least contributes to controlling inflation. It also
reduces the opportunities for corruption, and lets the fund directors concentrate on their main task,
land development.
3. Accountability and transparency
The draft law provides, in SEC. 20(9), for annual financial statements to be provided only to
the very government officials in charge of the fund: "The Ministers responsible for the administration
of the Fund shall ensure that an annual statement of the income and expenditure is prepared and
furnished to the President and all the four Ministers responsible for the Fund." Drafted this way, the
law does not provide for:
► conducting an independent, outside, annual audit of the accounts;
► making these accounts available to the public through timely publication in the press, as banks
do; nor
► submitting audited financial statements to parliament, nor to anyone other than the very
persons who are given authority to spend moneys in the fund.
If these omissions are not corrected, the public will be unable to determine whether funds have
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the worst, and respond accordingly in the next elections. The moneys to be spent through the Fund
are to be obtained through needed reforms in the present land legislation. However, if the public fears
that the money will be squandered, it will not support those needed reforms. The draft provisions for
the fund should therefore be modified not only to target fund activities more appropriately, but also
in order to ensure support for the other needed land policy reforms.
4. Operation of the LDF
How can the fund make its investment start sooner and go farther, ensure that the
disadvantaged participate, and ensure that land it develops is actually tilled? The Privatization Agency
might well work closely with the LDF in order to show results quickly. For instance, an existing but
unproductive state farm might be divided partly in four commercial family farms. Each would have
to pay an annual ground rent at about the same level as a private owner would charge a tenant. These
would be auctioned to the highest bidder while the rest of the state farm is split into another 40
smallholder plots.'
8 Their ground rent could be a little lower per acre, as a subsidy.
These smaller farms would also be auctioned to the highest bidders; but for them, bidding
would be limited to persons owning no other land and who are deemed disadvantaged. For example,
bids might be invited from persons who have been declared redundant in state or parastatal
employment or fear that they soon will be. In order to bid, they should show some knowledge of
farming and promise that they will move onto and cultivate the parcel if their bid wins. Retrenched
employees should be allowed to use their separation pay toward payment for the small leaseholds.
However, the LDF might also identify qualified disadvantaged persons, such as landless farm laborers,
who did not have separation pay to help them bid. They could be given "seed money" grants as initial
working capital, though they would still be required to make some kind of down payment in order to
show that they have some capacity to save, and that they understand that the parcels are not gifts, as
previous government programs have been.
19 In both cases, provision could be made for payment of
at least 25 percent of the bid price in cash, with the balance due over 10 years (commercial farms)
or 15 years (small parcels), at interest. Interest and repayment should be calculated each year in the
current value of maize or other principal crops of the area in order to avoid decapitalization of the
LDF through inflation.
Likewise, the sale should include a reversion clause providing that the LDF would inspect all
land sold one year after sale, to verify that it is in fact in cultivation and determine whether the owner
did in fact live on it. If not, the lease should include full authority for the fund to nullify the sale,
evict the unsatisfactory "buyer," and sell to another eligible farmer as part of its next auction. Where
specific conditions made the delay justifiable, the fund would make a public finding to that effect, and
give an extension of six months or a year to that buyer.
18 Some team members question the division of large state farms into part-commercial and part-emergent or peasant
farms. Others feel that diversity has merit, that each can learn from the other, and that an open land market will in time
determine the best mix.
19 This example is built on a national land fund recently created in Honduras. That fund uses payments made by land
reform and squatter titling program beneficiaries to help landless farm laborers buy small parcels in the land market. No
one who owns more than 10 ha, including the land being bought, may receive credit from that fund. A 20 percent down
payment is required. See Strasma, Meza, and Umana 1993.143
However, in practice, the fund should also authorize any buyer to sell the leasehold, even
before the year was up, to any person who would have been eligible to buy at the auction. For sales
during the first year, the price would be the price originally bid at the auction, less the unpaid debt,
which the new buyer would assume. In addition, the new buyer would pay the seller any mutually
agreed-upon amount for improvements made since the purchase at auction. The object is to obtain the
highest possible price at the auction while ensuring that the land is in fact farmed. If the first buyer
is unable for any reason to bring the land into appropriate use, he or she should sell it to someone else
who can and will do so. Thus, the fund should seldom, if ever, actually need to recover a farm itself.
As long as the parcel has been sold at auction, not given away free to a favored few as in the past,
the price on resale will not be very different from the auction price, and hence there is no need to
control it. Once the year-end inspection has verified that the buyer has placed the land in production,
there would be no further need for supervision. And any owner who wanted to sell or sublet the
leasehold would be allowed to do so, just like any other small farmer.
5. Potential buyers and sellers
Since a more fluid, transparent land market would enhance Zambian development and the
welfare of small farmers, the fund should invite anyone who would like to buy a farm or smallholding
that becomes available to put his or her name on a list of candidates. This list would be made available
to anyone, not just buyers at auction, that may want to sell land in small parcels. Likewise, the fund
should invite other landholders, as well as any of its own buyers who change their minds, to advise
the public, estate agents, and others that they are interested in selling and would like to receive offers.
In this simple way, the LDF could do much to increase the efficiency of the Zambian land market,
and reduce the cost, in time as well as money, required for someone who wants to find and buy a
small farm in order to make it produce.
VIII. Summary, conclusions, and recommendations
A. Summary and conclusions
The land market in Zambia is by all accounts more visible than it was three years ago, but it
is still far from efficient. People who seek access to land for productive purposes still have trouble
identifying some of the land that would serve their needs, and people who think they have secure
access to a specific piece of land, but have not yet built a substantial building or are using it, may find
that access revoked on ground that they are not "using" it to the satisfaction of government. The
converse also applies. A government functionary may decide that a piece of land is not being used and
therefore may revoke its lease and promise the land to someone else. However, the new leaseholder
may be informed before actually getting possession that the former leaseholder has appealed to the
courts, leaving the whole issue without resolution.
In another example of the insecurity of possession of leaseholds on state land, a person who
advertises the availability of vacant land suited to commercial or industrial use attracts the attention
of a functionary. That functionary may cancel the original leasehold without compensation, on grounds
that the previous leaseholder is not using the land, which had been a condition of the lease. Naturally,
leaseholders who have not yet developed the land will once again hesitate to advertise their willingness
to sell. These incidents happen frequently enough that it is fair to say that the land market is still144
somewhat opaque and that secure possession of land with good potential for farming (or of other land
not yet improved) is subject to insecurity.
No land may be transferred without permission from some civil authority, be it the chief of
a traditional community or the Commissioner of Lands. Despite reforms making the process simpler,
there is no guarantee that approval will be granted, nor any published list of conditions to fulfill in
order to insure that approval will be granted. Thus a future commissioner might be tempted to fall
back into corrupt practices, demanding payment of a bribe to authorize the sale of leasehold interests.
Zambian law provides that cities, towns, and rural councils may collect rates, an annual tax
on the value of buildings and other improvements, but not on the value of the land under them. The
law also authorizes the central government to collect a fee for assigning state land to an applicant, and
then an annual ground rent for that particular land. In practice, both rates and ground rents have
lagged far behind inflation and bring in very little revenue. This should be corrected, so that
speculators will find it expensive not to develop leaseholds, and so that local governments can finance
needed services, roads, schools, or other public goods. Yet, because of the difficulty of separating the
value of land from improvements, there is also the risk of excessive double taxation—i.e., setting both
rates so high as to make the combined effect regressive to production incentives.
B. Recommendations
1. Abolish impediments to the subdivision of urban or rural land.
Existing law, by requiring presidential consent before any land transfer, also in effect requires
that consent be sought before any division into two or more parcels. Implicitly, this law asserts that
the government (i.e., the Commissioner of Lands) knows better than anyone else what the correct size
and layout of every piece of land ought to be. Since appropriate site sizes change continuously,
according to many different factors affecting the supply and demand of land on the market, this
requirement is absurd.
This does not mean that government should have no say on land uses and transfers. There is
nothing wrong with clear, logical rules that limit land uses in specific areas in order to protect the
water sources for a city, or to prevent pollution by certain activities that tend to contaminate soil and
groundwater. However, an efficient land market is one in which all landholders (lease or freehold)
are able to sell off part of their land, and are equally free to buy a piece of land and annex it to their
own holdings in order to create a farm or a site suitable to their needs. The land market in Zambia
will become more efficient, and potential investors will feel more secure, when the law is changed to
provide that all land divisions or mergers that do not violate existing land-use regulations duly
promulgated will be approved automatically.
One could go further, providing by law that if the government agency involved fails to act at
all within a certain number of days after presentation of the paperwork, the application is deemed
approved. The interested party would then need only to present to an ombudsman or to a lands
tribunal proof that the application was presented in the appropriate office on a certain date, and that
after the specified number of days, that same office certified that the agency had not made any
determination as to whether it was in order. In that case, the ombudsman or tribunal would
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2. Convert presidential consent into an automatic right of the
leaseholder to transfer, subject to clear, written, verifiable, and
impersonal criteria.
The act of recording a transfer would constitute documentation of presidential consent. Refusal
of the registrar to record a transfer within 90 days of the time presented could be appealed to the land
tribunal, which would determine definitively whether the transfer was in order or not and instruct the
registrar to proceed accordingly.
3. Create procedures for the renewal of leases upon demand, subject to
agreed investments.
Present law states that 14-year leaseholds can be converted into 99-year leases upon demand,
by proving that improvements have been built. However, there is as yet no provision for renewal of
the 99-year leases. Draft laws state that these leases "may" be renewed, but do not say that they "will"
be renewed upon request, nor do the laws state if any conditions are to be imposed on the renewal.
For an efficient land market, the rules for renewal should be clear. It would be logical to
provide for renegotiation of the amount of the annual ground rent, for instance. The point is simply
that since improvements pass to the government upon expiration of the lease, an investor should have
the right to renew a 99-year lease earlier than 99 years if he/she is planning to make a further
investment in improvements. Such renewals are routine in Baltimore, Maryland, for example, a US
city in which much of the central business district land is leased on a ground rent basis. Owners of
the buildings on those sites routinely come to the banks or insurance companies that own the land
about 30 or 40 years before leases expire, to negotiate a new 99-year lease. In this way, the person
or company that intends to make a major investment in expanding or modernizing knows that it will
remain the owner of the building long enough to fully amortize the investment. This recommendation
does not necessarily mean a change in the present law; it merely clarifies that a 99-year lease can be
renewed for a further 99 years from any time, upon application by the lessee. The present law appears
to be silent on the matter, although it does explicitly allow for the conversion of a 14-year lease to
a 99-year lease at any time.
4. Update valuations, and index for the future.
As noted above, existing valuations of land and improvements in Zambia are far below market
values. Not only should they be updated, it would be prudent to provide for automatic maintenance
of that value in real terms in the future. Some governments set values in terms of "fiscal units of
value" and then provide by law that the monetary value of the fiscal units will change automatically
according to some index of prices that serves as a reference point. This policy does not take notice
of changes in market values arising from population growth, economic development, or public
investments that enhance the value of specific parcels of land. For that purpose, one still needs a
periodic reevaluation of all property. However, Zambia has a legal requirement that this be done every
five years for urban rates; that standard should probably simply be extended to annual ground rents
as well. Between revaluations, however, rates are currently adjusted by increasing the rate of tax on
valuations which quickly become obsolete. There is no similar automatic adjustment of annual ground
rents, and there should be. But rather than increase the nominal rate of ground rent on a static market
value, it might be easier for the law to specify that the amount of ground rent would be increased or146
decreased each year according to the rate of increase in a price index, until the next formal
revaluation.
5. Define the rights of leaseholders in the event of unilateral lease
cancellation.
The present government has made it fairly clear that it intends to continue the position that
it is the ultimate "owner" of land in the state leasehold sector. One reason given by senior officials
is that the government has, and should have, the right of a landlord to cancel a lease under certain
circumstances. Freehold ownership is not very different: government can still take land held in
freehold ownership, but legal systems are usually very clear in stating that the affected owner has the
right to full compensation at market value, paid before the land is taken away from its former owner.
It would seem appropriate to enact a law providing that in the event that government cancels a lease
before its expiration, the lessee should have the same right to full, prior, compensation for the value
of improvements made by the lessee. This would then be a curb on unreasonable, arbitrary, or corrupt
acts by functionaries. Enactment of such a law would be a valuable first step in the needed revision
of the Land Acquisition Act, but it need not await that much lengthier process.
6. Provide for reversion between the state and traditional authorities if
land transferred is not in fact developed as promised.
There are reported instances in which chiefs complained that they had assented to the transfer
of land to the State based on promises by applicants to make investments and create jobs for the local
people, but years later no investments had been made and no jobs created. They later learned that
government transferred that land to politicians who were planning a different use for it. Just as the
government reserves the right to cancel a lease if investments are not made in the land, perhaps the
traditional chiefs should be allowed to write enforceable contracts specifying that if specific conditions
in the application are not fulfilled, then the land would revert to the chief's control.
7. Consider declaring customary authorities to be the municipal
governments in rural areas (the Peruvian model).
Zambia now has two major sectors of landholdings and two sets of authorities governing land
matters: the state and the traditional sectors. It has been proposed that all of Zambia should be
considered one sector, with agencies of the government taking over land-related responsibilities. An
alternative, invented in Peru in 1970, is to endow the customary authorities with the same legal
powers that towns and cities have concerning land matters. This achieves the goal of having similar
procedures in both sectors, although (at least in the Peruvian model) the central government respects
the existing or traditional forms by which the traditional sector chooses its executive (the chiefs and
headmen), rather than imposing a European style of election of authorities. Government may wish to
study this variant on the suggestion of extending councils to cover the entire country.
8. Consider extending the concept of rates to include all land allocations
as a tax base for local or customary authority budgets.
Present law applies urban rates only to the value of improvements, and only to the value of
improvements within the so-called rateable areas of cities, towns, and councils. Taxing only
improvements encourages speculative holding of valuable land with minimal improvements, which is147
not favorable to development. The government should explore the feasibility of including the value
of land in the tax base for rates. In addition, it is clear that there is a great scope for investment to
open up rural areas of land with potential for great productivity. It would therefore be reasonable to
study the extension of rates to cover improvements outside the present "rateable areas." There is no
obvious reason why tourist facilities, large processing facilities, etc., should not be taxed to help
finance the roads that enable people and products to get to and from those facilities; further study
would therefore be in order.Chapter 5:
Land Tenure and Agricultural Development in Customary Areas:
Results from Eastern and Southern Provinces
by
Frank Place, V.R.N. Chinene, Michelo Hansungule, and Fabian Maimbo'
I. Introduction
Previous chapters have identified a number of potential tenure constraints to agricultural
development in rural areas. This chapter addresses some of these issues by utilizing recent data
collected from rural households mainly located in customary areas of Zambia. LTC, in collaboration
with ICRAF and the University of Zambia undertook a study of nearly 200 households in Eastern and
Southern provinces in 1992-93. The study focused on the link between tenure and on-farm tree
planting activities of households. However, the formal questionnaire used for the study included
general questions on land tenure as well as some indicators of agricultural productivity/development.
Following this introduction, section II contains a brief overview of the research design and description
of study sites. Section III presents some of the findings related to land tenure security including data
on land acquisition, rights, and disputes. Section IV describes the various agricultural development
indicators analyzed in the study. Section V examines the linkages between land tenure and selected
agricultural productivity indicators such as adoption of oxen mechanization, use of chemical fertilizers
and credit, and presence of various long-term improvements on land, including trees. Finally, section
VI summarizes the results and identifies further research needs.
II. Overview of LTC/ICRAF Study
The two provinces selected for study—Eastern and Southern provinces—are situated on a
plateau that is characterized by relatively fertile soils and medium rainfall. Characteristics of sample
households in each region are given in table 5.1.
Eastern province was chosen because it is host to an ICRAF research station. The province
is dominated by mixed maize/livestock farming systems, although maize appears to be by far the most
important component. Among crops, it is estimated to occupy over 80 percent of cultivated area
(Celis, Milimo, and Wanmali 1991). The Celis study also found that crop income accounted for over
90 percent of household income and this was mainly from maize. Other crops grown include legumes
such as groundnut and cash crops such as sunflower and cotton. Livestock is nevertheless important:
about 55 percent of sample households had cattle and the median herd size (of those with cattle) was
seven. As the province is located quite a distance from the major urban centers of Lusaka (500
kilometers) and the Copperbelt, there are few off-farm income opportunities. Prior to the
' Frank Place is research associate with the Land Tenure Center, University of Wisconsin-Madison; V.R.N. Chinene
is dean of the College of Agricultural Sciences, University of Zambia; Michelo Hansungule is lecturer in land law, School
of Law, with the University of Zambia; and Fabian Maimbo is with the Department of Rural Development, Faculty of
Agriculture, University of Zambia.150
implementation of an agricultural liberalization program, farmers marketed output and purchased
inputs through cooperative unions. Among sample households, 81 percent had used chemical fertilizer
and over 60 percent had used formal credit within the past five years. Formal credit was obtained
from both commercial banks and the government-owned LIMA bank.
Table 5.1: Characteristics of sampled households
Characteristic of household Southern province Eastern province
Number sampled 100 98
Percent female-headed 7.0 14.6
Mean household size 7.6 5.4
Median farm size (ha) 6.7 3.1
Percent with cattle 68.8 55.2
Percent using fertilizer







Southern province was selected as the other site mainly because of tree planting initiatives
there. It is more commercialized as indicated by the fact that over one-quarter of total cultivated area
is occupied by commercial farmers operating on State Land. The northern part of the province is near
to the Lusaka market. Like Eastern province, maize is the predominant farming enterprise, occupying
about two-thirds of cultivated area (Cells, Milimo, and Wanmali 1991). Fertilizer use is ubiquitous
with 94 percent of sampled farmers having applied fertilizer within the past five years. Nearly 70
percent of households have cattle, but herd sizes were rather low, the median being three. There are
few off-farm income opportunities in the province, but there is significant migration to Lusaka and
to the minor urban areas of Livingstone, Choma, and Mazabuka, among others.
Selection of research sites within provinces was decided on the basis of traditional descent
patterns affecting land transfers and the presence of tree planting activities. In Eastern province, the
research team selected broad areas of patrilineal and matrilineal descent patterns in order to contrast
tree-planting prospects between the two groups. The greater Chipata and Katete districts were chosen
as the focus of the study.' Chipata is the site of a recently established ICRAF on-farm program. It
is located just 30 kilometers from the border with Malawi and is inhabited mainly by the patrilineal
Ngoni. The Katete region, on the other hand, has a majority of matrilineal people (mainly Chewa) and
2 A couple of sites were chosen in Chadiza as well, but the area was minor relative to Chipata and Katete districts.151
is located to the southwest of Chipata by about 70 kilometers. Villages were randomly selected in
Chipata, Chadiza, and Katete districts, and for the most part households were also randomly selected.'
The addition of Southern province provided opportunities for studying multipurpose tree planting. In
Mazabuka district, conversion of woodlands led to the initiation of several tree planting projects by
the Forestry Department and Family Farms project. The researchers purposefully selected villages and
settlements in the district with the intention of capturing a significant percentage of tree planters among
the sample of households. The sites within Mazabuka district were the Mazabuka South area (near
Magoye) and the Mapangazya area some 90 kilometers to the north of Mazabuka town. Each is about
a three-hour drive from Lusaka on the Lusaka-Livingstone road.
Both the number of household members and the size of farms is larger in Southern province.
The larger farm size is explained mainly by the inclusion of larger farms on State Land (28 percent
of the sample),` the greater use of oxen which permit extensification, and more accessible commercial
markets for output which increase demand for labor.' The greater production also increases household
demand for labor which results in more members' and fewer male household heads who seek off-farm
employment. There is a larger percentage of female-headed households in Eastern province, including
single, divorced, widowed, and polygamous families.
III. Land tenure
A. Land administration
Under the Land (Conversion of Titles) Act of 1975, all land in Zambia was henceforth to be
vested in the state. However, land in the Reserves and Trusts was to remain under the administration
of traditional authorities (see chapter 1). Land matters in most rural areas continue to fall under the
jurisdiction of chiefs and village headmen. In many areas of Zambia, chiefs have permitted creation
of new villages to accommodate increasing population growth and in-migration. Headmen, who are
generally selected by the community in accordance with customary law, are responsible for local
governance. Chiefs usually retain customary control over allocation of nonvillage land and settlement
of newcomers to the area. Headmen are likely to administer matters over land (e.g., expansion of
farms, dispute settlement) in their villages.
Besides the power of allocating land, chiefs or headmen also have the authority to dispossess
farmers from their land. However, key informants visited during informal interviews insisted that this
is a possibility only in cases of unacceptable behavior on the part of a household member. Once a
specific piece of land is allocated, the family expects to control land-use decisions and to pass this
right to heirs. There is some variation over the degree to which households can transfer land outside
the family and formally register their land. In some areas, individual rights to sell and rent have
developed (mainly in peri-urban areas) whereas in others they are strictly forbidden. Likewise, farmers
in Reserves face varying degrees of acquiescence on the part of chiefs to requests for individual
registration of land.
3 A few households were pre-selected for their planting of multipurpose trees.
It is unclear from the analysis whether these larger farms self-selected registration or whether allocations by the GOZ
were larger than the average farm size under customary tenure.
6 Smaller farm sizes in Eastern province are not the result of lack of land in the area.
6 Polygamy is more prevalent among the sample in Southern province than in Eastern province.152
The administration of State Land, applicable to parts of the sample from Southern province,
is the jurisdiction of the state. This topic is addressed in chapters 1 and 2.
B. Land acquisition
There are two main types of land acquisition by households in Reserve and Trust Lands in
Eastern and Southern provinces: inheritance/gifts from family members and allocation headmen with
confirmation of the chief. This is not to say that systems of land transfer are simple or easy to
understand. On the contrary, inheritance systems are quite varied in the study sites (see below). While
the chief is responsible for allocating land in Eastern province, the village headman performs that
function in Southern province with chiefs consulted only in the case of dispute. In addition, there exist
scattered temporary land transfers involving seasonal renting or lending.' Sales of traditional land are
very rare according to survey respondents, although several mentioned chiefs accepting money for
some land allocations, making the transactions appear like sales.
In State Land, there are different common modes of land acquisition. In areas where relatively
new resettlement programs have occurred, many farmers acquire land through state allocation. In more
established State Land areas, inheritance is more common and some purchasing is found. Although
markets have been discouraged by government policy (bare land could not be bought or sold),
individuals have circumvented this by exaggerating the value of land improvements which can be
legally sold.
Table 5.2 shows that over 90 percent of the respondents in Eastern province acquired land by
inheritance or other intrafamilial gifts. Inheritance and gift have been lumped together because some
respondents used the word inheritance to describe inter vivos transfers while others called them gifts.
Inheritance and other intrafamily transfers were also the most common among the Southern province
sample (65 percent) but not to the same extent as in Eastern province. This is due to the inclusion of
State Land farmers in Southern province where purchase and state allocation accounted for 18 percent
of land acquisitions. The other common form of land acquisition was through allocation by the chief
or village headman, accounting for about 17-18 percent of acquisitions in each province. Purchasing
between individuals is rare; only six farmers in Southern province (three each on Reserve and State
Land) and one in Eastern province reported purchases.' Only one household (in Eastern province)
reported ever selling land.
The following sections discuss the important acquisition modes in greater detail.
1. Inheritance
Among the patrilineal Ngoni, land passes from father to son. Traditionally, a father would
give all the land to his eldest son (from his first wife in case of multiple wives, Dorner and Bruce
1982). Increasingly, however, land is divided among sons, either as inheritance or gifts, as evidenced
' This is true more in Southern province than in Eastern province.
Legally, purchase refers to the transfer of unexhausted improvements, not the land per se, although in practice the
buyer and seller implicitly appear to be incorporating land value into the negotiated price as well.153
by the large number of respondents in the sample who have inherited land (see table 5.2).
9 Cross-
tabulations show that all household heads below the age of 30 in Eastern province (N=21) had
inherited land. Further, 40 of 42 household heads under the age of 40 received inherited land. This
strongly suggests that land is normally passed to heirs prior to death of the father and that it is not one
but many heirs who receive land.
10 A similar, but more varied, pattern is found among the Tonga
of Southern province.
Table 5.2: Percentage distribution of households by method of land acquisition'
Method Southern province Eastern province
Inheritance or gift:
Patrilineal ties 32 64
Matrilineal ties 22 12
Other family ties' 11 20
Allocated by chief or headman 17 18
Purchased 6 1
Allocated by state 12 2
Rented or borrowed 0 2
a. Nearly all households in Southern province had only one parcel; ofthe few that had more, the two or more
parcels were acquired in the same manner, thus summing to 100 percent. In Eastern province, 19 of 98
households used more than one manner of acquisition, thus the reason for summing to 119 percent.
Unfortunately, parcel-level breakdowns were unavailable for reporting.
b. It is not clear from the responses whether "grandparents" or "other relatives" imply a matrilineal or
patrilineal pattern.
Those sons who do not receive an inheritance but wish to farm in the village may seek land
from the headman, but they must first seek land from within the extended family." Women do not
generally inherit land. In the case where the sons are too young at the time of the father's death, the
woman may retain the use of family gardens as custodian until the sons reach maturity.
Among the Chewa, various inheritance arrangements can be found. In traditional Chewa
society, the institution of uxorilocal marriage is common whereby marriage to a nonvillager was
promoted and residence taken up in the wife's village. In these cases, the couple will receive an
allocation of land from the wife's family. This practice has been modified over time, in some cases
9 The data do not permit further analysis of whether the father bequeathed land to multiple sons or to the eldest son, who
then allocated land to his brothers. The central point is nonetheless the same—i.e., land does not end up with one heir, which
is the general interpretation made in the literature.
10 Given these high proportions, it should be obvious that the result holds for both the Ngoni and Chewa ethnic groups.
" This policy, along with matching allocation sizes to ability to cultivate, can be viewed as two indigenous methods to
discourage underutilization of land. A third is repossessing idle land for reallocation by the chief.154
quite radically. In Malawi, the Chewa system of inheritance near Lilongwe seems to have evolved
slowly, with initial changes involving "probationary" uxorilocal marriage followed by relocation to
the husband's village.
12 In Zambia, the transformation has been more pronounced. One Chewa
village visited had completely overhauled the traditional system in favor of father-to-son transfers. As
shown below, other study villages have also significantly altered their systems of inheritance.
Among the Tonga, land is commonly passed through matrilineal descent rules, in general
order of preference to mother's brothers, maternal nephews, maternal grandchildren, and sons. Dorner
and Bruce (1982) point out that this is not strictly followed, however, and a great deal of importance
was attached to identifying a good farmer."
In both provinces, the matrilineal system of descent shows signs of having eroded. The
analysis shows a preponderance of father-to-son transfers of land. Many respondents stated that they
obtained land from their fathers and that they intended to pass it to their sons. Of all inherited parcels
in the formal survey, 52 percent were from the father, and 22 percent from uncles, brothers, or
fathers-in-law among the Chewa (the remainder were from grandparents or other relatives). Among
the Tonga, 56 percent of inherited/given parcels were acquired from fathers and 26 percent from
matrilineal relations. The data indicate that the conversion of inheritance practices is not a recent
phenomenon as the ratio of matrilineal to patrilineal acquisitions is roughly constant over age of
household head.
Women do not generally inherit or receive land as permanent gifts. However, there are
exceptions in the case of unmarried, divorced, or widowed women. Because land is abundant in
Zambia, it is not unheard of for an unmarried woman to be given a small area of land to farm by her
father. Divorced women may be able to retain some of the land they had been cultivating depending
on the particular circumstances. However, if she originates from another village, it is normally
expected that she return to find land in her home area. Upon the death of a husband, some societies
would expect the widow to marry one of the husband's brothers, entitling her continued access to land
in her former husband's village through matrimony (although not necessarily the land of her former
husband). Alternatively, she may be allowed to farm the land until the sons are old enough to take
over the farm. In other cases, women have been ejected from the land and forced to find land in their
home areas.
2. Allocation from traditional authorities
In Reserve Lands, land not under occupation can be requested from either the chief or the
headman. The chief retains paramount power over land allocations, although decisions concerning
village residents can often be made by the headman alone. There are two general processes through
which land is acquired. The first involves strangers seeking land in the village; the second involves
a local resident seeking land. In the first case, a stranger is usually expected to bring a letter
explaining his departure from his previous village. Land is normally allocated as long as the chief or
headman accepts this explanation, approves of the family, and/or accepts the stranger's reasons for
12
A companion study in Malawi (Nankumba 1994) found that in most uxorilocal marriages, the husband had some land
in his village as well.
13 According to Michelo Hansungule (personal conversation), old accounts of matrilineal descent rules are out of date
due to evolution of the Tonga customary system.155
wanting to move to the village.
14 Other terms and conditions, possibly including a token gratuity or
grant of money, may also be required. The second scenario is where the applicant is a current or
former resident of the village—e.g., a son who has not received land through inheritance, a farmer
who wishes to expand farm size, or a male resident who returns to claim land following a long
absence. In this case, it may be either the chief or the headman who will allocate the land. In all
cases, the size of the allocation is based in large part upon the amount of land the household will be
able to cultivate.
Land allocation appears to be an important method of land acquisition in Southern province
with 17 percent of households receiving land from chiefs or headmen. Similarly, in Eastern province,
allocations from traditional authorities are utilized by 18 percent of households. Within Eastern
province allocation is more frequent among households from outside the area (32 percent) than among
resident households (8 percent). In Southern province both resident and migrant households were
equally likely to obtain land from chiefs or headmen.
3. Temporary acquisitions
Temporary acquisitions include seasonal rentals and borrowings. Because landholdings are
large relative to household labor supply, there is normally not a significant demand for additional land
for cultivation. However, seasonal capabilities will differ according to access to oxen plows, seeds,
or labor. The most common reason for temporary exchanges is lack of maize seed to cultivate the
entire plowed holdings. Arrangements will be made with another farmer to till the land in exchange
for a portion of the output. The existence of a prepared field, unlike the case of a bare field, is
attractive to would-be tillers. Respondents prefer to describe this arrangement as lending rather than
renting, perhaps because there is rarely a cash transfer.
None of our respondents in Eastern or Southern province had rented in parcels during the
season prior to the interviews. The percentage of households having ever rented out land was also low:
6 percent in Southern province and 3 percent in Eastern province.'
S Only two households reported
borrowing land in Eastern province, and both were Chewa.
4. Other acquisitions
In addition to inheritance, state allocation and purchasing were used by households to acquire
State Land. Because some settlement areas visited were relatively new, state allocation appears to be
an important method of land acquisition with 12 of 28 State Land households using this method.
There were also seven purchases of land in the sample. Six occurred in Southern province,
three each in State Land and the Reserves. All seven involved private buyers and sellers.
14 Allocation of land to strangers can be made by the headman in consultation with his advisors, but not necessarily with
the chief, particularly in Southern province.
Percentages for households renting out are not comparable with the same figures for renting in. According to the way
the questionnaire was designed, renting in refers only to parcels that households are currently renting, while renting out
refers to an action made at any time in history.156
C. Rights to land
Questions related to the possession of various rights to land were asked of respondents. For
each right, enumerators recorded whether household heads and spouses had unilateral (or unfettered)
ability to exercise the right or whether the right was conditional on the permission of others (e.g., the
spouse, father, other relative, chief or headman, state, or other).
16 The answers should not be
construed as definitive evidence of the existence of various rights. In some cases, the responses were
hypothetical, since the respondents were talking about rights they had not exercised. Nonetheless, the
responses are indicative of the respondents' sense of security or control over the use and transfer of
the land.
Rights of use, transfer, and exclusion are distinguished and discussed first at the level of the
household—that is, whether the household head claims certain rights over any farmland." The data
reflect the percentage of male-headed households in each region who claim the unfettered ability to
exercise each particular right. This data is presented for all enumerated rights in table 5.3. Further
analysis is then made with respect to some of these rights in order to compare the involvement in
decisions of husbands and their wives (again within male-headed households). This material is
presented in table 5.4 only for all male-headed households;
18 the number of female household heads
was too small to undertake special statistical analysis on this subgroup.
1. Use rights
Rights of use are highly privatized in both provinces. Table 5.3 shows that rights to cultivate,
use inputs, plant trees, and harvest tree products are enjoyed by all but a couple of households in
either province. With respect to the right to fence in Eastern province and the right to cut trees in
Southern province there is less than unanimity on the ability to exercise use rights. The data also show
that respondents were less certain of the right to fallow without losing other rights to the land. While
over 80 percent of respondents in Eastern province felt secure in their ability to retain land after long
fallows, only 53 percent felt similarly in Southern province.
19
Household heads have more rights over land use than their spouses. Wives have to get
permission from the household head in the majority of cases and are altogether denied rights in many
others (see table 5.4). Spouses in Southern province appear to be completely excluded from fencing
and tree planting decisions in about half of households. Women are more active in land-use decisions
in Eastern province; males appear to involve their wives in most decisions unlike their Southern
province counterparts. In about 11 percent of male-headed households, women were able to plant trees
without asking permission. Further, women were allowed to plant following permission of the husband
in another two-thirds of households.
16 Usually, only one respondent answered for both the husband and wife.
17 The analysis is at the household level. Although land rights were collected at the parcel level, respondents claimed
to have the same rights over all their parcels.
Is Sometimes only men were interviewed, sometimes only wives, and sometimes both. Regardless of the gender of the
respondent, rights of both husbands and spouses were queried.
19 This was in contrast to discussions during informal interviews where this concern was not raised.157







Cultivate annual crops 98.9 98.8
Cultivate perennial crops 98.9 96.3
Use inputs 98.9 98.9
Erect a fence 98.9 82.9
Plant trees 98.9 96.3
Cut trees 79.6 94.9
Harvest produce from trees 93.5 98.7
Retain land after long fallow 52.7 81.7
Transfer rights:
64.5 60.8 Give trees to other family members
Give land to other family members 53.8 76.8
Give or sell land outside the family 40.9 37.8
Exclusion rights:
Prevent others from growing crops 86.0 96.3
Prevent others from harvesting crops 83.9 97.6
Prevent others from grazing animals 76.3 28.0
Prevent others from growing trees 84.9 96.3
Prevent others from harvesting trees 86.0 91.5
D. Transfer rights
Rights of transfer were the least common of all types of rights. Rights to give land to other
family members were claimed by 54 percent of Southern province households and 77 percent of
Eastern province households. The most restricted right is that of land alienation outside the family.
As seen in table 5.3, sales are rare in the study areas. The percentage of households who claim rights
to sell is about 40 percent in each province. Because of the higher frequency of households on State
Land in Southern province, one might have expected fewer rights to sell than in Eastern province due
to land market restrictions governing statutory tenure on State Lands. However, customary laws
forbidding sales might be more strongly enforced, and the lower population density of customary areas
may create little demand for purchases.158
Table 5.4: Percentage distribution of husbands and wives by selected rights of use and
transfer
Husband` Wife"
Right Southern Eastern Southern Eastern
province province province province
Cultivate perennials:
No rights 1 4 36 9
Yes, without permission 97 36 7 8
Yes, with spousal permission 2 60 57 83
Fence:
No rights 1 17 55 44
Yes, without permission 98 57 3 4
Yes, with spousal permission 1 26 42 52
Plant trees:
No rights 1 4 46 23
Yes, without permission 98 49 5 11
Yes, with spousal permission 1 47 49 66
Alienate land from family:
No rights 59 62 88 65
Yes, without permission 40 11 0 0
Yes, with spousal permission 1 27 12 35
a. The respondent is the household head commenting on spousal rights. This is a male only in 66 percent of
the cases in Southern province and 75 percent in Eastern province.
Spousal rights over land transfer are extremely weak. Table 5.4 shows that no spouse has the
unilateral right to alienate land outside the family. In Eastern province, wives would be consulted in
about one-third of households, but in Southern province only 12 percent of wives would be included
in this type of decision.
E. Exclusion rights
The ability to exclude others from using one's farmland was relatively common and suggests
a high degree of individualized property rights. In general, nonhousehold members are not permitted
to use a household's land for crop or tree cultivation without prior permission of the household head.
In addition, chiefs and headmen have established penalties for crop damage and unauthorized tree
cutting by others on farmers' own fields. Moreover, farmers claim to have the right to fence off land
(see above).159
The case of grazing animals appears to be an exception. Farmers were asked whether others
had unquestioned rights to graze in their fields. In Southern province, 76 percent of farmers claimed
that herders would have to ask their permission before grazing on their lands. This high percentage
might be explained by the Tonga custom of permitting one's own animals to graze one's stover before
allowing other animals on the property. In contrast, only 28 percent of Eastern province farmers
believed that their permission was required before others grazed their land.
F. Tenure security
Tenure security is a difficult concept to measure precisely. It is related to the number of rights
held, the duration of rights, and the respect of those rights by others (chapter 2). As indicated above,
farmers feel quite secure in their ability to cultivate crops on their land. The high percentage of
privatized rights to fence and plant trees also conveys the notion that cultivation rights are long term
in nature. Farmers were also asked specifically about the length of time they could continue to farm
their plots. With the exception of eight 14-year state leaseholds, virtually all households claimed they
could farm the land as long as they wished. Informal interviews corroborated this finding; respondents
mentioned that land would only be taken away in the case of "unseemly" behavior on their part.
In addition to long-term rights, the assurance that these rights will be respected by others is
also important for creating proper investment incentives. Again, the evidence above suggests that
farmers are largely left alone to develop their farms as they wish. One area of concern is open grazing
in the off-season coupled with poor supervision of animals. In such systems, the obligation is on the
landowner to make additional investments in the form of fencing or guards, thereby raising the cost
of land investments.
In summary, security of tenure seems high insofar as long-term rights to land are concerned.
There are examples to the contrary, however. Families do not enjoy the right to keep land idle or in
fallow for long periods. Women-headed households do not always concur that their tenure is
indefinite; during informal interviews, more than one woman reported fear of losing her land to male
relatives. One respondent on State Land had rented out land without a written contract for fear that
a written document could be used by the tenant to illegally obtain that parcel from the state. Hence,
statutory law and the presence of registration themselves can create some insecurity. One farmer on
State Land mentioned problems of claims to his land by his extended family who resided on traditional
land; the relatives argued that the land was rightfully theirs since the money used to purchase the farm
on State Land was earned from output in traditional land. Lastly, there was also a slight fear of
government expropriation should a farmer plant enough trees to appear to convert the crop land into
forest.
In terms of security for credit access it appears that title deeds are not necessary to obtain
loans (see below), and it is questionable as to how much they can help. From a lender's perspective,
a title deed is only valuable if the underlying asset (land) can be used to recover loan arrears. This
condition is not generally satisfied in the land-abundant Reserves of Zambia where land sales are rare.
As is discussed below (table 5.7) more than half of households had obtained credit and only a few160
farmers have titles to offer. Banks will often use other assets as collateral, but will even make
unsecured loans if a farmer can establish a sound credit history.
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Enumerators asked all respondents whether they felt title to land would increase their security
and whether they expected credit use to increase with title. With respect to security, the results were
nearly identical across the two provinces. In Southern province, 36.7 percent of households said that
they would be more secure with title and 35.8 percent felt similarly in Eastern province. However,
in Southern province, 84 percent of those in State Land replied affirmatively as opposed to only 19
percent of households in the Reserves. The responses with respect to perceived change in credit use
from titling differed with about twice as many in Southern province predicting greater use (62 percent)
as compared to those in Eastern province (32 percent).
G. Concept of ownership
Even though land belongs to the state under the 1975 Land Act, this was hardly recognized
by the respondents when asked who was owner of their farmland. Table 5.5 shows that 54 percent
of the respondents in Eastern province said that the household head is the owner of the land, while
31 percent mentioned the chief or headman. Nine percent of respondents said that the land belongs
to the extended family. The results in Southern province are virtually identical, despite the fact that
28 households held state leases which stipulate that all land is owned by the state.
Table 5.5: Distribution of households by perceived owner of land
Owner Southern province Eastern province
No one 1 3
Household/household head 57 54
Extended family 10 9
Chief, headman, community 28 31
Other 4 2
A cross-tabulation made between the perception of landownership and mode of acquisition
indicated that households acquiring land through patrilineal ties are more likely to claim ownership
over land than households who have acquired land through matrilineal ascendants. In both provinces,
59 percent of patrilineal households claim ownership rights, while for matrilineal households, the
percentage is 36 percent in Eastern province and 32 percent in Southern province. Conversely,
matrilineal households are more likely to name the chief as owner. All households located in State
Land believed they were the owners of the land.
20 As indicated shortly, easy credit proliferated in days prior to the present market liberalization, where credit from state
banking institutions was closely intertwined with purchases and sales through government-controlled input and commodity
markets. With the beginning of greater financial scrutiny in loans applied to banks in the early 1990s, title may become a
more significant determinant of credit access.161
H. Land disputes
Given the relatively low population density, land disputes are not as severe as those found in
other areas of sub-Saharan Africa. In fact, few disputes over land ever proceed to formal courts in
Eastern province. The disputes that do occur between farmers mainly involve boundary disputes and
to a lesser degree disagreements over inheritance.
21 Boundary disputes arise mainly because plot
boundaries are not normally marked owing to large farm sizes. All land disputes are normally settled
by the village headmen.
There are other disputes which arise over unlawful use of land such as illegal grazing during
the rainy season or cutting of trees. These are sometimes settled by the parties themselves, but can
also be decided by the headmen or even chiefs. Penalties are usually in the form of maize, if maize
crops were damaged, or animals (e.g., chickens or goats) for other damages.
Results show that around one-fifth of all households in both regions reported having been
involved in a land dispute sometime in the past. In both regions, boundary disputes accounted for over
half the total. In Eastern province, 11 households are currently involved in a dispute and seven
actually lost land as a result of a dispute. In Southern province, 3 percent of households are currently
involved in a dispute and 7 percent have lost land as a result of a dispute, the majority of these to
other family members.
I. Documentation
The majority of respondents did not have documents or title to land. In Southern province 75
percent of respondents had no form of documentation, and in Eastern province as many as 94 percent
did not carry written documentation to land (see table 5.6). Nine respondents in Southern province
had a title deed while another 14 carried receipts of transfer while waiting for titles to arrive. Only
one Eastern province farmer had obtained a formal title deed. The remainder of the document holders
held a letter from the chief.
Table 5.6: Percentage distribution of respondents by type of land documentation held














One Chewa headman said that inheritance disputes were very common before a patrilineal inheritance system was
adopted.162
IV. Agricultural development indicators
The LTC/ICRAF study did not have as an objective the analysis of links between tenure and
agricultural productivity or development. Therefore, the indicators used in this analysis are probably
not sufficiently rigorous in measurement or breadth to warrant any definitive conclusions. Further
work will certainly need to be undertaken. Nonetheless, the results are useful if for no other reason
than to guide future research.
The agricultural development data available exist in the form of binary responses indicating
whether a particular investment or activity was undertaken (for example, see tables 5.7, 5.8, and 5.9).
For all the measures except for use of formal credit, the time frame is the entire period the farmer has
occupied the land. For credit, the incidence refers to the past five years only. The following sections
compare indicators among regions, first with respect to credit and oxen use, second with respect to
land improvements, and third with respect to tree planting.
A. Credit and use of oxen
Table 5.7 displays some aspects of credit and oxen use among sample households. The
majority of households in both provinces obtained formal credit at least once during the previous five
years despite the low incidence of title among households. Instead, other forms of collateral were often
used to help secure credit, chiefly livestock and crops. The use of crops as collateral was made
possible by the state's control over agricultural inputs and outputs. Government banks would issue
credit to farmers who would obtain fertilizer from a government supplier. Credit risks were reduced
since all produce was marketed through the government as well. With the advent of market
liberalization, this degree of control will be lost and lenders will likely not be as keen on using crops
as collateral.
Table 5.7: Aspects of credit and oxen use among households
Southern province Eastern province
Percent using formal credits 55.0 60.4
Percent of borrowers using land or 17.0 0.0
title as collateralb "
Percent with oxen 58.0 44.8
Median number of head in oxen 3 2
households
a. At least once in previous 5 years.
b. Percent ofall loans secured with land title.
Around 58 percent of households in Southern province own at least one ox, compared with
45 percent in Eastern province. The use of oxen is important in expanding production area of a farm.
Studies by Celis, Milimo, and Wanmali (1991) found that the area under cultivation was about twice
as high in oxen-owning households as it was in households without oxen. With respect to this study,163
oxen households cultivated 16.4 hectares versus 5.8 hectares for nonoxen households in Southern
province. No significant difference was found in Eastern province, although a recent outbreak of
corridor disease may have affected oxen numbers; also, there is a higher incidence of oxen renting
by "non-oxen" households as defined.
B. Land improvements
Given that both study areas are similar in terms of rainfall, topography, and farming system,
it is not surprising that the types of land improvements made by farmers are similar in the two areas.
Table 5.8 shows the percentage of households making various types of land improvements. For
convenience, the land improvements have been grouped loosely by purpose. For example, the various
earth construction investments (terracing, bunding, and ridging) have been placed next to one another
and an aggregate figure for "earthwork" is also provided.
Table 5.8: Percentage distribution of respondents by type of land improvement made








Any water improvement 44.0 48.0
Fertilizer 86.0 72.4
Liming 1.0 0.0
Other chemicals 38.0 16.3
Any chemical treatment 88.0 72.4
Manuring 51.0 42.9
Mulching 3.0 3.1
Any organic treatment 52.0 43.9
Fencing 22.0 28.6
There is a similar percentage of households in each province undertaking investments in all
water improvements, fencing, terracing, chemical fertilizer, liming, and organic treatments. Generally,
the use of chemical fertilizer is high, about half of respondents made a waterwork improvement, half
used organic manure, one-quarter had made some fencing improvements, and very few made
investments in terracing, mulching, or liming.164
There were some important differences between the two provinces as well. Chemicals (i.e.,
pesticides and herbicides) other than fertilizers are much more commonly used in Southern (38
percent) than Eastern province (16 percent) due to the forger's better location relative to the Lusaka
market. Farmers in Eastern province were much more likely to construct bunds (53 percent versus
8 percent) and to undertake any earthwork than their counterparts in Southern province. The bunding
is used primarily on gently sloping upland fields, but sometimes also in the low-lying wetlands. The
higher incidence of earthworks in Eastern province is at least partially explained by its undulating
terrain relative to the "flat" topography of Southern province.
C. Tree products and tree planting
This section is a very brief summary of tree planting in the study sites and is adapted from
Chinene, Hansungule, and Place (1994). To understand on-farm tree planting, it is first necessary to
know what types of tree products and services are used and how households obtain them. Depending
on the tree product or service, the main sources will be common woodlands or forests, friends and
neighbors, the market, and one's own farm. When a product is plentiful from commonly used areas,
there is a reduced incentive to expend one's labor and capital to reproduce it on-farm.' Table 5.9
shows that there are considerable disincentives to grow trees for some important products, especially
in Eastern province where the commons provide the bulk of firewood, poles, and medicines. Fruits,
on the other hand, are normally not found in the commons. Specific services from trees such as shade,
windbreak, and fencing must necessarily be obtained from on-farm trees.
Table 5.9: Aspects of tree product and tree planting by households
Southern province Eastern province




Percentage of households planting:
Fruit trees 76.0 42.7
Multipurpose trees 46.0 11.5
Any tree in past 5 years 46.0 16.7
Principal fruits mango, guava, papaya mango, guava, papaya
Principal multipurpose trees Cassia siamea none
Gmelina arborea
Fruit trees are by far the most commonly planted trees by households. Mango (Mangifera
indica) was planted on 55 percent and 33 percent of households in Southern and Eastern province,
22 Assuming that the distance to the common source is not too great.165
respectively. Guava (Psidium guajava) is the next most popular in each province. No other species
was planted by more than 10 percent of households in Eastern province. On the other hand, mulberry
(Morus alba), Cassia siamea, Gmelina arborea, and Leucaena leucocephala were all planted by more
than 10 percent of sampled households in Southern province. Cassia siamea was particularly common
in the study sites, found on 35 percent of farms visited.
The percentage of households planting trees and the number of trees planted per household
were calculated after grouping together species as fruits or MPTs (multipurpose trees)' Seventy-six
percent of households in Southern province planted fruits and 46 percent MPTs. The percentages of
households planting each type within the past five years are lower, at 32 percent and 25 percent,
respectively. Among planting households, the average number of trees planted was 19 for fruits and
34 for MPT species. The primary uses of on-farm MPT species are for shade (36.6 percent of MPT
plantings), windbreak (18.3 percent), and fuelwood (12.2 percent). Plantings of fruits and MPTs are
almost always found near homesteads in blocks, rows, or clusters.
In Eastern province, 42.7 percent of households had planted fruits at any time, but only 11.5
percent planted MPTs. During the past five years, the percentages of households planting were lower,
especially for fruits (11.5 percent). The mean number of trees planted per planting household were
18 for fruits and 58 for MPTs. The primary use of on-farm multipurpose trees was shade (37.8
percent), soil fertility (18.9 percent), and poles (16.2 percent).
V. Tenure and agricultural development
A. Methodology
Previous sections demonstrated that virtually all farmers perceived having long-term use rights
to their holdings. However, there were tenure differences between farmers concerning how they
acquired land, their rights to transfer land, and their perceptions of who owned their farmland.
Households have acquired land primarily through patrilineal inheritance, matrilineal inheritance, chiefs
or headmen, or through the state. Do these differences matter for tenure security? It is often claimed
that incentives for investment are lower in matrilineal systems where the husband may not feel the land
is his or have the freedom to pass it to his sons. Between one-half to three-fourths of households
claimed ability to permanently transfer land to a family member. About 60 percent of households felt
that they owned the land. Are these perceptions related to tenure security and do they have any
implications for agricultural development? To answer these questions, three major hypotheses were
tested:
(1) The incidence of agricultural development indicators is lower on matrilineal land than on land
acquired by other means.
(2) The incidence of agricultural development indicators is higher where households claim to have
land alienation rights.
' The categories included both indigenous and exotic species.166
(3) The incidence of agricultural development indicators is higher where households claim to be
the owners of the farmland.
These hypotheses were tested using regression analysis. Due to relationships among the mode
of land acquisition, land rights, and landownership perceptions, the hypotheses were tested in
alternative regression models. In each model, other nontenure factors were included and were selected
on the basis of their likely links to investment. These include size of farm, size of household, age of
household head, education level of household head, frequency of extension visits, incidence of
livestock, quality of residential house, location of household within study site, and distance to roads,
markets, and agricultural offices. These variables were selected because they are hypothesized to affect
the agricultural decisions of farmers. A greater likelihood of investment is expected on larger farms,
those with more labor, among middle-aged or elderly household heads, among the more educated,
those who are in more contact with extension agents, those with greater wealth (livestock, quality of
house), and those who are located closer to markets and/or major roads.
It is certain that decisions regarding the various productivity measures are mutually dependent.
However, this decision-making process is quite difficult to handle from a statistical point of view. The
inclusion of several dependent variables in a simultaneous system requires a large number of
observations, while only 100 per region are available in these samples.'' One method is to use all
possible investment combinations or bundles as distinct outcomes.' However, this too requires
significant numbers of observations to assure that the number of cases in each investment combination
is sufficiently large. An alternative method was used instead. The 11 different improvements
enumerated were grouped into 5 categories: organic inputs, chemical inputs, earthwork structures,
water structures, and fencing (see table 5.8). Nearly all farmers used chemical inputs (mainly
fertilizer) so there was insufficient variation for explanatory analysis. Single equation logit regressions
were made using credit use, presence of oxen, use of organic inputs, incidence of earthwork
structures, water structures, fencing, fruit tree plantings, and multipurpose tree (i.e., nonfruit)
plantings as dependent variables. This grouping does not eliminate the problems of dependent decision-
making, but reduces them to some extent since the more important interlinked decisions are likely
within groups (e.g., wells and irrigation in water structures).'
Before proceeding to the empirical results, it should be stressed that the regression analyses
indicate associations with variables but should not be taken to imply causal relationships. The reason
for this has to do with the aforementioned time frames involved. The actual date of investment is
unknown and, therefore, one cannot be certain that any of the independent variables actually caused
the outcome (except for variables which are fixed at the time of land acquisition such as how the land
was acquired). Furthermore, it is important to point out that because the independent variables reflect
current household characteristics (e.g., current size of household), their relationships to land
improvement variables can become obscured. Unfortunately, this problem is very difficult to correct
since it would require superlative recall powers on the part of respondents (i.e., to provide dates and
amounts for investments).
u Perhaps more constraining is the lack of software capability to handle large simultaneous systems given that the
dependent variable is not continuous.
u In a multinomial logit framework, for instance.
26 On the other hand, this method is sensible only if the combined improvements are alike and respond to other factors
in the same manner.167
B. Results
The results are presented by hypothesis rather than by dependent variable, although references
to specific tenure-agricultural indicator effects are noted. The results which were found to be
significant are indicated in table 5.10. Insignificant or absent relationships are left blank.
Hypothesis 1: Matrilineal inheritance systems
The case of mode of acquisition is complex owing to its multiple possibilities. The significant
findings are from Southern province as only one minor finding was obtained in the case of Eastern
province. As opposed to households who acquired their land through matrilineal descent patterns,
households who acquired their land patrilineally were more likely to use credit and to make earth
structures. Those who acquired their land through the chief or headman were more likely to make
organic inputs, earthwork structures, or to plant fruit trees (than those who acquired matrilineally).
Lastly, those who purchased land or were allocated land from the state were more likely to own oxen,
use organic inputs, and to make earthwork structures. These results support the hypothesis in that
matrilineal land was found to be inferior to at least one other type of land acquisition for most of the
indicators. On the other hand, a superior mode of acquisition does not emerge from the data. The lone
result from Eastern province did not support the null hypothesis: the use of formal credit was greater
on farms with matrilineal land than on those who acquired from the chief or headman.
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Hypothesis 2: Land alienation rights
The right to alienate land outside the family was significant in only a handful of cases. The
right to permanently transfer land was positively related to the use of organic inputs in Southern
province, but was negatively related to multipurpose tree planting in the same site and to fruit tree
planting in Eastern province. Given the insignificant and mixed nature of the results, it is difficult to
draw any strong conclusions about the effects of land rights. The negative relationships with respect
to tree planting suggests that tree investment behavior differs from other improvements. One
explanation for this is that there tends to be a noticeable input of tree planting project personnel into
the observed pattern of on-farm tree planting.
Hypothesis 3: Perception of landownership
In Eastern province, households who felt they owned their land were more likely to own oxen,
to make earthwork improvements, and to plant fruit trees. In Southern province the ownership variable
was positively linked to use of credit and, again, earthwork structures. The results are supportive of
the hypothesis. Because ownership is a perception of households, it may be that it is influenced by
certain peculiarities of households (i.e., it is endogenous). If so, there may be other important
variables which explain both the perceptions of tenure security and the agricultural indicators. To
attempt to elucidate these issues, a regression was made using ownership (household or not) as a
dependent variable with several household and farm characteristics as independent variables. A strong
relationship was found between household ownership and wealth indicators (including number of cattle
and farm size) raising the possibility that the wealth of a household may lead both to more individual
claims of tenure control and to more investments.
This may be explained by the fact that the latter households are more likely to come from outside the area.168
Table 5.10: Summary of significant regression results for tenure variables
Matrilineal Land alienation Ownership
inheritance rights perception
Southern province
Use of formal credit negative positive
Presence of oxen negative
b








Use of formal credit positive `





Fruit trees negative positive
Multipurpose trees
a. Compared to patrilineal inheritance.
b. Compared to allocation by the state.
c. Compared to acquisition from the chief or headman and purchasing.
d. Compared to acquisition from the chief or headman, patrilineal inheritance, and allocation from the state.
e. Compared to acquisition from the chief or headman or patrilineal acquisition.
Other results
Among other variables, several were significantly related to the incidence of land
improvements. In Eastern province, size of farm was the most important explanatory variable. Farm
size was positively associated with a greater likelihood of using formal credit, possessing oxen, using
organic fertilizer inputs, making earthwork structures, making waterwork structures, making fencing
improvements, and planting fruit trees (i.e., all of the dependent variables used). In Southern province
size of farm was less important and was linked to organic fertilizer application (negatively) and to
planting of multipurpose trees and the presence of oxen (positively).169
Other important variables in Eastern province were age and education level of household head,
and the size of household labor pool. Improvements in fencing and waterworks were more likely
among the middle-aged households than either young or old household heads. At this stage of the
household cycle, there usually exists a good balance of labor supply and capital with which to make
investments.' Household heads with secondary education were less likely to make waterwork or
fencing improvements than those with no formal education. Since age was controlled for, this result
is rather surprising, but would indicate that formal education is not strongly linked to the ability to
undertake productive investment (e.g., it is not linked to wealth or income). The final notable result
is that the size of household labor supply is positively related to the presence of oxen and to earthwork
improvements. None of the household location variables were significantly related to the development
indicators.
In Southern province, none of the control variables was significantly correlated with land
improvements in more than a few cases. Perhaps the strongest of the variables was education. Unlike
Eastern province, secondary education was positively linked with investment in earthwork and
waterwork structures, and to planting of multipurpose and fruit trees. Household labor was positively
associated with the use of formal credit and the presence of oxen.' The frequency of extension visits
was positively associated with credit use, but negatively associated with the incidence of waterwork
structures. The distance from the household to major roads and agricultural offices was significant but
in an inconsistent manner, with each being positively and negatively linked to one type of indicator.
Thus, in general it can be concluded that there is no clear relationship between supply incentives (e.g.,
extension), market incentives (e.g., distance to market), and farm development using these data.
VI. Summary and implications for further research
A. Summary
This chapter has endeavored to describe tenure systems and their links to agricultural
development activities of farmers in selected areas of Southern and Eastern provinces. The major
findings involving tenure and tenure security can be summarized as follows:
► Almost all land is acquired through nonmarket means: inheritance, gifts, and allocations by
local or state authorities. Markets for land are poor for several reasons but the major reason
in the study areas is the relative abundance of land. Households are able to find adequate land
on which to satisfy their consumption needs and even to produce a surplus for the market.
Government policies have undoubtedly played some role as well. However, evidence from
other countries in sub-Saharan Africa indicates that where the demand for land is acute,
markets will develop even in restrictive policy environments.
► Households claim long-term use rights over land. The data clearly show that all but a handful
of sampled households perceive the ability to use their land for various purposes. Included
among rights claimed were the rights to fence and to grow perennial crops, both of which
' Young households normally lack capital while older households lack labor. In land-abundant areas of Zambia, it is
not easy to overcome household labor shortages through hiring.
n A household labor index is derived from the age, sex, and working pattern of each member.170
indicate long-term duration rights. All farmers, save several with 14-year leaseholds on State
Land, believed they could cultivate their land indefinitely. The only conflicting evidence
concerning long-term use of land was a hesitation of Southern province farmers to leave land
idle for long periods.
► Households claim exclusion rights except in the case of livestock grazing. The vast majority
of households reported that they can exclude nonhousehold members from engaging in crop
or tree growing activities. There was less privatization of land when the subject of off-season
grazing was raised.
► Transfer rights exhibit the lowest level of privatization. The percentage of households who felt
empowered to unilaterally make decisions over permanent transfers of land was low relative
to other types of rights and relative to other countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Only about 40
percent of households claimed to have the ability to transfer land to someone outside the
family. This demonstrates the continued corporate control over land by chiefs and their
communities.
► There is a wide variation among households as to whom they believe is the rightful owner of
their land. Nearly 60 percent of households believed that the farmland is their own. This view
is consistent with the fact that most have inherited their land from ancestors and plan to
bequeath it to descendants. On the other hand, a sizeable number of respondents believed that
the land was owned at higher levels such as the extended family, the community, or the chief.
The legal position, that land is owned by the State, is simply not felt by rural households.
► More than half of sampled households have obtained formal credit and very few use land or
land title as collateral. It is more often the case that livestock or crops were used by farmers.
Past credit use was facilitated by the state cooperative system under which loans were made,
inputs delivered, and outputs sold. This may not be feasible under liberalization.
► Evidence was found indicating that agricultural development was lacking somewhat more on
land acquired matrilineally than by other means in Southern province. The indicators which
were influenced by acquisition method were use of credit, presence of oxen, use of organic
fertilizer, incidence of earthwork structures, and planting of fruit trees. At the same time, no
single method of acquisition emerged as being superior to all others.
► Households that perceived themselves as owners of their farmland tended to adopt more
development measures. Household "owners" were more likely to make earthwork
improvements in both provinces, to plant fruit trees and have oxen in Eastern province, and
to use credit in Southern province. Claims of ownership were found to be related to wealth
indicators suggesting that wealth may be an important underlying variable explaining tenure
perceptions and development indicators.
► There was little relationship between the right to alienate land and agricultural development.
In most cases the land-rights variable was insignificant in regression analyses while it had
opposite effects in the three cases where it was significant.
► Farm size was a key variable in explaining adoption of productivity measures by households
in Eastern province. There was a positive and significant relationship between the size of farm171
and the likelihood of adopting all agricultural development indicators in Eastern province. This
result is appealing from an economic perspective since it points toward the movements of
production factors to achieve economic efficiency. In this case, the greater use of land
improvements by larger farms helps to equate land yields across different farm sizes; smaller
farms generally apply more labor per unit of land.
B. Implications for further research
This research has provided some insight into rural land tenure arrangements and how they
relate to agricultural productivity. But since the LTC/ICRAF study was not designed to tackle the
broad and complex issues involved in explaining agricultural productivity, the results are only
preliminary. Several recommendations for improvement in methodology and content arise from this
study. First, it is obvious that work must be done in a wider geographical area. Second, for all study
sites, it is necessary to define tenure security and measure it. A number of recent studies have
explored the possibility of using land rights as a proxy. Is this adequate? If so, which rights are most
important for agricultural productivity in Zambia? If not, what are the alternatives from an operational
point of view? Once this is resolved, it will be crucial to understand which factors are linked to tenure
security. This study has found possible links between wealth and tenure security. This issue needs
careful attention because it has important implications for the effectiveness of tenure policy change.
Once the tenure side of equation is better understood, more attention needs to be given to the
productivity measures, where, clearly, better measures need to be developed and used. Relying on
binary data is not sufficient, particularly when a particular investment is made by most farmers (e.g.,
use of chemical fertilizer). Moreover, this study did not consider many important measures such as
crop or livestock output. These in turn are related to efficiency per unit of input (e.g., land) as well
as the area under production.
The relationship between tenure, grazing, livestock management, land use, land investment,
and market access are crucial to understanding the effects of land policy interventions. These linkages
all stood beyond the scope and intent of the present study and, in light of the lack of sufficiently




Florence Chenoweth, Jane Knowles, and Gertrude Ngenda'
I. Introduction
Zambia's market economy continues to penetrate rural and peri-urban areas of subsistence
cultivation. In this environment, where islands of commercial activity are surrounded by a sea of
subsistence agriculture, settlement schemes have served as a mechanism for the expansion of the
frontier of commercial agriculture.' Zambia has an abundant supply of uncultivated arable land. The
land market for private transfers and administrative allocations on newly opened lands will provide
the principal mechanism through which people can acquire land in agricultural areas. However, due
to historical factors and economic hardship, some segments of the population seeking land for farming
will be unable to effectively use these mechanisms.' The GOZ has a long history of settlement
programs which they have attempted to use to accommodate the land needs of these people; the
desirability of continuing or expanding resettlement depends on the scale and performance of past
schemes.
This chapter was undertaken to pull together what is known of the various resettlement
schemes. Information was sought on the extent of such schemes, institutions involved, number of
settlers, scheme size, area settled, scheme expansion over time, settlement costs, settler characteristics,
and scheme performance in terms of production, land use, investment, income, employment, and
resource access and use. Data are based primarily on archival research, secondary sources, and some
interviews with public officials. Prior to 1991 there were several government institutions responsible
for resettlement schemes, including the Zambia National Service (ZNS); the MAFF; the Ministry of
Local Government and Housing; the Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM); and the
Department of Resettlement. Attempts were made to obtain data from all these institutions except
ZCCM. Officials repeatedly acknowledged the availability of data, but despite many informal and
formal requests, few data were ever provided due partly to information sanctions stemming from
political sensitivities, poor data management, lack of records, and dearth of quality research by outside
investigators. The findings in this chapter are thus superficial and, if anything, highlight the need for
exhaustive research involving fieldwork in this area.
In referring to the numerous schemes set up by the GOZ to settle people for agricultural
purposes, the term resettlement scheme is sometimes used while at other times, frequently in the same
document, settlement scheme is used. For the purpose of this chapter, all schemes are referred to as
1 Florence Chenoweth is an associate research scientist with International Agricultural Programs and Jane Knowles is
Associate Director of International Agricultural Programs, University of Wisconsin-Madison. Gertrude Ngenda is a
researcher with the Zambian Association for Research and Development.
2 Ray (1977a) uses the example of the Chifwile resettlement scheme in Northern Zambia to examine how such programs
can be used as a mechanism for expanding the frontier of commercial agriculture.
3 These segments of the population include the disadvantaged, urban people, and retiring or terminated civil servants.174
settlement schemes. Settlement schemes in Zambia fall into three broad categories: schemes set up to
settle European emigrants, schemes planned for Africans (Zambians), and schemes put in place to
settle refugees, particularly Angolans, Mozambicans, and Namibians, on a temporary basis. Though
references will be made to the settlement of Europeans, emphasis in this chapter is on settlement
schemes designed for Zambians, in both pre- and postcolonial times, and refugees from war-torn
neighboring countries.
II. Historical rationale for settlement schemes
A. Land alienation and reservation schemes
Settling people in designated areas has roots in Zambia's colonial past as well as in the
postindependence era. The authority to alienate land and move people was granted at the start of the
colonial era in 1894 to the British South African (BSA) Company founded by Cecil Rhodes. This
chartered company, which ruled Zambia up to 1924, was granted powers of direct administration in
areas north of the Zambezi as well as in Zimbabwe. It secured rights over the entire territory except
Barotseland (now Western province) and had the authority to alienate any land to European settlers.
Africans occupying the land were obliged to move into designated areas (Kalapula 1984, pp. 27-29).
Alongside the development of the copper mines—its prime reason for being in the region—
BSA desired to develop agriculture as an ancillary activity, to provide food for the mine workers and
their dependents. The company soon opted to exploit commercial agriculture as a prospective source
of revenue generation. The conditions were highly conducive for promoting commercial agriculture
including: the railway that ran through millions of acres of prime agricultural land, connecting Zambia
to Zimbabwe; the ready local market for food with the potential for export to European markets; the
abundance of cheap African labor; the excellent weather and good soils; and the vast land area.
The two choices available to BSA were to rely upon the African population to acquire the
knowledge and skills to produce the required agricultural products on a commercial basis, or to
encourage European farmers who already possessed the knowledge, skills, and necessary capital for
modern agricultural practices to migrate to the area. It chose the latter, and, by 1921, 714 European
immigrants were engaged in commercial farming in the area.
The policy option chosen for African agriculture was to keep the natives at their traditional
subsistence-production level. The process of alienation and reservation of land that began with the
coming of the European settlers had an underlying policy that Europeans would have the best and most
productive land reserved for their exclusive use, and that Africans would be concentrated into
restricted areas (Native Reserves) set aside for them. Land alienation and the development of the
reserves were mainly in the areas along the company-owned railway that ran through choice
agricultural lands, the Southern part of what is today the Eastern province, and the area within the
company's estates (an area south of Lake Tanganyika). Generally, lands reserved for the Africans
were made up of relatively small blocks, had soils of poor quality, and were in remote areas that were
often infested with tsetse fly, while the areas reserved for the Europeans (crown land) were the
complete opposite (see tables 1.1 and 1.2, chapter 1, above).
Africans displaced from the plateau and from mining areas in the Copperbelt and confined to
the reserves lost the population-land balance which allowed them to move onto other available land175
in the event of overcrowding. The Africans were from a large number of ethnic groups that included
both matrilineal and patrilineal societies. In spite of differences in languages and political organizations
among groups, the production practices, technology, and division of labor were very similar, and both
men and women played a role and shared in access to land which was in abundance.
With population increase due partly to in-migration of Africans from neighboring areas, and
with mal-distribution of population in reserves from the start, the population density in the African
reserves soon exceeded the carrying capacity of the land. In some cases, local congestion was so
serious that people were no longer able to produce enough food to feed their families and had to be
assisted with food by the government.
The problem of serious congestion in Native Reserves continued up to the 1940s while
ironically, at the same time, millions of acres of uncultivated land in the crown reserves` and what
was referred to as "unsigned land" lay idle. Out of concern for the degradation of the land and forest
resources, a large part of the crown land held by the Northern Charter Land Exploration Company
in Eastern Zambia was acquired by the government in 1941. In 1942, it was declared Trust Land and
made available for native occupation. In 1942, a land commission was appointed by the government
to review the issue of agricultural land requirements of the natives. Their work resulted in the
reallocation of a further 15,000 square miles of crown land for native occupation countrywide and
160,000 Africans were transferred from overcrowded reserves to new land.
In 1924, BSA divested its control of the territory and a governor was appointed by the British
sovereign, but the concept of restricting Africans to special areas remained the same. The policy of
the new administration was that Africans were to be resettled so as to reestablish a population-land
balance on the basis of traditional land usage and the population level at the time of settlement.
Settlement of Africans was not regarded as a substitute for agricultural improvement or as a means
of promoting agricultural development, even though simple measures of agricultural control and the
beginnings of soil conservation and agricultural improvements were introduced in each of the
settlement areas as a condition of occupation.
Settlement was instead to accomplish four immediate objectives: (a) to reduce population
pressure on the land in the congested areas and to remove the danger of food shortage and, in some
cases, actual starvation; (b) to reduce the urgent agricultural problems of poor land utilization to
manageable proportions; (c) to remove the imbalance of land-starved people in the midst of plenty;
and (d) to give time for experiment and introduction of new methods of agriculture.
The first scheme that aimed at improvement in African agriculture was introduced in 1946.
This scheme was to launch progressive individuals into modern, commercial agriculture on family
holdings. A price stabilization fund was established to run the program. Its goal was to create a
nucleus of proficient farmers to inspire other Africans to improve their farming and to seek a living
from the land (Hellen 1969).
BSA had anticipated a much larger in-migration of European settlers than materialized and, as such, had set aside
massive land areas as crown reserves.176
In 1949, a revised scheme was introduced, and, with it, the price stabilization fund was
renamed the Southern Province African Farmers' Improvement Fund. The fund was to be replenished
annually by a levy on all African sales of maize in the province. This new scheme was extended to
the railway zone of the Central province and to the Eastern province in 1951 (Kalapula 1984,
pp. 37-38).
B. Agricultural settlement schemes
The first agricultural settlement scheme was started in 1950 with the selection of Chipangali,
an area under Chief Sayiri, North of Chipata in the Eastern province, to provide alternative land for
agricultural development for Ngonis displaced by white settlers in areas of Chipata South that had been
declared crown land. The first families moved into the scheme in 1951, but it was not until 1955 that
infrastructural developments promised at the beginning were brought to the area. At this time, roads
were constructed, wells were sunk, dams were built, the land was demarcated, and staff houses, a
school, a dispensary, a welfare hall, and stores were built.
Between 1951 and 1963, other people slowly moved into the Chipangali agricultural settlement
area from South Ngoni. Apart from their displeasure over being displaced by the European
immigrants, people were reluctant to move to the settlement area because of the long distance from
their original home base, and fear that their cattle would not survive in the tsetse infested area. Once
there, settlers were registered under the peasant farming scheme and given plots of 40 hectares.
By the end of 1963, 67 of the 86 farm plots were occupied, and the farm families, who had
been provided with 6 hectares of cleared land, two oxen, a plough, and a ridge and scotch cart
5 on
loan, were growing groundnuts, maize, and burley tobacco. Even though a few farm families moved
out, the number moving into the scheme was larger, and by 1973, 105 farm families were cultivating
12,000 hectares of land (Eardmans 1972).
Shortly after independence, many of the European farmers left Zambia, leaving behind their
large landholdings in the crown land areas. The agricultural structure left behind by the colonial rulers
was highly dualistic. Settled farmers dominated most marketed crops, and there was little development
of small-scale, semi-commercialized African agriculture. The newly independent Zambian state had
adopted the philosophy of humanism,' which committed it to the policy of full employment, requiring
that every able-bodied person be fully employed in some productive work. At the same time, the
government was concerned with the country's food insecurity position. On the one hand, it was a
frontline nation and in the past, the country had depended upon imports from the white-ruled south.
On the other hand, the country's urban population was growing rapidly, with obvious political
significance.
The government embraced the idea of giving land to people who wished to settle for
agricultural purposes, through settlement in organized schemes, a move that was politically
motivated,' and one that has persisted as a key factor in Zambian agriculture. The farms vacated by
A small two-wheeled cart of southern Africa with a detachable or slanting panel at the back.
6 Humanism is a pragmatic form of African socialism which stresses the need to remove "man's exploitation of man"
through state control over the "heights of the economy" but still allows private enterprise to continue in most sectors of the
economy. See Kaunda (1974), Part II.
7 For a more detailed discussion of this viewpoint, see Kean and Woods (1992).177
the European farmers were purchased and redistributed by the state and became the site of many of
the original settlement schemes. Settled commercial farmers and medium- and small-scale farmers
were supported by research, credit, and extension to facilitate expansion of production. At the same
time, because of the equity requirement of the humanist philosophy, the government expanded the
agricultural extension service and the network of crop marketing depots to cover the whole country,
introduced subsidized tractor plowing services countrywide, and increased subsidies on fertilizers and
crop collection over a number of years to achieve uniform prices throughout the country.
C. Schemes for Angolan refugees
Beginning in 1966, significant numbers of Angolan refugees poured across the Zambian border
seeking shelter from the civil war raging in their country; as of 1989, considerable numbers were still
in Zambia. Some of these refugees were settled by the GOZ in the Maheba Scheme of Solwezi
district, and some were "self-settled" in villages where they had friends and/or relatives.'
By 1988, approximately 140,000 Angolan refugees were self-settled.' The Zambian Refugees
Control Act required that such refugees live in controlled schemes, and, in the 1970s, the government
conducted sweeps of villages where it suspected refugees were living to try to move them into the
schemes. The government's interest was limited to those who had arrived since 1985, and earlier
refugees were largely ignored. These refugees were ineligible to become Zambian citizens, and so they
depended on the generosity of their hosts and were ineligible for the subsistence packages (including
such basics as blankets) the GOZ provided to refugees in settlement schemes. Their position was
precarious.
By 1988, approximately 11,600 Angolan refugees lived in the Maheba Scheme, located on a
tarmac highway with good connections to neighboring cities. They enjoyed the start-up packages
provided by the GOZ to native resettled subsistence farmers (see section IV below) and were relatively
well off and secure in access to their holdings. In many cases, they were poorer materially than the
self-settled but were well integrated into the local economy, whereas the self-settled had more material
goods but still felt like refugees. Differences between the two groups are summarized in table 6.1. The
Angolans represent a special case, but one in which government settlement schemes produced clearly
superior results to self-settlement efforts by the refugees, a result the current GOZ may want to focus
on and learn from.
D. Postindependence settlement schemes
The postindependence government objectives for settlement programs were based on both
economic and political considerations. As indicated above, the equity goal in the humanist philosophy
required an increase in African participation in market-oriented agriculture not only for one area or
one group of producers, but throughout the country—a requirement which the government was unable
to meet. Faced with the problem of rapid out-migration from the rural area and rising unemployment,
especially in the peri-urban and urban areas, the notion of settling people in productive
Hansen (1990) compared the well-being of the two groups along five dimensions: (1) economic, (2) integration into
the host society and economy, (3) confidence and security, (4) health, and (5) access to infrastructure.
9 A settlement scheme known as the "Ukwimi Scheme" was also established in Petauke district of Eastern province to
settle Mozambican refugees. The scheme accommodated 25,000 refugees.178
Table 6.1: Self-settled versus scheme-settled
Attribute Self-settled Scheme-settled
Younger than the self-settled.
Men older than women.
More literate than self-settled, especially women.
More likely to be married than those self-settled, except
for women.
Little variation from self-settled dwellings.
One-quarter of the men and a few women owned one
or the other.
Many were given blankets, though some had to sell to
buy necessities.
Men earned more than women, though the differences
were small.
About one-quarter earned from cash crop sale by both
women and men, mainly soybeans.
Men earned from livestock and fishing. Women earned
from beer.
Trees, honey, and access to good road important to
income earning.
Men more self-sufficient than self-settled; little
difference among women.
Maize most important subsistence crop; easy access to
grinding mills.
Fully integrated into society, even had Zambian
registration cards.
No one wanted to return to Angola.
Age Older than those in schemes.
Men older than women.
Literacy Less literate than those in
schemes.
Host men most literate.
Marital Less likely to be married than
status those in schemes, especially
women.
House Little variation with schemes,
types though women had poorer
dwellings.
Bikes and No one owned either; although a
radios few host men did.
Blankets Most had none; hard to buy and
used as shrouds.
Gross cash Men earned more than women,
income though the differences were
small.
About one-fifth earned from cash
crop sale.
Men earned from livestock and
fishing. Women earned from
beer.
Food and Men more self-sufficient than in
home schemes; little difference among
products women.
Cassava most important
subsistence but infested by mealy
bugs. No access to grinding
mills, hence little maize.
Integration Not well accepted by surrounding
into society villages.
About one-half wanted to return
to Angola.179
agricultural areas and assisting them to develop farm plots demarcated and assigned to them was
viewed as the most realistic remedy to unemployment. It would result in greater self-employment in
the agricultural sector and reduce unemployment at the national level.
Settlement schemes were also attractive to the government as a favored policy tool aimed at
increasing agricultural production, diversifying the economy away from copper mining, and improving
the living conditions of some part of the rural farming population. The existence of large amounts of
formerly European-owned (and in some cases, developed) land as well as other vast unutilized areas
for redistribution made this policy tool an easy one to implement.
A review of the government objectives for settlement programs from independence to 1991
and those of the present government shows they are largely the same. The objectives of the previous
government were to:
► provide people the opportunity to settle permanently in the best agricultural areas available in
the provinces, and to enable the farmers if they so wished to obtain leasehold title to their
holdings;
► allow already permanently settled family farmers in some provinces where the population
pressures have increased to have the opportunity of acquiring more suitable mixed farming
units, where increased production of crops and livestock could take place without detriment
to the land;
► overcome the problems created by the flooding of the Gwembe Valley in Southern province;
► provide opportunities in selected areas to growers to participate in the production of specific
crops such as tobacco, coffee, and sugar cane;
► survey, plan, and demarcate areas of non-State Land into commercial farming units and have
these areas declared State Lands on which people, particularly those members of the public
who are unemployed and wish to take up agriculture as a means of livelihood, can settle; and
► reinforce, indirectly, the program clearing large tracts of land to overcome tsetse fly
infestations by settlement of selected areas cleared of the fly.
The present government also views settlement as a vital program, and it has expressed a
commitment to continuation of its implementation and support. In an effort to consolidate control and
bring about better coordination, responsibility for running the programs has now been placed in the
office of the vice president. The day to day administration is under the Department of Resettlement
in the vice president's office.
Like the previous government, the present government objectives for the settlement programs
are both economic and political. They include:
► creating opportunities for those retrenched from public service and others that are
unemployed;
► bringing more than 250,000 hectares of arable idle land under cultivation throughout the
country, thus increasing household and national food security;
► creating new focal points for rural investment and rural development; and
► bringing about more efficient utilization of social services in rural areas through the creation
of viable settlements as opposed to unplanned scattered settlements.180
III. Institutions involved in the settlement program
Prior to 1993, several government institutions were involved either directly or indirectly in
the initiation, planning, and administration of settlement schemes. The ZNS ran 41 Rural
Reconstruction Centers scattered throughout the country. The MAFF
10 had a large number of
settlement schemes under its control (see annex 6.1); the Ministry of Labor and Social Services was
responsible for schemes for the handicapped; the Ministry of Local Government and Housing was
involved in identifying settlement areas; the ZCCM ran two settlement schemes for people it retired,
and the Department of Resettlement was established to run settlement schemes for other retired people.
Cooperative schemes were run by the Department of Co-operatives, and the Ministry of Education
schemes served as outlet for the two agricultural colleges established in the 1960s. Schemes to
encourage tobacco production were also run.
Settlement of people from urban areas back into their home villages or other villages of their
choice was yet another settlement scheme supported by the GOZ. While most of the resettled people
have gone to the government-planned settlement schemes, there are some who have resettled in
unplanned areas, either due to their traditional beliefs or to their desire to settle back in their villages
rather than in one of the established settlement schemes. Frequent reference is made to the fact that
those people who have indicated a desire to return to the land for agricultural purposes, but not via
settlement schemes, have also been assisted by the government. There is, however, no mention of how
many people in this category have been settled, in which areas the settlers are, which organization
actually coordinates the program, or what they are doing.
Not only were there many institutions involved in running settlement schemes, but the policies
that governed the implementation of the schemes were also quite varied. The data available do not
allow for a detail listing of all of the groups and subgroups that were responsible for the various
aspects of all of the settlement schemes, but where data do exist, the picture of a layered
administrative structure is clear. For example, at the implementation level, ten committees were
responsible for the Rural Reconstruction Centers. Table 6.2 below outlines the committees and their
functions.
With so many players, it can be assumed that there were divergent views about how the
settlement programs were to run, and what policy and implementation strategy were to guide them.
Such divergent views in planning, policy formulation, and implementation strategy could only lead
to the introduction of conflicting measures that would in turn lead to the failure to achieve any goal.
Also, with the diverse functions of resettlement, it became clear to government that no one
ministry could handle the planning for and management of settlement schemes for the entire
country.
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In 1989, a new department—the Department of Resettlement—was established in the office
of the prime minister, and full responsibility for planning of settlement programs and coordination of
10 Formerly the Ministry of Agriculture and Water Development.
11 Land demarcation is performed by the Ministry of Agriculture; water, wells, and boreholes by the Ministry of Energy;
and schools, clinics, and social services by the ministries of Education, Health, and Community and Social Services, among
others.181
Table 6.2: Committees responsible for administration of Rural Reconstruction Centers
Name of committee Function/responsibility
All matters of administration.
All matters of politics and political education.
Matters of field crops, vegetables, and orchards.
Rearing of livestock and poultry.
Defense and security of the center.
Developing such skills as carpentry, bricklaying,
blacksmithing, and development plan of centers.
Cultural Promote Zambian culture in the centers.
Social Welfare Health, education, sports, and general welfare of center.
Financial All matters of finance.
Disciplinary Matters of discipline in the center.
Source: Adapted from E.S. Kalapula, "Back to the Land: Youth-based Agricultural Land Settlement Centers for
Economic and Social Development in Southern Zambia" (1984), p. 119.
their implementation was turned over to it.
12 While in theory this new department had the
responsibility charged to it, in practice it was unable to function effectively because it lacked both
trained personnel and resources. As a result, each individual district office took over responsibility
for schemes in its area. In 1992, the Department of Resettlement again took responsibility for all
schemes, although the staffing situation had not improved substantially. Under the current government,
the Department of Resettlement is in the office of the vice president, and the responsibility for
planning of all settlement programs and coordination of their implementation rests with it. The
department now has a slight improvement in its staffing. However, with the huge responsibility with
which it is charged, there is still much need for expansion of resources.
IV. Settler selection procedures and assistance provided
The procedure for selection of settlers involves six steps, which can take several months to
complete. People wishing to resettle in land settlement scheme areas are first required to make this
known to the government by registering their names at the council office of residence. They then must
complete an application form (Form DR 1), which is filled out in triplicate, giving such details as the
size of family, profession and skill, and suggested destination/area of settlement.
'2 Data on the establishment of certain schemes were already lacking when files were transferred to this department in







Step two involves the submission of the completed form by the council to the district executive
secretary who retains a copy at the council and distributes one copy each to the district where the
applicant intends to settle and the Department of Resettlement in the office of the prime minister.
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The third step involves a number of substeps: the town of destination makes a request to the
town of origin for information about the applicant; the town of destination is required to make an
assessment of the potential of its area to accommodate people from the town of origin; and the
settlement area and the estimated cost involved must be identified.
Once these conditions are met, the fourth step involves getting a response on the outcome of
the application from the council office in the area of destination to the council where the application
originated, and finally to the applicant. If approved for settlement, the applicant is advised to prepare
for the move and to inform the district office of expected date of travel.
The fifth step involves the provision of transportation to facilitate the move to the settlement
area. Transportation to the settlement area is one item in the incentive package that the government
gives to all settlers. Arrangement for transportation for the move from the town of origin is the
responsibility of the dispatching council up to the headquarters of the recipient district, which then
takes the responsibility for transporting the new settler to the settlement area where he/she is
immediately allocated a plot.
Once the settler is in his/her new home area, the rest of the incentive package is made
available. The incentives given to settlers have changed over the years and have varied depending on
the category of settlement. Prior to 1985, people were being settled either as medium- or small-scale
commercial farmers or as subsistence farmers who wanted to relocate and to take advantage of the
incentives being offered by the government.
The incentive package for the medium- or small-scale commercial farmers included: soil
survey and demarcation of farm plots; access roads to each farm on the scheme; access to communal
water supplies and cattle-dipping facilities; access to agricultural extension, credit, supply, and
marketing services; sufficient cleared land for the first year of the farming system proposed;
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subsidies for fencing and water supply at the existing levels; tractor services for plowing; and
transportation to the settlement area.
People going into settlement schemes to produce on a subsistence basis were provided with
transportation for the family to the settlement area. In addition, they were provided with soil survey
and demarcation of farm plots; access roads to each farm on the scheme; access to communal water
supplies; access to agricultural extension advice; stumping and windrowing of one hectare (or
stumping of two hectares), free of charge; seed, fertilizer, and pesticides for two hectares, free of
charge for the first year; the normal subsidies available for fencing and water supply; and tractor
service for plowing."
13 This department is now in the office of the vice president.
14 The land clearing cost was to be recovered from the farmer.
15 Granting 14-year leases was only considered after observing and assessing the farmer for at least two years. The major
consideration was that the farmer should show progress in terms of clearing land above the initial area cleared by the
government.183
In 1985, the government began a project to review the level of success and bottlenecks of the
settlement programs and, in collaboration with provincial authorities, to identify new areas for
settlement. With growing urbanization and unemployment, the government was also seeking ways to
make the program more attractive so as to encourage more people to return to the land. At the same
time, the government sought ways to make the settlement program more sustainable.
In the process, attention was called to the need to change the target group to include programs
for youth, the unemployed, and retirees, and to review the cost structure for running the schemes. The
task force concluded that the government approach for developing the settlement led to high
investment costs that could not be sustained and, therefore, needed to be changed. Despite this
definitive position statement, the committee's report did not indicate cost for the programs with a
comparison to other development costs. In fact, there is very little recorded information about the
actual cost for establishing the various schemes, and, where some information does exist, it is
incomplete. For example, the MAFF annual report for 1987 shows that as at the middle of 1986, the









Alone, these figures tell very little. What would have been useful is a comparison of land
clearing cost in settlement areas and other areas, by method of clearing and type of vegetation, and
a breakdown of these costs over time. The same information would have been useful for other
investment costs.
The committee proposed a low-investment approach that would require that the government
provide an incentive package that included only such basic infrastructure as roads, demarcation of plot
boundaries, a few communal wells or boreholes, and a dam, leaving the rest of the farm development
cost to be borne by the settler.
As part of the exercise, each province was requested to identify possible areas of new land
as well as land areas of existing schemes that were underutilized for redistribution to settlers. In the
process, vast areas of land including former state farms and the 1.5 million hectare Tazara Corridor
were identified for the new schemes.
In 1989, the prime minister informed the national assembly of the changes that the government
had proposed to the implementation of the settlement program. In addition to the existing settlement
areas, it had been decided that the rural reconstruction centers and areas under the councils be fully
utilized for the purpose of resettling people. A requirement, however, was that settlers who were
already in place would be given title deeds prior to admitting newcomers. Table 6.3 shows areas that
were identified for settlement.184







ha) Centers (ha) (ha)
Central 44,941 9,276 22,262
Copperbelt 60,103 2,474 137 42,295
Eastern 71,172 7,277 13
Luapula 7,100 1,200 60 20,000
Lusaka 13,215 1,210 8 -
Northern 69,595 9,010 8 7,500
North-Western 10,650 1,920 81 12,000
Southern 98,275 10,657 11 29,200
Western 840 6,146
Total 375,840 49,150 318 133,257
` Not all figures in this table sum correctly; these errors are in the original documents.
Source: Land Settlement Information Booklet (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1987).
Separate incentive packages were approved for the unemployed and retirees who wanted to
resettle.
16 The package for the unemployed includes:
► transportation for all approved settlers up to a maximum of eight persons (inclusive of father
and mother) per family, from the point of residence to the settlement area;
► free food for a period of one year through the provision of maize meal coupons;
► a grant in kind of K2,000 to each settler (upon certification that they have a minimum cleared
land area of 1 hectare) to cover costs of clearing the land, seeds, and fertilizer;"
► free lease preparation costs and survey fees; and
► a title deed to the plot for those within settlement schemes. (For those going into villages, the
settler had the responsibility to negotiate with the headman and the chief for the title deeds.)
The retirees with earnings of less than K12,000 in terminal benefits are entitled to:
► all of the incentives applicable to the unemployed;
► access to social amenities such as schools and clinics with an input of self-help;
16 Sources for information included: First Ministerial Statement to the National Assembly by The Right Hon. Prime
Minister, General M.N. Masheke, "On the Subject of Resettling the Unemployed and Ret
irees on the Land" (November
1989); and the Department of Resettlement publication, "Land Resettlement Programme of the Retired and Unemployed:
What to Do to Resettle" (December 1989).
17 The money for inputs was paid directly to the supplier.185
► access to agricultural extension services;
► soil survey and demarcation of farm plots; and
► access to roads to each farm, communal water supplies, and cattle-dipping facilities.
Under the new program, the councils were assigned as implementing agents of the settlement
program. The specific roles assigned to the councils included:
► demarcation of the settlement plots;
► provision of wells or boreholes and dipping facilities;
► provision of access roads and all necessary infrastructure; and
► coordination of the institutions involved in settlement including the Ministries of Agriculture,
Water, Lands and Natural Resources, General Education, Youth and Sports and Works and
Supply.
V. Structure and growth of settlement schemes
Information on settlement schemes is so fragmented and out of date that it is difficult to
discern even such basic facts as: which schemes actually settled people, the number of such schemes,
the number of settlers, which schemes have been abandoned, when and why, which schemes were
reorganized and had the name changed, and which agency is currently responsible for running the
schemes. As best as can be interpreted from the available material, the Zambian government continued
to support the settlement schemes that had been started by the colonial government and commenced
soon after independence to organize their own. The first schemes were organized along cooperative
farming lines. The January 1965-June 1966 Transitional Development Plan and the First National
Development Plan 1966-1970 speak of these.
From the late 1960s to mid-1980, a number of other alternative schemes were attempted
including: peasant farmers schemes, master farmer schemes, family farm schemes, area development
projects, the intensive development zones program (later changed to the Integrated Rural Development
Program), consumer cooperatives, multipurpose cooperatives, tenancy schemes, settlement schemes,
resettlement schemes, and crop season credit and minimum package schemes.
The dearth of information about these programs inhibits much elaboration. It might be useful
at some future date to compile these if records can be found to do so. The summary below is based
on information collected during a rather extensive data search.
(a) Rural Reconstruction Centers.'
s In 1975, the government commenced the establishment of
these centers as settlement schemes with the objective of fitting school-leavers and urban
unemployed youth for productive life in the rural sector. Two years later, the government
indicated that the program was open to all—boys and girls, men and women—who were not
gainfully employed or who were underemployed.
'i The precursors to the Rural Reconstruction Centers in Zambia are in the Zambia Youth Service and the Zambia
National Services. All three programs emphasized training of youth in trades, agriculture, and military skills.
According to officials in the Department of Resettlement, government at the time requested land from the councils
which in turn sought land from the chiefs. A number of chiefs are now contesting these claims and demanding that the land
be returned on grounds that the former chiefs performed their duties improperly in giving the land away.186
Various scholars perceived the objective of the program differently and indicated this in their
writings. For example, Tiberondwa (1976, p. 4) wrote that the Rural Reconstruction Centers
were areas where school-leavers were taken and taught to participate in productive manual
work instead of being allowed to loiter in towns. Sakala (1975) indicated that the centers were
to serve as nuclei of agricultural and agroindustry development for the government. According
to Shepande (in Kalapula 1984), the primary aim and objective of the program was to
implement the party and the government policy of rural development.
The planned annual enrollment in the program was 42,000, and every district was to have five
centers, with an intake of 800 per center. As noted by the ILO/JASPA Mission (1975), 19 if
such a plan had been implemented, 250 centers would have been established in the country
as a whole, and this would have involved 216,000 farming families or 1,080,000 to 1,296,000
people, which was equal to one-third of the rural population of Zambia in 1974. The initial
estimated cost was K17.5 million a year (Sakala 1975). By 1987, 51 schemes had been
started, comprising a total land area of 49,170 hectares. Out of this, 8,208 hectares had been
cleared and 1,434 youths settled. Further details are presented in table 6.4 below.
The selection criteria were simple: one had only to be a Zambian youth who had dropped out
of school and was unemployed. There was no shortage of such people. In 1987, government
figures showed that there were an estimated 1,316,637 unemployed out of a total labor force
of 1,966,285. Zambia has a very young population, and the school dropout rate is high. The
would be settlers were required to join the Zambian National Service and to become members
of the individual center cooperative.
(b) State Farms. Eighteen farms, comprising a total demarcated land area of 380 thousand
hectares. By 1987, only three farms (Mswebe in Lusaka West and Mwembeshi and Mtirizi
in Petauke district) were in production. The other fifteen farms comprising 300,000 hectares
had by this date been identified as State Land to be subdivided and allocated as small holdings.
(c) Southern Province Land Commission Farms. These were smallholdings of varying sizes, that
covered an estimated 29,642 ha. By 1987, 25,562 hectares had been surveyed, and a decision
had been reached by the government to subdivide the area and allocate the farms to people
that wanted to settle. Table 6.5 below gives details on the locations, number of farms, and
size of each.
(d) Tazara Corridor projects. A program was started in 1986 to develop commercial farms in an
area of about 1.5 million hectares along or near the Tazara railway. Development of the
project was hampered by inadequate funding, and as a result, of the 649,000 hectares that had
been demarcated in four areas, only 40,000 hectares comprising 486 farms had been
developed by 1990. These farms were incorporated into the Land Resettlement Program.
Details of the project are presented in table 6.6 below.
19 Reported in Kalapula 1984. p. 112.187
Table 6.4: Land available under Rural Reconstruction Centers
Land (hectares) Settlers (number) Cost of
clearing
Province Available Cleared Uncleared Current Shortfall the land
(K)
Central
Serenje 3,818 216 3,602 41 13 864,480
Kabwe 337 327 100 65 24,000
Mumbwa 500 200 300 34 16 72,000
Mkushi 4,621 256 4,365 19 45 1,047,000
Subtotal 9,276 909 8,367 159 74 2,007,480
Copperbelt
Kitwe 150 130 20 26 7 8,000
Mufulira 200 120 80 20 10 32,000
Chingola 750 700 50 35 140 20,000
Luanshya 208 165 43 27 14 17,200
Ndola 198 98 100 18 7 4,000
Chililabombwe 770 90 680 18 5 272,000
Kalulushi 198 198 18 30
Subtotal 2,474 1,501 973 162 213 353,200
Eastern
Chipata 1,058 150 908 31 7 363,200
Petauke 1,000 34 968 30 - 387,200
Katete 1,000 215 785 35 16 314,000
Chadiza 1,000 330 670 34 49 268,000
Chama 1,919 41 1,878 11 751,200
Lundazi 1,300 185 1,115 36 13 446,000
Subtotal 7,277 955 6,324 177 85 2,529,600
Luapula
Samfya 185 150 35 25 13 14,000
Nchelenge 219 27 192 20 - 76,800
Mansa 386 150 238 48 94,400
Kawambwa 200 158 42 22 18 16,500
Mwense 210 150 60 20 18 24,000
Subtotal 1,200 635 567 135 49 225,700
Lusaka
Rufunsa 210 70 140 50 - 33,600
Luangwa 1,000 88 912 12 13 218,880
Subtotal 1,210 158 1,052 62 13 252,480188
Land (hectares) Settlers (number) Cost of
clearing
Province Available Cleared Uncleared Current Shortfall the land
(K)
Northern
Mpika 4,000 209 3,791 57 1,516,400
Isoka 1,165 161 1,004 24 16 401,600
Chinsali 1,500 159 1,341 22 16 536,400
Mporokoso 250 150 100 35 3 40,000
Kaputa 725 40 685 11 274,000
Mbala 150 150 38
Kasama 1,000 212 788 55 315,200
Luwingu 220 135 85 45 - 34,000
Subtotal 9,010 1,216 7,794 287 35 3,117,600
North-Western
210 100 110 27 - 44,000 Solwezi
Mwinilunga 174 174 18 26 -
Kabompo 500 40 460 22 184,000
Zambezi 500 50 450 28 180,000
Chizera 300 50 250 12 1 100,000
Kasempa 236 156 80 22 17 32,000
Subtotal 1,920 570 1,350 129 44 540,000
Southern
1,800 208 1,592 65 382,080 Livingstone
Choma 500 260 240 38 27 57,600
Kalomo 5,333 190 5,143 25 23 1,234,320
Monze 2,181 160 2,021 28 12 485,040
Mazabuka 628 107 521 23 4 125,040
Namwala 150 47 103 7 5 24,720
Sinazongwe 65 57 8 26 1,920
Subtotal 10,657 1,029 9,628 212 71 2,310,720
Western
Kaoma 360 100 260 15 10 62,400
Mongu 500 500 - 25 100 -
Senanga 4,704 55 4,649 10 4 1,115,760
Sesheke 44 44 - 34 - -
Kalabo 500 500 10 109 -
Lukulu 38 38 17 -
Subtotal 6,146 1,237 4,909 111 223 1,178,160
Grand total 49,150 8,210 40,964 1,434 807 12,514,940189
Table 6.5: Farms recommended for settlement in Southern province°























a The figures in this table do not sum correctly; this error is in the original document.
Source: Land Settlement Information Booklet (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1987).








1. Katikulula 90,000 6,000 60
2. Munte 215,000 10,000 101
3. Manshya 147,000 16,000 182
4. Kanchibiya 197,000 8,000 143
Totals 649,000 40,000 486
Source: National Commission for Development Planning, Economic Report, 1990.190
Table 6.7: Farm Block Development in Zambia










Copperbelt Kantolo-Luankuni 4,050 NA` 21
Luansobe 12,000 NA 36
Eastern Mwasemphangwe 9,340 NA NA
Muchimadzi 4,000 4,000 66
Luapula Chitondo
Mansa NA NA 22
Lusaka Shikabeta 2,900 2,600 69
Northern Longwe 4,428 4,428 91
b
Mwita 9,500 -
North-Western Mikilingi 18,526 7,474 12
Southern NA but in most areas Varied Varied 644
Western
identified
Kalumwange 21,000 6,000 69
Lombe Lombe
a. NA = not available.
b. This block is now part of the resettlement program.
Source: National Commission for Development Planning, Economic Report, 1990.
(e) Farm Block Development Program. This program was started in the mid-1980s to make
additional land available for commercial agriculture. Each province identified the location and
hectareage of land for inclusion in the program, and, with assistance from the government
through the resettlement program, farmers were settled. By the end of 1990, farm blocks had
been developed in each of the provinces except the Central province. Table 6.7, above, gives
details of the development program up to 1990.
Settlement schemes. A program launched in 1986 called for the development of new areas in
each district for settling people that wanted to develop agricultural plots smaller than those
settlements provided for commercial farmers. By 1990, ten schemes had been developed, with
at least one in each of the nine provinces. A list of the schemes and their location is presented
in table 6.8.
Settlement schemes for the handicapped. Fourteen settlement farms with a total of 318




Table 6.8: Resettlement schemes, 1986-1990
Province Name of scheme District
Number of plots
demarcated
Central Katikulula State Farm Serenje 442
Copperbelt Lukanga North Ndola Rural 563












Northern Mpika State Mpika 576
North-Western Solwezi State Farm Solwezi 323
Southern Masasabe State Farm Namwala 337
Western Kalumwange Kaoma 310
a. Figure covers area demarcated in both districts in the province.
Source: National Commission for Development Planning, Economic Report, 1990.
VI. Present administration of settlement programs
A department of resettlement in the office of the prime minister was formed in 1989 to
facilitate the government's program of settling the unemployed and the retired that resided in towns
at the time. As the responsibility for settlement programs have now been assigned to the office of the
vice president, the department is also now under the vice president's office. The department was given
statutory powers on settlement in "The Statutory Functions, Portfolios and Composition of
Government" (Gazette Notice no. 46 of 1992). As yet, however, it has been assigned a number of
responsibilities including:
► devise a suitable land settlement policy and procedural guidelines;
► identify, appraise, and select suitable sites in conjunction with district authorities;
► initiate the survey and planning of the sites;
► coordinate all resettlement activities;
► mobilize resources; and
► supervise implementation and monitor projects in the settlement areas.
According to officials in the Department of Resettlement, 50 percent of land in current
schemes is demarcated in plots less than 10 hectares, which are allocated to smallholders who are
unable to provide for themselves. Four families are normally settled to one well or borehole. Another
35 percent of the land is allocated to demarcations 10-20 hectares in size. The remaining 15 percent192
is allocated in demarcations 20-50 hectares to those people with sufficient capital to invest in
boreholes themselves; applicants in such cases must present confirmation of having 1 million kwacha
to demonstrate the means to develop the land. Schemes are provided with schools and other facilities
to attract people from urban areas (according to one official, life must be made better than in a typical
village or people have no incentive to come or stay). Schemes have had a less than remarkable
experience with acquiring 14-year titles to land. Applications are often submitted only to become lost
in the system; some files are lost permanently. Inheritances, subdivisions, and transfers have become
important issues in many schemes—issues that the department feels inadequate in addressing given the
current land policy.
VII. Access by women and minority groups
The achievement of a satisfactory level of self-sufficiency in the production of staple foods has
been a long-term goal of the Zambian government. In its Fourth National Development Plan,
1987-91, the basic strategy outlined for achieving this goal was that preferential treatment would be
given to small-scale farmers, in line with their greater number, their development potential, and their
relatively efficient use of scarce foreign exchange resources.
The majority of small-scale farmers are women, and, in the same Development Plan, there
was evidence of the increasing recognition of their development role by the government. The plan
contained a full chapter on women in development, including agriculture. Empirical research during
the 1970s to 1980s also gives recognition to the important role that women in Zambia play in
agriculture.'
Despite this broad recognition, there is little evidence to suggest that women enjoyed equal
rights to development assistance in the agricultural sector. To the contrary, there is some evidence
suggesting that they did not.
As mentioned earlier, the first postindependence government chose the cooperative movement
as a means of promoting rural development. A program to encourage the formation of cooperative
societies began in 1965 with emphasis on the communal cooperatives. A number of marketing
cooperatives based on individual farms were, however, also organized.
Rules governing the formation of cooperative societies indicated that any group of ten people
could register as a cooperative to carry out a wide range of activities. For agricultural cooperatives
where members ran the farm together, the government provided an incentive package that included
seasonal and medium-term loans and subsidies for land clearing and research and extension advice on
improved production techniques. No food crops could be grown on the farm and incentives for cash
crop production were given only to the head of household, the man, and only he was allowed to be
a member. Women were therefore denied the opportunity to benefit from the formation of agricultural
cooperatives and to get the incentive package for supporting their agricultural ventures. Instead, they
and their children were expected to grow food crops unassisted, outside of the schemes. 21
20 See Allan (1984); Blake (1984); Chenoweth (1984); Due and Mudenda (1984); and Gaobepe and Mwenda (1980).
21 Chilivumbo (1982); Keller (1984); Mutamba (1982).193
While specific schemes are not identified, Ngenda (1993) mentions that marital status was used
in some schemes as a criteria for participation. In those cases, married women could not be considered
as individuals to own farms or plots. Single women without children were also not eligible for these
schemes unless they were backed by a male figure or had a position in the ruling political party
structure at the local level. The available data are not gender specific except in two cases shown in
tables 6.9 and 6.10.
Table 6.9: Number of settlers in Rural Reconstruction Centers,
December 1979
Province Male Female Total settlers (#)
Central 395 1 396
Copperbelt 589 5 594
Eastern 303 1 304
Luapula 285 1 286
Lusaka 189 - 189
Northern 494 1 495
North-Western 295 5 300
Southern 454 6 460
Western 348 4 352
National totals 3,352 24 3,376
Source: Chambo Kawonga, Technical Paper No. 10, Rural Reconstruction Programme
ILO/JASPA (1981), p. 148.
Table 6.10: Farm owners by sex in various settlement schemes
Settlement scheme Male Female Joint Total
Chitina 45 4 49
Big Concession 68 2 70
Lubombo 63 2 65
Lukulu North 74 - 74
Lusaka 101 9 5 115
Milombwe 117 1 - 118
Mumba 53 5 - 58
Mungwi 144 6 150
Ngwezi 128 2 130
Totals 793 31 5 829
Source: C.N. Himoonga, M. Munachonga, and A. Chanda, "Women's Access to Agricultural
Land in Zambia" (1988).194
VIII. Desertion of settlement schemes
The information of rate of desertion of settlement schemes is scanty though several references
are made to the fact that some people originally settled left the schemes. Also, there is little
information about why people left the schemes, and what encouraged those that remained to do so.
The only time series data on desertion identified (Mbulo 1983) refer to seven rural reconstruction
centers in the Southern province. According to this study, in 1975, the combined settler population
was 1,985. By 1982, the number of people still settled in the seven schemes was only 278. See table
6.11.
Table 6.11: Desertion rate from resettlement centers
Settlement scheme Location Number of people, 1975 Number of people, 1982
Sibanyati Choma 315 41
Ngwezi Kalomo 275 49
Kabuyu Livingstone 500 58
Nega-Nega Mazabuka 300 29
Namilongwe Monze 300 60
Ngabo Namwala 115 9
Sinazongwe Sinazongwe 180 32
Totals 1,985 278
Source: M.P. Mbulo, "Some Issues in the Development of Settlement Schemes in the Southern Province"
(1983).
IX. Type of production on schemes
Nowhere in the data available to the researchers is there detailed information on types of
agricultural activities, output, exact amounts of input or incomes of the settlers. From the vague
information gathered, maize was the main crop grown. Other crops included sorghum, tobacco,
sugarcane, and vegetables. Livestock included cattle and poultry. This should be an area of research
during future study of settlement programs in Zambia. The information would give better insight into
issues of desertion, level of enrollment, and why some schemes were abandoned by the government
or nongovernmental funding agencies. The best source of such information is a report on the
agricultural settlement schemes compiled by Mpenda, Jaboni, Mtonga (1983), which, except for its
size (109 pages), would have been attached to this report as an annex. The report, however, is readily
available through the University of Zambia Library and should be consulted by researchers carrying
out future study.
X. Settlement schemes and conservation issues
Very little is recorded on land resource conservation issues as they relate to settlement schemes
in Zambia. What the available information seems to suggest is that those areas for which detailed farm195
planning was done prior to settling, and where the plans have been followed, there are no serious soil
or water conservation problems. Such is the case with most of the original farms on State Land but
not on traditional land. In these areas, soil erosion is said to be evident in most areas, especially in
pastoral rural communities. While some livestock owners have shown regard for animal stocking rates
and carrying capacities of their holdings and have adopted appropriate farming practices, others have
disregarded all such factors, resulting in general land degradation.
The Land Use Planning Section of MAFF indicates that, at present, only about 6 percent of
Zambia's arable land is adequately planned for agricultural use. It warns that present land development
remains a big threat to overall resource conservation and management, and suggests that appropriate
planning and conservation need to focus high on the agenda from now on.' (See table 6.12 for
details on existing planned agricultural areas in Zambia.)
Table 6.12: Existing planned agricultural areas in Zambia
RCP° CCP° SS" FBD*
Province Area Area Area Area
No. (
km2) No. (km') No. (km
2) No. (
km)
Central 13 3,525 9 6,842 8 333 3 3,840
Copperbelt 3 1,143 3 1,108 14 1,014 5 801
Eastern 0 0 5 1,184 23 700 2 199
Luapula 0 0 0 0 3 24 5 844
Lusaka 12 3,080 0 0 3 131 1 35
Northern 0 0 0 0 7 296 4 3,677
North-Western 0 0 0 0 4 115 2 365
Southern 29 7,730 20 4,591 25 844 - 620
Western 0 0 0 0 2 30 2 96
All Zambia 57 15,478 37 13,725 89 3,487 24 10,477
a. RCP = Rural Reconstruction Program; CCP = cooperative program; SS = Southern province small block
program; FBD = farm block development.
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries, Land Use Planning Section, "Statement of Policy and Plan
of Action: Final Report" (February 1993).
XI. Concluding remarks
Based on the information available to the authors, attempts have been made to help researchers
identify what is known of resettlement schemes in the Zambian literature. Highlights of successes and
problems encountered in the various settlement programs have been given. No attempt, however, has
been made to draw conclusions on the future of settlement schemes or on ways to improve their
' Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries, Land Use Planning Section: Statement of Policy and Plan of Action 1993.196
efficacy. This was never an intent of the chapter, and to try to do so with the dearth of information
available would be unwarranted. What can be concluded is that a huge amount of resources has gone
into these endeavors, and settlement programs are still held in favor by many policymakers in Zambia
today as a way of providing land for farming and other social services to the disadvantaged
population, urban people, and retiring or terminated civil servants. Given the wide number and extent
of schemes nationwide, research of the type recommended in this chapter is advised to help improve
the sector's performance and better integrate it into the country's national development strategy.








(ha) (#) (#) (#)
Western Kaoma Dairy 20 8 8
province Kaoma Tobacco 500 433 433
Mushwala 320 19 19
Subtotal 840 460 460
Luapula Kamani 5,000 22 22
province Mulumbi-Mulukuma 1,500 40 40
Munganushi 600 22 22
Subtotal 7,100 84 84
Copperbelt Ipafu Irrigation 50 42 42
province Kafubu Dam-West and South 5,183 40 40
Luongo State Land 5,528 29 29
Miengwe 4,000 125 125
Mikata Tobacco 24 30 30
Misundu Dairy 218 6 6
Mutende Multi-Purpose Co-operative 100 47 47
Ngosa Muchinshi Rank 19,000 84 84
West Luanshya Development Area 26,000 20 20
Subtotal 60,103 423 423
Lusaka Chiawa Banana Scheme 68
province Chipapa Irrigation Scheme 124 26 26
Luimba 10,124 43 43
Mungu 2,899 26 26









ha) (#) (#) (#)
Southern Chikola 8,704 51 50 1
province Kayuni 6,100 38 38
Kazungula 3,654 38 38
Nkungwa (Kalomo) 4,500 45 45
Luyala 3,848 9 9
Lusitu 54
Mbabala 1,496 13 13
Magoye (A and B) 2,400 36 36
Magoye (C and D) 2,289 24 24 -
Magoye (E) 805 13 13
Mbaya (Mazabuka) 3,815 46 46
Muchila (Namwala) 1,050 22 22
Musuma (Mazabuka) 1,935 33 33
Mwanachingwala 6,141 173 173
Naluama 7,750 164 164
Nega A 1,175 13 13
Nega B 750 41 41
Nega Nega C 764 8 8 -
Ngwezi 8,800 130 130
Ngwezi C 1,305 18 - -
Siachiteme 12,164 58 -
Sibanyati 1,874 16 - -
Silwilii 8,797 48 48
Tara I 1,827 7 7
Tara II 1,493 12 12
Upper Kaleya 4,785 46 46 -
Subtotal 98,275 1,102 1,009 1
Central Chitina 10,627 49 49 -
province Kalola (Kabwe Rural) 600 97 97
Kapyanga (Mumbwa) 1,500 72 60 12
Keembe (Kabwe Rural) 2,000 40 37 3
Malo (Serenje) 1,500 94 89 5
Milombwe (Mkushi) 4,500 30 30
Mpima (Dairy)(Kabwe Urban) 1,500 31 31
Mumbwa 600 57 57
Munyama (Kabwe Urban) 10,000 36 36 -
Mkushi West 12,114 17 17








(ha) (#) (+#) (#)
Eastern Chipangali 22,565 154 154
province Chipangali Tobacco 300 25 25
Chifunda 200 27 27
Chinjara 5,332 60 60
Jimoli 665 12 12
Kapilingizya 400 76 76
Kasinga 2,500 51 6 45
Katangalika 300 196 196
Katete State Land (New Block) 2,702 21 21
Mphangwe 1,565 23 23
Chiringodi 2,137 36 36
Kalimeta 3,080 21 21
Kagwelema 1,904 20 20
Lumezi Tobacco 3 13 13
Lunthwele 582 10 10
Mchimadzi 10,215 163 10 153
Nganjo 200 52 52
North Nyampande (old) 4,100 229 229
Nyamphande Ext. Area 1961 75 75
Rukuzye 9,500 58 58
Simulemba 300 39 39
Sinda Misale (Tobacco) 127 30 30
Sinda Virginia -
Zemba Tobacco 293 660 660
Tobacco School 241 60 60
Subtotal 71,172 2,111 1,913 198
North- Jiwondu 61 36 36
Western Kawama 8,000 50 50
province Nyangombe 79 48 36 12
Kabukafu SE Kasempa Dev. Area
Mpungu South-East Kasempa 1,410 84 84
Kasempa Dev. Area 1,100 24 24
Lungevungu 15 15
Mashivi Zambezi Settlement Scheme 38 30 8
Towe Zambezi Settlement Scheme 8 8
Subtotal 10,650 303 283 20
Northern Chamfubu Settlement 1,800 76 71 5
province Chifwile 3,100 36 36
Chinsali 50,000 30 21 9
Kapatu 2,025 33 8 25
Lubu 1,000 30 30
Lukulu North Irrigation 10,000 74 74
Mukonge 1,640 135 105 30
Subtotal 69,565 414 345 69
Grand total 308Chapter 7:
Land Use Patterns and Growth in Commercial Input Use,
Productivity, and Profitability by Farm Size Category
by
Jeffrey A. Cochrane and Michael J. Roth'
I. Introduction
This chapter examines trends in cultivated area and production in order to understand the
changing patterns of Zambian land use and management. Reported data suggest that in the commercial
farms sector there has been over the past two decades a general diversification of production away
from maize and into primarily wheat and soybeans. In the late 1980s, harvested land area under maize
has been replaced by these other crops, with the overall harvested area remaining roughly constant.
In the noncommercial farms sector, data suggest that production in much of the country has fluctuated
greatly with no clearly discernible trend. The principal exception is the far northeastern region of the
country where maize production has increased dramatically, particularly from 1976 to 1986. These
and other results are discussed below in detail after a preliminary note concerning data sources and
their reliability.
II. Data sources
The next chapter provides a detailed discussion of data issues. This section focuses on
particular problems affecting the analysis of changes in land use patterns. Table 7.1 summarizes
various selected Zambian data sources by year as used in the preparation of this chapter.
For verification and comparison purposes, a number of key national statistics were drawn from
the Economic Research Service of the United States Department of Agriculture and from the World
Bank. These other sources generally provide national statistics, sometimes broken down by crop, but
are based upon primary CSO and other Zambian government data. This report focuses upon results
gleaned directly from the primary Zambian sources.
The CSO of the Zambian Government conducted several crop forecasting exercises covering
all farms. These provide the most recent data available for our analysis. Forecasts are available for
1991 and 1992,
2 and the publication for the 1991 crop forecast includes actual production data for
the 1990 season, which is not available from any other known source. The 1992 forecast publication
breaks down farms into two size categories, the first being a small/medium category and the second
covering large farms, though the report does not provide definitions of these categories.
Jeffrey A. Cochrane is postdoctoral research fellow with the Land Tenure Center and Department of Agricultural
Economics, University of Wisconsin-Madison, and Michael J. Roth is associate research scientist with the Land Tenure
Center and Department of Agricultural Economics, University of Wisconsin-Madison.
2 Years refer to the beginning of a cropping season.200
Table 7.1: Zambia data sources
Commercial Noncommercial All
Year farms farms farms Price Forecasts











1971 x x x
1972 x x x
1973 x x x
1974 x x x
1975 x x x x
1976 x x x x
1977 x x x
1978 x x x
1979 x x x
1980 x x x
1981 x x x
1982 x x x x
1983 x x x x
1984 x x x x
1985 x x x x
1986 x x x
1987 x x x
1988 x x x
1989 x x x
1990 x x x
1991 x
1992 x
a. Years are the beginning of the crop season (e.g., 1990 = 1990/91 crop season).
b. ERS: United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service.201
Principal time series data are drawn from publications of the CSO annual "Agricultural and
Pastoral Production" reports, one each for commercial and noncommercial farms. A quite complete
commercial farms series is available from 1975 to 1989. The noncommercial farms series begins in
1971, was interrupted from 1977 to 1981, and resumes for 1982 through 1985. Commercial farms
data are generally divided by farm area size categories (0—199 hectares, 200-1,999 hectares, 2,000+
hectares). Data on noncommercial farms are not broken down by size.
Noncommercial farmers are defined in these "Agricultural and Pastoral Production" reports
simply to be those farmers who are not commercial farmers. In order to determine who qualifies as
a noncommercial farmer, the 1973 noncommercial farms report defines commercial farmers as:
(a) a farmer who sold maize worth K600 or more at the line of rail prices;
(b) a farmer who grew virginia [sic] or burley tobacco in his own name and was
registered with the Tobacco Board of Zambia;
(c) a farmer who sold dairy products to, and was registered with, the Dairy Produce
Board;
(d) a farmer who had title to land.
This definition has been amended over time. By the time of the 1982 commercial farms report, the
commercial farms classification had been amended to include farms that sold to marketing boards any
crops exceeding the value of 150 90kg bags of maize, farms that bred or sold livestock to licensed
firms or boards, and state farms.
This classification and separate enumeration of commercial and noncommercial farms poses
problems for analysis. For example, as economic conditions change from year to year, a farmer may
choose to produce and market tobacco, thereby leaving the noncommercial classification and entering
the commercial farms classification. There is also some question as to the reliability of the population
lists for each classification, particularly since the mid-1980s when the state reduced its role in the
marketplace and as a consequence reduced its ability to monitor market activity. For these reasons,
it is difficult to determine whether increases in production of commercial crops is due to expansion
of output by existing commercial crops producers, to marketed output by farmers previously classified
as noncommercial, or to new market entrants. Better analysis would be possible if there were a more
reliable and stable long-term program of farm data collection.
Data on commercial farms production in Zambia are available from 1975 to 1989, and are
broken down by province and farm area size classification. These data are based on responses to an
annual mailed census sent on average to about 3,000 farming households nationwide. (Response rates
were generally low; e.g., 34 percent in 1978.)
The survey is intended to cover all the commercial farmers in the country and
questionnaires are mailed on the basis of postal addresses. The response has however
been quite poor. Many of the returned questionnaires were only partially completed
requiring many imputations for individual reports to be summarized on a
representative basis (CSO 1989a, p. iii).
A consultant's report to USAID (Scott 1990) notes, "The [commercial farms] list used is
known to be incomplete and the response rate is below 20 percent, so that the purpose of this annual
operation is not clear."202
Data on noncommercial farms are from an enumerated sample survey conducted annually from
1971 to 1976 and also from 1982 to 1986, with no data collected by the CSO in the period from 1978
to 1981. While data were apparently collected and published for the 1977 season (CSO 1989b), these
data are not available. Available data are broken down by province but not by farm area size. Using
a two-stage design, a stratified random sample of geographic areas was first selected, with strata
corresponding to ecological zone. In the second stage, two random samples were selected, one of
households reporting livestock holdings, the other of households not reporting livestock. These details
are generally explained in the introductions to the reports. While in most years farmers are asked to
provide information on the agricultural period just completed, it should be noted that for a few
provinces in 1982, data are based on recalled responses collected as part of the 1983 survey.
Additional limited data were collected on farm expenditures and revenues and are briefly
inspected here. Significant difficulties with the consistency of categories in the collection of these data
over time make it quite difficult to analyze relationships between prices, input uses, and output. A
cursory inspection of these data for commercial farms is provided below.
Price indexes for bundles of consumer goods as well as for numerous commodity groups are
available in the CSO's Monthly Digest of Statistics. Several editions of these digests have been
compiled to compute a price series for the years 1962 to 1990, adjusted to the common base year of
1985. These data are also presented below. Consumer price indexes are used to deflate expenditure
and revenue data to permit examination of real price trends independent of inflation. As will be seen,
this is particularly important for data from the late 1980s when Zambia experienced significant
hyperinflation.
Anomalies are apparent in the data sources. For example, in the 1987 commercial farms
report, the same harvested area and production for soybeans in the Copperbelt province is given for
two separate farm sizes categories. Such a coincidence seems unlikely. In Luapula province in 1990,
farms of one size are reported to have produced one kilogram of wheat but then to have sold 37. Since
reports do not distinguish sales from present harvest versus past harvests, it is impossible to determine
whether this is an error or due to stock adjustment.
Given problems in data collection and reporting, policy recommendations arising out of
analyses of these data should be regarded as tentative and subject to verification in more detailed
retrospective studies of selected areas. Longitudinal analyses that follow particular farming households
over time seem particularly warranted if an understanding of structural change in agriculture is to be
gained.
III. National production trends
The aforementioned problems with the data notwithstanding, a number of important
characteristics of production structure in Zambia can be discerned. Table 7.2 presents harvested crop
areas for all farms in the nine regions of Zambia as a percentage of national totals. Data in the table
are three-year averages drawn from CSO crop forecasts for 1991 and 1992, and from actual area
figures for 1990. Of Zambia's 942,362 hectares planted nationwide in 1990-92 (three-year average),
63.8 percent are comprised of maize, followed by groundnuts (8.5 percent), seed cotton (7.3 percent),
millet (5.4 percent), sorghum (4.4 percent), sunflower (3.4 percent), soybeans (2.9 percent), mixed
beans (2.2 percent), rice (1.4 percent), and assorted other crop enterprises (0.7 percent).'
Total crop area is based only on data for crops that were reported. Area of unreported crops (horticultural crops,
cassava, other vegetables) is not included. Note also that, in official publications, tree crops are reported as numbers of
trees rather than area of planting; estimates of tree-crop area are thus not possible.204
Provincial-level data from the CSO reveal that the bulk of planted area of cultivated maize,
tobacco, sunflower, and seed cotton is situated in the Eastern, Central, and Southern provinces. This
is the primary agriculture production region of Zambia, with cultivation based on a hand-hoe farming
system, and with oxen used in some areas. Maize is generally the chief staple followed by sorghum,
while relish crops are vegetables, beans, and groundnuts. Cash income for most farmers obtains from
sales of beer, fish, chicken, and a portion of the maize harvest. Only minimal inputs are used in
production (USAID n.d.). In percentage terms, the Eastern province accounts for the bulk of national
area allocated to maize (34.8 percent), groundnuts (33.7 percent), and burley tobacco (93.3 percent);
the Southern province accounts for the largest area allocated to sorghum (28.7 percent) and sunflowers
(43.8 percent); and the Central province contains the most area under production of seed cotton (38.9
percent), rainfed wheat (73.0 percent), and Virginia tobacco (50.2 percent).
IV. Commercial farms sector
Table 7.3 presents time series data on the area harvested of principal crops for the period 1975
to 1989 in the commercial farm sector. These data are depicted in graphical form in figure 7.1 for all
crops, and for all crops excluding maize in figure 7.2. Maize clearly dominates the cropping system.
The data suggest a complex pattern of crop diversification characterized by three major trends over
time: a stagnation in total crop area; a decreasing emphasis on maize; and an increasing emphasis on
wheat and soybeans. Aside from the sharp increase in area harvested between 1975 and 1976,
followed by the sharp decline from 1976 to 1978, total area harvested appears relatively stable to
gradually increasing.
Figure 7.1: Changes in areas of principal crops,
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Figure 7.2: Changes in areas of principal crops,
excluding maize, cumulative distribution,
1975 to 1989
Source: CSO.
Figure 7.3: Commercial farms production of maize,
wheat, and soybean, 1975 to 1989
(in metric tons)
Source: CSO.Table 7.3: Harvested area (hectares), commercial farm sector, 1975 to 1989
Virginia Sun- Soy- Seed Seed Burley
Year Maize Wheat tobacco flower bean maize cotton Potato Cotton Coffee tobacco Total
1975 103,650 7,400 4,970 5,220 2,470 400 124,110
1976 169,860 12,240 5,750 9,130 2,330 590 199,900
1977 88,159 10,360 4,544 5,821 130 2,071 111,085
1978 57,070 2,150 5,340 4,160 3,680 186 630 73,216
1979 74,233 5,213 7,990 3,606 3,824 775 1,333 151 97,125
1980 67,860 7,494 4,874 3,625 4,528 1,541 2,156 94 92,172
1981 84,701 3,390 3,444 8,719 8,150 2,695 422 3,444 114,965
1982 100,859 3,963 5,601 11,146 5,307 3,509 390 2,708 2,287 135,770
1983 101,286 2,645 3,372 6,312 5,758 4,916 2,587 448 2,587 97 130,008
1984 54,922 5,074 2,762 2,947 15,323 8,603 797 1,695 118 92,241
1985 67,739 7,266 5,206 4,316 11,660 5,277 875 2,016 540 104,895
1986 69,477 7,620 6,480 5,234 13,899 8,959 659 1,373 3,137 116,838
1987 74,763 12,168 5,682 5,989 12,868 5,938 627 4,680 3,340 126,055
1988 72,090 7,180 6,293 3,219 25,963 1,172 3,296 894 103 120,210
1989 43,630 19,187 3,003 3,990 20,305 5,697 1,274 201 2,865 100,152
Source: Derived from Zambia CSO data.Table 7.4: Crop production, commercial farm sector, 1975 to 1989
(thousand metric tons)
Virginia Sun- Soy- Seed Seed Burley
Year Maize Wheat tobacco flower bean maize cotton Potato Cotton Coffee tobacco
1975 418.31 7.67 4.37 20.86 5.85 .43
1976 451.33 6.26 5.53 23.00 4.25 .75
1977 324.10 8.10 2.57 19.79 .66 2.01
1978 187.82 9.62 4.72 3.94 10.64 1.24 .45
1979 239.12 16.39 7.19 3.21 11.75 .08 1.36 .06
1980 274.03 16.17 3.72 3.62 17.98 5.24 3.24 .05
1981 245.50 14.41 2.74 6.54 7.23 8.92 .40 2.73
1982 340.77 13.44 4.60 10.49 6.76 18.05 4.88 2.62 1.99
1983 223.89 10.40 4.07 5.91 7.41 10.42 2.61 5.44 2.61 .06
1984 172.54 26.30 2.69 2.27 23.05 29.25 19.00 1.20 .08
1985 315.01 32.17 5.93 4.03 19.81 20.99 12.78 1.86 .29
1986 315.41 43.53 7.70 6.26 26.09 10.88 10.65 1.33 2.33
1987 290.80 59.82 7.03 5.05 28.03 31.80 8.62 9.20 1.18
1988 317.99 38.43 5.57 3.48 24.45 14.51 5.32 .26 .19
1989 153.79 38.87 3.66 4.48 21.82 25.50 1.07 .20 2.70
Source: Derived from Zambia CSO data.208
The declining importance of maize relative to other crops in the commercial farms sector is
further confirmed by production quantity data. Table 7.4 presents these data in tabular form for all
recorded crops, while figure 7.3 illustrates changes in production for the three leading crops in the
commercial farms sector: maize, wheat, and soybeans. The graph indicates increases in wheat and
soybean production that are large in percentage terms but that do not match the magnitude of the
decrease in maize production for the same period. Note, however, that the most recent indicated
downturn in maize production (1989) is not substantially greater than previous downturns from which
production later recovered.
A more complete analysis of these data would attempt to reconcile fluctuations in production
with specific political and economic events such as droughts, changes in government, currency
devaluations, or price liberalizations. Such an analysis would require additional data not contained in
the CSO reports and is therefore beyond the scope of the present exercise. In the absence of specific
statistical controls for such events, a growth rate may nonetheless be calculated, though it matters a
great deal where one places the starting and finishing points for the calculation.
The growth rate "r" is derived as follows:
(1) Y = a(l+r)'
where Y is either area, production, or yield, depending on which growth rate is desired. The variable
T is a time trend.
Equation (1) can be linearized in logs as shown in equation (2):
(2) LnY = Ln(a) + Ln(1 +r)(T) = A + BT
Equation (2) then forms the basis for a linear regression of the log of either area, production, or yield
on a time trend. The growth rate estimate is then calculated from the ordinary least squares parameter
estimate for the trend variable:
(3) r = eB - 1
Area growth rates estimated from the data in table 7.3 are presented in table 7.5 for two time
periods: afifteen-year period from 1975 to 1989 and a seven-year period from 1983 to 1989. The data
suggest that area under maize has declined at an average annual rate of 4.1 percent since 1974, with
the decline accelerating in more recent years. On the other hand, areas under wheat, soybeans, and
several other crops have increased at an accelerating rate. Given the volatile nature of the figures, care
must be exercised in interpretation.
The CSO data permit further disaggregation of commercial farm data by region, but the way
data have been disaggregated has changed over time. In 1975-76, data were disaggregated by Central,
Southern, and "Copperbelt and others" categories, along with a national total. In 1981-82, this
division was changed to Central, Lusaka, Southern, and "Copperbelt and others," a system of
classification that remained unchanged through 1989-90. In order to facilitate statistical computations
and conserve on reporting, two regionally disaggregated time series were generated from these data:
northwest representing the data from "Copperbelt and others" and including the Western,
Northwestern, Copperbelt, Luapula, and Northern provinces; and southeast including the Central,209





Virginia tobacco -5.2' 5.1
Sunflower -1.0 -3.1
Soybean 18.0' 19.3'





Burley tobacco 15.6 41.2
All crops -.6 -.2
a. The estimate of B in the regressions is significant at the 5 percent level.
b. The estimate of B in the regressions is significant at the 10 percent level.
Eastern, Lusaka, and Southern provinces. With the exclusion of southern areas of the Western
province, the northwest region is generally situated in areas receiving in excess of 1,100 millimeters
(or 44 inches) of annual precipitation, while the provinces in the southeast region receive 1,000
millimeters (or 40 inches) of rainfall per year or less.
Data in the commercial farm series are further disaggregated by farm size categories, but the
categories have not remained the same over time. In 1975-76, six categories were used: 0-79
hectares, 80-199 hectares, 200-399 hectares, 400-799 hectares, 800-1,999 hectares, and 2,000+
hectares. This classification system was maintained until 1986-87 when the number of categories was
reduced to four—0-199 hectares, 200-799 hectares, 800-1,999 hectares, and 2,000+ hectares—and
remained so through 1989-90. To ease computation burdens, data series were further consolidated into
three categories for purposes of growth rate analysis: small farms (less than or equal to 199 hectares),
medium farms (200-1,999 hectares), and large farms (2,000+ hectares).210
Table 7.6: Crop area growth rates, commercial farms sector (percent)
Farm size
1975-1989 1983-1989
Small Medium Large Small Medium Large
(0-199 ha) (200-1,999 ha) (2,000+ ha) (0-199 ha) (200-1,999 ha) (2,000+ ha)
Northwest region'
Maize 13.7
" -1.7 -2.9 1.1 1.6 -46.3
-
Wheat° -45.0 3.2 -14.3




" -12.8 2.6 -14.6
tobacco
Sunflower° 15.3' -1.4 33.7 5.0 6.2
Soybean 5.6 -18.9 8.4 68.1' -17.2 -33.4
-
Seed maize° 15.2 31.6
" -.2 -30.9
' -49.7 -42.7
Potato 13.4 12.9 -11.1 33.0 70.7 45.7
Cotton
d 20.1 1.1 73.9
- 31.8
Coffee° -77.2 -43.8 -77.3 -77.2 -43.8 -77.3
Burley 34.3 -.6 -06.7 147.0 17.2
tobacco
d
All crops 13.9 1.2 1.2 00.8 -5.1 -34.3
Southeast region`
Maize -3.5 -7.4










" -14.1 6.6 -16.4
Soybean -6.4 23.9 27.0` -2.1 25.8" 32.4"
Seed maize° 7.5 -.1 -1.5 62.4 10.1 -2.7
Potato -3.6 2.3 1.4 30.9 16.9 2.7
Cotton 12.1




Burley 9.5 40.3 64.8
- 54.4 178.0 139.0
tobacco°
All crops -.5 -4.1 1.5 .8 4.4 3.7
The estimate of B in the regressions is significant at the 10 percent level.
The estimate of B in the regressions is significant at the 5 percent level.
a. Years with missing data on a particular crop/region combination were excluded.
b. Includes Western, Northwestern, and Copperbelt, but not Luapula and Northern provinces.
c. Includes Central, Eastern, Lusaka, and Southern provinces.
d. Data exist for the following crops/regions/farm sizes in the listed years only: wheat/northwest/small (1982, 86-90);
sunflower/northwest/large (1975, 80-82, 88); seedmaize/northwest/small (1976-79, 81, 85-87, 89),
seedmaize/southeast/small (1975-81, 84, 86-87, 89); cotton/northwest/medium (1982-83, 86-87); coffee/northwest/small
(1987-88), coffee/northwest/medium and large (1986-88), coffee/southeast/medium (1989-90), coffee/southeast/large
(1986-88), burley tobacco/northwest/small (1980-85), burley tobacco/northwest/medium (1980, 89), burley
tobacco/northwest/large (1979, 82-85, 89), burley tobacco/southeast/small (1979-80, 84, 89), burley
tobacco/southeast/medium (1979, 82-84, 89), burley tobacco/southeast/large (1979-80, 85, 88-90).
Source: Derived from Zambia CSO data.211
Table 7.7: Crop production growth rates, commercial farms sector (percent)
Farm size
1975-1989 1983-1989
Small Medium Large Small Medium Large
(0-199 ha) (200-1,999 ha) (2,000+ ha) (0-199 ha) (200-1,999 ha) (2,000+ ha)
Northwest region°
Maize 16.7° -4.1 .7 11.1 .1 -43.1
*
Wheat' -45.5 15.1 10.4 566.4 116.6 -31.6
Tobacco -8.4
` -14.9
` -6.6 -1.3 -28.4
"
Sunflower' 22.6° 2.0 21.7 15.8 13.1*
Soybean .6 -19.4 14.8 40.9 -23.4 -32.5
"
Seed maize' 34.0 * 44.7
` -14.3 -51.5 -39.3
"` -41.3
Potato 8.0 51.3 -1.6 -25.3 130.3 68.4
Cotton' 10.5 -19.1 39.6 1.9
Coffee' 57.0 -38.8* -90.1 57.0 -38.8` -90.1
Burley 33.3 -1.4 -6.7 142.2 6.5
tobacco'
Southeast region`
Maize -3.3 -7.1° 00.4 14.0 1.6 1.8
Wheat 8.4 17.2
' 23.2° -12.8 32.7° 58.1°
Tobacco -5.3 -4.9 05.0 19.1 1.8 9.5
Sunflower 2.1 2.1
"' -08.8
* -5.2 5.8 -19.2
Soybean -10.2 30.5 23.9
`" -10.3 22.6° 19.3
Seed maize' 17.7 .1 -01.0 70.1 16.6 20.9
Potato -8.5 13.8 15.2 -11.2 -15.4 -23.0
Cotton -6.8 -.6 08.9 -53.8 -37.9 -1.8
Coffee' -13.1 -43.1
* -13.1 43.1*
Burley 32.9 35.7 73.4° 183.0 312.0 198.8
tobacco'
The estimate of B in the regressions is significant at the 10 percent level.
The estimate of B in the regressions is significant at the 5 percent level.
a. Years with missing data on a particular crop/region combination were excluded.
b. Includes Western, Northwestern, and Copperbelt, but not Luapula and Northern provinces.
c. Includes Central, Eastern, Lusaka, and Southern provinces.
d. Data exist for the following crops/regions/farm sizes in the listed years only: wheat/northwest/small (1982,
86-90); sunflower/northwest/large (1975, 80-82, 88); seedmaize/northwest/small (1976-79, 81, 85-87, 89),
seedmaize/southeast/small (1975-81, 84, 86-87, 89); cotton/northwest/medium (1982-83, 86-87);
coffee/northwest/small (1987-88), coffee/northwest/medium and large (1986-88), coffee/southeast/medium
(1989-90), coffee/southeast/large (1986-88), burley tobacco/northwest/small (1980-85), burley
tobacco/northwest/medium (1980, 89), burley tobacco/northwest/large (1979, 82-85, 89), burley
tobacco/southeast/small (1979-80, 84, 89), burley tobacco/southeast/medium (1979, 82-84, 89), burley
tobacco/southeast/large (1979-80, 85, 88-90).
Source: Derived from Zambia CSO data.212
Table 7.8: Crop yield growth rates, commercial farms sector (percent)
Farm size
1975-1989 1983-1989
Small Medium Large Small Medium Large
(0-199 ha) (200-1,999 ha) (2,000+ ha) (0-199 ha) (200-1,999 ha) (2,000+ ha)
Northwest region
'
Maize 2.7 -2.5 3.7* 9.9
* -1.5 6.1
Wheat' -10.0 11.6 28.9° 124.2 36.6 -6.0
Tobacco .6 -1.0 -4.7 7.0 -3.8 -16.2
Sunflower' 1.4 3.4 -8.9° 10.2 6.5
Soybean -4.7 - .7 5.9 -16.2
` -7.4 1.3
Seed maize" 16.4
" 10.0 -14.2 -29.8° 20.7 2.3
Potato -6.9 36.8 10.6 -43.9 34.9 15.6
Cotton' -12.2 -20.0° -19.7 -22.7
Coffee' 589.5 8.8 -56.2 589.5 8.8 -56.2
Burley -.7 -.8 .0 -2.0 -9.1
tobacco'
Southeast region`
Maize .2 .3 3.8* 8.6 3.2 11.2
Wheat 2.9 .1 -1.6 -6.9 5.1 -6.5
Tobacco -1.3 3.0 6.0
"` -17.0 -1.2 1.2
Sunflower 2.5* 2.8 .1 10.4
* -.7 -3.4
Soybean -4.1 5.4 -2.4 -8.4 -2.5 -9.9
Seed maize" 9.4 .2 .5 4.7 5.9 24.3
Potato -5.2 11.3 13.6 -32.2 -27.6 -25.1
Cotton 4.7
` -0.1 1.2 22.9* -2.2 6.9
Coffee' 279.6 13.1 279.6 13.1
Burley 21.4 -3.3 5.2 83.3 48.2 25.0
tobacco'
* The estimate of B in the regressions is significant at the 10 percent level.
** The estimate of B in the regressions is significant at the 5 percent level.
a. Yields derived from area and production data. Years with missing data on a particular crop/region combination were
excluded.
b. Includes Western, Northwestern, and Copperbelt, but not Luapula and Northern provinces.
c. Includes Central, Eastern, Lusaka, and Southern provinces.
d. Data exist for the following crops/regions/farm sizes in the listed years only: wheat/northwest/small (1982, 86-90);
sunflower/northwest/large (1975, 80-82, 88); seedmaize/northwest/small (1976-79, 81, 85-87, 89),
seedmaize/southeast/small (1975-81, 84, 86-87,89); cotton/northwest/medium (1982-83, 86-87); coffee/northwest/small
(1987-88), coffee/northwest/medium and large (1986-88), coffee/southeast/medium (1989-90), coffee/southeast/large
(1986-88), burley tobacco/northwest/small (1980-85), burley tobacco/northwest/medium (1980, 89), burley
tobacco/northwest/large (1979, 82-85, 89), burley tobacco/southeast/small (1979-80, 84, 89), burley
tobacco/southeast/medium (1979, 82-84, 89), burley tobacco/southeast/large (1979-80, 85, 88-90).
Source: Derived from Zambia CSO data.213
Results are presented in table 7.6 for area growth rates, table 7.7 for production growth rates,
and table 7.8 for yield growth rates. Missing data for some years and crops render interpretation of
some rates problematic, but rates are presented whenever at least three years of data are available. A
number of findings stand out:
Area harvested
► Total area cultivated by small farms in the northwest region appears to have been increasing
at annualized rate of 13.9 percent since 1975 but has stagnated (0.8 percent) in recent years.
Total area cultivated in the southeast appears to have remained relatively flat since 1975.
► Data suggest that total area cultivated by the largest farms in the northwest region has
increased moderately at an annualized rate of 1.2 percent since 1975 but declined 34.4 percent
since 1983. In the southeast, total area appears to have remained relatively flat (an increase
of 1.5 percent since 1975 and 3.7 percent since 1983).
► The decline in maize area over time mentioned earlier for national-level figures seems to have
been the result primarily of declining maize production on large farms. Maize area cultivated
in the northwest region by the smallest farm size category appears to have increased at an
average annualized rate of 13.7 percent since 1975 and 1.1 percent since 1983. In contrast,
growth in maize area in the same region on the largest farms (2,000+ hectares) appears to
have declined at an annualized rate of 2.9 percent since 1975, and data suggest maize area has
plummeted (46.3 percent) since 1983. Roughly similar trends are observed for the southeast
region.
► Small farm hectareage of nearly all crops in the northwest region (excluding wheat and
Virginia tobacco, where the base is small) seems to have increased rapidly since 1975,
particularly so for cotton (20.1 percent), sunflower (15.3 percent), potatoes (13.4 percent),
and soybeans (5.6 percent). Growth in cotton area (73.9 percent) and soybeans (68.1 percent)
since 1983 appears particularly high and comes at the expense of coffee, wheat, and tobacco.
In the southeast region, data suggest growth in cotton area (12.1 percent) and wheat (5.4
percent) is displacing other crops, particularly maize and soybeans.
► Data suggest that large farms in the southeast have over the long term been shifting emphasis
to burley tobacco (64.8 percent), wheat (25.2 percent), soybeans (27.0 percent), and cotton
(7.6 percent), and away from maize (-3.2 percent), and sunflower (-8.9 percent). Area growth
since 1983 in burley tobacco (139.0 percent), wheat (69.1 percent), and soybeans (32.4
percent) appears particularly robust.
Production and yield
  Small farms. Data from the northwest suggest rapid growth in the production of coffee (57.0
percent), seed maize (34.0 percent), burley tobacco (33.3 percent), sunflower (22.6 percent),
maize (16.7 percent), and cotton (10.5 percent) has been achieved by small farms since 1975.
Growth in output by small farms in the southeast has been more moderate, with production
declines experienced in maize, tobacco, soybeans, potato, and cotton.214
  Large farms. Large farms in the northwest region since 1975 appear to have experienced rapid
growth in production of wheat (10.4 percent), soybeans (14.8 percent), and sunflowers (21.7
percent), and declining production in seed maize (-14.3 percent), coffee (-90.1 percent), and
tobacco (-14.9 percent). In the southeast region, production over the long term seems to have
grown most rapidly in wheat (23.2 percent), soybeans (23.9 percent), and burley tobacco
(73.4 percent).
In principle, the sum of growth rates for area and yield should equal that of production. Differences
in the tables arise at times due to missing values and rounding errors.
V. Noncommercial farms sector
Production data from the noncommercial farms sector are available from 1971 to 1985, though
with a gap from 1977 to 1981. Data on area for this sector are available only in the most recent years,
1982 through 1985. Since yield calculations require data on both area and production, yields can only
be calculated for the period 1982 to 1985.
Figure 7.4 depicts changes in the production of maize, groundnuts, millet, and cassava, and
suggests that for the noncommercial sector, the diversification story found in the commercial farms
sector does not apply. Indeed, the story seems to be precisely the opposite. Instead of a gradual
decline in maize production, a dramatic increase is apparent, and other crops generally appear to
decline over time.
Figure 7.4: Noncommercial farm production of maize,
millet, groundnuts, and cassava, 1971 to 1976
and 1982 to 1986 (000 metric tons)



















Figure 7.5: Noncommercial farms production of maize
by province, 1971 to 1976 and 1982 to 1985
Source: CSO.
There appear to be significant regional variations. Focusing specifically on maize, it can be
seen from figure 7.5 that production has increased steadily in the Eastern province, as well as in the
North and Luapula provinces.4 .' Production trends have been mixed elsewhere. Table 7.9 presents
production growth rates for the 1972-1986 period. Table 7.10 presents growth rates for production,
area and yield for the 1983-1986 period.
Regional breakdowns in the data time series vary from year to year; for example, data for the
Copperbelt/Northwest region were reported separately sometimes and as one combined total at other
times. The regional breakdowns in Tables 7.9 and 7.10 represent the finest level of disaggregation
possible from the published data without eliminating data for certain years.
These data are somewhat inconsistent with a report on the Eastern province from the
International Food Policy Research Institute that implies growth in maize production only until 1980,
at which time production in the Eastern province reportedly began to decline (Cells, Milimo, and
Wanmali 1991, p. 24). Data from the CSO are consistent with statistics reported by the Economic
Research Service of the US Department of Agriculture, which suggest a growth rate in cereals
production in Zambia of roughly 1.1 percent (figure 7.6).
° Production in the combined Central, Southern, and Lusaka provinces has fluctuated greatly but has increased on
average 1.3 percent per year.
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Beans -.009 -.066 -.042 .049 -.038
Cassava .015 -.208
' -.013 -.109 -.042
Groundnuts -.013 -.118" -.074" -.060" -.039
Maize .010 .013 -.065" -.063" -.052"
Millet -.063
' -.021 -.046' -.022 -.022
Sorghum .011 -.043 -.027 -.001 .036
* The estimate of B in the regressions is significant at the 10 percent level.
**The estimate of B in the regressions is significant at the 5 percent level.
Source: Derived from Zambia CSO data.
Figure 7.6: Zambia cereals production (thousand metric tons)
Source: ERS.
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Beans -.010 .624 -.258
` .025
Cassava .232 -.154 .054 57.500 .805
Groundnuts -.056 .338 .050 .178 -.042
"'
Maize .167° .516
' .100 .041 .130






Beans .034 .472 -.254° .037
Cassava .130 -.132 .079 3.800 .706
"
Groundnuts -.012 .219 -.036 .016 .039
Maize .013 .336 .129 -.062 .241
Millet .354 .071 -.021 .034 .275
Sorghum .242* .268
* -.017 .475 .641
*
All crops .026
'" .301 -.094 -.046 .218
'
Yield
Beans -.043 .104 -.006 -.011
Cassava .090
* -.026 -.023 11.188 .058
Groundnuts -.045 .097 .090 .159 -.078
Maize .152
* .135 -.026 .110 -.090
*
Millet -.071 .166 .074 -.010 .037
'
Sorghum .071 -.019 .070* .138 -.105
* The estimate of B in the regressions is significant at the 10 percent level.
** The estimate of B in the regressions is significant at the 5 percent level.
Source: Derived from Zambia CSO data.
The World Bank estimates growth rates for the combined set of commercial and
noncommercial farms for the period 1974 to 1990 (World Bank 1993b, p. 25). Area and production
of maize are reported by the Bank to have increased by 8 and 10 percent, respectively, over the
period, with yields declining by about 2 percent. Results here, on the contrary, suggest modest
declines in maize production on commercial farms on the order of 3 to 7 percent, and modest
increases of from 1 to 6 percent in maize production on noncommercial farms. It should be noted that
the World Bank starting point for growth rate calculations is 1974, a momentary trough in output,
which may account for the high calculated rates. Again, the highly volatile nature of the data cannot
be overemphasized.218
A further example of data volatility can be seen by examining the number of reported farming
households. In contrast to the commercial farms sector where the number of farming households is
reported to fluctuate around a mean of 3,000, significant changes in the number of reported
noncommercial farming households appears in the CSO data. From a high near 1.3 million in the early
1970s, the number of households drops to around 1 million for an extended period, until increasing
again to near 1.2 million in the mid-1980s (see table 7.11). Fluctuations of 300,000 households in the
farming population (plausibly 1 million or more individuals) is difficult to explain except perhaps as
a general problem with the data collection system.
Table 7.11: Number of noncommercial farm households
Year Copperbelt/
Central/
Southern/ Northern/ Eastern Western All
Northwestern Lusaka Luapula
1971 144,400 273,000 499,600 230,400 148,600 1,296,000
1972 146,400 239,500 488,100 209,000 191,600 1,274,600
1973 97,600 203,300 348,100 273,200 109,000 1,031,200
1974 95,700 232,900 381,900 192,600 158,000 1,061,100
1975 111,800 247,400 318,600 128,500 157,500 963,800
1976 129,700 197,800 372,900 222,600 148,600 1,071,600
1982 124,200 180,580 320,890 208,350 151,900 985,920
1983 124,880 172,710 320,760 222,890 133,600 974,840
1984 135,970 183,360 318,120 247,350 152,120 1,036,920
1985 111,328 260,201 343,651 256,627 189,130 1,160,937
Source: Derived from Zambia CSO data.
VI. Revenues and expenditures
The CSO also provides data on farm expenditures and revenues. Tables 7.12-7.15 present
results for the two broad regions of commercial farms defined above, excluding data on farm livestock
revenue. They suggest a dramatic nominal increase in the kwatcha value of operations in the late
1980s, on both the revenue and the expenditure side, which corresponds to a period of hyperinflation.
When nominal values are deflated by a low-income CPI, farm sales and operating expenses for all
farm categories are shown to increase in real terms as well, although wide fluctuations are evident.
Results are not substantially different if the high-income CPI is used as a deflator. The rather
astounding 1989 increase in operating expenses (fertilizer and pesticide applications, machinery, seed,
etc.) in the Central, Southern, and Lusaka combined provinces on medium-sized farms cannot readily
be explained.219
The net effect of these adjustments in commercial farm sales, operating expenses, and wage
expenses, are summarized in the partial net revenue figures in table 7.15. Partial net revenue is
negative for the small farm sector in nearly all years from 1975 to 1989, partly because of missing
income from livestock and the fact that revenues include only farm sales, not the value of home
consumption. However, even for medium-scale farms for which auto-consumption should theoretically
be much smaller, very large negative figures for net revenue are reported. Only for the large-farm
sector is net revenue positive, and then only in the early to mid-1980s. However, by 1988, even the
large-scale sector again appeared to be operating in the red, with very large deficits reported for
medium-scale farms.
Data presented for CPIs and selected commodity and input price indexes (agricultural
wholesale prices, building materials, and fixed capital goods) in table 7.16 reflect rapid inflation in
the 1970s and hyperinflation by the late 1980s. The CPI of low income consumers tripled over the
period 1970 to 1980, then increased by a factor of 43 between 1980 and 1990. Prices of building
materials and capital goods rose faster that the CPI, while the wholesale index of agricultural prices
grew at a slower rate suggesting a worsening terms of trade for agriculture in the 1980s. The effect
on prices of selected individual farm commodities (maize, tobacco, wheat and cotton) and fertilizer
prices (triple super phosphate and urea) are presented in table 7.17. Real output prices of maize, which
were relatively constant in the 1970s, tended to rise over the period 1980 to 1986 before falling
sharply to a twenty-year low in 1989. Real tobacco and wheat prices declined during the 1970s,
fluctuated up and down in the early- to mid-1980s, before also falling precipitously in 1989. Real
cotton prices appear to have been in a long-term secular decline from 1970 to 1989. The price of
fertilizer over time has tended to be constant to increasing over the period 1971 to 1985-86, before
also falling sharply in the late 1980s.
Growth in farm profitability can theoretically occur through a number of sources: (a)
increasing production through area expansion; (b) increasing production through technical change; (c)
increasing output prices; (d) decreasing tradable input use; and/or (e) decreasing input prices. Data
on commercial farms from section IV indicate that over the period 1975 to 1989 (southeast region),
production of maize fell, and that of wheat, soybeans, and burley tobacco increased, largely due to
crop area adjustments. However, these adjustments moved in directions surprisingly counter to trends
in real prices, i.e., rising real maize prices and falling prices for industrial crops. No data were
reported on tradable input use, but the above analysis of price indexes suggests rising real costs of
fixed and variable capital inputs. Assuming these data are correct, it may be that commercial farms
are shifting away from maize not because of price incentives but due to restrictions on marketing that
act to limit the amount of maize sold in the marketplace.
The analysis thus suggests that profitability has historically been closely linked with the ability
to expand crop area and substitute land for capital inputs. Such strategies would work to the advantage
of smaller farms employing oxen and labor-intensive management, and to the disadvantage of larger
farms relying on capital-intensive techniques. The data are far from sufficiently reliable to reach strong
conclusions (and this analysis is highly speculative), but the analysis does provide some very weak
evidence for the increasing area cultivated by small farms, as documented in chapter 3.220










1975 38,560 165,739 637,220 2,738,910 1,104,440 4,747,124
1976 448,350 1,680,493 1,665,740 6,243,480 1,328,070 4,977,835
1977 416,344 1,307,712 2,069,577 6,500,422 2,941,521 9,239,147
1978 627,848 1,672,290 1,246,315 3,319,594 1,411,260 3,758,929
1979 658,883 1,556,307 1,003,442 2,370,169 2,936,569 6,936,291
1980 611,594 1,304,469 2,462,836 5,252,983 4,065,529 8,671,366
1981 653,605 1,234,504 3,646,138 6,886,683 4,782,206 9,032,444
1982 1,318,870 2,200,621 9,864,834 16,460,123 29,800,277 49,723,718
1983 3,253,783 4,669,982 1,810,816 2,598,968 9,856,298 14,146,220
1984 1,112,400 1,332,378 13,282,619 15,909,268 47,298,385 56,651,680
1985 4,488,066 4,488,066 20,943,035 20,943,035 32,592,720 32,592,720
1986 17,859,026 12,911,365 17,775,775 12,851,177 119,197,265 86,174,876
1987 15,982,721 7,758,227 34,139,319 16,571,683 82,152,580 39,877,962
1988 46,204,737 14,854,102 75,727,593 24,345,239 46,938,639 15,090,040
1989 18,737,511 3,017,191 21,125,009 3,401,636 11,381,725 1,832,732
1975 2,370,840 10,190,387
Southeast region
12,983,680 55,806,687 23,506,790 101,037,309
1976 4,257,440 15,957,617 22,717,360 85,148,569 12,388,240 46,433,252
1977 3,608,362 11,333,656 20,954,172 65,815,842 8,339,458 26,193,755
1978 2,884,862 7,683,908 15,665,928 41,726,624 9,113,582 24,274,273
1979 3,210,976 7,584,451 23,293,395 55,019,911 12,940,515 30,566,003
1980 5,229,649 11,154,318 30,142,149 64,290,186 17,916,608 38,214,331
1981 7,286,861 13,763,138 25,688,377 48,519,203 12,218,440 23,077,712
1982 8,004,097 13,355,361 36,825,758 61,446,194 19,237,815 32,099,557
1983 8,406,376 12,065,224 35,269,976 50,621,119 25,718,732 369,127,27
1984 5,879,813 7,042,551 33,990,139 40,711,718 37,990,810 45,503,525
1985 34,892,784 34,892,784 132,954,469 132,954,469 140,293,368 140,293,368
1986 25,205,982 18,222,921 172,599,774 124,782,763 289,224,028 209,097,455
1987 98,785,330 47,951,722 299,833,301 145,543,099 384,874,747 186,823,356
1988 161,526,275 51,928,176 365,268,613 117,428,158 225,185,002 72,393,464
1989 90,368,388 14,551,488 957,438,581 154,170,687 852,845,309 137,328,650
Source: Derived from Zambia CSO data.221
Table 7.13: Annual commercial farm operating expenses, nominal and 1985 deflated kwatcha
a
1975 1,027,770 4,417,580 1,462,490 6,286,101 846,300 3,637,582
1976 1,831,590 6,865,114 2,856,990 10,708,489 1,481,660 5,553,516
1977 1,425,481 4,477,353 3,530,924 11,090,428 2,315,283 7,272,170
1978 2,064,080 5,497,733 4,320,730 11,508,382 2,637,460 7,024,946
1979 3,654,722 8,632,597 3,192,670 7,541,212 3,986,588 9,416,477
1980 2,536,975 5,411,114 5,600,683 11,945,696 3,535,818 7,541,546
1981 3,786,497 7,151,788 11,343,599 21,425,347 3,631,218 6,858,503
1982 9,689,398 16,167,396 20,307,255 33,883,987 5,762,067 9,614,387
1983 3,687,741 5,292,818 9,219,046 13,231,606 3,680,049 5,281,778
1984 3,261,358 3,906,294 16,100,177 19,284,001 15,771,369 18,890,170
1985 22,134,990 22,134,990 29,068,671 29,068,671 23,956,634 23,956,634
1986 64,114,761 46,352,419 25,787,081 18,643,033 90,599,461 65,499,803
1987 119,172,564 57,847,958 34,375,926 16,686,535 68,086,610 33,050,152
1988 35,214,022 11,320,758 253,260,212 81,419,206 66,526,979 21,387,385
1989 78,757,704 12,681,889 9,271,714,613 1,492,969,515 14,600,470 2,351,028
1975 3,032,760 13,035,464
Southeast region
18,987,560 81,612,673 18,982,720 81,591,869
1976 2,300,670 8,623,307 29,939,390 112,217,979 17,293,010 64,817,173
1977 4,577,150 14,376,563 20,313,688 63,804,119 28,479,720 89,453,153
1978 4,272,000 11,378,588 24,982,630 66,541,913 34,001,830 90,564,796
1979 4,461,744 10,538,814 35,405,748 83,629,764 34,396,719 81,246,398
1980 4,330,558 9,236,647 44,469,648 94,849,306 29,010,392 61,876,261
1981 13,102,790 24,748,038 43,393,887 81,960,679 29,947,982 56,564,579
1982 13,675,085 22,817,777 43,845,941 73,159,830 25,531,058 42,600,246
1983 14,832,245 21,287,932 42,808,609 61,440,917 44,270,155 63,538,597
1984 16,271,308 19,488,973 56,379,475 67,528,564 77,326,276 92,617,612
1985 22,353,101 22,353,101 89,325,498 89,325,498 101,636,018 101,636,018
1986 33,579,194 24,276,420 157,303,061 113,723,849 212,899,764 153,918,051
1987 85,692,368 41,596,223 295,734,214 143,553,347 232,586,587 112,900,644
1988 783,251,905 251,803,263 500,947,351 161,046,755 225,049,519 72,349,908
1989 418,319,638 67,359,544 1,004,500,030 161,748,715 1,136,914,161 183,070,581
a. Includes equipment hire, feed, soil inputs, veterinary supplies, implements, and maintenance. Excludes
wages.
Source: Derived from Zambia CSO data.
Farm size
Year Small (0-199 ha) Medium (200-1,999 ha) Large (2,000+ ha)
Nominal Deflated Nominal Deflated Nominal Deflated
Northwest region222
Table 7.14: Annual commercial farm wage bill, nominal and 1985 deflated kwatcha
1975 266,200 1,144,186 474,990 2,041,611 464,860 1,998,070
1976 857,860 3,215,407 1,558,060 5,839,877 538,580 2,018,690
1977 400,615 1,258,309 1,580,059 4,962,874 1,090,033 3,423,731
1978 1,706,850 4,546,241 766,960 2,042,819 796,210 2,120,727
1979 857,409 2,025,234 1,012,535 2,391,647 1,671,595 3,948,373
1980 1,318,350 2,811,909 1,137,435 2,426,035 1,398,510 2,982,882
1981 956,470 1,806,543 3,021,996 5,707,828 1,905,349 3,598,749
1982 1,310,466 2,186,599 3,731,350 6,226,002 7,735,055 12,906,447
1983 949,639 1,362,966 4,064,313 5,833,292 2,201,807 3,160,136
1984 628,582 752,885 4,206,774 5,038,667 8,280,695 9,918,209
1985 6,389,381 6,389,381 8,036,546 8,036,546 7,883,322 7,883,322
1986 13,168,843 9,520,549 12,701,236 9,182,488 30,394,968 21,974,351
1987 11,677,183 5,668,261 13,107,524 6,362,568 18,560,342 9,009,439
1988 12,044,948 3,872,263 24,647,278 7,923,715 24,298,815 7,811,690
1989 10,479,608 1,687,469 20,579,334 3,313,769 1,237,000 199,187
1975 917,530 3,943,744
Southeast region
6,385,130 27,444,681 6,151,850 26,441,993
1976 850,800 3,188,945 7,589,380 28,446,300 7,989,370 29,945,532
1977 1,143,089 3,590,376 9,643,821 30,290,684 12,060,667 37,881,858
1978 1,188,430 3,165,416 12,037,390 32,061,915 5,560,690 14,811,049
1979 998,178 2,357,736 17,692,459 41,790,281 11,520,015 27,210,727
1980 1,160,911 2,476,107 19,982,267 42,620,175 9,387,735 20,023,099
1981 2,111,946 3,988,961 9,679,489 18,282,241 7,774,976 14,685,071
1982 2,487,040 4,149,789 16,413,275 27,386,626 4,097,295 6,836,606
1983 3,449,377 4,950,707 9,741,551 13,981,530 13,050,177 18,730,224
1984 4,687,643 5,614,628 17,554,679 21,026,132 26,683,982 31,960,762
1985 4,161,863 4,161,863 20,784,751 20,784,751 17,481,002 17,481,002
1986 5,780,490 4,179,064 29,382,383 21,242,293 37,165,726 26,869,340
1987 11,050,099 5,363,866 65,505,507 31,797,250 45,913,446 22,287,001
1988 124,709,755 40,092,240 187,458,457 60,264,968 53,102,424 17,071,601
1989 28,424,054 4,576,958 217,665,700 35,049,424 209,085,128 33,667,745
Source: Derived from Zambia CSO data.
Farm size
Year Small (0-199 ha) Medium (200-1,999 ha) Large (2,000+ ha)
Nominal Deflated Nominal Deflated Nominal Deflated
Northwest region223
Table 7.15: Annual commercial farm partial net revenue, nominal and 1985 deflated
kwatcha
a
1975 -1,255,410 -5,396,027 -1,300,260 -5,588,802 -206,720 -888,528
1976 -2,241,100 -8,400,028 -2,749,310 -10,304,886 -692,170 -2,594,371
1977 -1,409,752 -4,427,950 -3,041,406 -9,552,880 -463,795 -1,456,754
1978 -3,143,082 -8,371,684 -3,841,375 -10,231,607 -2,022,410 -5,386,744
1979 -3,853,248 -9,101,524 -3,201,763 -7,562,690 -2,721,614 -6,428,559
1980 -3,243,731 -6,918,554 -4,275,282 -9,118,748 -868,799 -1,853,062
1981 -4,089,362 -7,723,827 -10,719,457 -20,246,492 -754,361 -1,424,808
1982 -9,680,994 -16,153,374 -14,173,771 -23,649,866 16,303,155 27,202,884
1983 -1,383,597 -1,985,802 -11,472,543 -16,465,930 3,974,442 5,704,306
1984 -2,777,540 -3,326,801 -7,024,332 -8,413,400 23,246,321 27,843,301
1985 -24,036,305 -24,036,305 -16,162,182 -16,162,182 752,764 752,764
1986 -59,424,578 -42,961,603 -20,712,542 -14,974,344 -1,797,164 -1,299,278
1987 -114,867,026 -55,757,992 -13,344,131 -6,477,420 -4,494,372 -2,181,629
1988 -1,054,233 -338,919 -202,179,897 -64,997,682 -43,887,155 -14,109,035
1989 -70,499,801 -11,352,167 -9,271,168,938 -1,492,881,648 -4,455,745 -717,483
1975 -1,579,450 -6,788,821
Southeast region
-1,627,780 -6,996,553 -12,389,010 -53,250,667
1976 1,105,970 4,145,365 -14,811,410 -55,515,710 -12,894,140 -48,329,453
1977 -2,111,877 -6,633,283 -9,003,337 -28,278,961 -32,200,929 -101,141,256
1978 -2,575,568 -6,860,096 -21,354,092 -56,877,204 -30,448,938 -81,101,572
1979 -2,248,946 -5,312,099 -29,804,812 -70,400,134 -32,976,219 -77,891,122
1980 -261,820 -558,436 -34,309,766 -73,179,295 -20,481,519 -43,685,029
1981 -7,927,875 -14,973,861 -27,384,999 -51,723,717 -25,504,518 -48,171,938
1982 -8,158,028 -13,612,205 -23,433,458 -39,100,262 -10,390,538 -17,337,295
1983 -9,875,246 -14,173,415 -17,280,184 -24,801,328 -31,601,600 -45,356,094
1984 -15,079,138 -18,061,050 -39,944,015 -47,842,978 -66,019,448 -79,074,849
1985 8,377,820 8,377,820 22,844,220 22,844,220 21,176,348 21,176,348
1986 -14,153,702 -10,232,563 -14,085,670 -10,183,379 39,158,538 28,310,064
1987 2,042,863 991,633 -61,406,420 -29,807,498 106,374,714 51,635,711
1988 -746,435,385 -239,967,327 -323,137,195 -103,883,565 -52,966,941 -17,028,045
1989 -356,375,304 -57,385,014 -264,727,149 -42,627,452 -493,153,980 -79,409,676
a. Excludes revenue from livestock activities.
Source: Derived from Zambia CSO data.
Farm size
Year Small (0-199 ha) Medium (200-1,999 ha) Large (2,000+ ha)
Nominal Deflated Nominal Deflated Nominal Deflated
Northwest region224

















1967 13.30 11.80 11.50 5.90
1968 14.40 13.10 11.80 6.00
1969 15.10 13.40 12.40 6.10
1970 15.90 13.80 12.50 6.20
1971 16.70 14.60 13.00 6.80
1972 17.60 15.40 13.70 7.40
1973 18.90 16.40 14.30 7.90
1974 20.60 17.70 15.30 9.00
1975 22.40 19.50 17.60 21.40 10.90
1976 26.00 23.10 18.30 25.80 14.50
1977 30.60 27.70 21.10 29.10 18.30
1978 34.20 32.30 24.10 34.00 23.70
1979 38.00 35.40 27.00 38.90 27.90
1980 42.40 39.50 32.40 42.30 31.20
1981 46.80 45.10 44.90 47.50 34.30
1982 53.00 50.70 50.90 55.40 39.40
1983 62.40 60.60 63.00 63.40 48.70
1984 75.30 72.80 68.50 70.40 69.90
1985 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
1986 160.10 154.00 166.90 148.40 283.30
1987 250.30 224.30 201.30 237.00 601.50
1988 375.80 346.90 271.20 300.50 486.10
1989 847.00 793.50 582.10 864.40 764.70
1990 1,695.20 1,674.40 1,124.30 2,062.90 1,963.80
Source: Derived from Zambia CSO data.225







Nominal  Deflated Nominal  Deflated Nominal  Deflated Nominal Deflated Nominal Deflated Nominal  Deflated
1970 3.50 25.36 0.81 5.87 0.17 1.23
1971 4.00 27.40 0.81 5.55 0.17 1.16 4.70 32.19 4.19 28.70
1972 4.30 27.92 0.88 5.71 0.17 1.10 3.13 20.32 2.80 18.18
1973 4.30 26.22 0.88 5.37 0.17 1.04 4.00 24.39 3.55 21.65
1974 4.30 24.29 0.96 5.42 0.25 1.41 3.90 22.03 4.05 22.88
1975 5.00 25.64 0.84 4.31 16.00 82.05 0.30 1.54 3.90 20.00 4.05 20.77
1976 6.30 27.27 0.97 4.20 16.00 69.26 0.40 1.73 6.45 27.92 6.74 29.18
1977 6.30 22.74 1.10 3.97 16.00 57.76 0.40 1.44 6.45 23.29 6.74 24.33
1978 6.30 19.50 1.45 4.49 20.00 61.92 0.46 1.42 6.45 19.97 6.74 20.87
1979 9.00 25.42 1.51 4.27 20.00 56.50 0.46 1.30 13.50 38.14 8.75 24.72
1980 11.70 29.62 1.57 3.97 20.00 50.63 0.46 1.16 11.50 29.11 11.65 29.49
1981 13.50 29.93 1.65 3.66 26.00 57.65 0.46 1.02 13.65 30.27 9.65 21.40
1982 16.00 31.56 2.40 4.73 32.00 63.12 0.47 0.93 16.65 32.84 10.95 21.60
1983 18.30 30.20 2.70 4.46 35.75 58.99 0.52 0.86 25.80 42.57 14.95 24.67
1984 24.50 33.65 2.80 3.85 42.50 58.38 0.58 0.80 28.45 39.08 24.10 33.10
1985 28.32 28.32 3.45 3.45 45.20 45.20 0.67 0.67 28.45 28.45 26.75 26.75
1986 55.00 35.71 5.12 3.32 86.40 56.10 0.84 0.55 64.00 41.56 26.75 17.37
1987 78.00 34.77 6.25 2.79 111.00 49.49 1.60 0.71 64.00 28.53 65.00 28.98
1988 80.00 23.06 14.00 4.04 190.00 54.77 3.00 0.86 64.00 18.45 65.00 18.74
1989 108.00 13.61 14.40 1.81 225.80 28.46 3.60 0.45 77.00 9.70 71.00 8.95
a. Price deflator is the low-income CPI.
Source: Derived from Zambia CSO data.
VII. Conclusions
It should be stressed that these are foundational national data upon which much of the
published national statistics found in international sources is based. The reliability of these foundational
data has been questioned, suggesting that extreme caution be exercised as statistics based upon these
data are used to inform policy. In reporting rather remarkable growth rates from 1974 to 1990 of as
much as 78 percent for commodities in Zambia, the World Bank adds in a footnote:
Unfortunately, the data on gross output...do not appear to be consistent with the
official data on GDP growth in agriculture.... We include this information, however,
because it is the only data on this subject and because the relative importance of land
increases and yield increases is consistent with our understanding and other evidence
(World Bank 1993b, p. 24).226
The "other evidence" that corroborates high growth rates in commodity production in Zambia is not
cited by the World Bank. The evidence examined here, problematic as it may be, does not corroborate
the World Bank report.
Rather than booming growth, analysis here suggests a more complicated story of
diversification in the commercial sector, and increased noncommercial maize production centered in
the far northern and eastern areas of Zambia. Problems of data quality render more detailed
conclusions quite tentative. Longitudinal surveys, both retrospective and into the future, would greatly
assist analysis of agrarian structural change in Zambia.Chapter 8:
Zambia's Agricultural Data System:
A Review of the Agricultural Time Series Data
by
John Litschauer and John S. Rowe'
Although policymakers and other leaders recognize the need for highly accurate and reliable
data in order to make sound agricultural development decisions, they do not always give high priority
to providing the resources necessary to collect and publish such data. This chapter focuses on the
importance of sustaining and improving Zambia's agricultural data system. After presenting a brief
summary of four criteria to be used in evaluating an agricultural data system, the two main sources
of agricultural data in Zambia are reviewed. In the final section, some suggestions are offered on ways
the system might be improved.
It is extremely difficult to initiate and maintain an agricultural data system. High-quality
agricultural data are particularly difficult to collect due to the extensive nature of farming areas and
the seasonality of production. Maintaining a data series requires sustained dedication by the data
collection staff and continued commitment from government. It is with considerable appreciation for
the time and energy put into the Zambian agricultural data system that the following comments are
made. The data managers and their staff should be recognized for their sustained efforts in producing
data series that span years of erratic climatic conditions and rapidly changing economic times.
I. Criteria for evaluating an agricultural data system
The continued production of accurate agricultural estimates needed to build meaningful time
series requires the cooperation of many actors in a government setting. Cost-effectiveness, efficiency,
accuracy, and timeliness are necessary qualities and criteria for judging the outcome of these
interactions.
A. Cost-effectiveness
A data system should be of the proper size and cost for the country. Leaders must recognize
the necessity of having high-quality information available for decision-making and they must be willing
to allocate the necessary resources. It is important that data managers and policymakers enter into a
dialogue that defines the essential data needs for the country. Only data necessary to meet specific
information requirements should be collected and summarized. An open door to information requests
allows the data-collection and data-handling resources to become overburdened. Data systems should
be "demand-driven," with only amply justified data being collected. Policymakers and data managers
must work together as gatekeepers in deciding on the cost-effectiveness of the number of surveys and
the amount of data collected from each survey.
' Mr. Litschauer is a consultant for the Land Tenure Center; Mr. Rowe is a research associate with the office of
International Agricultural Programs.228
B. Efficiency
Once decisions have been made concerning the data to be collected, the technical staff (data
managers, statisticians, data collectors, computer technicians, and the like) must collect and publish
the data in the most efficient manner possible. Selection of the appropriate survey and sample designs
should be based on the type of data needed. Probability designs in which a known portion of the
population is sampled should be used when inferential statements about the population are required.
Probability surveys allow the calculation of sampling errors and allow survey statisticians to make
scientifically valid statements of data precision. If general information is sufficient, a non-probability
design may be acceptable. To achieve efficiency in surveys, the technical staff must be properly
trained and correctly located. Adequate logistical support must be provided at the appropriate time and
place. These requirements are difficult to achieve and often test the administrative and personnel
capacities of the survey organization.
C. Timeliness
Much of the value of agricultural data depends on timing. Policymakers need access to current
information to enable them to make meaningful decisions. By their nature, information on crop yields,
livestock numbers, and market prices must be obtained during the season. It is impossible to determine
these numbers once the crop has been harvested or the livestock sold or moved. Country leaders must
be sensitive to the needs of producing timely data and support the logistical needs of the data collection
units. Unless the amount of data collected is restricted to only the essential numbers, the entire process
is slowed—causing losses to both efficiency and timeliness. To provide accurate data, it is essential
that data collection, data summarization, and data analysis teams work in concert. The important step
of analyzing the data with respect to current economic, climatic, and political conditions must also be
done quickly and accurately. This is achieved by making researchers and policy analysts a part of the
survey-planning team. It is only through the work of the data analysts that the compiled data become
usable information.
D. Accuracy
To state that data must be accurate to be usable in decision-making seems elementary. While
no policymaker would willingly accept inaccurate data as a basis for decisions, it is necessary to do
just that in too many developing countries. Leaders are forced to use available data, the accuracy of
which is seldom known and even less often committed to paper by data managers. Hence the data user
is left with the problem of determining whether the data are accurate. This can only be done by
understanding the source of the data series' sampling and non-sampling errors. Unfortunately, the data
manager's judgement of accuracy is usually clouded by a lack of information.
Before commenting on a data set's accuracy, a manager must have full knowledge of how the
data were collected. What were the practices employed by the field enumerators? Were mistakes or
oversights made? Were the mistakes unintentional or intentional? Inaccuracies caused by these kinds
of mistakes are called non-sampling errors. Non-sampling errors are understood and controlled by
thorough survey planning followed by intensive training and supervision of staff. While it is not
possible to completely eliminate non-sampling errors, a good data manager constantly works to
minimize them. Minimizing non-sampling errors is possible only if data managers are able to insist
upon high-quality performance from their employees. Survey leaders should strive to create an
atmosphere of "expected excellence." However, to do this successfully, a manager must have the229
authority to replace employees who do not display a keen interest in maintaining the highest quality
standards.
A portion of a data set's accuracy can be measured by calculating the sampling errors. This
allows a statistician to make statements of the likelihood of a population parameter falling within a
certain range of the survey statistic. These calculations are valid only if the survey was designed and
carried out as a probability survey—meaning that each sampling unit has a known probability of
selection. To conduct a probability survey, it is necessary to construct a sampling frame and to follow
a scientific sample design.
Accurate information is derived from data that have both low sampling errors and low non-
sampling errors. As mentioned above, these errors are impossible to eliminate and difficult to
minimize. Data managers should be free to discuss the various sources of errors in a data set and
should publish sampling errors and data collection procedures in technical notes.
E. Types of surveys
While agricultural censuses were once believed to be the only certain way of obtaining
accurate agricultural information, a wide variety of innovative methods of collecting agricultural data
have been developed during the past several decades. Survey organizations have accepted the validity
of smaller, more specialized probability surveys and no longer see the need to do a complete
enumeration of all farming units. The proliferation of survey types has placed an added responsibility
on the data manager and statisticians to choose the most effective survey designs. Careful survey
selection is crucial if the four criteria listed above are to be met. For example, it is not possible to
meet the need for current food security information with a national census that takes two years to plan
and implement. On the other hand, a rapid rural reconnaissance survey will not suffice if detailed
structural information on the number of farmers operating under various land tenure arrangements is
needed. At times, these decisions may mean abandoning a time-honored survey design in favor of a
more efficient, cost-effective alternative.
The most important factor in maintaining efficient surveys is to limit the use of each survey
to only the most necessary information. Planners must remain vigilant in the effort to limit data
collection to only necessary items. A survey overloaded with data requests slows the process, makes
the data less accurate, and wastes time and money; the data provider must endure lengthy interviews
and the policymaker must search through extraneous data for the information needed to reach
meaningful decisions.
Table 8.1 provides additional information on the interactions and responsibilities necessary in
coordinating an agricultural data system. It should be recognized that all the criteria listed have very
likely been present at one time or another in the Zambian agricultural data system. The available data
series show that donors and the Zambian government have supported data collection efforts rather well
for over twenty years.Table 8.1: Performance criteria for an agricultural data system
Actors Cost-effectiveness Efficiency Accuracy Timeliness
Decision-makers and
policymakers
Understand importance of using
current information in decision-
making and willing to assist data
providers in setting/maintaining data
collection priorities.
Willing to provide both moral
and administrative support to
data systems recommended by
technical managers.
Value high-quality data and insist on
statements of data accuracy being
made available to data users.
Insistence on timely
information coupled with a
willingness to support the
data collection system.
Data system managers Able to provide policymakers with
realistic estimates of time and
materials necessary to collect various
types of information. Able to reject
requests for low priority, non-
essential data.
Well organized and able to
make decisions on most efficient
mix of programs and personnel.
Actively seek to minimize non-
sampling errors and sampling errors
through sound training and survey
design.
Dedicated to providing high-
quality information in a time





Able to choose the most appropriate
data collection methods for a variety
of information needs.
Able to correctly analyze
various survey options and
select most appropriate data
collection method.
Use "total survey design" techniques




Able to design surveys that
meet the accuracy and
timeliness criteria.
A d m i n i s t rat i v e
support
Aware of the importance of
administrative support to produce
high-quality data.
Able to facilitate the required
logistical support.
Acknowledge importance of








Well trained in the various data
collection techniques. Dedicated to
the collection of high-quality data
under adverse conditions.
Motivated to provide the most
accurate data in the most timely
manner.
Fully trained in importance of
following survey plans. Must remain
vigilant in the collection of high-
quality data—rejecting short cuts or
falsification of data.
Dedicated employees willing
and able to collect high-
quality data as required to
meet time constraints.
Data handlers and
c o m p u t e r
programmers
Able to make realistic estimates of
processing requirements and to
process data quickly with minimal
errors.
Knowledgeable of various
computer software packages and
equipped at an appropriate level.
Recognize importance of following
survey plans. Maintain exacting
standard of data handling. Do not
hesitate to question entries, return to
field for verification.
Able to input, clean, and
summarize survey data
within the prescribed time
requirements.
Data analysts Thoroughly understand current
economic and political climates as
well as available data sets; able to
provide meaningful data analysis.
Well trained in various data-
analysis techniques and equipped
with appropriate hardware.
Knowledgeable of the biases present
in various data sets. Able to explain
and publish information on a data
sets' accuracy.




H. Review of Zambia's agricultural time series data
This section provides a review of the agricultural time series data available from two Zambian
government statistics units: the MAFF and the CSO. This review, which focuses on the crop and land
area statistics without reviewing the livestock data series, was accomplished by cataloguing the various
national surveys and supplying comments on the quality of the data sets. The comments are offered
with the admission that data sets are difficult to evaluate without corroborating data from other sources
or accompanying notes provided by the survey managers. Unfortunately, there are few comments in
MAFF or CSO publications concerning the data quality or technical notes describing survey designs.
No mention of calculating sampling errors for the CSO probability surveys was found in the
publication notes.
There are four sets of time series data that describe Zambia's agricultural sector: one generated
by the MAFF and three compiled by the CSO, the main data gathering agency for the Zambian
government. Each of these data sets is described below.
A. MAFF agricultural data series
Prior to 1983, the MAFF published three types of Agricultural Statistical Bulletins on a
consistent basis—monthly, quarterly, and annually. Both the quarterly and annual publications
provided various agricultural data for multiple years. These data, published at the national and
provincial levels, were obtained from parastatals such as the National Agricultural Marketing Board
(NAMBoard, the primary parastatal agency vested with the legal right to purchase most crops) and
the Tobacco Board of Zambia, and some private organizations and companies. As a result, only sales
are reported. Farm numbers, crop production, crop areas, and yields are not available for most crops
during these years. Livestock farm numbers are also not available prior to 1983.
The MAFF began its crop forecasting exercise for the entire crop subsector with the support
of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the ZATPID I Project during the 1982/83
season. The purpose of this exercise, performed by the Statistics Unit (a unit of MAFF's Planning
Division) is to provide early warning information on the production of crops at the provincial and
national levels. The data series contain area, yield, and production estimates for the major crops. The
number of farms growing each of the crops were projected for internal use but not published. With
the initiation of crop forecasting, the MAFF continued to publish its annual bulletins, which now
contain more complete data series than the crop forecasts, but on an inconsistent basis. The last of
these "annual" publications covered the 1988/89 and 1989/90 crop years. Thus, the only data available
from the MAFF after 1989/90 are from their annual crop forecasts (table 8.2). Despite the lapses in
reporting, a fairly complete data series is available on the agricultural sector from the MAFF for all
crop years from 1970/71 onward.
The MAFF crop data are compiled by camp officers through their contacts with local farmers.
No sampling frame or probability survey techniques are employed. The data are categorized by size
groups: large (more than 20 hectares), medium or emerging (5-20 hectares), and small (less than 5232
Table 8.2: Agricultural time series data available in Zambia
MAFF agric. CSO annual CSO annual
Crop statistics/ CSO survey survey
year crop forecasts crop forecasts (noncommercial) (commercial)
1970/71 X n.a.
b
1971/72 X X n.a.
1972/73 X X n.a.
1973/74 X X n.a.
1974/75 X X n.a.
1975/76 X X X
1976/77 X X X
1977/78 X n.a. X
1978/79 X no survey X
1979/80 X no survey X
1980/81 X no survey X
1981/82 X no survey X
1982/83 X° X' X
1983/84 X X X
1984/85 X X X
1985/86 X X` Xf X
1986/87 X n.a. n.a.
g X
1987/88 X X n.a. X
1988/89 X X n.a.' X
1989/90 X X n. a.' X~
1990/91 X
k X n.a.' n.a.
1991/92 X
k n.a. n.a.' n.a.
1992/93 X
k X n.a.' n.a.
a. 1971/72 was the first year for this survey.
b. Data available for 1969/70.
c. MAFF crop forecasts began.
d. FAO surveys began.
e. CSO crop forecasts began.
f. BUCEN surveys began.
g. Disks misplaced.
h. Data entered but no expansion factors.
i. Data not entered.
j. From disks, some data missing.
k. Crop Forecast Surveys only.
1. Ag Census, data entry not complete.233
hectares). Once the data are listed at the camp level, the agricultural officer forwards them to the ward
supervisor.' The ward supervisor reviews the data and aggregates them to the ward level before
sending them to the district agricultural officer (DAO).' Special crop-forecasting meetings are held
at the district and provincial levels to review the data and to agree upon the forecasts. The data are
then forwarded to the central office in Lusaka for final tabulation and review. The annual crop
forecasts are published by the Early Warning Unit of the MAFF in May of each year. As an example,
table 8.3 lists the MAFF time series data published for maize (Zambia/MAFF 1993).
Table 8.3: Maize time series data published by the MAFF















80/81 622,550 16,500,180 27 7,832,181 47%
81/82 456,000 8,162,000 18 5,671,613 69% 103,791,000 18.30
82/83 546,700 10,392,000 19 5,901,824 57% 144,595,000 24.50
83/84 506,500 9,686,000 19 6,347,637 66% 179,765,000 28.32
84/85 581,846 12,470,570 21 7,069,637 57% 200,212,000 28.32
85/86 588,490 13,673,265 23 10,607,414 78% 583,408,000 55.00
86/87 609,529 11,816,096 19 7,296,044 62% 569,091,000 78.00
87/88 723,087 21,591,321 30 14,989,980 69% 1,199,198,000 80.00
88/89 1,020,574 20,499,758 20 13,551,314 66% 1,463,542,000 108.00
89/90 763,277 12,140,784 16 6,678,711 55% 1,896,754,000 284.00
MAIZE-MF.WB1
Maize Produced and Sold





80/81 81/82 82/8383/8484 /85 85/86 86/8787/88 88/89 89/90
15M Amount Sold
2 This organizational structure was first developed during the colonial period for purposes of providing extension services
to small-scale farmers. The largest local structure was the "block" and within each block several "camps" were identified.
Communications traveled from the district agricultural officer through the block supervisor to each of the relevant camps.
After independence, the "blocks" became "wards" (with the exception of the Southern province), and the purpose of the
organizational structure became primarily political.
3 The Department of Agriculture's "Crop Forecasting Questionnaire" is used to record individual farm data at the camp
level. The "Crop Forecasting Summary Sheet" is used to aggregate camp-level data before it is sent to the DAO.234
Theoretically, all crop farmers in the country are surveyed under this system. However, as
far as can be discerned, no quality control efforts are conducted in the field during the exercise,
raising doubts whether full coverage is actually attained. Some data users suspect that camp-level
figures may be changed for political reasons.4.`Finally, all tabulations of the data at the ward and DAO
levels are done manually. Reports of undetected errors finding their way into final publications are
common.
While the published MAFF data may be subject to considerable error, the exercise is valuable
in providing timely estimates of annual crop production and early warnings of unusual production
patterns. Since the summaries are subject to review and possible manipulation at several administrative
levels, the potential for politically motivated self-serving adjustments should be recognized by
individuals who wish to use the data as a time series.
B. Central Statistics Office agricultural data series
There are three data series emanating from the CSO. They are the commercial farms, the
noncommercial farms, and the crop forecast data. The latter two data series are derived from the same
sample agricultural survey. The agricultural statistics publications printed by the CSO can be found
in the references.
1. Commercial farms data
Data on commercial farms are collected by the CSO annually via a questionnaire mailed to
all known "commercial" farmers. During the early years of the survey the mailing list of commercial
farms was based on a membership list obtained from the Commercial Farmers Union. However, this
practice was discontinued when it was discovered that many union members were not farmers but had
joined to obtain certain products at a preferential price. As a result, by 1969/70, the CSO had
redefined a commercial farmer in terms of agricultural activity.
Definition of a commercial farmer, 1969/70
(1) A farmer who sold maize worth K600 or more at the line of rail prices;
(2) a farmer who grew Virginia or burley tobacco in his/her own name and was registered
with the Tobacco Board;
(3) a farmer who sold dairy products to and was registered with the Dairy Produce Board; or
(4) a farmer who had title to land.
In the mid-1970s, the definition of a commercial farmer was expanded to include the widening variety
of specialized agricultural producers. By 1975/76, when the currently available data series begins, a
commercial farmer was defined as one who satisfied any of the following criteria:
Definition of a commercial farmer, 1975/76
(1) Any farmer who sold during the previous 12 months to NAMBoard or any other
cooperative union any crops the value of which was equivalent to 150 bags (90
kilograms) of maize or more at the ruling producer price;
° For example, a ward supervisor might revise maize production estimates upward to show an increase from the previous
year or to compare more favorably with an adjoining ward.235
(2) any farmer who grew tobacco in his/her own name and was registered with the National
Tobacco Company of Zambia Ltd.;
(3) any farmer who sold to the Dairy Produce Board;
(4) any farmer who bred, reared, and/or fattened cattle or poultry and sold them to the Cold
Storage Corporation of Zambia, Poultry Processing Company, Ltd. or to any licensed
butcher or supermarket;
(5) any farmer who reared and/or fattened pigs and sold them to the Zambia Pork Products
or the Cold Storage Corporation of Zambia or to any licensed butcher or supermarket;
(6) all hybrid poultry breeders; or
(7) all state farms operated by the Agriculture Division of ZIMCO and other agencies on a
commercial basis.
This definition has continued with minor adjustments until 1990/91.
5 The data series reviewed here
(1975/76 and later) falls entirely under the "modern" definition. Data users who have occasion to use
any of the pre-1975 data should be aware of the definition change. While it is reasonable to expect
the estimated number of commercial farmers to be somewhat greater after the more inclusive definition
was adopted, the published farm numbers are not available to make the comparisons.
6
Commercial farm data are published at the provincial and national levels by size groups. A
wide range of data are collected including: area, yield, production, and sales of major crops;
inventory, production, and sales of livestock and poultry; inventory of farm implements; pesticide and
fertilizer usage; production expenditures; and farm gate prices. To collect this much information
requires a very long survey instrument. It is not difficult to understand why relatively few commercial
farmers responded when they received such a long and complex questionnaire in the mail.
The CSO data on commercial farms forms the second longest continuous data series when
compared to the other data sets—from 1975 through 1989/90.' Unfortunately, the accuracy of these
data is questionable for two reasons: the accuracy of the list frame used and the low response levels
to the mailed questionnaires. While it was not possible to evaluate the data sets' accuracy directly,
examining the response rates to the mail survey for the years in which the data were obtained along
with the number of commercial farms identified to receive the mailed questionnaire indicates problems
in both areas (table 8.4).
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The number of questionnaires sent to commercial farms increased sharply from 1,603 farms
in 1975/76 to 2,595 farms in 1976/77. The number then remained around 2,000 until it dropped
suddenly to 1,072 in 1982/83. It is not clear whether these variations were due to incomplete or
incorrect lists or were actually correct farm numbers. However, the short time between the sizable
gains and losses support the first conclusion. It would have taken a very serious economic event to
suddenly halve the number of commercial farms in Zambia.
5 No data have been compiled after 1989/90. However, since the 1990/91 Census, the CSO has supposedly changed their
emphasis from "commercial" to "large (>20 ha)" farmers. Whether this transition has actually been made is unknown.
6 Given the problems noted later in this paper concerning the commercial farm estimates, this change in definition may
have had no effect on the published data.
Both the 1988/89 and the 1989/90 data sets have yet to be published. However, preliminary computer summaries are
available.
Maize production estimates for commercial farms are available as far back as 1940. See the annex 8.2 for a complete
listing of the maize data series.236
Table 8.4: Commercial farms survey: numbers of questionnaires mailed and returned
and estimated number of farms, by crop year, CSO, Zambia
Number of Estimated
Crop year commercial Questionnaires Response rate number of
farms.4' returned (%) farmsb
1975/76 1,603 526 33 1,527
1976/77 2,595 578 22 2,242
1977/78 2,025 523 26 2,010
1978/79 1,771 599 34 1,566
1979/80 1,920 657 34 1,894
1980/81 2,143 536 25 1,835
1981/82 2,187 583 27 1,780
1982/83 1,072 276 26 1,103
1983/84 1,231 290 24 1,314
1984/85 1,283 307 24 1,102
1985/86 912 279 31 1,972
1986/87 180 99 55 2,026
1987/88 not specified - 2,115
1988/89 not available 2,185
1989/90 not available - 1,444
a. Number of farmers to whom questionnaires were mailed.
b. The CSO published estimate ofthe number of commercial farms.
Source: Zambia CSO (commercial farms) series.
During the same period, response rates to mailed enquiries ranged from 22 to 34 percent.
Without a sampling of the nonrespondents, the representativeness of the voluntary respondents is
unknown. CSO officials recognized this problem as early as 1970 when they reported on a
nonresponse survey in the "1970 Agricultural and Pastoral Production Report." The exercise found
that the smaller farms on the commercial farms list had not received a questionnaire in the mail and
that the list was out-of-date because of the many changes in ownership.'
Over the last three years for which surveys were published, the number of questionnaires
mailed decreased significantly—down to 912 in 1986 and then to 180 in 1987. No numbers were
specified for 1988. Consequently, data collected during the last five years of the time series are likely
to be even less accurate than those collected during the first 10 years of the commercial farm survey.
While the exact procedures used by the CSO to arrive at the published estimates of commercial
agricultural production are not explained in the publications, the most common method, expanding
9 The reporting of this nonresponse study is the only comment found which indicated an attempt to access the quality
of the commercial farm data.237
the data, uses the information provided by the voluntary respondents as indicators of what all farmers
are doing. Using this method, the average of the data from the mail responses is calculated and
multiplied by the estimated number of commercial farms. Since the CSO commercial farm data were
published by farm size within provinces, the procedure would be somewhat more complicated. The
statistician would first have to estimate the number of farms in each size group in each province and
then apply an appropriate average value to each.
In the 1977/78 report, the data user is warned that the estimation procedure is not totally
accurate and that the "maize and other major crops would be the most accurate." This is because there
is usually less variability in area, yield, and production data when nearly all the farmers are actively
producing the crop. Experiences from other African countries suggest that a direct expansion of data
from voluntary respondents may be flawed for a number of reasons. Some amount of overestimation
or upward bias was introduced when the smaller commercial farms did not receive a questionnaire and
thus were not given a chance to respond. On the other end of the scale, large farmers are notorious
for either refusing to report or grossly underreporting their agricultural holdings. Since the commercial
farms survey was totally voluntary with no response validation process, it is reasonable to expect that
the holdings of the largest farmers are underrepresented. This would cause a downward bias in the
estimates derived by expanding the data. While it is impossible to speculate on the impact of the
adjustments on the crop estimates, it is fair to say that the low response rate from an unknown and
possibly underrepresented portion of the population leaves serious questions about the level of
estimated crop production reported. For example, the data series in table 8.4 listing the estimated
number of farms shows much variability—changing radically from one year to the next, especially for
the three years beginning in 1982/83 and then again in 1989/90. If it is difficult to have confidence
in an estimate as basic as the number of farms, it is even more difficult to imagine how the more
detailed estimates of crop area and production might be accurate. 10
Another anomaly in the commercial farm survey is the timing of publications. Although the
questionnaires continued to be mailed each year, the results are often not published until several years
later. In the 1987/88 report (published in September 1990), the director thanks the staff for catching
up with 12 years of unpublished data. Evidently the demand for detailed commercial farm data was
strong enough to cause the CSO to resurrect and publish data that had not been given a high priority
at the time it was collected.
2. CSO noncommercial crop surveys and crop forecasts
To complement the commercial farm data series, the CSO also collects data from the
noncommercial farmers (all farmers not falling under the definition of commercial farmers). Attempts
to measure the agricultural production of the noncommercial farmers is done via a series of sample
surveys. At present, the CSO collects data on the noncommercial farm sector for the purpose of
providing both annual crop forecasts as well as more detailed statistics. The crop forecasts focus on
the number of farms growing the major crops, the area planted, and expected production. These
estimates are published midway through the crop year as part of the early warning process. In
contrast, the annual surveys are designed to provide more detailed information on land use, crop
production, livestock numbers, and prices received for agricultural produce. Estimates are published
10
Additional remarks on estimating procedures may be found in the section titled "Setting and Publishing Agricultural
Estimates" (see p. 245).238
at the provincial and national levels. Table 8.5 lists the published time series data for maize production
on noncommercial farms, as an example.
While the annual survey of noncommercial farmers began in 1971/72, the crop forecasting
portion of the survey was first initiated with technical and equipment support being provided by the
ZATPID II Project (equipment and long-term advisory support) and the US Bureau of Census
(BUCEN—training and short-term technical support) in 1985/86. As can be seen in table 8.2, this
effort has been less than successful in producing publishable data sets. Despite continuous collection
of detailed annual survey data since 1986, only the results from that year have been published."
Crop forecasts, however, have been published for the period 1986 through 1993. 12 The following
is a description of the evolution of the CSO sample survey in its three iterations.
3. CSO sample surveys, 1972 to 1978
Designed as a probability survey of the entire country, the sampling frame was built by first
stratifying the country into urban, peri-urban, and rural areas. The urban stratum contained all
principal towns with populations of 30,000 or more; the peri-urban stratum comprised all urban
centers with populations less than 30,000 plus all provincial and district administrative centers; the
rural stratum comprised the remainder of the country.
Once the rural stratum was identified, a 10 percent sample of basic areas (BAs—the primary
sampling unit [PSU] for the survey) was selected. A total of 134 BAs were selected in 1972 out of
a total rural population of 1,145 BAs. 13 Field enumerators listed all of the noncommercial farming
households in the sample BAs, and a sample of 10 percent of the households was randomly selected
for interviewing. The number of selected BAs ranged from 3 to 28 per province. Fortunately, the
amount of data collected under these surveys was reasonable—especially when compared to the
magnitude of the present efforts. Copies of the questionnaires used can be found in the back of each
publication.
Despite the probability design of the survey which would have permitted sampling errors to
be calculated, the publications do not discuss any sampling or non-sampling errors. Given the large
size of the PSUs, it is difficult to say what the sampling errors might have been. Normally, a sample
size of 10 percent in the second stage of sampling is more than adequate for agricultural surveys. As
with most agricultural surveys, the non-sampling errors are a very important part of the estimation
procedure and are largely immeasurable. If the survey managers had noted the major data collection
problems and how they were handled, it would have provided future data users with some hints
concerning the quality of the time series.
11 Summary tables for both the 1986/87 and 1987/88 surveys have been completed but not published. (Disks containing
the 1986/87 summary data have been misplaced.) The 1988/89 raw data have been entered on the computer but have not
been summarized because the expansion factors (weights) needed for summarization have not been entered.
12 Although these data have been published, a complete data set is not available. Some data were able to be recreated
from disk backups.
13 The size of these BAs must have been huge. If all Zambia was divided into 1,145 BAs, the average size of a BA
would have been approximately 65 square kilometers. At present, 9,682 rural survey enumeration areas (SEAs) are used
as PSUs. The average size of a SEA is approximately 8 square kilometers.Table 83: Maize time series data published by the CSO, noncommercial farms
























71/72 431,700 6,164,600 2,618,900 42% 9,123,800 3.48
72/73 415,400 5,272,000 1,581,700 30% 6,372,500 4.03
73174 389,200 6,302,800 2,466,200 39% 10,813,800 4.38
74175 397,100 10,262,800 5,066,600 49% 25,274,500 4.99
75/76 319,300 9,911,200 5,614,100 57% 35,095,900 6.25






82/83 378,300 358,510 0.95 7,190,000 20 3,857,000 54% 68,666,000 17.80
83/84 386,560 397,020 1.03 7,998,000 20 4,543,000 57% 102,280,000 22.51
84/85 400,210 400,810 1.00 9,229,000 23 4,735,000 51% 126,692,000 26.76
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4. CSO sample surveys, 1982 to 1985
Following a hiatus in surveys from 1979 to 1982, annual surveys were conducted between
1982 and 1985 with assistance from the FAO. In 1981/82, a pilot census of agriculture was carried
out in preparation for the census of agriculture that was scheduled to be conducted during the 1982/83
crop season. The actual census was never conducted, and, as a result, the FAO and the CSO agreed
to do a sample survey of agriculture on a rotating basis. The four major agricultural
provinces—Central, Eastern, Southern, and Lusaka—were actually surveyed in 1982/83. Recall data
were collected during the following year to complete the 1982/83 survey in the remaining provinces.
It is not entirely clear how the 1984/85 data were collected. While the authors of the survey
publication state that a two-stage sample was used with survey enumeration areas (SEAs) serving as
the primary sampling units, they do not provide information on sample size at either the primary or
secondary levels. Again, no estimates of sampling errors were calculated or published for the data.
5. CSO sample surveys, 1986 to 1993
Since 1986, the CSO has conducted annual surveys of crop forecasting on the noncommercial
sector, initially with technical assistance provided from BUCEN and independently since 1990. Results
have been less than spectacular, at least with respect to the publication of the annual surveys. The
results of only the 1986 survey have been published. According to CSO officials, crop forecasting data
are regarded as confidential until the Minister of Agriculture certifies them acceptable. Publication of
such data has been the prerogative of that ministry because the final announcement was a blend of two
forecasts collected separately, one by the CSO, and the other by the Ministry of Agriculture. The CSO
is thus unable to publish the data themselves without upstaging or contradicting the minister's role.
For these surveys, a new sample design was used which comprised a three-stage sampling
system. The sample is used for both the crop forecasting exercise and the annual survey with the goal
of publishing data at the district, provincial, and national levels. The first stage of sampling is done
from the census supervisory areas (CSAs). Within each CSA, SEAs have been identified based on
readily identifiable boundaries. From one to four SEAs are located in each CSA. Sample CSAs are
first selected with probability proportional to the number of households located in each based on the
1990 census (1980 census in earlier data-gathering efforts). Once a CSA is selected, a sample SEA
is then selected, again based on probability proportional to the number of households. During the
earlier years of the survey, 800 SEAs were selected, however the number has been reduced to 400
for recent surveys. Households in each sample SEA are listed and farm households identified.
Following the listing process, farm households are stratified based on area planted to crops.
Three strata are identified: small (less than 5 hectares), medium or emerging (5-20 hectares), and
large (greater than 20 hectares). Fifteen sample households are systematically selected from each of
the small and medium groups. Normally, only a few households are identified as medium-sized
farmers in any given sample SEA. If fewer than 15 households qualify as medium-sized, all of these
households are selected and the remainder of the intended 15 sample households are reassigned to the
small-farm stratum. For example, if a sample SEA contained 100 small farmers and 3 medium
farmers, the final sample would include the 3 medium farmers plus 27 of the small farmers. Only if
the total number of farmers—small and medium—were less than 30 would the sample size be less than
30. This results in a sample size that nearly always approaches the maximum of 30 per SEA or a total241
of 12,000 from 400 sample SEAs. Usually, no large-farm households are identified. If they are
identified, data are collected from these households via the commercial farm survey.
After the sample farmers are identified, each is visited three times. During the first visit,
which is conducted in January/February, the listing process is completed, sample farmers are
identified, and preliminary crop forecast data are collected. During the second visit, which is
conducted in March/April, data are collected for the final crop forecast. During the third visit, which
is conducted in October/November, a post-harvest survey is completed. This last data set forms the
basis for the annual agricultural survey report.
Based on a preliminary analysis of the sample size, the CSO's noncommercial survey is both
too small and too large. While a thorough review of the data is necessary to determine the optimum
number of samples to be selected at each stage of the survey, experience suggests that a sample size
of 400 PSUs would tend to have sampling errors that are too high for data presentation at the district
level. At the same time, a secondary sample size of 30 farmers is clearly larger than required at the
final stage of sampling. More likely, 5 to 10 small farmers and a 100 percent sample of medium
farmers selected from each sample SEA would provide the basis for acceptably accurate provincial
and national estimates. This would reduce the data handling load by 75 percent which would greatly
facilitate the speed of collection, summarization, and publication. While the data should probably only
be published at the provincial and national levels, it may be feasible to provide district estimates for
only the larger districts that exhibit reasonable sampling errors.
14
A review of the "Phase 3 Final Crop Forecasting Questionnaire
" shows the survey instrument
to be of reasonable length. However, the post-harvest survey is extremely detailed with 33 pages.
Thus, three sets of data are to be collected from 24,000 (presently 12,000) farmers each year. This
means the CSO staff is faced with a total of 72,000 (or 36,000) questionnaires to be entered, edited,
and summarized annually. The post-harvest survey questionnaire is far too long and is also not
designed for efficient data entry. It should be reduced so only the essential data are being gathered and
simplified to allow easier data entry.'
5
The large size of the questionnaire is also problematic during the summary phase.
Conversations with CSO personnel indicate that corners are cut to speed the summarization process.
For example, as far as can be discerned, no computer edits of the data are conducted. Given the
pressures of trying to push large amounts of data through a summary system without adequate edit
"According to officials in the CSO, the government's policy is to encourage development planning in all sectors at least
down to the district level. The CSO thus feels compelled to collect and publish data at the district level to help facilitate
government planning. Rather than abandoning the current practice, the CSO instead recommends improving the quality and
lowering the cost of district-level data collection.
While the management of CSO also feels that the questionnaire is probably too long, it stresses that length alone is
not a hindrance. Space is provided for capturing all the possible production activities of households, but rarely does a
household have more than 4-5 activities (out of 20 in section 2) to report, leaving substantial empty space. Also, few
households report information on growing fruit trees in section 3 and vegetables in section 4. Thus, the majority of the
questionnaires returned to the CSO have substantial space that has been left blank. Moreover, the CSO management feels
that the current data being collected are essential for monitoring purposes. Before discarding items for sake of increasing
efficiency, the CSO management advises caution against loss of important information, a point of view shared by the authors.242




It is obvious that the CSO, as the premier data collection agency for Zambia, has devoted
much time and effort to the continuation of agricultural data series. It is unfortunate that more effort
was not spent in assuring the quality of the data. It appears the foundations of the survey organization
may be sound, but the current activities are sorely in need of reevaluation and redirection.
C. Comparison of MAFF and CSO estimates
One method of assessing data accuracy is to compare several independent data series.
Sometimes two data series will rise and fall in the same general pattern but have minor differences.
In these cases, a close comparison may reveal that one series uses a slightly different definition or may
contain a bias that accounts for the variations. However, at other times, when more serious differences
exist in one or both of the series, little comparability may be present. It is difficult to compare the
MAFF and the CSO data series because of differences in methodologies. While both the CSO and the
MAFF call their surveys "crop forecast" surveys or exercises, the MAFF series is derived from a
grassroots listing of data from all farms. The CSO uses a sample-survey approach. The intent of both
is to provide early-warning information during the growing season. In contrast, the CSO's commercial
and noncommercial surveys are meant to provide a more comprehensive view of agricultural
production without the time constraints of the forecast surveys.
The "final" estimates of the CSO crop forecast (CSO/CF), the MAFF crop forecast
(MAFF/CF), and the combined commercial and noncommercial agricultural surveys (CSO/AS) were
compared. While it would have been preferable to use basic estimates such as "numbers of farms" or
"total land in farms" for comparison, they were not available, so maize was chosen as the crop
estimate series which was likely to be most accurate. Data for "area planted," "production," and
"sales" were compared. Table 8.6 lists the data and figure 8.1 provides graphic comparisons of the
data sets.
Comparisons of maize area planted shows the MAFF/CF to be generally higher than the
CSO/CF. In the eight years of comparative data, only in 1984 and 1987 were the MAFF estimates
lower (90 and 92 percent respectively) than the CSO. There seems to be no real connection between
the CSO/AS data and the CSO/CF data. For the four years, comparisons range from 91 to 126
percent. Special note is made of the 1988-89 MAFF estimate of maize planted, which is substantially
higher than any other estimate in any series. The 1,021,000 hectare figure is about 40 percent greater
than the MAFF estimates for the years immediately preceding and following.
16 However, questionnaire size is not the sole or even the most important reason for these problems. According to CSO
management, the problems encountered during the summary phase stem mainly from the lack of an incentive structure that
encourages personnel to properly edit data before summaries are undertaken. An officer who goes to the field to collect data
is eligible for an allowance in addition to salary. No such incentive is given to an officer in Lusaka who is responsible for
scrutinizing data to detect and eliminate data errors. It is generally the case that data processing personnel are left alone to
resolve inconsistencies without proper guidance from the statisticians—the outcome being inadequate editing and short-cut
methods employed to speed the summarization process.243
Table 8.6: Comparison of the CSO and MAFF maize estimates
1980-81 623
1981-82 456
1982-83 479 434 91% 547 126% 114%
1983-84 488 564 116 % 507 90 % 104 %
1984-85 455 575 126 % 582 101 % 128 %
1985-86 552 532 97 % 588 111 % 107 %
1986-87 659 610 92%
1987-88 692 723 105 %
1988
.-89 797 1,021 128 %






1981-82 10,976 9,628 88% 8,162 108% 95%
1982-83 10,486 10,330 99% 10,392 94% 92%
1983-84 11,146 13,492 121% 9,686 92% 112%
1984-85 17,732 15,855 89% 12,471 86% 77%
1985-86 11,146 13,673 106%
1986-87 20,378 11,816 106%
1987-88 22,188 21,591 92%







1981-82 7,513 4,944 66 % 5,672 119 % 79 %
1982-83 6,685 6,749 101% 5,902 94 % 95 %
1983-84 6,593 7,227 110 % 6,348 98 % 107 %
1984-85 10,729 9,794 91 % 7,070 108% 99 %
1985-86 6,886 10,607 106 %
1986-87 12,947 7,296 116 %
1987-88 15,115 14,990 90 %





a. Total of CSO commercial and noncommercial estimates.
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Maize area estimatesFigure 8.1: Comparison of the CSO and MAFF maize estimates
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It is difficult to recognize any discernable patterns between the maize production data series.
Comparisons between the MAFF and the CSO data range from 75 to 108 percent. Comparisons
between the two CSO series vary from 88 to 121 percent. The MAFF estimates for maize production
in 1989 and 1990 are substantially greater than preceding or following years.
As with maize production, comparisons between the series show little similarity for the maize
sold estimates. It appears that the MAFF series of maize sales and the CSO series listed in its
"1992/1993 Final Crop Forecast" are the official estimates of sales.
Beginning with the 1993/94 agricultural season, the separate crop forecasting surveys of the
CSO and MAFF were merged. The survey method is that used by the CSO as outlined in the previous
section.
D. Publishing agricultural estimates
Statistical organizations have a choice of either publishing data as collected or using them as
indicators in an estimation process. Governmental organizations rely on survey data as indicators for
setting their published estimates of agricultural production. This method allows the survey statisticians
to adjust for anomalies in the survey data. The result is a smoother set of survey estimates which show
reasonable (believable) changes over time. If the organization publishes "raw" survey data (or data
with little review) the users are forced to make their own interpretation of how questionable data are
to be used. For instance, most agriculturalists would find it difficult to imagine a set of circumstances
that would result in the numbers of commercial farms (or the average area planted to maize)
fluctuating as much as is indicated by the CSO data. The graphs in the appendix illustrate the dramatic
amount of variation in the commercial farms data series. Normally averages for a group of farms
change slowly over time unless there are severe political, economic, or climatic events.
Agricultural statisticians agonize over how much they should adjust survey data. On one hand,
they do not want to be accused of "manipulating" data, but they are also reluctant to publish data
series that show inconsistencies. The CSO has had difficulty in choosing just how much intervention
they wish to impose in reporting their survey results. It appears they should have been more willing
to control for the variability caused by both sampling and non-sampling errors in the commercial
farms surveys. If the CSO statisticians had written technical notes about problems and the procedures
they followed in correcting them, it would have provided both a consistent data series for the many
users who just "need a number" and a basis for further study for the in-depth analysts. However,
simply expending more time writing technical notes will prove ineffective in correcting the problem
without a commensurate improvement in salary structures that provide office staff sufficient incentive
to scrutinize data and make necessary corrections.
After reviewing data series such as those published by the CSO and the MAFF, external
reviewers often face the dilemma of deciding whether to state that the data series are too fraught with
errors to be usable or to be more understanding and merely warn data users that the series contain
many unexplained inconsistencies. The first alternative is seldom taken because data are so badly
needed and are deemed to be "the best there are." Fortunately, an understanding of statistical
organization and training exists in Zambia that can be used as a basis for reviving the system if the
government decides to move toward fewer, more accurate statistics.246
III. Suggestions and recommendations
As mentioned at the outset, Zambia has a large data system which has received support from
various donors over the years. Unfortunately, donor support has been spasmodic and not sustained.
The system has not been held to high standards of cost-effectiveness, efficiency, accuracy, or
timeliness. The following are some suggestions of how to improve performance in these areas.
A. Improving cost-effectiveness
The overriding need in the Zambian agricultural data system is to work toward a more
cohesive, organized data system that emphasizes collecting only data that has been substantially
justified. Currently, too many resources are flowing into a system that produces many, but not
necessarily usable, results." It appears the system has been allowed to accept more and more
requests for data without a thorough review of necessity. Publications are often delayed due to the
inability to summarize the unwieldy quantity of data.
It is not uncommon for large national surveys to become vehicles for collecting increasing
amounts of data. The CSO's survey questionnaires have become laden with many interesting but
inappropriate questions. To rectify the situation, every survey instrument used in Zambia should be
forced to pass a rigorous evaluation process that would allow only the most essential items to remain
on the questionnaires.
18 Eliminating questions that have been on questionnaires for a number of years
will be difficult, but it is an essential step in making the surveys more accurate sources of information.
Even when troubles are well known, problems of institutional rigidity, lack of resources, lack of skills,
or complacency lead to inaction. Scott mentions a CSO "user-producer seminar on government
statistics" scheduled for May 1990 (Scott 1990). According to CSO management, that seminar was
held, but no changes were made to the surveys by way of follow-through.
Data collection should be trimmed to an absolute minimum. The specific data to be collected
should be determined at a series of data user conferences where the realities of data collection and
publication are discussed. Organizations requesting data must be convinced that less-extensive, higher-
quality data sets are of more value than the more detailed, but questionable, statistics currently being
collected. Data users who want to maintain current levels of data collection should be asked for
specific examples of where published data are used. Only those data sets which have a proven current
use should be allowed to continue. It is difficult to believe that the detailed structural/size group data
collected by both the MAFF and the CSO are necessary every year. Usually collection of these data
every three to five years is sufficient. Following thorough review, data from other sources, such as
parastatals and marketing boards, should continue to be published by the CSO. These data provide the
only comparisons to the survey data published in Zambia.
'
7 Based on requests it has received from users, CSO officials believe that most of the data collected is usable. Rather,
it is the long lag between data collection and publication that diminishes the data's usefulness.
' The CSO's comprehensive agricultural survey described by Scott (1990) was not reviewed as a part of this study.
Given the extreme amount of data collected by the survey, the exercise sounds like an ill-conceived use of resources. The
level of detail collected by the survey is normally restricted to specialized research studies and is seldom deemed cost-
effective at the national level.247
A sampling frame should be developed which allows for the collection of data at various
administrative, ecological, and geographical levels. This would facilitate the initiation of smaller, more
cost-effective survey designs to collect detailed data for specific needs.
With a accurate sampling frame in place, most future surveys should be based on probability
designs. Probability surveys allow the statistician to make statements about the estimates' precision.
These statements in turn allow the data users to calculate a band of confidence in using the data.
Decision-makers would gain confidence in both the MAFF and the CSO if the organizations moved
to more probability surveys and concentrated on collecting and summarizing fewer, higher-quality data
sets.
Scott suggests that some movement has begun within the CSO to combine the noncommercial
and commercial surveys. This is an excellent idea. When combined, the resulting survey should be
much more cost-effective and efficient than the existing separate surveys. However, as of April 1994,
separate questionnaires were still being administered to the two categories of farms. One small
improvement has been made. Instead of sending and receiving commercial questionnaires by post, the
forms are now being delivered by enumerators and later collected by them.
B. Improving efficiency
Survey efficiency is gained through the proper management of resources. All survey managers
should be well trained and should be vested with the authority to respond quickly to unexpected field
conditions—adjusting logistics and personnel accordingly. Extra salary incentives that encourage
fieldwork over central office work are detrimental to both the efficiency and the accuracy of the
surveys. The extra time spent in the field not only lessens the amount of time spent in cleaning and
summarizing the data, it allows more data to be collected, thus adding even more to the burden of
work to be done in the central office. Staff working on the agricultural data have not yet systematically
collected, entered, analyzed, and published data as one continuous and coherent process. The emphasis
on data collection has pulled resources away from analysis—the outcome being piles of unprocessed
data. Reducing data collection to the essentials will go a long way toward solving the central office
staffing problems, but incentive structures need to be modified to encourage office work in Lusaka
on analysis and publication.
C. Improving timeliness
The inability to publish timely reports has been most obvious in the CSO commercial farm
surveys. Many of the reports are published well after the year in which the data were collected. One
reason for delay is the imbalance between field and central office staff discussed earlier.
Reorganization may be necessary to assure that each survey unit has a data entry and computing staff
capable of handling the current data collection activities. The speed with which data are handled can
be greatly enhanced with proper data entry/computer editing programs. Modern microcomputer
processing is available to overcome many of the time and accuracy problems of out-of-date systems.
Data summary and analyses can also be made more timely through the proper addition of computer
techniques.
Late reports are also often the result of ill-defined priorities. If the data managers do not have
a clear sense of priorities, it is easy to allow outside requests for data to overcome what should be
ongoing data series. To maintain proper focus on the priorities, a clear mandate must be agreed upon248
and realistic budgets and human resource support must be provided. Without the insistence of top
government officials on timely publications, the timing will inevitably slip. Data managers must see
their mission as providing high-quality information that is available for current decisions.
D. Improving accuracy
It is difficult to judge the accuracy of the agricultural estimates because there are few
alternative measures for comparison. The data series reviewed show variations that may have been
caused by either natural variations in agricultural production or data collection errors. However, the
magnitude and rapidity of fluctuations suggest significant collection errors. Unless a thorough review
of a survey's accuracy is completed during the survey period, much of the information that would
reveal the true accuracy of the data is lost.
For example, it is not difficult to understand why errors exist in the CSO data series when
surveys take several years to be published. It is difficult to accurately track data for the three-year
waiting period now occurring between data collection and data entry. Data have to be tracked at every
point in the data entry/editing process—upon receipt, during data entry, and at each point in the
computer editing process. Steps need to be taken to ensure that manual edits performed in the field
and after receipt at the central office are performed correctly. This requires both training and good
manuals which define the editing required.
In the future, it is hoped that both the MAFF and the CSO survey units will publish technical
notes that attempt to explain data fluctuations. A mature and confident survey unit displays an open
interest in eliminating survey shortcomings. All surveys, even in experienced hands, have points of
difficulty. For the Zambian units to ignore or minimize them is not helpful to the data user. When the
survey managers begin publishing comments on the possible biases in the survey, the data users will
gain confidence in both the data and the survey unit. Again, this type of information can be easily lost
in the delay between collection and analysis/publication.
The survey units should make every effort to employ improved statistical techniques designed
to minimize sampling and non-sampling errors. Employing "total survey design" techniques would be
a helpful approach. This methodology allows the survey designers to identify the various error-causing
components of a survey and to minimize both sampling and non-sampling errors.
Training is often a key component in minimizing survey errors.
19 All survey personnel should
be provided with comprehensive training so they fully understand and appreciate the impact their
actions have on data quality. For example, field personnel are often expected to spend long days
following intricate procedures in search of data that have little meaning to them. This situation often
leads to fabrication of the data by the field enumerators. However, when the staff is given information
about the survey sample design and insights into the purpose of the survey, the quality of their
performance is higher.
19 The CSO is presently engaging its statisticians in on-the-job training of manual editing using 1992/93 post-harvest data.
The statisticians, after the program, are then expected to supervise junior officers in future surveys. Based on early feedback,
the statisticians are gaining a lot of experience with common data errors generated by enumerators in the field and data entry
personnel in Lusaka (CSO, personal communications).249
IV. Summary
In spite of substantial effort in agricultural data collection, review of the available summaries
and reports suggest significant problems with quality. As stated earlier, it is difficult to review data
series after a period of time has elapsed unless there are technical notes that document the survey
procedures including problems that may have affected the quality of data collected. Unfortunately, few
such notes exist in either the MAFF or the CSO publications. However, the quality of Zambia's
agricultural data may be improved in the future in a number of ways. The most important steps are
to ensure the elimination of all unnecessary questions from the two main CSO and MAFF surveys and
then to concentrate on the development and maintenance of solid data collection techniques. This will
not be an easy task. It will take the courage of policymakers and survey managers alike to make
commitments to data quality rather than data quantity.
The most expeditious way of beginning to change the Zambian data system is to employ a
team of outside evaluators to review the system in detail. Once the evaluation is complete, and a plan
of work is agreed upon by the appropriate governmental units, the government should request the aid
of donors in mounting a sustained program of survey evaluation and improvement. Following are four
alternative levels of technical support donors should consider providing to the Zambian agricultural
data system. Each alternative offers unique benefits. Assisting Zambia with a combination of these
inputs would be most effective.
(1) Short-term trip(s) with the specific task of designing and organizing surveys to collect data for
LTC research projects might be considered as a minimal level of support. Working on
specific LTC research questions, short-term technical assistance (STTA) would collaborate
with CSO statisticians in designing appropriate samples. STTA would explore the use of CSO
sampling frame to facilitate probability samples. Areas of possible data-collection collaboration
could be considered with the MAFF and/or the CSO field personnel. Any collaboration would
be accompanied by in-country training provided by the STTA. The number of trips provided
in this category would be totally dependent on LTC research needs.
Benefits: Professionally designed surveys resulting in high-quality research data. Collaboration
and a small amount of training provided for the MAFF and the CSO staff.
(2) One or two short-term trips to search for existing data that would be helpful to the LTC
researchers would probably produce information that was previously overlooked. Data series
or administrative records very likely exist which have potentially valuable information for
researchers. These may include information from governmental or parastatal units (e.g.,
mortgage listings, title registrations, and the like), or listings currently being compiled for the
CSO sampling frames. The search for these information sources would take some time and
would depend on STTA's ability to convince government officials of the value of cooperating
in the effort.
Benefits: Possible discovery of information that could be made available to the project and
others at a relatively low cost.
(3) STTA would develop an ongoing relationship with CSO and MAFF to assist in providing
incremental improvements to the agricultural data system. Following a system review, the
STTA would work to encourage changes that appear to be most effective in improving data250
quality. Training of staff (both in-country and in the US) would be encouraged as the most
certain method of assuring long-term improvements. STTA would expect to spend no less than
two months in Zambia each year. Additional time would be spent in the US designing
specialized training programs as needed.
Benefits: Improved data and improved working relationship between the project staff and the
data collection officials. This kind of technical input could be particularly beneficial if the
STTA is allowed to work closely with the CSO and/or the MAFF staff to gain their
confidence and cooperation. As travel and training opportunities are realized, interaction
between UW and Zambia professionals would be strengthened, offering possibilities for future
collaboration.
(4) Long-term TA (LTTA) to work with the CSO in completely rethinking the data system. There
is evidence that the system needs major structural changes if it is to satisfy the needs of future
data users. While new technologies such as GIS, remote sensing, and area frames may offer
efficiencies and improved accuracy, there are many areas in which incremental changes would
be beneficial to the organization. A resident LTTA would be able to influence major changes
in design and methods that a STTA may not have the clout to accomplish. However, STTAs
would be important for specialized training and statistical design needs.
Benefits: With sufficient funding, the CSO and the MAFF could collaborate in building an
agricultural data system that uses cost-effective and efficient surveys to provide timely and
accurate data.
Any project delivering STTA and LTTA should emphasize transfer of knowledge to local
personnel. As obvious as this sounds, according to CSO officials, some TA personnel have
perpetuated their employment by doing the work themselves. Some have failed to produce technical
notes about survey methods despite remaining in Zambian organizations for years. Despite these
reservations, the CSO nevertheless welcomes STTA and LTTA. From the perspective of the authors,
such problems of confidence and transfer of knowledge are best encountered through projects
emphasizing long-term institutional collaboration and commitment (e.g., options (3) and (4) above).
Improvement of staff performance is key to raising the quality of agricultural data in Zambia.
By offering training opportunities to the staff, both productivity and accuracy will rise as they learn
new procedures and experience higher morale. Some of the statistical training programs available are
summarized below:
ISPC, Bureau of Census offers focused training in several areas of statistics, survey
management, and computer analysis. Courses are usually 12 months in length. ISPC training is
expensive, but courses impart valuable practical training on what is needed to manage an agricultural
data system.
OICD/USDA contracts with governmental agencies and universities to provide specialty
training of 2 to 8 weeks in length. Each year OICD offers several 2- to 6-week courses in agricultural
statistics and computer usage. The impression is that the courses are somewhat limited in scope and
the contractors have fairly rigid programs with limited latitude for adapting materials to specific
country needs.251
University of Wisconsin-Madison offers training opportunities either on-campus or in-country.
Courses range from formal university graduate-level courses to 2- to 4-week workshops. Courses can
be geared to the needs of the students. For example, courses can be adapted as refreshers for
experienced staff or as beginning courses designed to get new employees started. Instructors will travel
to Zambia to conduct short courses and/or assist Zambians in training local staff.
If employed as STTA to interface with the CSO and the MAFF (item 3 above), the instructor
will spend up to two months per year in Zambia working on data problems. Coordination of STTA
visits and training plans would increase effectiveness.
The University of Wisconsin offers additional courses in monitoring and evaluation, research
methods, rapid rural appraisal methods and land tenure issues periodically at various African sites
(e.g., Senegal, Madagascar, Uganda, and The Gambia).
The CSO prefers locally-organized courses as they afford opportunities for a larger number
of officers to attend. However, this by no means precludes training abroad in specialized areas.
Further, as it is difficult to identify with perfect knowledge all training needs in advance, the CSO
strongly advises maintaining flexibility in choice of training programs during the course of project
design.252
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1970 1,277 59,530 47 2,318,590 39
1971 849 39,940 47 2,020,400 51 3158600 97% 12,469,000 3.95
1972 898 69,970 78 3,264,600 47 2213070 97% 9,391,810 4.24
1973 705 53,028 75 2,291,008 4 4,982,220 95% 21,261,440 4.27
1974 1,203 102,030 85 5,247,430 51 2,923,500 95% 14,475,360 4.95
1975 1,181 62,130 53 3,077,000 50 4,376,490 94% 27,282,290 6.23
1976 1,096 103,650 95 4,647,840 45 4,765,160 95% 29,788, 890 6.25
1977 1,959 169,860 87 5,014,830 30 3,273,806 91% 22,385,618 6.84
1978 1,620 86,684 54 3,601,018 4 1,972,530 95% 18,749,520 9.51
1979 1,224 57,070 47 2,086,880 37 2,307,704 87% 26,395,249 11.44
1980 1,478 74,233 50 2,656,850 36 2,870,635 94% 39,476,683 13.75
1981 1,569 67,860 43 3,044,772 45 2,471,264 96% 38,599,593 15.62
1982 1,463 84,701 58 2,572,991 30 3,656,297 97% 67,797,895 18.54
1983 1,259 100,859 80 3,786,320 38 2,141,583 86% 51,319,040 23.96
1984 1,000 101,286 101 2,487,687 25 1,858,407 97% 53,518,671 28.80
1985 789 54,922 70 1,917,150 35 3,412,687 98% 185,893,448 54.47
1986 1,463 67,739 46 3,500,140 52 3,398,491 97% 266,587,369 78.44
1987 1,670 69,477 42 3,504,521 50 3,031,477 94% 257,466,415 84.93
1988 1,577 74,763 47 3,231,122 43 3,314,679 94% 403,922,001 121.86
1989 1,595 72,090 45 3,533,213 49References
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